M. v. Raimondo , 784 F.3d 825 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1585
DANNY B., BY NEXT FRIEND GREGORY C. ELLIOTT, and
CASSIE M., BY NEXT FRIEND KYMBERLI IRONS,
FOR THEMSELVES AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
GINA M. RAIMONDO,* IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Lincoln D. Almond, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Souter,** Associate Justice,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
William Kapell, with whom Ira Lustbader, Children's Rights,
John W. Dineen, Jared Bobrow, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP were
on brief, for appellants.
Neil F.X. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Peter
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Governor Gina M.
Raimondo has been substituted for former Governor Lincoln D. Chafee
as the lead defendant-appellee.
**
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, and Brenda D. Baum, Assistant
Attorney General, were on brief, for appellees.
April 21, 2015
SELYA, Circuit Judge. The management of complex
litigation presents challenges that test the mettle of even the
most able trial judge. Given the rigors of this task, we have
ceded substantial discretion to the district courts with respect to
case management decisions. But that discretion, though wide, is
not boundless.
In the case at hand, two case management orders crossed
this line: an order that totally denied plaintiffs' counsel access
to their own clients and an order that prevented the plaintiffs
from seeking plainly relevant discovery. Accordingly, we vacate
the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The background facts are set out in exegetic detail in a
prior opinion of this court and in the opinion of the court below.
See Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.
2010); Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee (Cassie III), 16 F. Supp.
3d 33 (D.R.I. 2014). We assume the reader's familiarity with those
narratives and rehearse here only the events that bear directly on
the issues sub judice.
This putative class action was brought on behalf of ten
foster children in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of
Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). Because the plaintiffs were
minors, the initiators of the suit sought to appear as their next
friends under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17.
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The complaint designated as defendants, in their official
capacities, a coterie of state officials (collectively, the State).
It sought certification of a class of all minor children who were
in (or might enter) DCYF custody based on a report or suspicion of
abuse or neglect. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint prayed
for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the named
plaintiffs and the putative class.
The gravamen of the complaint was the allegation that
DCYF's failings expose foster children in its custody to an
unreasonable risk of harm in violation of their substantive due
process rights. Relatedly, the complaint averred that the State
had failed to comply in various respects with the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628,
670-679a.
The State moved to dismiss the complaint, and the
district court obliged. The court's principal rationale was that
the proposed next friends did not satisfy Rule 17's requirements.1
See Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 610 F. Supp. 2d 171, 181-84
(D.R.I. 2009). On appeal, we deemed it fitting that foster
children be afforded access to a federal forum to seek redress
against their custodian. See Sam M., 608 F.3d at 91-92. After
evaluating the qualifications of the proposed next friends, we
1
In addition, the court dismissed the claims of three
plaintiffs as moot.
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concluded that they were suitable representatives. See id. at 92-
94.
On remand, the case was transferred to a different trier.
See D.R.I. R. 105(b). The State again moved to dismiss, this time
invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although the
district court dismissed as moot the claims of five more
plaintiffs, it allowed the case to proceed. See Sam M. ex rel.
Elliott v. Chafee, 800 F. Supp. 2d 363, 389 (D.R.I. 2011). The
court then invited the parties to submit updated briefing on the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification (which had been filed
with the complaint). Later, however, the court advised the parties
that it would not address class certification until it had decided
dispositive motions on the individual claims.
Concerned about the ravages of mootness, the district
court allowed the filing of an amended complaint adding five new
plaintiffs. The court then denied without prejudice the motion for
class certification.
Pretrial discovery frequently proved contentious, taxing
the patience of the district judge and the magistrate judge.
Although their efforts bordered on the heroic, we eschew a blow-by-
blow account and, instead, fast-forward through seven months of
discovery to October 23, 2012. On that date — with an array of
unfulfilled discovery requests and motions to compel pending — the
State moved for a protective order aimed at limiting the scope of
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discovery. Its principal thesis was that the plaintiffs were
entitled only to information pertaining directly to the named
plaintiffs. For example, it objected to many of the plaintiffs'
discovery requests on the ground that the information sought went
beyond the case files of the individual plaintiffs and, therefore,
was not relevant.
The district judge referred the motion to the magistrate
judge, who allowed the protective order in part. See Cassie M. ex
rel. Irons v. Chafee (Cassie I), No. 07-241, slip op. at 3 (D.R.I.
Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished). His rescript explained that, in
light of the district judge's plan to address the claims of the
individual plaintiffs on summary judgment before addressing class
certification, discovery should be limited to information bearing
upon those claims. See id. at 2. No separate order was entered
delineating the modified scope of discovery, but the magistrate
judge directed the parties to confer in an attempt to narrow their
disputes in light of his decision. As a result, the plaintiffs
provisionally withdrew portions of their motions to compel.
The plaintiffs appealed the protective order to the
district judge, who upheld it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
Thereafter, the magistrate judge ruled on a number of lingering
discovery issues. His decision confirmed that the protective order
"effectively precluded [the plaintiffs] from seeking policy or
practice discovery." Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee (Cassie
-6-
II), No. 07-241, 2013 WL 785621, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 1, 2013). This
depiction was consistent with the way in which the plaintiffs had
characterized the protective order in their appeal to the district
judge.
Another development transpired while the parties were
sparring over the scope of discovery. On February 26, 2013, the
plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. They
argued that the district judge's reluctance to decide the class
certification issue was causing substantial prejudice because the
claims of ten plaintiffs already had become moot and several more
plaintiffs would soon age out of DCYF custody. Following
procedural skirmishing not relevant here, the district judge again
declined to address class certification and allowed the State to
delay a response to the class certification motion until fourteen
days after any summary judgment decision.
On July 24, 2013, the district judge performed an about-
face. At a status conference, the judge voiced concerns about how
long it was taking to bring the case to a head. She suggested that
the most efficient course of action would be to dispense with
dispositive motions and proceed directly to trial. Acting on her
own suggestion, the judge declared that she would set the case for
trial on the individual claims without awaiting summary judgment
motions.
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The plaintiffs objected and moved for various kinds of
relief. Pertinently, they implored the district judge to postpone
any trial, take up the issue of class certification, and reopen
discovery so that they could obtain the policy and custom evidence
that had been foreclosed by the protective order. The judge
rejected these importunings. Citing the fact that the plaintiffs
had been able to depose certain DCYF policymakers, she stated that
she "believe[d] that the Plaintiffs had an opportunity and have
received evidence and discovery on the question of [DCYF's]
policies, procedures, [and] customs." In regard to her
unwillingness to address class certification, the judge noted that
the plaintiffs were required to prove that their constitutional and
statutory rights were being violated and reasoned that such a
determination could more expeditiously be made in the context of
their individual claims before allowing class-wide discovery.
With an unwanted trial looming, plaintiffs' counsel asked
the State to facilitate meetings with their clients. The State
demurred, making plain that it would not provide any contact
information without a court order. On August 29, 2013, the
plaintiffs moved to compel the State to allow plaintiffs' counsel
and the next friends to meet with the plaintiffs for purposes of
trial preparation.2 The State objected.
2
Plaintiffs' counsel previously had requested contact
information for the plaintiffs' caregivers during discovery. The
State stonewalled, arguing that the plaintiffs were "not 'clients'
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At the ensuing hearing, the district judge stated that
she viewed the motion for access as a veiled attempt to obtain fact
discovery beyond the discovery deadline. When the judge asked
whether the named plaintiffs would be called as witnesses, counsel
replied that they could not make that determination without meeting
with their clients. The judge proceeded to deny the motion,
effectively preventing plaintiffs' counsel from speaking with their
clients in advance of trial.
By the time that the trial commenced on November 12,
2013, the claims of all but two of the named plaintiffs (Danny B.
and Cassie M.) had been rendered moot through aging or adoption.
When the plaintiffs rested, the State moved for judgment on partial
findings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). The district judge took the
matter under advisement and, after receiving post-trial briefing,
concluded that the plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence
to establish that DCYF's policies and customs had either harmed
them or exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Cassie
III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 79. The judge likewise concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof with respect
in the typical attorney client relationship," and that meetings
with counsel could result in disruption and harm to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs moved to compel reasonable access to their attorneys and
next friends, but (for reasons that are not apparent from the
record) they withdrew the motion before any judicial officer
addressed it.
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to their statutory causes of action. See id. at 80. Judgment
entered, and this timely appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs advance a compendium of claims of error.
Two of these claims, which relate to pretrial proceedings, are
front and center: that the district court (i) prevented the
plaintiffs without sufficient reason from meeting with their
lawyers and (ii) improvidently pretermitted discovery relating to
DCYF's policies and customs. Because we conclude that the district
court abused its discretion both when it denied plaintiffs' counsel
access to their clients and when it refused to allow discovery
essential to the plaintiffs' claims, we are constrained to vacate
the judgment. The tale follows.
A. Access to Counsel.
The plaintiffs submit that the district court abused its
discretion when it refused to allow their lawyers to meet with
them.3 We have not yet had occasion to consider the standard of
review applicable to decisions anent a minor's access to her
3
The plaintiffs' claim also extends to the denial of their
next friends' request for access. This denial has some independent
significance: next friends serve the important role of ensuring
that minor plaintiffs are afforded entry to the federal courts in
pursuit of their rights. See Sam M., 608 F.3d at 91-92; Gaddis v.
United States, 381 F.3d 444, 453-54 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Here, however, the district court's refusal to allow the next
friends access to the plaintiffs was intertwined with its refusal
to allow the plaintiffs' lawyers to meet with their clients.
Consequently, we use a shorthand and refer throughout only to
counsel's denied access.
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lawyers. Nor do we need to cross that bridge today: the parties
agree that we should review this decision for abuse of discretion,
and we accept that agreement. See United States v. Ramirez-Rivera,
241 F.3d 37, 40 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2001); cf. Borden v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
federal court sitting in diversity may accept parties' reasonable
agreement concerning choice of law).
The district court is responsible for safeguarding the
interests of those minors who appear as litigants before it. See
Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974). The situation is
complicated where, as here, the minors are foster children who are
suing the State. As we previously noted, the State has a
structural conflict of interest when it comes to decisions
concerning the legal representation of such plaintiffs. See Sam
M., 608 F.3d at 88 n.12. This conflict is exacerbated because
plaintiffs' counsel cannot even gain access to their own clients
without the State's cooperation.
The claim of error here tests the way in which the
district court handled this conflict. A fundamental principle
guides our analysis. Civil litigants have a constitutional right,
rooted in the Due Process Clause, to retain the services of
counsel. See Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257
(1st Cir. 1986); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d
1101, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1980). This right safeguards a litigant's
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interest in communicating freely with counsel both in preparation
for and during trial. See Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d
1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1118-19.
After all, the right to retain counsel would be drained of meaning
if a litigant could not speak openly with her lawyer about her case
and how best to prosecute it. See Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944,
954 (7th Cir. 2000); Doe, 697 F.2d at 1119. While this right is
not absolute — courts surely can insist upon reasonable rules of
practice that affect the lawyer-client relationship — a court must
give great weight to this valued interest even in areas committed
to its discretion. See, e.g., Doe, 697 F.3d at 1119-20 (requiring
protective order limiting counsel's discussion of discovery
materials with client to be narrowly drawn); Potashnick, 609 F.2d
at 1119 (reversing judgment where court unreasonably barred
attorney from speaking to client during breaks in testimony).
Resolving this appeal does not require us to explore all
of the circumstances that might justify limiting communications
between a minor plaintiff and her lawyer. Suffice it to say that
a court may not restrain a litigant's access to counsel without
some substantial justification, and any such restraint should be
narrowly tailored to respond to the concern that prompted it. See
Doe, 697 F.2d at 1120; In re Ti.B., 762 A.2d 20, 29-30 (D.C. 2000);
cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981) (discussing
restrictions on communications with potential class members, and
-12-
requiring that such orders be "carefully drawn" and "limit[] speech
as little as possible"). An order that effectively precludes any
pretrial communication between a minor and her attorney must
satisfy these criteria.
No substantial justification is apparent here. The
record reveals no indication that the court below accorded any
weight to the plaintiffs' interest in communicating with counsel.
Goaded by the State, the court seemed to assume that the next
friends' access to counsel was a sufficient substitute for the
plaintiffs' access, reasoning that for purposes "of trial strategy
sessions, that's what the next friends are for." But this
reasoning does not hold water: even if a next friend's access to
counsel sometimes may assuage due process concerns, that would not
be true when, as in this case, the next friend was also denied
access to the client.
The district court gave two other reasons in support of
its preclusive ruling. First, the court posited that the motion
for access was untimely because it was filed after the close of
discovery. This assumed, of course, that the purpose of the
requested meetings was to obtain discoverable information. But
that assumption was not grounded in anything that plaintiffs'
counsel said or wrote. Rather, plaintiffs' counsel advised the
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court that the purpose of the proposed meetings was to prepare for
trial and to determine whether their clients wished to testify.4
At any rate, the plaintiffs' interest in speaking with
their counsel plainly persisted beyond the close of discovery.
Even though there was a legitimate concern that counsel might
obtain and attempt to introduce new information in derogation of
the discovery deadline, the district court had the ability to
prevent the use of such new information without resorting to a
total denial of access. There is no need to use an elephant gun to
slay a mouse, and the court could have allowed the meetings to
proceed and simply excluded any newly discovered matter if and when
the plaintiffs attempted to use it at trial. See, e.g., Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(f); 37(b)(2)(A)(ii).
The district court's second rationale relates to its
allowance of a motion by plaintiffs' counsel to have their chosen
psychologist interview the plaintiffs in advance of trial. The
court theorized that since it was allowing the psychologist to
examine the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel would have the benefit
of the psychologist's report and would have no need to meet
personally with their clients. We do not agree.
4
In the context of the case as it stood, that approach made
sense. Cassie, for example, turned 17 during the course of the
trial. The district court was silent as to why she should not have
been permitted to choose whether to testify to her own behoof.
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The psychological examinations served an entirely
different purpose than the requested attorney-client meetings.
Those examinations did not provide counsel an opportunity to
explain the litigation, determine how the children would fit into
a trial strategy, or ascertain the desirability of having them
testify. If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — the
psychological examinations were videotaped and by court order
delivered to opposing counsel. Manifestly, then, any privileged
communication was impossible. That the court allowed the
psychological examinations to go forward was irrelevant to whether
the State was justified in blocking the lawyers' access to their
clients.
In an effort to catch lightning in a bottle, the State
tries to justify the denial of access on the ground that attorney-
client meetings might not have been in the plaintiffs' best
interests. But this is pie in the sky; the State offered no
evidence that the plaintiffs might suffer any harm from such
meetings.5 Dancing around this point, the State says (without
meaningful citation to the record) that the district court denied
access, at least in part, out of such a concern. But the district
5
The State suggests that an incident that occurred during
Danny's psychological evaluation buttresses its claim of potential
harm. But that incident took place after plaintiffs' counsel
unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to their clients and has no
bearing on whether the requested attorney-client meetings posed any
risk of harm to the plaintiffs.
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judge, who ably articulated her views at every stage of this
complex case, neither expressed any such concern nor made any
finding that harm was likely to ensue should the lawyers meet with
their clients.6 Consequently, we decline the State's self-serving
invitation to impute this reasoning to the court below.
The short of the matter is that the denial of access
rests on insupportable findings, which are not strengthened by the
State's conjectural hypotheses. There is simply not enough here to
justify the total denial of a litigant's right to consult with her
lawyer. Cf. Sam M., 608 F.3d at 88 n.12 (disapproving State's
attempt to oppose appointment of next friends based on "a general
assertion" that other relatives might be suitable representatives).
Let us be perfectly clear. We do not hold that a
district court may never place limits on communications between
foster children and their lawyers. In this realm, as in others,
the court may make orders that are necessary and appropriate to
protect the child's interests. See, e.g., Neilson v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 652 (2d Cir. 1999); Dacanay v.
Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1978). Withal, the
limitations imposed by any such order must be no broader than
necessary to protect the child. See Doe, 697 F.2d at 1120-21;
6
The district judge, while allowing the psychological
evaluations to proceed, did worry that those examinations might be
detrimental to the plaintiffs. But that concern cannot be
transplanted root and branch to the different question of access to
counsel.
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Ti.B., 762 A.2d at 29-30. Viewed through this prism, the total
denial of access imposed here cannot withstand scrutiny. We hold,
therefore, that the court below abused its discretion when it
completely denied the plaintiffs access to their lawyers prior to
trial.
This holding leaves only the question of prejudice — and
prejudice is manifest. Apart from a dubious suggestion that
plaintiffs' retained psychologist was able to testify about topics
that attorney-client meetings might have covered, the State has
made no serious attempt to explain how the total denial of access
to counsel could be harmless.
The right to counsel is a right of the highest order of
importance, and keeping a lawyer from meeting with his client
before going to trial frustrates that right. Where, as here, a
restraint of that magnitude is imposed without substantial
justification, we think that prejudice can fairly be presumed. Cf.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984) (identifying
situations implicating the right to counsel where the circumstances
"are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating
their effect in a particular case is unjustified"). It follows
that the judgment below must be vacated. See Doe, 697 F.2d at
1121.
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B. Protective Order.
Although the judgment below must be vacated, see supra
Part II(A), the prospect of further proceedings counsels in favor
of resolving the plaintiffs' contention that the district court
erred when it barred discovery of DCYF's policies and customs.7 We
start with first principles: district courts must be afforded wide
latitude in the management of discovery, and appellate review of
such matters is correspondingly deferential. We will disturb a
district court's discovery ruling "only upon a clear showing of
manifest injustice, that is, where the . . . order was plainly
wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice." Mack v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989). Though this
sets a high bar, an order limiting the scope of discovery may
constitute reversible error when it is sufficiently prejudicial and
based upon an incorrect legal standard or a misapplication of law
to fact. See Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 122 (1st Cir. 2010);
Saldana-Sanchez v. Lopez-Gerena, 256 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001).
In the case at hand, the plaintiffs seek to impose
liability upon official-capacity state defendants under section
1983. As such, their suit is the functional equivalent of a suit
against the sovereign. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
7
The parties and the court below appear to use the terms
"policies and customs," "policies, practices, and customs," and
"policies and practices" interchangeably. For ease in exposition,
we refer throughout to policy and custom discovery.
-18-
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In such a suit, it is black letter law
that the plaintiffs must prove that a policy or custom of the State
contributed to the alleged violations of federal law in order to
prevail. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Burrell v.
Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). Here, moreover,
the plaintiffs seek forward-looking injunctive relief rather than
damages; thus, their flagship substantive due process claim turns
primarily on whether DCYF's policies and customs subject them to an
unconstitutional risk of future harm. See DG ex rel. Stricklin v.
Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (explaining that injunction
may issue to remedy constitutional violation without waiting for
manifested harm).
Against this backdrop, we examine the protective order.
The lack of a separate document embodying the terms of the
protective order hampers this examination. We work with what we
have.
The magistrate judge made his ruling in a written
rescript. See Cassie I, slip op. at 1-3. This rescript described
the protective order as limiting discovery to "nonprivileged
information that is relevant to the substantive claims of the
individual" plaintiffs. Id. at 2. The plaintiffs appealed the
protective order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), plausibly
characterizing it as a complete bar to policy and custom discovery.
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This characterization was consistent with the arguments that the
State had made to the magistrate judge. When asked to describe its
vision of how discovery should unfold, the State explained:
Now, you speak to policies, practices and
potentially customs that may have impacted the
children. We believe that [the plaintiffs]
need to be able to show that there's been some
harm to these individual children in the first
instance before you move on to the broader
picture of what other policies, practices and
procedures may be implicated.
Similarly, the State's supporting memorandum argued "that the
requested discovery relating to the policies, patterns or practices
. . . is irrelevant to the determination of [the plaintiffs']
substantive claims. The discovery concerning policies, patterns or
practices . . . should be reserved until after [the plaintiffs']
individual substantive claims are addressed." In sum, the State
drew a sharp distinction between discovery pertaining to harm to
the individual plaintiffs (which it argued should be allowed) and
policy and custom discovery (which it argued should not be
allowed).
The district judge upheld the proscription. She
concluded that the protective order was in line with her decision
to resolve the individual claims before addressing class
certification and, thus, was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary
to law.
In a subsequent ruling, the magistrate judge confirmed
that the plaintiffs had correctly apprehended the scope of the
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protective order. He made pellucid that the protective order
"effectively precluded [the plaintiffs] from seeking policy or
practice discovery." Cassie II, 2013 WL 785621, at *2. The
magistrate judge's straightforward characterization of his own
order dissolved any possible ambiguity concerning the scope of
permissible discovery. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st
Cir. 1987) (explaining that "uncertainty as to the meaning and
intendment of a district court order can sometimes best be
dispelled by deference to the views of the writing judge"). Thus,
the protective order foreclosed the plaintiffs from seeking plainly
relevant discovery.
This was an abuse of discretion: a district court may not
impose discovery restrictions that preclude a suitor from the
legitimate pursuit of evidence supporting her cause of action. See
Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559-60 (11th
Cir. 1985) (finding abuse of discretion when court limited
discovery to single issue though other issues were relevant);
Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1983)
(vacating protective order that barred highly relevant discovery
based on court's misapprehension of nature of plaintiff's claims).
Nor can it be doubted that the denial of discovery was prejudicial.
The protective order forced the plaintiffs to attempt to prove
their substantive claims without essential evidence. Given the
applicable legal standard, their attempt was destined to fail.
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That is exactly what happened: the district judge
dismissed the substantive due process claim because she concluded
that "[t]here was . . . no evidence to establish that DCYF's
current policies and practices — or any deliberate disregard of
such policies and practices — resulted in harm to the [plaintiffs]
or that the [plaintiffs] were subjected to unreasonable risk while
in DCYF's care." Cassie III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 79. It is,
therefore, nose-on-the-face plain that the adverse decision at
trial rested in substantial part on the plaintiffs' failure to
adduce precisely the sort of evidence that the protective order
prevented them from discovering.
The State offers an interleaved series of arguments in an
attempt to shore up the protective order. These arguments are
unpersuasive.
The State begins with a suggestion that any failure to
obtain policy and custom evidence is the plaintiffs' fault. It
maintains that the magistrate judge's decision left the door open
for policy and custom discovery, and the plaintiffs — had they
elected to do so — could have walked through that portal. The
State reaches this hopeful conclusion, however, by selectively
parsing the record.
The State's argument emphasizes a statement in the
magistrate judge's December 17, 2012 rescript to the effect that "a
reasonable range of discovery focused on the [plaintiffs] and the
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various 'system failures' [they have] alleged" would be permitted.
Cassie I, slip op. at 3. This language arguably gave rise to a
latent ambiguity about the availability of custom and policy
discovery. But any ambiguity created by this language was
dispelled by how the parties treated the protective order and by
the magistrate judge's clarification. See Cassie II, 2013 WL
785621, at *2 (vouchsafing that the protective order "effectively
precluded [the plaintiffs] from seeking policy or practice
discovery"). The State's optimistic reading of the protective
order simply cannot be reconciled with either the parties' actions
or the magistrate judge's construction of his own ruling.
In a related vein, the State asserts that it produced
ample policy and custom evidence during discovery and that the
plaintiffs actually submitted some policy and custom evidence at
trial. Building on this foundation, the State further asserts that
the protective order worked no prejudice.
There is a grain of truth to these assertions. After
all, the plaintiffs did introduce some policy and custom evidence
at trial. But there is no way to tell either how much policy and
custom evidence somehow came to the plaintiffs' attention or —
perhaps more important — how much policy and custom evidence was
withheld during discovery. The State has not identified any
practical method for allowing us to explore that void, and there is
no carefully drawn protective order upon which we can rely. The
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only thing about which we can be certain is that policy and custom
discovery was completely off limits after the magistrate judge
issued the protective order.8
Finally, the State exhorts us to affirm the protective
order on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to specify what
policy and custom information they were seeking when they moved to
reopen discovery prior to trial. Its exhortation invokes our
admonition, made in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(d), that a party seeking additional discovery must "articulate[]
a plausible basis for the . . . belief that previously undisclosed
or undocumented facts exist, that those facts can be secured by
further discovery, and that, if obtained, there is some credible
prospect that the new evidence will create a trialworthy issue."
Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26,
44 (1st Cir. 1998). But there was no Rule 56(d) motion here —
indeed, the district judge directed the parties to forgo summary
judgment practice — and the comparison that the State seeks to make
is apples to oranges.
8
The record does not support the district judge's intimation
that the plaintiffs were given an adequate opportunity to obtain
policy and custom evidence. Although the plaintiffs were allowed
to depose certain DCYF policymakers, there is no showing that they
actually received any meaningful policy or custom evidence by means
of those depositions. That some depositions were taken says
nothing about the interplay between the protective order and
ongoing deposition practice.
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Unlike a typical Rule 56(d) motion, the plaintiffs'
motion involved discovery that previously had been denied by court
order. A party whose timely discovery request has been denied
cannot reasonably be expected to describe precisely the information
responsive to that request that may have been withheld from her.
It follows that, in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs'
motion seeking to reopen discovery was sufficient.
We add a caveat. Our opinion should not be read to
suggest that the plaintiffs are entitled to the full range of
policy and custom discovery that they sought in the district court.
Both the magistrate judge and the district judge expressed
legitimate concerns about the breadth of the plaintiffs' discovery
requests and the State's plaint that complying with those requests
could prove unduly burdensome. But a categorical preclusion of all
policy and custom discovery was an over-the-top response to those
concerns. On remand, the district court, in its sound discretion,
may balance competing considerations of relevance and
burdensomeness, and place reasonable limits on the scope of the
remaining discovery. See, e.g., Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing
Ass'n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 402-03 (1st Cir. 2005).
C. Class Certification.
Throughout the proceedings below, the plaintiffs
beseeched the district court to certify a plaintiff class sooner
rather than later. The district court, for reasons of judicial
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economy, initially delayed consideration of class certification
pending resolution of anticipated motions for summary judgment.
But the court then shifted gears: it scrapped any thought of
dispositive motions and declared that it would not rule on class
certification until after trial. When it later ruled for the State
midway through trial, class certification became a dead letter.
The plaintiffs argue that the district court's handling
of this issue constituted an abuse of discretion. They submit that
the court should have addressed class certification early in the
proceedings; that the specter of mootness (through the collateral
effects of aging and adoption) made time of the essence; and that,
in all events, it was inappropriate to defer a ruling on class
certification until after trial on the merits.
Because this case must be remanded for further
proceedings, we do not decide the class certification issue. We
do, however, offer some general guidance to the district court.
The length of time that a case is pending is not the sole
determinant of when a class certification decision should be made.
The Civil Rules speak of the need to address class certification at
"an early practicable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). The
word "practicable" imports some leeway in determining the timing of
such a decision. See Howe v. Townsend (In re Pharm. Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig.), 588 F.3d 24, 40 (1st Cir. 2009)
(explaining that Rule 23(c)(1)(A) gives a court "flexibility to
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wait to certify the class until the court feels it understands the
case and the issues it raises"); Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541,
543 (9th Cir. 1984) (similar).
Class certification decisions are context-specific, and
each case must be viewed in terms of its own facts. As a general
matter, however, Rule 23 permits a district court, in appropriate
circumstances, to defer the issue of class certification until
after disposing of summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Toben v.
Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC, 751 F.3d 888, 896 (8th Cir.
2014); Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir.
1995); Wright, 742 F.2d at 543-44. In such a situation,
consideration of summary judgment motions is likely to furnish the
court the information that it needs to "understand[] the case and
the issues it raises." Pharm. Indus., 588 F.3d at 40.
Notwithstanding this flexibility, we are aware of no
precedent authorizing a district court, over objection, to conduct
a full-blown trial on the merits without pausing to take up a
timely motion for class certification. The reason for this lack of
precedent seems obvious: at best, trying the individual claims
first may prove inefficient; at worst, doing so may create
substantial prejudice. See Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d
552, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1982); Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
628 F.2d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Rodriguez v. Banco
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Cent., 790 F.2d 172, 175 (1st Cir. 1986). The bottom line is that
staging a case in this manner puts the cart before the mule.
With these considerations in mind, we counsel the
district court that, upon completion of discovery in this case, the
parties should be given an opportunity to file dispositive motions.
If the case survives summary judgment with the class certification
issue still velivolant, the court should decide the motion for
class certification.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. The district judge and the
magistrate judge, as well as the parties, have labored long and
hard over this case, and we are reluctant to push the reset button.
But fairness is (and must be) the hallmark of federal-court
litigation, and the essence of fairness is the provision of a level
playing field. Here, however, the two errors that we have
discussed — the total denial of counsel's access to their clients
and the imposition of an overly broad protective order —
impermissibly tilted the playing field. Consequently, we must
vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs are to be taxed in favor of
the plaintiffs.
Vacated and Remanded.
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