United States v. Szpyt , 785 F.3d 31 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1543
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
RICHARD W. SZPYT, a/k/a Zip;
RAMÓN DELLOSANTOS, a/k/a José Ramón, a/k/a Monstrito,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Howard, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellant.
Caleigh Shea Milton, with whom Leonard I. Sharon, were on
brief, for appellee Szpyt.
James S. Hewes, for appellee Dellosantos.
April 3, 2015
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Appellant, the United States,
appeals the district court's order dismissing an indictment against
Appellees Richard Szpyt and Ramón Dellosantos (collectively,
"Appellees" or "Defendants") as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Specifically, the United
States contends that the current indictment alleges a factually
distinct and separate conspiracy from an earlier, related
indictment and conviction which this court vacated due to a
material variance. Appellees, meanwhile, contend that the
dismissal was proper because their first convictions were vacated
due to the insufficiency of the evidence and the current indictment
is merely charging a subset of the broader conspiracy they were
acquitted of. After careful consideration, we agree with the
government and reverse.
I. Background1
On October 22, 2008, the government returned an
indictment charging Szpyt, Dellosantos, and sixteen others (the
"First Indictment"). According to the First Indictment:
Beginning on a date unknown, but not later
than 2004 and continuing until a date unknown,
but no earlier than December 2007, in the
District of Maine and elsewhere, Defendants
. . . knowingly and intentionally conspired
with one another and with others known and
unknown to the Grand Jury to commit offenses
against the United States, namely,
1
Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is taken
from United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2011).
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distribution and possession with intent to
distribute controlled substances, including 5
kilograms or more of cocaine, and marijuana,
and did aid and abet such conduct.
At trial, the government presented evidence from a number
of witnesses, including several cooperating witnesses. The
evidence showed that from 2004 to 2007 (until their arrest), Szpyt
and Dellosantos, both residents of Massachusetts, sold cocaine
which they received solely from Plino Vizcaíno, a Massachusetts-
based drug distributor. Specifically, Dellosantos would purchase
cocaine from Vizcaíno and later sell some of that cocaine to Szpyt.
Szpyt, after purchasing cocaine from Dellosantos, would
sometimes sell it from his Massachusetts home to his Maine
customers and, other times, deliver it directly to his Maine
customers. Both Szpyt and many of his Maine customers were members
of the "Iron Horsemen" motorcycle gang. Not only was Szpyt
formerly the president of the Maine chapter of the Iron Horsemen,
but he was also the owner of the gang's Maine clubhouse.
During this same time frame, one of Szpyt's fellow gang
members and cocaine customers, Robert Sanborn, also sold cocaine to
motorcycle gangs in Maine. He obtained his cocaine primarily, but
not exclusively, from Szpyt. In addition to selling cocaine,
Sanborn also sold marijuana to customers in Maine, starting some-
time in 2005 and ending in either late 2007 or early 2008,
following his arrest. Sanborn obtained his marijuana from sources
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unaffiliated with Szpyt and Dellosantos.2 Sanborn did, however,
sometimes use the proceeds from his marijuana sales to buy cocaine
from Szpyt.
Twice during the trial, both Szpyt and Dellosantos moved
for judgments of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure: once at the close of the government's case
and once at the close of their own cases. The district court
denied the motions. Subsequently, on May 13, 2009, Szpyt and
Dellosantos, along with one other defendant,3 were found guilty of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
cocaine and marijuana. In addition, the jury found Szpyt guilty of
using a communication facility to facilitate the commission of the
charged conspiracy.
On appeal, Appellees asserted that "the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support their convictions."
In a 2-1 decision, we reversed, finding that
there was insufficient evidence to support the
finding of a single conspiracy. Rather, the
evidence pointed to at least two distinct
conspiracies: (1) the Massachusetts-based
Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to
2
At trial, Sanborn identified his marijuana sources as Carl
Demarco, Lee Chase, Danny Boivin, and Sherwood Jordan. There was
"no evidence that Sanborn consulted with or received approval from
Szpyt when he started to distribute marijuana, or at any point
thereafter," and no evidence that "directly implicate[d]
Dellosantos in any illegal [marijuana] activity."
3
The other fifteen co-conspirators all pleaded guilty prior to
trial.
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distribute cocaine, and (2) the Maine-based
Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute both
cocaine and marijuana.
Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 119. In coming to this conclusion, we
were
[m]indful of this variance, [and found] that
the Defendants' convictions cannot stand for
two reasons. First, we f[ou]nd that the
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict
that either Szpyt or Dellosantos knowingly and
voluntarily joined the Sanborn-centered
conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and
marijuana. Second, assuming without deciding
that the evidence was sufficient to permit a
jury to find the Defendants guilty of joining
the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, we f[ou]nd that the
Defendants would be unfairly prejudiced by the
difference between the conspiracy specified in
the indictment and the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-
Szpyt conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Id. at 121.
After opining on why the evidence was insufficient to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellees joined the
Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and
marijuana, we then turned to "whether the Defendants' convictions
c[ould] nonetheless stand based on a finding that the Defendants
joined the other conspiracy proven by the United States, i.e., the
Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to distribute cocaine." Id.
at 124. Looking at this conspiracy, we concluded that "the
evidence was arguably sufficient to support a finding that the
Defendants joined the other conspiracy proven by the government."
Id. We added that "because the statutory violation for joining the
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Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy remain[ed] the same as that
alleged in the indictment, the jury, under a proper set of
instructions, could arguably have convicted the Defendants of
participating in the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy so long
as the difference between the conspiracy specified in the
indictment and the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy 'd[id] not
cause unfair prejudice.'" Id.
Despite the sufficiency of the evidence on the Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only conspiracy, though, we found that
the convictions could not stand. We held that "the difference
between the conspiracy specified in the indictment and the
Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy unfairly prejudiced the
Defendants," id. at 125, because
under the guise of its single conspiracy
theory, the government subjected the
Defendants to voluminous testimony relating to
unconnected crimes in which they took no part.
This situation created a pervasive risk of
"evidentiary spillover," where the jury might
have unfairly transferred to the Defendants
the guilt relating to the other sixteen
indicted individuals.
Id. In conclusion, we crystallized our holding:
The evidence established at least two
conspiracies, (1) the Sanborn-centered
conspiracy, and (2) the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-
Szpyt conspiracy. With regards to the first
conspiracy (i.e., the Sanborn-centered
conspiracy), the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that the Defendants joined
the same. In addition, although the evidence
was arguably sufficient to support a finding
that the Defendants joined the second
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conspiracy proven (i.e., the Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy), we find that
the variance between the conspiracy specified
in the indictment and the Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy unfairly
prejudiced the Defendants.
Id. at 125-26. As a result, the court "vacate[d] both Dellosantos'
and Szpyt's convictions." Id. at 126.
Following the vacatur, the district court entered a
judgment of acquittal. The government, meanwhile, obtained a new
indictment against Szpyt and Dellosantos (the "Current
Indictment"). According to this indictment:
Beginning on a date unknown, but not later
than 2006 and continuing until a date unknown,
but no earlier than December 2007, in the
District of Maine and elsewhere, Defendants
. . . knowingly and intentionally conspired
with one another and with others known and
unknown to the Grand Jury to commit an offense
against the United States, namely,
distribution and possession with intent to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or
substance containing cocaine, and did aid and
abet such conduct.
In response to the Current Indictment, Szpyt and Dellosantos
separately filed motions to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. On
April 3, 2013, the district court granted the motions and dismissed
the Current Indictment. It reasoned that the two conspiracies
"amount to the same offense" because the time frame of the cocaine-
only conspiracy is "completely subsumed" in the time frame of the
cocaine-and-marijuana conspiracy, because there was a complete
overlap of personnel involved, and because the government would not
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present any new evidence in a second trial. As such, it deemed
that the Current Indictment charged a conspiracy that was simply a
"chapter[]" of the "Szpyt I novel."
On April 25, 2013, the government timely filed a notice
of appeal challenging the district court's dismissal of the Current
Indictment.
II. Discussion
A. Double Jeopardy
Because this is a question of constitutional law, we
review the district court's dismissal of the indictment on double
jeopardy grounds de novo. See United States v. García-Ortiz, 657
F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2011).
As a quick primer, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const.
amend. V. Thus, "once [a] reviewing court has found the evidence
legally insufficient," a second trial is "preclude[d]." Marshall
v. Bristol Superior Court, 753 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "It is a 'venerable principl[e] of double jeopardy
jurisprudence'" however, that "'[t]he successful appeal of a
judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no bar to further
prosecution on the same charge.'" Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400,
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402 (1987) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-81 (1978)). A
material variance falls into this latter category. Marshall, 753
F.3d at 18 ("[W]here reversal is based upon a variance between the
crime charged in the indictment and the crime proved at trial, the
Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial."); see also United
States v. Bobo, 419 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005) ("It has long
been accepted, for example, that retrial is not barred when a
defendant's conviction is vacated on appeal due to an insufficient
indictment . . . ."); Parker v. Norris, 64 F.3d 1178, 1181 (8th
Cir. 1995) ("It is clear that the Constitution permits retrial
after a conviction is reversed because of a defect in the charging
instrument." (quoting Hall, 481 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Any double jeopardy analysis essentially splinters into
three questions: (1) whether jeopardy ever attached; (2) whether
the first proceeding was a decision on the merits; and (3) whether
the subsequent proceeding involves the "same offense." See United
States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 2006). Only
questions two and three are implicated in this case. Here, the
parties dispute why Appellees' convictions were vacated in
Dellosantos, and whether that decision was, in fact, on the merits.
The government argues that our opinion in Dellosantos vacated
Appellees' convictions due to a material variance -- a procedural
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ground not subject to double jeopardy. See Hall, 481 U.S. at 402-
03; Marshall, 735 F.3d at 18. Appellees, meanwhile, argue that we
vacated their convictions due to insufficient evidence -- a
substantive ruling "relate[d] to the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence" and protected from retrial under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1075 (2013)
(quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 98 n.11) (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
571 (1977); Marshall, 753 F.3d at 18. A careful reading of
Dellosantos reveals that we did both.
In Dellosantos, we initially explained that while "the
indictment charged the Defendants with participation in a single
Maine-based conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute both cocaine and marijuana," 649 F.3d at 121, there was
"insufficient evidence to support the finding of a single
conspiracy," id. at 119. Rather, the evidence "established the
existence of at least two distinct conspiracies: (1) the
Massachusetts-based Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, and (2) the Maine-based Sanborn-centered
conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana." Id. at 121.
As such, because the charged conspiracy never existed, it was
necessary to analyze each of these distinct conspiracies to
evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
conviction, and, if so, whether the variance between the charged
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conspiracy and the conspiracy proven was prejudicial. Id. at 122,
124. The analysis for each conspiracy resulted in an independent
holding -- each with its own consequence and implication for future
proceedings.
Regarding the second conspiracy -- the Maine-based
Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and
marijuana -- we held that "the evidence was insufficient to support
a verdict that either Szpyt or Dellosantos knowingly and
voluntarily joined." Id. at 121. This was clearly a substantive
ruling that went to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
As a result, any attempt to re-indict Appellees on that conspiracy
would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g.,
Marshall, 753 F.3d at 18 ("It is black letter law that 'the Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court
has found the evidence legally insufficient.'" (quoting Burks, 437
U.S. at 18)); United States v. Meléndez-Rivas, 566 F.3d 41, 43 (1st
Cir. 2009) (explaining that if "the evidence was insufficient
. . . then the case ends and [defendant] may not be tried again").
But our analysis in Dellosantos did not end there.
Instead, we then "turn[ed] to whether the Defendants' convictions
can nonetheless stand based on a finding that the Defendants joined
the other conspiracy proven by the government, i.e., the Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to distribute cocaine." Dellosantos,
649 F.3d at 124. In analyzing this conspiracy, we held that
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"although the evidence was arguably sufficient to support a finding
that the Defendants joined the second conspiracy proven (i.e., the
Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy), . . . the variance between
the conspiracy specified in the indictment and the Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy unfairly prejudiced the Defendants."
Id. at 125-26. We explained that
under the guise of its single conspiracy
theory, the government subjected the
Defendants to voluminous testimony relating to
unconnected crimes in which they took no part.
This situation created a pervasive risk of
"evidentiary spillover," where the jury might
have unfairly transferred to the Defendants
the guilt relating to the other sixteen
indicted individuals.
Id. at 125.
Unlike our substantive holding regarding the Sanborn-
centered cocaine-and-marijuana conspiracy, our holding regarding
this Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only conspiracy was
procedural -- there was a problem with the initial indictment --
and had nothing to do with either the sufficiency of the evidence
or Appellees' guilt or innocence.4 Accordingly, the Double
4
Indeed, unlike the Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute
both cocaine and marijuana, the entire panel believed there was, at
least arguably, sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions on
this independent Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only
conspiracy. E.g., Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 124 ("[T]he jury, under
a proper set of instructions, could arguably have convicted the
Defendants of participating in the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt
conspiracy . . . ."); id. at 125 ("[T]he evidence was arguably
sufficient to support a finding that the Defendants joined the
second conspiracy proven (i.e., the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt
conspiracy) . . . ."); id. at 126 (Howard, J., concurring in part
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Jeopardy Clause "poses no bar to further prosecution" on it. Hall,
481 U.S. at 402 (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 90-91) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Marshall, 753 F.3d at 18 ("[W]here
reversal is based upon a variance between the crime charged in the
indictment and the crime proved at trial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is no bar to retrial."); see also United States v. Akpi, 26
F.3d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding no double jeopardy violation
where Appellant "took his first appeal to correct an error based on
a defective indictment" because the "defect in no way related to
the sufficiency of the evidence but only to the manner in which he
was charged" and the reversal "was on a most technical ground,
particularly when it is remembered that the government presented
ample evidence at trial"); Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599-
600 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he jury was allowed to convict
[Appellant] on a different set of facts than those set forth in the
information. . . . Consequently, we hold the modified jury
instruction constituted a constructive amendment of the information
which requires reversal. . . . [T]he case [is] remanded for a new
trial on that charge."). It is this Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt
cocaine-only conspiracy that is charged in the Current Indictment.
The district court's entry of an order of acquittal on
the First Indictment does not alter this conclusion. An acquittal
and dissenting in part) (finding that "[e]ven under [the
majority's] framework, there was sufficient evidence to convict
Szpyt" and possibly Dellosantos).
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"is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's actions," but
rather by "whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. at 571; see also United States v. Hosp. Monteflores,
Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 333 n.1 (1st Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed this principle, explaining that a "decision
turns not on the form of the trial court's action, but rather
whether it 'serve[s]' substantive 'purposes' or procedural ones."
Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1078 (alteration in original) (quoting Scott,
437 U.S. at 98 n.11). As an example, it observed that "[i]f a
trial court were to announce, mid-trial, 'The defendant shall be
acquitted because he was prejudiced by preindictment delay,' the
Double Jeopardy clause would pose no barrier to reprosecution,
notwithstanding the 'acquittal' label." Id. (emphasis added).
Though arising in a slightly different context, the same
principle applies here. Dellosantos held that: (1) there was no
Maine-Massachusetts overarching conspiracy to distribute both
cocaine and marijuana; (2) there was insufficient evidence to
convict on the Sanborn-centered marijuana and cocaine conspiracy;
and (3) though there was arguably enough evidence, it would
constitute a material variance to allow a conviction to stand on
the distinct Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only conspiracy.
Regarding this distinct Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only
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conspiracy, therefore, Defendants prevailed on a procedural issue;
the merits of this separate crime were never decided, and the
district court's use of the word "acquittal" does not change that
fact. It is clear to us that the entry of "acquittal" was intended
to be no different than had the government on remand moved to
dismiss without prejudice or to amend the indictment -- both of
which would not have been barred by the Double Jeopardy clause.5
As such, the Current Indictment does not constitute a
re-prosecution on the same crime and there is no double jeopardy
violation.
Still, despite the analyses and holdings in Dellosantos,
Appellees argue that the government is seeking to prove the "same
offense" in this subsequent proceeding. They argue that an
application of the "more nuanced form of the same evidence test" as
explained in United States v. Laguna-Estela, 394 F.3d 54, 57 (1st
Cir. 2005), and United States v. Hart, 933 F.3d 80, 85-86 (1st Cir.
1991), is required.6 That test, they say, necessitates a finding
5
This, of course, only applies to the distinct Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt cocaine-only conspiracy. Because we found in
Dellosantos that there was insufficient evidence to convict
Appellees on the Sanborn-centered cocaine-and-marijuana conspiracy,
the district court's entry of acquittal as applied to that
conspiracy was just that: an acquittal based on the merits. Thus,
had the government attempted to re-indict Appellees on the Sanborn-
centered conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana, the
entry of acquittal and the Double Jeopardy Clause would have barred
any further prosecution.
6
In those cases, we "identified five factors that must be
considered" in determining whether "two charged conspiracies that
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that the Current Indictment is just a subset of the overarching
conspiracy charged in the First Indictment, and that both
indictments charge Appellees for their participation in one single
conspiracy. However, Appellees seemingly overlook the fact that
Dellosantos explicitly rejected the argument that there existed
only one overarching conspiracy. On at least six different
occasions, we emphasized that this overarching conspiracy did not
exist, but rather that the "evidence established at least two
conspiracies" which were "distinct" and separate from each other.
See, e.g., Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125.
We explained that: "the two conspiracies had materially different
goals," id. at 119; that "the two conspiracies lacked sufficient
interdependence," id.; that "nothing was presented to the jury to
suggest that either [Appellee] believed that the success of their
cocaine distribution operation likely depended on Sanborn's
marijuana distribution venture," id.; that "the ventures [did not]
share the objective of serving a particular organization or boss,"
id.; that no "individual or group had an 'iron-fisted control' over
the two distribution schemes" but rather each scheme used different
allege violations of the same substantive statute are the same
offense for the purpose of double jeopardy." Laguna-Estela, 394
F.3d at 57. These include: (1) the time during which the
activities occurred; (2) the persons involved; (3) the places
involved; (4) whether the same evidence was used to prove the two
conspiracies; and (5) whether the same statutory provision was
involved in both conspiracies. Id.; see also Hart, 933 F.2d at 85-
86.
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suppliers, id.; and that "Sanborn was not the type of 'hub'
character that frequently exists in cases where this court has
found significant overlap and an overarching conspiracy," id. at
121.
In sum, we concluded that the "Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt
criminal conspiracy to distribute cocaine was a different criminal
enterprise than the [Sanborn-centered] marijuana enterprise, with
different products, a different source of supply, different goals,
and a different history." Id.; see also United States v.
Calderone, 982 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]e have held
conspiracies to be different where the facts of a smaller
conspiracy . . . such as time and geography, were wholly contained
within a larger conspiracy so long as there were sufficient factors
that shared only a slight overlap of facts or none at all.");
United States v. Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The
essence of the determination is whether there is one agreement to
commit two crimes, or more than one agreement, each with a separate
object."). There is little question that the government is free to
bring separate charges on a different, though similar, conspiracy.
See, e.g., United States v. Félix, 503 U.S. 378, 386, 387 (1992)
(explaining that "a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions
does not establish a double jeopardy violation" and that "the
introduction of relevant evidence of particular misconduct in a
case is not the same thing as prosecution for that conduct");
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United States v. Morris, 99 F.3d 476, 480 (1st Cir. 1996)
(rejecting double jeopardy claim despite the two conspiracies
taking place contemporaneously, involving essentially the same
personnel, occurring at much the same places, and involving most of
the same evidence because the conspiracies involved different
primary goals and thus separate statutory provisions); Hart, 933
F.2d at 85 ("The fact that both counts against [plaintiff]
implicate the same statutory violations does not in itself create
a double jeopardy bar. . . . [Plaintiff] could have been tried
separately for the two similar but separate conspiracies.");
Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1981)
("[I]ndictments charging two or more agreements, even agreements to
commit similar or related crimes, charge more than one conspiracy."
(citing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 52 (1949))); see
also United States v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 943-48 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding no double jeopardy violation because defendant was
indicted on two separate yet similar conspiracies and not one
overarching conspiracy). This is especially true when the
convictions were reversed due to a material variance and not due to
the insufficiency of the evidence.7
7
This is a far cry from the district court's pronouncement that
the "Government now essentially seeks to rip the 'Vizcaíno-
Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy' chapters from its Szpyt I novel and
present those very pages to a new jury in hopes that it can secure
a conviction of the Defendants on this smaller conspiracy." Though
the district court apparently viewed the evidence differently,
Dellosantos found not one overarching conspiracy but rather two
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We recognize that the resolution of this case is driven
almost exclusively by our decision in Dellosantos. Indeed, had the
jury in that case returned a not-guilty verdict, our analysis today
would be limited solely to the indictments in each case and the
typical five-factor investigation called for by Laguna-Estela.
Under that scenario, the result would undoubtedly be different.
But, because we must give full force to our prior decision,8 we
simultaneous yet distinct conspiracies. It is impossible to
conclude -- as both the district court and the dissent attempt to
do -- that the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy is just a
smaller part of a larger overarching conspiracy when that supposed
overarching conspiracy was found to never have existed in the first
place. Regardless of whether or not the district court's
application of Laguna-Estela and Hall would have withstood scrutiny
and been affirmed in the first instance, the findings in
Dellosantos mandate the opposite result and are binding under res
judicata. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948)
(explaining that res judicata "applies to criminal as well as civil
proceedings"); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., 603 F.3d 71,
95 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Issue preclusion requires that (1) both
proceedings involved the same issue of law or fact, (2) the parties
actually litigated that issue, (3) the prior court decided that
issue in a final judgment, and (4) resolution of that issue was
essential to judgment on the merits."); Negrón-Fuentes v. UPS
Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) ("In general
terms . . . , issue preclusion renders conclusive the
determinations reached in previous law suits between the same (and,
sometimes, different) parties."). Our dissenting colleague's
suggestion that these findings were not essential to the judgment
on the merits in Dellosantos just further highlights its misreading
of Dellosantos. Dellosantos's findings of two simultaneous yet
distinct conspiracies, and not one overarching conspiracy, were the
entire foundation for our holding that there was a material and
prejudicial variance mandating reversal.
8
Though the dissent suggests that we are attempting to revisit
Dellosantos, it is actually the dissent that is doing so. Despite
Dellosantos's holding to the contrary, the dissent insists on
characterizing the Current Indictment as a "narrower" charge and a
"portion" of the First indictment. At the same time, it disregards
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have no other choice but to conclude that double jeopardy does not
bar this indictment.
B. Dellosantos's Additional Arguments
Recognizing that we may affirm the district court "on any
basis made apparent by the record," McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d
262, 266 (1st Cir. 2006), Dellosantos raises two additional
arguments to support the dismissal of the Current Indictment. We
address each issue briefly, finding neither to have merit.
1. Judicial Estoppel
Dellosantos first contends that the government is
judicially estopped from arguing that there are two distinct
conspiracies because this position is inconsistent with its initial
position that there existed one overarching conspiracy. See
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2003) ("As a
general matter, the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a
litigant from pressing a claim that is inconsistent with a position
taken by that litigant either in a prior legal proceeding or in an
earlier phase of the same legal proceeding."). Though the contours
of judicial estoppel are "hazy, and there is no mechanical test for
determining its applicability," Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v.
Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2004), three factors have
guided us in the past:
Dellosantos's entire variance analysis.
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First, a party's later position must be
clearly inconsistent with its earlier
position. Second, courts regularly inquire
whether the party has succeeded in persuading
a court to accept that party's earlier
position . . . . A third consideration is
whether the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position would derive an unfair
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the
opposing party if not estopped.
United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 504 (2006)).
Dellosantos is certainly correct that the government has
taken mutually exclusive positions in these successive
prosecutions, thus satisfying the first factor. The other factors,
however, are not met. Contrary to Dellosantos's claim, the
government was not successful in the initial prosecution. Its
initial position of one overarching conspiracy -- which did
admittedly succeed at trial -- was ultimately rejected on appeal in
Dellosantos. Once the jury's verdict was vacated, any success the
government may have had with its one-overarching-conspiracy
position disappeared.
We also reject the contention that the government is
deriving an unfair advantage from this change in position. As the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Burks, when a conviction is reversed
following a finding of procedural error, not only does "the accused
[have] a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his
guilt free from error," but society also "maintains a valid concern
for insuring that the guilty are punished." 437 U.S. at 15. Both
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the jury and our prior decision found sufficient evidence to
convict Appellees. There is nothing unfair about allowing the
government to retry them following a reversal for a material
variance, which is nothing more than a procedural error. Because
two of the three considerations for a finding of judicial estoppel
are lacking, Dellosantos's argument fails.9
2. Improper Venue
Dellosantos next argues that because he did not have a
relationship with any of the Maine co-conspirators, never lived or
worked in Maine, is accused of buying and selling cocaine only in
Massachusetts, and entered Maine only for court-related matters,
venue in Maine is improper and thus his constitutional rights are
being violated. See United States v. Lanou, 137 F.3d 656, 661 (1st
Cir. 1998) ("A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional
right to be tried in a proper venue."); see also U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed
9
We also note that Dellosantos's argument cuts both ways. Like
the government, Dellosantos is taking an opposite position here.
In the prior prosecution and before us in Dellosantos, Dellosantos
argued that the evidence was insufficient because there were
multiple conspiracies; now he argues that the two conspiracies were
really just part of one overarching conspiracy. If anything, the
case for judicial estoppel would be stronger against Dellosantos
because his initial position of two distinct conspiracies did
succeed in the earlier proceedings and because he is now attempting
to escape punishment for his crime despite a jury finding him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and this court finding sufficient
evidence in the record to support that verdict.
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. . . ."); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . ."). Venue in Maine, however, is
appropriate.
In the context of a conspiracy, "venue is proper in any
district in which an act in furtherance of the charged conspiracy
has taken place." United States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20, 25 (1st
Cir. 1996). This is true "even if a particular coconspirator was
not himself physically present in that district." Id. While
Dellosantos may not have had any ties to Maine, his co-conspirator
Szpyt did have such ties. As we explained in Dellosantos, the
evidence showed that Szpyt owned the Iron Horsemen clubhouse in
Maine and sold cocaine to numerous Iron Horsemen members there, one
of those customers being Sanborn. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 111-12.
Given these facts, the government has met its burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that venue in Maine
is proper. See Lanou, 137 F.3d at 661.
III. Conclusion
In Dellosantos, we rejected the argument that there
existed a single, overarching conspiracy to distribute both cocaine
and marijuana. Instead, we held that there were two independent
and distinct conspiracies, each running simultaneously with one
another and with very little overlap. While we found insufficient
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evidence to support Appellees' convictions on one conspiracy -- the
Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and
marijuana -- we found that there arguably was sufficient evidence
to convict Appellees on the other conspiracy -- the uncharged
Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to distribute only cocaine.
Nevertheless, we vacated the convictions due to a procedural issue:
a material variance between this second conspiracy and the single
overarching conspiracy charged in the indictment. Given our
holdings in Dellosantos, the government's decision to bring the
Current Indictment charging Appellees with this second conspiracy
is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Dellosantos's efforts
to save the dismissal on the alternate grounds of estoppel and
venue also fail. Accordingly, the district court's order
dismissing the indictment is REVERSED.
"Concurring Opinion follows"
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HOWARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. The majority opinion
correctly solves this double jeopardy puzzle, and I join it except
with respect to one analytical step.
The lead opinion suggests that issue preclusion requires
us to adopt the findings of Dellosantos. Slip Op. at 18-19 n.7.
I, however, believe that the law of the case doctrine actually
governs. See United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)
(explaining that a legal decision in one case ties "a successor
appellate panel in a second appeal in the same case"). If the
acquittal following Dellosantos "was intended to be no different
than had the government on remand moved . . . to amend the
indictment," Slip. Op. at 15, I do not see how this appeal differs
from any other that follows a remand and subsequent proceeding for
law of the case purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 573
F.3d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 2009). Indeed, by implying that this is a
new, discrete matter, the lead opinion might give fodder to the
dissent's point that our analysis should be limited solely to the
indictments.
Either way, I agree that our decision must now be
tethered to the holdings of Dellosantos.10 Though the dissent's
10
I continue to believe that Dellosantos was wrongly decided. See
United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 126 (Howard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to
expressing that belief at the time of the decision, I also
dissented from the panel's refusal to rehear the case. Order on
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Dellosantos,
Nos. 09-2135, 09-2670 (1st Cir. Nov. 1, 2011). Our dissenting
-25-
analysis would unquestionably be correct in a normal double
jeopardy case, it does not adequately account for that prior
decision.11 Simply stated, Dellosantos reversed the appellants'
convictions on prejudicial variance grounds -- a purely procedural
decision that does not bar re-prosecution on the discrete crime
that the government currently charges. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Bristol Superior Court, 753 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2014). Only by
turning a blind eye to the nearly twenty times that Dellosantos
differentiated the conspiracies, and by pretending that the charged
crimes present themselves here on a blank slate, could we view the
Massachusetts-based conspiracy as a "lesser included" version of an
offense the defendants were acquitted of.
Such a perspective is certainly not mandated here, and it
would permit the defendants to escape the natural consequences of
their prior, successful appeal by introducing a new, irreconcilable
colleague here nicely captures the reasons why. Dissent at 35-36
n.16 (describing how the prior Dellosantos decision was potentially
incompatible with Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), and
questionable under a "mere variance analysis"). Having lost that
battle though, I cannot now "revisit[] how to decide Dellosantos."
Dissent at 36.
11
The dissent takes the position that the prior Dellosantos
decision was one that spoke to the substantive guilt of the
defendants. As the lead opinion emphasizes, the dissent can only
reach that conclusion by ignoring the entire variance analysis at
the heart of Dellosantos. It is that misstep that permits the
dissent to classify the charged conspiracy as "an offense entirely
subsumed in the prior acquitted offense," dissent at 37, and to
thus present its rhetorically powerful though ultimately fictive
parade of horribles.
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argument. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (A
litigant should not be permitted to "prevail[] in one phase of a
case on an argument and then rely[] on a contradictory argument to
prevail in another phase") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 59 (1st
Cir. 2009) (asking whether a party's later position is clearly
inconsistent with an earlier one; whether the party succeeded in
the first proceeding based on the prior argument; and whether that
party "would derive an unfair advantage" if permitted to "assert an
inconsistent position").
In the first appeal, Dellosantos insisted that "[t]he
evidence showed there were two conspiracies; one involving cocaine
and the other involving marijuana. These two conspiracies were
distinct, involved different sources and flow of distribution." He
added, "[i]f the defendant was a member of another conspiracy, and
not the one charged, then the defendant is not guilty of the
conspiracy as charged." Szpyt likewise asserted that "[t]he
evidence in this case established two conspiracies, not the one
charged in the indictment."12
In the appeal now, however, the defendants take an
entirely inconsistent position. They argue that "the government is
12
The dissent again sees only what it wants. It states that in
Dellosantos the defendants merely "argued, first, that the
government failed to prove [the conspiracy charged]." Dissent at
32. But, the defendants' precise argument, as highlighted above,
shows otherwise.
-27-
attempting an 'end run' by re-prosecuting Dellosantos and Szpyt for
the same conspiracy, minus the marijuana part." In other words,
they claim that this cocaine-only conspiracy is merely part of the
one, overarching conspiracy charged before.
They cannot have it both ways. Either there was a
conspiracy that included at least the cocaine-only conspiracy, or
there were entirely distinct conspiracies. After succeeding in
convincing a majority of the prior panel that the latter was true,
it would be inequitable to permit the defendants to escape
prosecution by now arguing the former. As the lead opinion notes,
the defendants have changed their tune solely to "escape punishment
for [a] crime despite a jury finding [them] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and this court finding sufficient evidence in the
record to support that verdict." Slip. Op. at 22 n.9. Allowing
such a gambit threatens "the integrity of the judicial process."
Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, because our inquiry must be anchored to
Dellosantos, and since the defendants cannot now proffer an
inconsistent position to dodge the foreseeable result of their
earlier contention, I concur.
"Dissenting Opinion follows"
-28-
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. In Dellosantos the
government charged defendants with participating in a single
conspiracy (the so-called "overarching conspiracy" covering two
states and two illicit drugs). The court in that case
unequivocally stated: "we conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to support the finding of a single conspiracy." 649 F.3d
at 119. My colleagues must therefore agree (they would say so if
they did not), that the Fifth Amendment bars the government from
re-indicting defendants for that single, overarching conspiracy
charged but not proven in Dellosantos. Indeed, it would appear
that even the government agrees with that unremarkable proposition.
The government instead re-indicted defendants on a narrower,
cocaine-only portion of the previously charged single, overarching
conspiracy. So we have a classic double jeopardy question: Is the
new charge the "same offense" as the offense for which defendants
were previously indicted and acquitted?
When the offenses to be compared are each conspiracy
offenses, the comparison can sometimes be tricky. See United
States v. Laguna-Estela, 394 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) (employing
a "nuanced," five-factor test). Here, though, the government
concedes that there is no element of the second charged offense
that was not an element of the first charged offense. Indeed,
there will not even be any new evidence. Under basic double
jeopardy rules, it therefore follows that the two offenses are the
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same. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) ("[T]wo offenses
are the same unless each requires proof that the other does not.").
The majority misses this straightforward answer by
failing to compare the offense charged in the new indictment (the
Massachusetts-based, cocaine-only conspiracy) with the offense for
which defendants were previously acquitted (the single overarching
conspiracy). Instead, the majority devotes most of its effort to
comparing the offense charged in the new indictment with only the
unproven portion of the overarching conspiracy charged in
Dellosantos. Noting that Dellosantos found that the Massachusetts-
based, cocaine-only conspiracy and the Maine-based, cocaine and
marijuana conspiracy were "distinct," 649 F.3d at 119, the majority
interprets that finding to mean that, for double jeopardy purposes,
the newly charged offense is different than the offense for which
defendants were acquitted.
That is simply the wrong comparison. As the majority
avoids acknowledging, but cannot claim to dispute, Dellosantos
plainly held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
single, overarching conspiracy that was charged. Id. So, that is
the offense for which re-prosecution is barred. And that is
therefore necessarily the offense to which this new indictment must
be compared to see if it alleges a different offense (i.e., one
with a new element).
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To support a contrary and entirely unprecedented
approach, my colleagues declare that the single conspiracy charged
in Dellosantos "did not exist." Slip Op. at 16. And to make that
declaration binding on defendants, their two opinions audition a
trio of preclusion doctrines for roles these doctrines have never
played before in any cited precedent. For example, to script a
role for the law of the case doctrine, the concurrence must pretend
that this case is actually the same case as Dellosantos. See,
e.g., United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (The
law of the case doctrine governs "the same issues in subsequent
stages in the same case") (emphasis added). As the docket numbers
and common sense evidence, it clearly is not.13 More importantly,
in applying each of the estoppel doctrines mentioned in their
opinions, my colleagues make three fundamental mistakes.
First, their description of the holding in Dellosantos
that they say now binds these defendants in this subsequent case
materially errs in its lack of precision. The precise question at
issue in Dellosantos was whether the government had proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that there was an overarching, two-state
conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana. The holding
in Dellosantos that the evidence was insufficient to prove such a
13
Were it the same case, then I would presume no additional
appointments of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act would have
been required, Speedy Trial Act deadlines would be calculated
accordingly, limitations periods would not have continued running
after the acquittal, and so on.
-31-
single conspiracy required acquittal on the charge. Whether there
was in fact no such single conspiracy is something that the court
could not have known and the defendants need not have proved (and
actually did not argue). For that simple reason there is no basis
at all for applying issue preclusion to establish that the single
overarching conspiracy never existed. See, e.g., Global NAPS, Inc.,
v. Verizon New Eng., 603 F.3d 71, 95 (1st Cir. 2010) (Issue
preclusion requires that resolution of the issue was essential to
judgment on the merits in the first case).
Second, defendants are not engaged in any inconsistent
advocacy regarding the existence of the overarching conspiracy.
They argued, first, that the government failed to prove such a
conspiracy; they argue, now, that the government is still trying to
convict them of a lesser included version of that exact same
conspiracy. The lack of any inconsistency between these two
positions renders judicial estoppel inapplicable. See, e.g., Perry
v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2010) (Judicial estoppel
requires, among other things, that the party's earlier and later
positions are "clearly inconsistent.").
Third, and most tellingly, even if one were to accept the
proposition that these defendants are now bound to accept as a fact
the non-existence of the single overarching conspiracy for which
they were acquitted in Dellosantos, so what? Such a proposition
leaves untouched the pertinent double jeopardy inquiries: Can the
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prosecution re-indict on that offense? Clearly it cannot. And
does this newly charged offense have any element that was not
included in that prior acquitted offense? As the government
concedes, it does not. Under Brown v. Ohio, double jeopardy
therefore bars this second prosecution. 432 U.S. at 168.
This conclusion is hardly surprising. By definition,
most acquittals occur precisely because the government fails to
prove a part of its case. If that failure therefore were to mean
that we no longer compare the newly charged offense to the prior
acquitted offense because the greater crime charged "did not
exist," then Fifth Amendment protections would shrink markedly.
Surely the majority does not mean to suggest that anytime the
government overcharges and a court finds that it fails to prove the
aggravating element, the government may re-indict on a lesser
included offense merely by pointing out that it failed to prove a
portion of the previously acquitted, greater offense? Brown v.
Ohio plainly prohibits such a gambit. Id. Yet that is exactly
what the majority says the government can do here.14
14
Implicitly recognizing that double jeopardy would bar the
prosecution here if Dellosantos resulted in an acquittal for
insufficient evidence, the concurrence argues that Dellosantos
vacated defendants' convictions on purely procedural grounds, like
a defect in the charging instrument, and thus double jeopardy does
not bar this prosecution. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404
(1987). But Dellosantos plainly stated: "the government failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the conspiracy that was
charged." 649 F.3d at 126 n. 18 (emphasis in original). There was
no defect in the charging instrument except to the extent that the
government charged an offense that it could not prove.
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Nor does it matter that the government may have proved
part of its case the first time around. That happens in most
prosecutions that end in acquittal. See, e.g., United States v.
Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858–60 (1st Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, as long
as the disposition "represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some . . . of the factual elements of the offense charged," the
double jeopardy clause bars re-prosecution for that same offense.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
And, as I must stress, that "same offense" includes any offense
that does not contain a new element. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168.
The majority cannot pass its holding off as a one-time
only, idiosyncratic mulligan for the prosecution. Prosecutors not
infrequently stretch ambitiously in charging the scope of
conspiracies so as to rope in more drugs, more guns, and thus
higher minimum and maximum sentences. See, e.g., Glenn, 828 F.2d
at 858–60. And jurors not infrequently buy such claims, leading to
judicial reversals for insufficient evidence. In Glenn, for
example, we reversed a conviction for conspiracy to distribute both
hashish and marijuana because the evidence showed only that the
defendant was involved in a conspiracy to distribute hashish. Id.;
see also United States v. Franco-Santiago, 681 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2012) (insufficient evidence to show that defendant conspired to
rob multiple banks, though sufficient evidence to show he conspired
to rob one bank); United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63–65 (1st
-34-
Cir. 1995) (insufficient evidence to show that defendant conspired
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, though arguably
sufficient evidence that she conspired to possess cocaine); United
States v. Hernandez, 625 F.2d 2, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1980) (insufficient
evidence to show that defendant conspired to distribute eight
pounds of cocaine, though arguably sufficient evidence that he
conspired to sell one ounce). After today, in this circuit (but
fortunately in no others yet), the government need not worry itself
too much over losses of that type; rather, it can recharge on the
smaller, subsumed conspiracy, using even (as here) only evidence
from the first unsuccessful prosecution.15
With some reason, my colleagues may wonder in hindsight
whether Dellosantos was correctly decided.16 But the Fifth
15
The concurrence, like the majority, offers no counter to the
argument that its approach allows re-prosecution for uncharged
lesser included offenses in a broad array of cases of which the
foregoing is simply a sample.
16
Under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), the
indictment might arguably have been read as charging a dual object
conspiracy that could arguably be proven merely by supporting a
conviction on one of the two objects. 649 F.3d at 126-27 (Howard,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Or one might
arguably have read the indictment as simply a charge of conspiracy
to distribute and possess controlled substances, with the dual
product allegations serving as details that would lead only to a
mere variance analysis. See, e.g., Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d
1539, 1545–46 (6th Cir. 1992); cf. Marshall v. Bristol Superior
Court, 753 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2014).
Apparently, though, the prosecution did not press these
arguments. 649 F.3d at 126 n.18 ("[T]he government argues in a
cursory manner . . . .") and 127 ("But the government has to make
the argument to benefit from it.") (Howard, J., concurring in part
-35-
Amendment prevents us from revisiting how to decide Dellosantos.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 ("A verdict of acquittal
could not be reviewed on error or otherwise without putting (a
defendant) twice in jeopardy.") (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). The only relevant finding from Dellosantos now is
that it issued a "substantive ruling that went to the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence," Slip Op. at 11, indicating
acquittal for insufficient evidence on the charged offense.
Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 126.
The government could have avoided all of this by pleading
alternative counts in Dellosantos. See United States v.
Calderone, 982 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1992). Prosecutors are well
aware of the double-edged sword presented by tiered, lesser
included offenses. Indicting a defendant in the alternative on
both greater and lesser included versions of a crime likely
increases the chances of a guilty verdict but also decreases the
chances of a guilty verdict on the greater offense. Here, the
government was overly ambitious, charging defendants with only the
most extended characterization of the conspiracy that involved the
greatest drug quantity. It then failed to prove that charged
and dissenting in part). In any event, even if the result in
Dellosantos was wrong, we cannot fix it now without erring further.
See Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1081 (2013) ("[T]here is
no way for antecedent legal errors to be reviewable in the context
of judicial acquittals unless those errors are also reviewable when
they give rise to jury acquittals . . . .").
-36-
conspiracy. Allowing the government to take a second shot, trying
defendants for an offense entirely subsumed in the prior acquitted
offense, materially shifts the balance in favor of the government
in a way that our founders sought to avoid. And because
prosecutors frequently charge conspiracy counts and stack drug
quantity offenses, others who may actually be innocent of any crime
may pay a dear price.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's
decision to permit a post-acquittal prosecution for a lesser
included version of the prior charged offense.
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