in the Interest of J.S. ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-22-00156-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF J.S.
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On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-237,066-A
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother 1 appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her two-year-
old child J.S. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory
grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of her
parental rights would be in the best interest of the child.2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P), (2).
1
We refer to the appellant as “Mother” and her child as “J.S.” to protect their
identities. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court terminated J.S.’s father’s parental rights by an interlocutory
order, and J.S.’s father did not appeal.
1
Mother’s appointed counsel submitted a brief in which counsel states that he
has concluded that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is
frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d
728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures
apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the
trial court’s judgment. Mother’s appellate counsel has represented to the Court that
she gave Mother a copy of the brief that was filed, notified Mother of her right to
file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a copy of the appellate record. The Court
notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response and the deadline for doing so.
The Court’s records show that Mother did not file a response.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and counsel’s brief. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d
618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we
conclude that no arguable grounds exist to support an appeal from the trial court’s
judgment, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See
Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating
in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record
for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of
2
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief
this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We
deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel
because an attorney’s duty in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends
through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the
obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother has not been discharged. See In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court
of Texas, counsel’s obligations to Mother can be met by filing a petition for review
that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief. See id. at 27-28.
AFFIRMED.
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LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on August 31, 2022
Opinion Delivered September 8, 2022
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
3