Gallant v. Delahanty ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    December 14, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 94-1733

    ALFRED A. GALLANT, II,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    THOMAS DELAHANTY, II, JUDGE, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Alfred A. Gallant, Jr. on brief pro se. ______________________



    ____________________


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    Per Curiam. A magistrate judge recommended that __________

    plaintiff's vague, verbose, and partially illegible civil

    rights complaint be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.

    1915(d) because the allegations were "fanciful" and directed

    at acts perpetrated by private individuals, rather than state

    actors. The district court adopted the report and dismissed

    the complaint.

    We agree that much of plaintiff's complaint was

    properly dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d)

    because the legal theory underlying the claims was

    indisputably meritless. The claims properly dismissed

    included the following: 1) plaintiff's complaint that police

    had failed to investigate crimes, see Sattler v. Johnson, 857 ___ _______ _______

    F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988) (victims have no constitutional

    right to have defendants criminally prosecuted); Slagel v. ______

    Shell Oil Refinery, 811 F. Supp. 378, 382 (C.D. Ill. 1993) ___________________

    (police officer had no constitutional duty to conduct

    investigation of plaintiff's assault charge), aff'd, 23 F.3d _____

    410 (7th Cir. 1994), or protect plaintiff prior to his

    incarceration, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social ________ _________________________________

    Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); 2) allegations concerning pre- ________

    incarceration stalkings and harassment, Yancey v. Carroll ______ _______

    County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989) (investigation, ______

    without more, is not a constitutional violation);

    Philadelphia Yearly Meeting v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337 (3d ___________________________ ____

















    Cir. 1975); Hickombottom v. Chicago, 739 F.Supp 1173, 1178 ____________ _______

    (N.D. Ill. 1990) (police surveillance of apartment did not

    violate the Fourth Amendment as plaintiff had no reasonable

    expectation of privacy in his comings and goings); 3) denial

    of workers' compensation benefits; 4) unconstitutional

    conviction, Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); 5) four- ____ ________

    day denial of an attorney, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. _____________ _______

    180, 187 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 _____ ________

    (1972); 6) deprivation of property without due process,

    Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Daniels v. ______ ______ _______

    Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); electronic surveillance while ________

    in prison, United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 22-23 _____________ __________

    (2d Cir. 1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in

    conversation conducted in a public area of a jail), cert. _____

    denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989); United States v. Harrelson, 754 ______ _____________ _________

    F.2d 1153, 1169-71 (5th Cir. 1985) (prisoner had no

    reasonable expectation of privacy while conversing with his

    wife in his cell), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908, 1034 (1985); ____________

    United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-46 (9th Cir. _____________ ______

    1977) (monitoring and recording of prisoner-visitor

    conversations was reasonable and therefore not violative of

    the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); _____________

    and 7) ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel,

    Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Polk County v. ____________ ______ ___________

    Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th ______ ____ _____



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    Cir. 1976). In a similar view, the denial of access to

    courts claim was subject to dismissal under 1915(d) because

    the restrictions described (e.g., delay in access to legal ____

    papers; rifling of papers; destruction of some papers; denial

    of forms, paper clips, staples) were insufficiently

    substantial.

    Other allegations, however, although often lacking

    enough detail to state constitutional claims which would

    survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, were not premised

    on indisputably meritless legal theories and conceivably

    could be cured by more specific factual allegations. Four

    potential claims fall into this area.

    First, plaintiff outlined conceivable Eighth

    Amendment violations. He claimed he had been assaulted and

    terrorized by both guards and inmates while in prison and

    denied medical attention and nutrition. See Farmer v. ___ ______

    Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1920 (1994) (prison officials who _______

    knowingly disregard substantial risk of serious harm to

    inmates may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment);

    Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). While plaintiff's _______ ______

    allegations are confusing and conclusory, enough was stated

    to avoid a 1915(d) dismissal. Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d ______ ____

    269, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1990).

    Second, plaintiff complained that his mail was

    tampered with, switched, and late and that legal mail was



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    opened. Depending on how the facts were fleshed out,

    conceivably a constitutional claim could exist, if, for

    example, incoming legal mail were opened with some regularity

    outside plaintiff's presence. Castillo v. Cook County Mail ________ ________________

    Room Dep't, 990 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing 1915(d) __________

    dismissal of inmate complaint, which alleged that three

    letters from public officials received in an eight-month

    period had been opened, because a colorable constitutional

    claim had been stated). This claim, too, should not have

    been dismissed under 1915(d).

    Third, plaintiff should be afforded a further

    opportunity to articulate his complaints concerning placement

    in segregation for refusal to work. On the present record,

    we cannot tell whether plaintiff had any liberty interest in

    remaining out of segregation, and, if so, whether he was

    accorded due process before being deprived of it. Rodi v. ____

    Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1991). __________

    Fourth, plaintiff outlined some contours of a

    possible First Amendment retaliatory transfer claim. He

    asserted that shortly after he tried to communicate with the

    governor, a newspaper, an attorney, and the federal district

    court in March 1994, he was transferred to high maximum

    security in retaliation. See McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 ___ ________ ____

    (1st Cir. 1979) (prisoner who alleged that he had filed

    actions against prison officials, that he was subsequently



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    transferred, and that the transfer was in retaliation for

    litigation activities, stated a claim even though the

    allegations were conclusory); Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d ________ _____

    888, 891-92 (1st Cir. 1980) (retaliation claim stated by

    allegations that officials denied plaintiff a transfer to

    minimum security after plaintiff filed a suit complaining

    about prison conditions). See also Mujahid v. Sumner, 807 ___ ____ _______ ______

    F.Supp. 1505 (D.Hawaii 1992) (rule forbidding prisoners to

    correspond with the media was facially unconstitutional),

    aff'd, 996 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1993). Because plaintiff did _____

    not state the subject of his communication, he may not have

    satisfied even McDonald's lenient pleading standard, Leonardo __________ ________

    v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398 (1st Cir. 1979), but since _____

    plaintiff may be able to fill in enough details to state a

    claim, a sua sponte 1915(d) dismissal was not appropriate. ___ ______

    We therefore remand for further proceedings. As a

    result of this opinion, plaintiff is now on notice that in

    order to state constitutional claims he may not rest on

    vague, conclusory allegations, but must set factual

    allegations respecting the material elements of his claims.

    Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514-15 (1st Cir. ______ ________________

    1988). Therefore, on remand, plaintiff should amend his

    complaint.

    Appellant's request for appellate counsel is

    denied.



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    Vacated and remanded. ____________________



















































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