Mahan v. Plymouth County ( 1995 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 94-1835

    RICHARD MAHAN and FELICIA MAHAN,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.


    PLYMOUTH COUNTY HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________


    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________



    Matthew Cobb, with whom Law Firm of Matthew Cobb was on brief for ____________ ________________________
    appellants.
    James B. Lampke for appellee Town of Hull. _______________
    Matthew J. Buckley, with whom Law Office of Matthew J. Buckley ___________________ _________________________________
    was on brief for appellee Walter Bouchie.
    Steven M. Walsh for appellee Plymouth County Sheriff's __________________
    Department.


    ____________________

    September 7, 1995
    ____________________















































































    CYR, Circuit Judge. On November 14, 1989, Walter CYR, Circuit Judge. ______________

    Bouchie, a detective with the Town of Hull Police Department

    ("Hull Police Department"), executed a valid arrest warrant

    against plaintiff-appellant Richard Mahan ("Mahan") for the rape

    of Sheila Commesso.1 The arrest took place in Mahan's hatchback

    automobile. Bouchie and other officers searched the hatchback

    incident to the arrest and damaged a cord over the hatch area and

    a pocket tape recorder in the car.

    Following the arrest, Mahan was taken to the Hull

    Police Station for "booking." Once the "booking" had been

    completed, Bouchie began interrogating Mahan without giving

    Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). _______ ___ _______ _______

    Mahan asked if he had the right to speak with an attorney.

    Bouchie informed him that an attorney would be appointed at

    arraignment. Mahan asserted a right to remain silent until an

    attorney was present. Bouchie then said, "[Y]ou are going to

    talk to me or I will lock you up in that cell down there, and you

    won't get out." When Mahan would not relent, he was placed in

    the holding cell. No further questioning occurred.

    Within hours of the arrest, a representative of the

    Hull Police Department was sent to Mahan's home to pick up a

    bottle of medicine Tegretol which had been prescribed in

    early 1989 for depression and seizures caused by a head injury
    ____________________

    1The evidence and inferences are related in the light most
    favorable to Mahan, the party opposing judgment. See Favorito v. ___ ________
    Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); _______
    Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st Cir. ___________ ____________________
    1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

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    Mahan sustained many years earlier. The Tegretol bottle, clearly

    marked with Mahan's name, the name and telephone number of the

    prescribing physician, and the dosage to be administered, was

    delivered to the Plymouth House of Corrections ("PHC") when Mahan

    was transferred there around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday,

    November 14. There is no record evidence that Mahan informed any

    corrections officer or other PHC personnel, prior to November 21,

    as to the actual symptoms he experienced while detained. The PHC

    corrections officers repeatedly refused Mahan's requests for

    Tegretol during the period November 14-21.2

    Mahan first arrived at PHC late Tuesday evening,

    November 14, after the medical officer's regular hours. PHC

    corrections officers later informed Mahan that a medical officer

    was present at PHC on Tuesdays and Thursdays only. On November

    15 and 16, Mahan was taken to court for arraignment and bail

    review. Thus, he was not seen by a medical officer on Thursday,

    November 16, since he did not return from court until after the

    medical officer had left for the day. Four more days passed

    before a medical officer met with Mahan on Tuesday, November 21.

    In accordance with PHC policy, the medical officer declined to

    administer Tegretol to Mahan without first contacting the pre-

    scribing physician. Within one or two days after Mahan met with

    the medical officer on November 21, PHC administered the Tegretol

    ____________________

    2PHC policy prohibits administering prescription medicines
    to a detainee without clearance from a "medical officer" and on ___
    days the detainee is scheduled to appear in court. Medical
    officers are corrections officers with some medical training.

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    to Mahan and his symptoms were alleviated.

    Although Mahan was experiencing severe depression and

    anxiety attacks, and continuously complained to various correc-

    tions officers that he needed the Tegretol, there is no record

    evidence that he ever informed PHC personnel that he was experi-

    encing these or any other symptoms prior to November 21. Nor is

    there any evidence that PHC personnel ever witnessed, or other-

    wise became aware of, any such symptoms. Mahan testified to an

    anxiety attack on the night of November 15, which was witnessed

    by a cellmate.3 A guard who happened by the cell shortly after

    this incident, inquired whether Mahan was all right. To which

    Mahan replied simply: "I don't know. I don't feel good." Thus,

    there is no evidence remotely suggesting that PHC personnel had

    ever been made aware that Mahan's condition might warrant any

    deviation from the standard medical clearance policy.

    After Mahan was released on bail, he was tried and

    acquitted, then initiated this section 1983 action, see 42 U.S.C. ___

    1983, against Detective Bouchie and the Town of Hull for

    wrongful arrest and interrogation, and against PHC for wrongfully

    withholding his prescription medicine. Felicia Mahan filed a

    pendent claim for loss of consortium. Prior to trial, the

    district court granted summary judgment for the Town of Hull.

    ____________________

    3The cellmate neither testified nor provided a deposition
    concerning the circumstances surrounding any anxiety attack or
    other symptom experienced by Mahan. Mahan himself testified that
    he asked his wife to tell his lawyer that PHC personnel were
    refusing to administer Tegretol. Yet the lawyer neither testi-
    fied nor is there any evidence that he ever contacted PHC.

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    The Mahans proceeded to trial on their claims against Bouchie and

    PHC.

    During the trial on liability, Mahan and/or his wife

    testified to the above-described events. In addition, before the

    district court ordered judgment as a matter of law under Rule

    50(a), Mahan proposed to call the prescribing physician, to

    testify that Mahan had a "serious medical need" for Tegretol.

    Rather than admit the proffered testimony, the district court

    presumed, for purposes of the Rule 50(a) motion, that Mahan had a

    "serious medical need" for Tegretol.

    Thereafter, the district court directed verdicts for

    Bouchie and PHC, ruling that Mahan had proffered insufficient

    evidence to establish an unconstitutional deprivation in connec-

    tion with his arrest; the Miranda claim failed as a matter of _______

    law, since no interrogation actually occurred after Mahan re-

    quested an attorney; and PHC had not acted with "deliberate

    indifference" in withholding Mahan's prescription medicine.

    A decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de __

    novo, Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st ____ ___________ ____________________

    Cir. 1993), as is a judgment entered as a matter of law, Favorito ________

    v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1994). _______

    A. The Arrest A. The Arrest __________

    Under section 1983, a municipality may be answerable in

    damages under section 1983 to a person who is subjected to a

    deprivation of his constitutional rights as a result of official

    action taken pursuant to a "custom or usage" of the municipality.


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    See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, ___ ______ ____________________________________

    691 (1978). Mahan claims that there was sufficient evidence that

    the Town of Hull, by "custom and usage," investigated criminal

    complaints inadequately, thereby causing arrests without probable

    cause. He relies on our decision in Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 _________ ______

    F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir.) (single incident may provide some ______ ________ ____

    proof of municipal policy where, inter alia, large contingent of _____ ____

    municipal police officers engaged in concerted assaultive con- _________

    duct), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). Bordanaro held, _____ ______ _________

    however, that evidence of a single incident is insufficient, in __

    and of itself, to establish a municipal "custom or usage" within ___ __ ______

    the meaning of Monell. Id. at 1156-57. ______ ___

    Mahan has not brought his case near the Bordanaro _________

    umbrella, let alone under it. He produced no evidence of prior

    incidents of inadequate investigation by the Hull Police Depart-

    ment. Nor has he introduced direct evidence of improper investi-

    gatory methods or practices employed by the police in this case.

    Thus, we discern no error in the district court decision granting

    summary judgment on the section 1983 claim against the Town of

    Hull.

    B. The Arrest and Search B. The Arrest and Search _____________________

    As there was insufficient evidence to support a trial-

    worthy claim against the Town of Hull, there was no actionable

    section 1983 claim against Detective Bouchie relating to Mahan's

    arrest. Mahan presented no evidence that Bouchie acted unreason-

    ably in executing the valid arrest warrant, nor in effecting the


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    arrest and contemporaneous automobile search. See United States ___ _____________

    v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1994) (police entitled to ______

    search hatch-area of automobile incident to lawful arrest of

    driver), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1716 (1995). The damage to the _____ ______

    hatchback cord and the tape recorder, see supra p. 2, do not ___ _____

    establish a trialworthy Fourth Amendment "unreasonable" search

    claim. There was no error in the district court decision to

    direct judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bouchie.

    C. The Miranda Claim C. The Miranda Claim _________________

    Mahan claims that Bouchie violated his Miranda rights _______

    by refusing to read the required Miranda warnings and threatening _______

    to place him in the holding cell if he declined to respond to

    questioning without an attorney present. We do not agree.

    An "accused must be adequately and effectively apprised

    of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully

    honored." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Although Bouchie did not _______

    give the required Miranda warnings, it is undisputed that Mahan _______

    made no statements pertinent to the Commesso investigation in

    response to interrogation. Upon Mahan's assertion that he wished

    to have an attorney present during interrogation, Bouchie ceased

    all interrogation. Every court of appeals which has spoken to

    this matter in similar circumstances has held that no actionable

    section 1983 claim lay. See Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 ___ ______ _______

    (2d Cir. 1994); Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994) _____ _____

    (Powell, J., sitting by designation); Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d _______ ______

    1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, ______ ______


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    1242-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Warren _____ ______ ______

    v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.), cert. _____________________ _____

    denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, ______ _______ ______

    1263 (10th Cir. 1976). We now join their ranks. There was no

    actionable section 1983 claim relating to the alleged Miranda _______

    violation.4

    D. The Eighth Amendment Claim D. The Eighth Amendment Claim __________________________

    Mahan challenges the district court ruling directing

    judgment as a matter of law on the claim that PHC refused to

    administer his Tegretol for seven days. This claim implicates

    the established PHC clearance policy preventing corrections

    officers from administering prescribed medicines on days the

    detainee is scheduled to appear in court and until permitted to ___

    do so by a "medical officer."

    Eighth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees alleging

    denials of medical assistance essentially turn on whether the

    challenged official action constituted "deliberate indifference"

    to a "serious medical need". Consolo v. George, 58 F.3d 791, _______ ______

    793-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, _____ __________________

    ____________________

    4Although there can be no question that the alleged threat
    by Bouchie to keep Mahan in the holding cell until he responded
    to further questions assuming it were credited by the fact-
    finder would be fully deserving of official sanction, it did
    not rise to the egregious level of police misconduct required for
    an actionable 1983 claim absent evidence that it succeeded in
    overbearing Mahan's will to exercise his Miranda rights. Cf. _______ __
    Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240-50 (police who engaged in conduct that ______
    "shocks the conscience," by attempting to "grill [suspect] until
    he confessed," and questioning him for thirty minutes despite
    assertion of right to counsel, are subject to liability under
    1983 even though defendant does not incriminate himself).

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    17 n.13 (1st Cir. 1992). A "serious medical need" is one "that

    has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one

    that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize

    the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudreault v. Munici- __________ _______

    pality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. ______________________ _____

    denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991). The prescription indicated, and the ______

    district court assumed, that Mahan needed, and would benefit

    from, Tegretol. The record thus established a serious medical

    need.5

    As the district court found, however, the record does

    not establish a trialworthy claim that PHC was "deliberately

    indifferent" to Mahan's "serious medical need." The Supreme

    Court recently defined "deliberate indifference" in the prison

    context. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In ___ ______ _______

    order to be found "deliberately indifferent," prison officials

    must be shown to have been subjectively aware of a condition ____________

    requiring their intervention. Id. at 1980-82. The evidence in ___

    this case established one component of the "subjective awareness"

    requirement; viz., PHC corrections officers were well aware that

    Tegretol had been prescribed for Mahan, and that he repeatedly

    requested it.

    Nevertheless, the record on appeal contains no evidence

    ____________________

    5PHC argues that the district court ruling should be af-
    firmed on the ground that Tegretol would not have alleviated
    Mahan's anxiety attacks. Given the presumption of "serious
    medical need" apparently indulged by the district court, which
    obviated the necessity for Mahan's prescribing physician to
    testify, see supra p. 4, we must reject this suggestion. ___ _____

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    from which a rational factfinder could conclude that PHC person-

    nel were informed, or otherwise learned, of the serious symptoms

    Mahan actually experienced while detained, such as would have

    made them subjectively aware of a condition requiring their

    intervention prior to November 21. Id. at 1980-82; cf. Miranda ___ __ _______

    v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 257-59 (1st Cir. 1985) (acknowledging _____

    that prison officials knew pretrial detainee's epilepsy not under

    control). Absent evidence of subjective awareness, there could

    be no "deliberate indifference" to Mahan's serious medical need.

    Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1980-82. Consequently, the Eighth Amend- ______

    ment claim failed as a matter of law. See United States v. John ___ _____________ ____

    Doe, a/k/a Pizarro-Calderon, No. 94-1096, slip op. at 11-12 (1st ___________________________

    Cir. Aug. 4, 1995) (appellate court may affirm district court

    ruling on any ground supported in record).

    Our ruling should not be misconstrued as condoning the

    status quo, however, but merely as indicating that PHC cannot be

    held liable for failing to adjust its policy to accommodate a

    "serious medical need" of which it was not made aware.6 In

    these circumstances, Mahan simply failed to introduce evidence

    essential to enable a reasonable factfinder to conclude that PHC

    violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

    The district court judgment is affirmed. All parties ________
    ____________________

    6We add that the seemingly inflexible PHC policy relating to
    prescription medicines, coupled with the limited "medical offi-
    cer" hours, could well have resulted in serious harm to Mahan
    during the extended and stressful period the medicine needed to
    control his previously diagnosed condition was withheld. See ___
    Miranda, 770 F.2d at 259 (detainee died after epileptic seizure). _______


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    shall bear their own costs.




















































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