United States v. Carlow ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion





    August 25, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




    ____________________

    No. 94-2140

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    DALE CARLOW, a/k/a WILLIAM R. HARMON,
    a/k/a BILL HARMON,

    Defendant - Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Stahl, Circuit Judge, _____________

    and Dom nguez,* District Judge. ______________

    _____________________

    Paul A. Dinsmore, by Appointment of the Court, for ___________________
    appellant.
    Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, ______________________
    with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and James L. ________________ ________
    McCarthy, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for ________
    appellee.



    ____________________


    ____________________

    * Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.









    ____________________























































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    Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Dale Carlow was Per Curiam ____________

    convicted after a jury found him guilty of 54 counts of mail and

    wire fraud. Carlow now appeals his conviction and sentence.

    Because we discern no error, we affirm.

    For three months in 1990, Carlow used the name William

    Harmon in 29 wire transmissions to buy computer equipment from

    suppliers all over the United States for a retail computer

    company in Maine. Carlow ordered increasingly large quantities

    of equipment and paid by company checks that bounced. After

    Carlow was arrested on November 30, 1990, he opened a computer

    company called Electrobyte. Through this company, Carlow engaged

    in a similar pattern of fraudulent mail and wire transactions.

    Carlow was arrested once again in September 1991.

    At his trial, Carlow's theory of defense was that he

    lacked the requisite intent to defraud, and his main source of

    evidence in support of this argument was his own testimony.

    Closing arguments focused, not surprisingly, on the credibility

    of Carlow's testimony. After deliberating for over three hours,

    the jury found Carlow guilty on all 54 counts. Carlow was

    sentenced on October 19, 1994 to 51 months' imprisonment, and was

    ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $111,649.65.

    Carlow now offers several arguments to challenge his

    conviction and sentence, contending: 1) that the district court

    improperly calculated his sentence under the Sentencing

    Guidelines; 2) that the court erred in ordering restitution in an

    amount greater than $50,000; 3) that the court erred in finding


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    that Carlow's conduct involved more than minimal planning, and

    for failing to decrease his sentence based on his role in the

    offense; that the court erred in instructing the jury at trial;

    5) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to sustain

    his conviction; and 6) that Carlow received ineffective

    assistance of counsel at trial.

    Having carefully reviewed the entire record of the

    trial and sentencing, we find no discernible error or abuse of

    discretion by the district court.1 Accordingly, we reject

    Carlow's contentions on appeal, and affirm. ______


























    ____________________

    1 Because we ordinarily refrain from entertaining ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims on direct review, United States v. ______________
    Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993), and we see no reason to ____
    depart from this rule here, we do not address Carlow's
    ineffective assistance argument here.

    -3-






Document Info

Docket Number: 94-2140

Filed Date: 8/25/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015