Mount v. United States ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    November 12, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 93-1355

    CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    ____________________

    No. 93-1411

    CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
    Petitioner,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent.

    ____________________

    No. 93-1655

    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,

    v.

    CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    ____________________


    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________
    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________
    Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
    ______________
    ____________________



















    Charles Merrill Mount on briefs pro se.
    _____________________
    A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Tobin N. Harvey,
    ___________________ _______________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on briefs for appellee/respondent.


    ____________________


    ____________________

























































    Per Curiam. The judgments in these consolidated appeals
    __________

    are each affirmed. The contention that the district judge

    lacked jurisdiction to preside over appellant's collateral

    proceedings because she presided at trial is frivolous.

    Appellant's reliance on Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d
    ________ _____________

    270 (1st Cir. 1967), is misplaced. See, e.g., Panzardi-
    ___ ____ _________

    Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989),
    _______ _____________

    cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990); Tracey v. United States,
    ____________ ______ _____________

    739 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
    ____________

    1109 (1985). Nor is there any reason to disturb the denial

    of appellant's motion to "cancel" the $50 special

    assessments. Contrary to his assertion, such assessments are

    to be imposed "per count rather than per defendant." United
    ______

    States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); see,
    ______ _____ ___

    e.g., United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152 n.5
    ____ _____________ _______________

    (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991). The
    ____________

    statutory directive that the "obligation to pay an assessment

    ceases five years after the date of the judgment," see 18
    ___

    U.S.C. 3013(c), contemplates no judicial intervention, at

    least in the absence of an ongoing attempt to secure payment.

    And cessation of the obligation to pay is not the equivalent

    of nullification ab initio of the assessment.
    _________

    The judgments are affirmed. Appellant's petition is
    ________________________________________________________

    denied. Appellant's "cross-motion for summary judgment" is
    _____________________________________________________________

    denied.
    _______



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Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1355

Filed Date: 11/12/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015