Akitoye v. United States ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    December 27, 1993
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




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    No. 93-1217

    ADEGBOYEGA AKITOYE,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Defendant, Appellee.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
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    Adegboyega Akitoye on brief pro se.
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    Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, Margaret E. Curran and
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    James H. Leavey, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief for
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    appellee.


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    Per Curiam. Appellant Adegboyega Akitoye was
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    convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with the

    intent to distribute heroin. We affirmed his conviction on

    direct appeal. See United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221
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    (1st Cir. 1991). He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.

    2255 to vacate his sentence. In the motion, appellant raised

    two related grounds: (1) his conviction for conspiracy was

    obtained by the use of evidence not relevant to him; and (2)

    there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

    possession with the intent to distribute heroin. On appeal,

    appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient as to

    the existence of a conspiracy and that his lawyer provided

    ineffective assistance by failing to raise the sufficiency of

    the evidence claim on direct appeal.1

    Issues not pursued on direct appeal are subject to

    the cause and prejudice standard under United States v.
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    Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). See Suveges v. United
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    States, 7 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (failure of 2255
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    movant to object at trial to enhanced term of supervised

    release and to appeal sentence "in the first instance,"




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    1. Appellant also raises an argument concerning the trial
    court's denial of the jury's request to have the testimony of
    three witnesses read to it. However, appellant failed to
    present this ground when he brought his 2255 petition in
    the district court. "[A]n issue not presented to the trial
    court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
    Nogueira v. United States, 683 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1982).
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    In all events, this ground has already been considered and
    rejected on direct appeal. See Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 225-27.
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    constituted procedural default; movant therefore must show

    cause and prejudice to obtain collateral relief); Ford v.
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    United States, 983 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
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    (defendant was procedurally barred, absent a showing of cause

    and prejudice, from raising issues in a 2255 motion which

    he had failed to pursue on direct appeal). Thus, appellant

    is barred from raising the claim concerning the sufficiency

    of the evidence unless he can show cause and prejudice. He

    cannot establish `cause' here, except, perhaps, by resort to

    the principle that cause can be established by ineffective

    assistance of counsel. Suveges, 7 F.3d at 10; Ford, 983 F.2d
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    at 898-99.

    To show ineffectiveness, appellant must demonstrate

    "that counsel fell below the applicable standard for

    performance, defined by what the lawyer knew, or should have

    known, at the time of his/her tactical choices . . . ." See
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    United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir. 1993).
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    Here, what appellant's attorney knew at the time he filed the

    appeal was that we had upheld, on direct appeal, the trial

    judge's finding that appellant had obstructed justice by

    perjuring himself at trial. The trial judge, in enhancing

    appellant's base offense level, had described appellant's

    testimony as a "self-serving `cock and bull story.'" 923

    F.2d at 228. Indeed, in referring to appellant's attempt to

    cast his co-conspirator as the "villain" by disclaiming any



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    knowledge of the drugs or marked money found in his

    (appellant's) apartment, we stated: "Viewed as a seamless

    web, the record stalwartly supports the conclusion that

    Akitoye fabricated a fairy tale in a lame effort to avoid the

    condign consequences of his criminal conduct." Id at 229.
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    Given this scenario, it would be difficult to describe

    counsel's decision not to contest the sufficiency of the

    evidence as anything other than a tactical decision well

    within what constitutes "reasonable professional assistance."

    See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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    Nor do we think that appellant has established the

    second prong of Strickland -- that he was prejudiced by the
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    failure of his attorney to present this issue on direct

    appeal. See id. at 687. We have carefully reviewed the
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    record and find that there was sufficient evidence, beyond a

    reasonable doubt, to support the jury's conclusion that

    appellant had engaged in a conspiracy to distribute heroin

    and possession with the intent to distribute it. See, e.g.,
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    United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1991).
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    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

    district court is affirmed.
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