United States v. Martinez ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion






    January 25, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




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    No. 93-1100

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    RUBEN MARTINEZ,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ___________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
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    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
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    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
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    Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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    Arthur R. Silen, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
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    Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with
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    whom Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, and Gerard B.
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    Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for
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    appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Defendant Rub n Mart nez pleaded guilty to
    Per Curiam
    __________

    two counts of conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21

    U.S.C. 846 and three counts of distributing or possessing with

    the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

    841(a)(1) & 18 U.S.C. 2(a). On January 7, 1993, the United

    States District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced

    Mart nez to five concurrent terms of 51 months in prison, five

    years of supervised release, including a special condition

    relating to deportation, and the required assessments. Mart nez

    challenges his sentence because it was based in part on an

    allegedly erroneous finding that he was a leader or organizer

    under United States Sentencing Guidelines 3B1.1(c).1 We

    affirm.

    I. BACKGROUND
    I. BACKGROUND

    According to the Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") and the

    transcript of the sentencing hearing, see United States v. Reyes,
    ___ _____________ _____

    3 F.3d 29, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that upon a guilty

    plea, the relevant facts should be taken from the PSR and the

    sentencing transcript); United States v. Castellone, 985 F.2d 21,
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    22 (1st Cir. 1993) (same), Drug Enforcement Administration

    ("DEA") Special Agent Russell Holske purchased cocaine from

    defendant Mart nez on three separate occasions during an

    undercover investigation in April through July of 1992. Holske

    made his first purchase on April 1, 1992, buying 27.7 grams of


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    1 All citations refer to the 1992 version of the Sentencing
    Guidelines which were in effect at the time of the sentencing.

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    cocaine from Mart nez for $900. On that occasion, Holske met

    with Mart nez who then made a phone call because he did not have

    the drugs with him. Shortly thereafter, codefendant Juan

    Ituribides arrived with the cocaine and handed it to Mart nez

    who, in turn, handed it to Holske.

    Two days later, Holske purchased 50.5 grams of cocaine

    from Mart nez for $1750. As in the first transaction, Mart nez

    made a phone call before the drugs were delivered; however, on

    the second occasion, codefendant El as Ventura Morales, instead

    of codefendant Ituribides, actually brought the cocaine to

    Mart nez.

    On July 17, 1992, Agent Holske negotiated with Mart nez

    for the purchase of "Two Big Eights" (9 ounces) of cocaine for

    $8000. After Holske and Mart nez met, they were joined by

    Morales. The three then moved to a new location where Mart nez

    showed Holske a small sample of cocaine in exchange for a look at

    the money Holske brought. Morales left and then returned twenty

    to thirty minutes later at which point DEA agents arrested

    Mart nez and Morales and seized 223.4 grams of cocaine.

    Mart nez contests this version of events. He claims

    that he was not the source or supplier of the cocaine but instead

    merely an intermediary who was offered money by a confidential

    informant to assist in the sale. During the first sale, Mart nez

    contends, Ituribides supplied the cocaine and collected the money

    for the deal while Mart nez only assisted by passing the cocaine

    to Holske. For the other two purchases, Mart nez claims that he


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    was approached by the confidential informant and asked for the

    whereabouts of Ituribides. On those occasions, Mart nez

    contends, Morales intervened in the discussion and arranged the

    drug deals. According to Mart nez, his only role was to wait

    with the informant while Morales went to get the cocaine.

    II. ENHANCEMENT OF SENTENCE FOR LEADERSHIP ROLE
    II. ENHANCEMENT OF SENTENCE FOR LEADERSHIP ROLE

    In calculating Mart nez' sentence, the district court

    imposed a two level enhancement for being a leader and organizer

    pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c).2 Mart nez claims the court

    erred because the presentence report contains insufficient facts

    necessary to support a finding that Mart nez organized, managed

    or directed the activities of his codefendants in committing the

    charged offenses.

    We review the district court's "role in the offense"

    determination for clear error. United States v. Schultz, 970
    _____________ _______

    F.2d 960, 963-64 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1020
    ____ ______

    (1993); United States v. Veilleux, 949 F.2d 522, 524 (1st Cir.
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    1991). A leadership role enhancement is warranted where the

    defendant has exercised control or directed the actions of at

    least one other person in committing the crime. The sentencing

    court can take into account such factors as the exercise of

    decision making authority and the degree of participation in

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    2 U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) provides for an increase in the offense
    level:

    If the defendant was an organizer,
    leader, manager, or supervisor in any
    criminal activity other than described in
    (a) or (b), . . .

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    planning or organizing the offense. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 comment

    note 3; Schultz, 970 F.2d at 964; United States v. Panet-Collazo,
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    960 F.2d 256, 261 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 220
    ____ ______

    (1992).

    The evidence from the PSR is sufficient to support the

    sentencing judge's determination that Mart nez "was a leader and

    organizer of this little business [to sell cocaine] that he had"

    and that Mart nez "had working for him Ventura Morales and

    Interpediz [sic]." According to the PSR, Holske purchased the

    cocaine "from" Mart nez or "negotiated with" Mart nez during all

    three of the drug transactions. During the July transaction,

    Mart nez "arranged to be met" at a certain location and later

    displayed a sample of cocaine for Holske. On two occasions,

    Mart nez first met with Holske and then placed a telephone call

    after which the cocaine was delivered. When considered together,

    this evidence is sufficient for the judge to conclude that

    Mart nez arranged and planned each sale and directed the

    activities of his codefendants who served as assistants or

    couriers for Mart nez' operation.

    Mart nez insists that the evidence in the PSR is, at

    most, only sufficient to support a finding that he was an

    intermediary. There is nothing, Mart nez claims, to show he gave

    any orders or directions to anyone or otherwise exercised

    decision making authority. He further asserts that there is no

    evidence, beyond the bald statement that Holske "purchased

    cocaine" or "negotiated" with Mart nez, to support the conclusion


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    that Mart nez set terms and conditions, made the arrangements, or

    profited from the sale.

    While the actions reported in the PSR (making the

    initial contact with the buyer and placing phone calls before

    each drug delivery) may be consistent with those of an

    intermediary, they are also consistent with those taken by a

    leader or organizer. When we factor in Holske's statements that

    Mart nez "negotiated" the deal and "arranged" the meeting

    location, we find ample support for the court's inferences that

    Mart nez was making decisions about terms and conditions when he

    met with Holske, and exercising control over his codefendants

    when he made the telephone calls. "'Where there are two

    permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice

    between them cannot be clearly erroneous.'" Veilleux, 949 F.2d
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    at 525 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
    ________ _____________________

    574 (1985)). The sentencing judge, in fact, explicitly rejected

    Mart nez' alternative version of events when he stated that

    Mart nez had not been "completely candid with the Court nor with

    the Probation Counsellor trying to give the impression that he

    was really working for somebody else, but he wasn't."

    Mart nez also claims that the sentencing judge failed

    to make reasonably specific factual findings to support the

    upward adjustment. This objection is groundless. The sentencing

    court's explicit rejection of Mart nez' alternative version of

    events, together with its statements that, based on the evidence

    in the PSR, Mart nez was a leader of his own business to sell


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    cocaine,3 constitutes specific factual findings which support

    the upward adjustment. See Schultz, 970 F.2d at 963 n.7; United
    ___ _______ ______

    States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir.
    ______ ___________________________

    1991). As we discuss below, any objections to the evidentiary

    basis for the court's specific factual findings are waived.
    _____

    III. OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE SENTENCE
    III. OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE SENTENCE

    Mart nez claims that the sentencing judge erred by

    relying upon information outside his own PSR to determine whether

    he was a leader and organizer. During sentencing, the judge did,

    in fact, explicitly base his findings partly upon information

    contained in the PSR's of Mart nez' codefendants, Morales and

    Ituribides. Mart nez' counsel, however, failed to voice any

    ____________________

    3 At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge stated:

    I'm satisfied from the evidence in this
    matter presented from all the material
    that I've been privy to not only from
    this presentence report but from the
    presentence report involving Morales and
    Interpediz that this Defendant was a
    leader, an organizer. He was akin to a
    self-employed, independent sales
    representative. I'm satisfied that he
    didn't own the cocaine, but he was in
    business for himself selling cocaine and
    he was going to earn a commission for
    selling that cocaine and he had working
    for him Ventura Morales and Interpediz.
    As a matter of fact, Interpediz was only
    involved in one instance for a pittance,
    about $40 was going to be his pay for
    simply going to the source and getting
    the cocaine and bringing it to the
    designated place and Morales was serving
    in the same function. So the Defendant
    clearly was a leader and organizer of
    this little business that he had. So the
    Probation Office was correct in tacking
    on two points in this case.

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    objections to this at the hearing. Consequently, the issue has

    not been preserved for appeal unless there are some "unusually

    compelling circumstances." United States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991
    _____________ _____________

    F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). This exception mainly applies where a

    correction of the alleged error would ensure the defendant's

    success and thus prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id. Mart nez
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    fails to point out any circumstances, compelling or otherwise,

    that would be sufficient to overcome his procedural default.

    Given the sufficiency of the evidence in Mart nez' own PSR and

    given that the judge, in making a "role in the offense"

    determination for Mart nez, had to take into consideration the

    relative roles of all the codefendants anyway,4 we are convinced

    that no miscarriage of justice has occurred in this case.

    Mart nez also challenges the sentencing judge's

    decision to grant only a two level, instead of a three level,

    decrease in his base offense level for acceptance of

    responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b)(2). He concedes,

    however, that he did not raise this objection during sentencing

    and that "under the 'plain error' rule, he will not succeed on

    this point alone." As we have decided all other issues against

    the defendant, according to his own admission, we must decide

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    4 According to the prosecution, prior to Mart nez' sentencing,
    the district court had already determined that at least one
    codefendant, Ituribides, was merely a courier and had awarded
    Ituribides a downward adjustment for playing a minor role.
    Defense counsel also referred to this at the hearing and
    cautioned the judge that such a finding did not necessarily mean
    that Mart nez was a leader and organizer. The issue of what
    roles were played by Mart nez' codefendants was thus brought to
    the judge's attention before his ruling.

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    this one against him as well.

    Affirmed.
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