United States v. Jiminian ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    January 24, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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    No. 93-1857




    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BENITO FILIMON JIMINIAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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    Joel Vincent on brief for appellant.
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    Jonathan R. Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney, and
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    Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief
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    for appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Benito Filimon
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    Jiminian pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin

    with intent to distribute it, see 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),
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    841(b)(1)(c), 846, and one related conspiracy count, see 18
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    U.S.C. 2. The district court determined that Jiminian is a

    career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced

    him accordingly. Jiminian challenges his sentence, claiming

    that he was improperly classified as a career offender.

    Appellant also argues that the district court erred in

    refusing his request for a downward departure from the

    applicable guideline range on the basis that his criminal

    history category over-represented the seriousness of his

    criminal history. We affirm.

    I.

    The district court adjudicated Jiminian a career

    offender on the basis of two prior state drug convictions for

    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it.

    Appellant argues that these convictions could not properly

    count as predicate offenses because the Sentencing Commission

    exceeded it statutory authority when it designated offenses

    under state drug laws as qualifying offenses for career

    offender status. In particular, Jiminian contends that the

    enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. 924(h), allows only drug

    convictions obtained under the federal statutes it

    enumerates--not convictions obtained under similar state



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    statutes---to count as predicate offenses. We have

    previously rejected this argument and are not persuaded to

    revisit the issue here. See United States v. Beasley, No.
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    93-1391, slip op. at 6-12 (1st Cir. December 21, 1993); see
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    also United States v. Dyer, No. 93-1045, slip op. at 2 (1st
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    Cir. June 18, 1993) (per curiam).

    Appellant also argues that the district court erred

    in failing to inquire into the facts surrounding the latter

    of the two state drug convictions to determine whether it

    indeed qualified as a predicate offense. Although

    appellant's argument is not entirely clear, he appears to

    contend that if the district court had made further inquiry,

    it would have ascertained that the evidence in this state

    case was only sufficient to support a finding of simple

    possession of cocaine for personal use and not intent to

    distribute it.1 Appellant, however, conceded below that

    this offense was a predicate offense under "a strict reading

    of the sentencing guidelines." Accordingly, the issue is

    waived on appeal. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707,
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    717 (1st Cir. 1992) (claims not raised at the time of

    sentencing are waived on appeal), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
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    1005 (1993). We further note that since appellant's



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    1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2, a conviction for
    possession of a controlled substance with intent to
    distribute it--but not simple possession of a controlled
    substance--is a predicate offense for career offender status.

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    conviction in the state case at issue resulted from a guilty

    plea, he admitted guilt to the charged offense. See, e.g.,
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    Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 308 (1st Cir.),
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    cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992).2
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    II.

    Appellant's remaining claimed error is the failure

    of the district court to depart downward from the applicable

    guideline range. We have often stated that a district

    court's discretionary decision not to depart from the

    guidelines is unappealable unless the decision is a "product

    of the court's miscalculation about whether it possessed the

    authority to depart." United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288,
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    292 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 224 (1992). Here,
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    the record is clear that the district court recognized it had

    the authority to depart from the guidelines, but exercised

    its discretion not to do so. Accordingly, we have no

    jurisdiction to review appellant's claim. The judgment below

    is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.
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    2. We also find that appellant waived any issue regarding
    the voluntariness of the guilty plea. We make no comment on
    whether the constitutionality of the state conviction would
    have been open to collateral attack at sentencing if the
    issue had been raised below.

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