United States v. Ghaffar ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    April 7, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ___________________


    No. 93-1711




    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    AMIR GHAFFAR,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
    __________________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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    ___________________

    Loletta L. Darden on brief for appellant.
    _________________
    Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, Gerard B. Sullivan
    ______________ ___________________
    and Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorneys, on
    ___________________
    brief for appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Appellant, Amir Ghaffar, pled guilty
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    to the following three counts: I) possession with intent to

    distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)); II) use of a

    firearm during a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c));

    and III) possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C.

    922(g)). The United States District Court for the District

    of Rhode Island sentenced him to 70 months in prison on

    counts I and III, to run concurrently, and to 60 months in

    prison on count II, to run consecutively with the sentence

    imposed for counts I and III.

    Ghaffar appeals the sentence on the grounds that the

    five-year consecutive sentence mandated by 18 U.S.C.

    924(c)(1) violates his due process and Eighth Amendment

    rights and that the district court erred in failing to merge

    counts II and III for sentencing purposes. We affirm.

    1. Due Process and Eighth Amendment Claims
    _______________________________________

    Ghaffar argues on appeal, for the first time, that the

    imposition of a five-year consecutive sentence mandated by 18

    U.S.C. 924(c)(1) violates his due process rights and

    constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Ghaffar did not

    raise these constitutional issues below, despite ample

    opportunity to do so. "We have repeatedly ruled, in

    connection with sentencing as in other contexts, that

    arguments not seasonably addressed to the trial court may not

    be raised for the first time in an appellate venue." United
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    States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1991). Therefore,
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    we deem these constitutional claims to have been waived.

    Even had the claims not been waived, however, they would

    not entitle Ghaffar to relief. In United States v.
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    Campusano, 947 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991), we upheld the
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    mandatory sentencing provision of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) against

    claims that it precluded discretion by the sentencing court

    in violation of appellant's due process and Eighth Amendment

    rights. Id. at 3-4.
    ___

    Here, Ghaffar's argument is that the statute violates

    due process because it is not the "least restrictive means

    for accomplishing Congress' purpose." There is no support

    for the application of such a standard to the statute in

    question. Ghaffar also argues that the consecutive sentence

    requirement of section 924(c)(1) violates the Eighth

    Amendment because it imposes a penalty that is "harsher than

    necessary." Even if we liberally interpret this as a

    proportionality argument, the mandatory consecutive sentence

    imposed under section 924(c) does not come close to the level

    of disproportionality that would constitute cruel and unusual

    punishment. In United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21 (1st
    ______________ ________

    Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989), we held that
    ____ ______

    a minimum fifteen-year sentence for possession of a firearm

    by an habitual criminal, imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(e),

    did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The



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    reasoning of that opinion has equal, if not greater, force

    here.

    2. Merger of Counts II and III
    ___________________________

    Ghaffar's second argument on appeal is that the district

    court erred in sentencing him under count II (for using or

    carrying a firearm during or in relation to a drug

    trafficking offense) and count III (for possession of a

    firearm by a convicted felon) because both counts involved a

    single act: possession of a firearm. Ghaffar relies upon

    Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (holding that
    ____ _____________

    Congress did not intend punishments to be imposed for both

    receipt of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(h)(1) and

    possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. App.

    1202(a)(1)). Ghaffar raised this argument below. The

    district court, after briefing by the parties, rejected it in

    a Memorandum and Order dated May 14, 1993. The district

    court fully articulated the reasons that Ghaffar's reliance

    upon Ball v. United States is misplaced. We reject Ghaffar's
    ____ _____________

    argument for the reasons stated in the district court

    opinion.

    The sentence imposed by the district court is summarily

    affirmed pursuant to Loc. R. 27.1.









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