Surfact, Inc. v. South Pearl ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    March 31, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ___________________


    No. 93-2263




    SURFACT, INC.,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    SOUTH PEARL CHEMICAL, INC.,

    Defendant, Appellee.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge.
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    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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    David Efon and Kevin G. Little on brief for appellant.
    __________ _______________
    Gloria L. Lebron Nieves and Cobian & Valls, on brief for
    ________________________ ______________
    appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Appellant Surfact, Inc., a Florida
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    corporation, appeals the dismissal for lack of diversity

    jurisdiction of its action against appellee, South Pearl

    Chemical, Inc. We affirm.

    I

    On February 1, 1988, appellant Surfact, entered into an

    exclusive dealership agreement with South Pearl Chemical,

    Inc. According to appellant, the agreement was illegally

    terminated on January 31, 1990, in violation of Puerto Rico

    Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278. Appellant brought suit in the

    United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico

    and invoked diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

    1332. Appellee in turn moved to dismiss for lack of

    diversity. A magistrate judge issued a report and

    recommendation that the motion for dismissal be granted

    because both parties to the agreement were Florida

    corporations. The district court affirmed.

    II

    The dispute in this case arises out of the fact

    that there have been two corporations with the name "South

    Pearl Chemical, Inc." One corporation [South Pearl Puerto

    Rico] was incorporated in 1984 in the Commonwealth of Puerto

    Rico. South Pearl Puerto Rico amended its corporate charter

    in July 1987 to change its corporate name to Ole South Pearl

    Chemical, Inc. The other corporation [South Pearl Florida]



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    was incorporated in 1987 in the state of Florida. In May

    1987, Ole South Pearl transferred all its "assets and

    business" to South Pearl Florida in exchange for 800 shares

    of South Pearl Florida common stock.1 However, the

    corporations remained separate entities. The exclusive

    dealership agreement between Surfact and South Pearl

    Chemical, Inc. was entered into almost ten months after the

    transfer of assets between Ole South Pearl and South Pearl

    Florida.

    Surfact asserts that it entered into the exclusive

    dealership agreement with Ole South Pearl. The district

    court, however, found that the exclusive dealership contract

    had been entered into by Surfact and South Pearl Florida.

    Hence, diversity of parties was absent. We review findings

    of jurisdictional facts only for clear error. See, e.g.,
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    Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist.,
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    992 F.2d 1171, 1178 (11th Cir. 1993); Rocovich v. United
    ________ ______

    States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    ______

    The district court's finding is supportable in the

    record. Prior to the signing of the exclusive dealership

    agreement, all Ole South Pearl's "assets and business" were

    transferred to South Pearl Florida. From this, the court

    could have inferred that, at the time of the exclusive


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    1. The transfer agreement, dated May 31, 1987, refers to Old
    South Pearl, Inc., even though the amendment to the corporate
    charter changing the name was not filed until July 24, 1987.

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    dealership agreement, South Pearl Florida was the only active

    corporation and thus the only one which would have entered

    into the agreement with Surfact. This inference is confirmed

    not only by the fact that, by the time of the agreement,

    South Pearl Puerto Rico had changed its name to Old South

    Pearl, but also by tax records, which show that, after the

    transfer of assets, South Pearl Florida was an active

    corporation with net sales of over $1,600,000 in 1988 and

    $4,000,000 in 1989, whereas there is no record of any tax

    reports having been filed by Ole South Pearl after 1987.

    Finally, Heraclio Prieto, who signed the agreement on behalf

    of South Pearl Chemical, Inc., filed a sworn affidavit

    stating that he did so as a representative of South Pearl

    Florida. Although other evidence in the record might

    support a contrary finding, the district court's finding is

    not clearly erroneous. See Lundquist v. Precision Valley
    ___ _________ ________________

    Aviation, Inc., 946 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (no clear
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    error where factfinder chooses between two permissible views

    of the evidence).2



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    2. Appellant also contends that the district court erred in
    dismissing the case before granting appellant an adequate
    opportunity to conduct discovery relevant to the motion to
    dismiss. However, this objection was not raised before the
    magistrate judge or in appellant's objection to the
    recommendation and report of the magistrate judge. It,
    therefore, cannot be raised before this court. See Borden v.
    ___ ______
    Secretary of Health & Human Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.
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    1987) (argument which could have been but was not presented
    to magistrate in first instance is waived on review).

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    Affirmed.
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