Yates v. Gawel ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    October 13, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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    No. 94-1660

    JOHN YATES,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    MICHAEL A. GAWEL,
    Defendant, Appellee.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and
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    Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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    Arthur E. Chatfield, III on brief for appellant.
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    Marc DeSisto and Kathleen Powers, on brief for appellee.
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    Per Curiam. Appellant John Yates appeals the granting
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    of judgment as a matter of law to appellee Officer Michael

    Gawel of the Foster Police Department on appellant's claims

    of civil rights violations, due to appellee's alleged

    malicious prosecution and false arrest of appellant, and

    appellant's state law claim of malicious prosecution. We

    affirm.

    Judgment as a matter of law was properly granted on

    appellant's claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C.

    1983 because appellant failed to show that he had suffered a

    deprivation of either his substantive or procedural due

    process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Senra v.
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    Cunningham, 9 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 1993). Appellant
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    produced no evidence, such as that he had been physically

    abused, detained or prosecuted on racial or political

    grounds, which would support a jury finding that he had

    suffered a substantive due process violation.1 See id. His
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    failure to demonstrate that the Rhode Island state law remedy

    for malicious prosecution was inadequate to rectify any harm

    he might have suffered is fatal to his procedural due process

    claim. Id.
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    1. Moreover, the recent Supreme Court case of Albright v.
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    Oliver, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994), "would appear virtually to
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    foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis
    for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983."
    Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1994).
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    To establish a claim of malicious prosecution under

    Rhode Island state law, appellant needed to prove, inter
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    alia, that Officer Gawel lacked probable cause to initiate a
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    criminal proceeding against him. Id. at 174. Such a finding
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    was precluded in the instant case, by the fact that appellant

    had previously been found guilty of the criminal charge in

    question after trial in the Rhode Island District Court.

    Even though this verdict was reversed after a jury trial in

    the Rhode Island Superior Court, the determination by the

    Rhode Island District Court is nevertheless determinative on

    the issue of probable cause under Rhode Island law. See Nagy
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    v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 931, 392 A.2d 365, 368 (1978) ("a
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    judicial determination by a court of original jurisdiction in

    favor of the person who initiated . . . proceedings is

    generally held to be conclusive evidence of probable cause,

    even though that determination is ultimately reversed on

    appeal, unless it is shown to have been obtained by fraud or

    other imposition upon the court") (citing cases).

    Finally, Gawel presented sufficient, uncontradicted

    evidence to demonstrate that he had a reasonable belief that

    probable cause existed to arrest appellant. Therefore, Gawel

    was entitled as a matter of law to qualified immunity from

    the claim that he had violated appellant's civil rights

    through a false arrest. See Ricci v. Urso, 974 F.2d 5, 7
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    (1st Cir. 1992).



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    Affirmed.
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