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USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1676
NAN TOUCH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MASTER UNIT DIE PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant, Appellant.
v.
TRUEBLOOD, INC., a/k/a MODDRN, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Mark A. McCormack, with whom Law Offices of Mark A. McCormack was _________________ ________________________________
on brief for appellant.
Lenahan O'Connell, with whom O'Connell and O'Connell was on brief _________________ _______________________
for appellee.
____________________
January 5, 1995
____________________
CYR, Circuit Judge. Defendant and third-party plain- CYR, Circuit Judge ______________
tiff Master Unit Die Products, Inc. ("MUD"), appeals from an
adverse judgment dismissing its cross-claim for contribution
against appellees P.H. Trueblood Corporation and Trueblood, Inc.
(collectively: "Trueblood"). As the findings of fact and
conclusions of law entered by the district court do not permit
reliable appellate review, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), we vacate ___
its judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I I
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________
In 1966, Trueblood designed, manufactured, and sold a
plastic-molding press designed so that end-users could affix to
its movable shuttle table two "quick-change" frames. Once the
press was equipped with the required quick-change frames (not
manufactured by Trueblood) and each frame was fitted with a die
containing an injectable mold, the press would inject liquified
plastic into one die-mold; and after the shuttle table shifted
the first frame off to one side, the press would inject liquified
plastic into the die-mold on the second frame. From recessed
holes in the shuttle table surface, the press triggered a "knock-
out" plate built into the sidelined frame which thrust up through
the filled die-mold, thereby ejecting and purging the hardened
plastic part from the work area. After the ejection was complet-
ed, the shuttle table shifted the frame containing the empty die-
mold back into a central position for the next injection of
plastic, while the press shifted and "knocked out" the twin die-
mold in the same manner.
The console which housed the controls for the Trueblood
press was located within arm's length of the press operator and
had three settings. In the "off" mode, the press would not
operate. In "automatic" mode, the press automatically repeated
the entire cycle of functions described above, but the press
operator was required to use both hands to push two widely-spaced ____
buttons on the console, which meant that the operator's hands
could not be inserted into the injection or ejection areas while
the press was in operation. In the "hand" mode, however, the
press operator could perform each function in the cycle by
manually depressing one console panel button for each function, ___ ____ ________
leaving the operator with one free hand. Moreover, when first ____ ____
switched from "off" to "hand," the press automatically "recy-
cled," thereby thrusting into the ejection area any knockout
plate then in position. The "hand" mode was designed to allow
the press operator to insert an implement through an opening in
the quick-change frame to dislodge a jammed knockout plate or
plastic part, while manually triggering the "eject" button
located on the control console.
By early October 1989, an unaltered Trueblood press had
come into the possession of Styletek, Inc., in Lowell,
Massachusetts, fitted with two quick-change frames designed and
manufactured by appellant MUD. On October 11, 1989, Styletek
employee Nan Touch was operating the Trueblood press in the
3
"automatic" mode when one of the MUD frame's knockout plates
became jammed in the "up" position. With his left hand, Nan
Touch reached through an opening (1.4" high x 5.25" wide) in the
front of the jammed frame to dislodge a part stuck in a die-mold,
at the same time using his right hand to change the press from
"automatic" to "off" to "hand" mode. At this point, the jammed
knockout plate "recycled" and amputated portions of two fingers
on Nan Touch's left hand.
In June 1992, Nan Touch instituted this diversity
action against MUD in the District of Massachusetts, alleging
negligence, breach of warranty, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106, ___
2-314, and unfair trade practices, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. ___
93A, in the design, manufacture, and sale of frames incorporating
an opening large enough to permit a press operator to insert a
hand into the ejection area during operation. MUD impleaded
Trueblood as a third-party defendant, Mass Gen. L. Ann. ch. 231B,
1 (contribution among joint tortfeasors), alleging that the
"one-handed" design of the press and its automatic recycling of
the knockout mechanism upon transition into "hand" mode contrib-
uted to Nan Touch's injury. Prior to trial, Nan Touch settled
with MUD.
MUD's third-party complaint for contribution against
Trueblood was tried to the court. The district court found for
Trueblood and entered the following findings of fact and con-
clusions of law:
As to the defectiveness of the molding press,
MUD has failed to establish that two-hand
4
operation was the industry standard for the ________ ________
manufacturing of mechanical power presses in __
1966. While Trueblood's molding press may ____
very well violate current day OSHA regula- _______ ___ _______
tions, it would be unfair to impose modern _____ ______
standards on the practices of nearly thirty
years ago. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the molding press was not defective when ___ _________ ____
manufactured . . . . ____________
Nan Touch v. Master Unit Die Prods., Inc., No. 92-11493-EFH, slip _________ ____________________________
op. at 3 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994) (emphasis added).
II II
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________
We review interpretations of state law de novo, see __ ____ ___
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1991), and ____________________ _______
findings of fact for clear error, see Interstate Commerce Comm'n ___ __________________________
v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir. 1993). _____________________
MUD maintains that the district court misapplied the Massachu-
setts law governing claims for breach of warranty based in tort,
or relied on implicit findings of fact unsupported by the evi-
dence. We do not reach the merits of these contentions, for we
conclude that the district court ruling is insufficiently clear
to enable effective appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ___
("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law . . . ."). Under applicable Massa-
chusetts product liability law, negligence-based claims differ
markedly from tort-based claims for breach of warranty. The
factfinder confronted with a negligence-based product liability
5
claim focuses on whether the conduct of the designer or manufac- _______ ________ ________
turer reveals a failure "to use reasonable care to eliminate _____
foreseeable dangers which subject a user to an unreasonable risk
of injury." Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313 ______ _________________
(Mass. 1989). Consequently, evidence that the defendant designer
or manufacturer met the pertinent industry safety standards
prevailing at the time of manufacture would be material, albeit __________ __ ___ ____ __ ___________ ________
nondispositive, evidence that the defendant was not negligent, ________ ___
even though its product's design might not comport with safety
criteria later embraced by the industry.
By contrast, a breach of warranty claim arising under
Massachusetts tort law is founded on strict liability principles, ______
see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106, 2-314; Restatement (Second) of ___ ___________ ___________
Torts 402A cmt. c. (1965), and focuses exclusively "'on whether _____
the product [is] defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on _______ ____________ _________ ___ __
the [actual] conduct of the user or the seller.'" Colter, 525 ___ ________ _______ __ ___ ____ __ ___ ______ ______
N.E.2d at 1313 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Back v. ___ ____
Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-70 (Mass. 1978). Because the ____________
breach of warranty inquiry is not concerned with the reason-
ableness of the designer/manufacturer's conduct, see Correia v. _______ ___ _______
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983) ____________________________
(explaining that defendant may be liable for breach of warranty
even if he "[took] all reasonable measures to make his product
safe"), compliance with "state of the art" safety standards at __
the time the product was designed or manufactured is usually im- ___ ____ ___ _______ ___ ________ __ ____________ __ _______ ___
material. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 ________ ___ ____ _____ __________
6
(Mass. 1984). Instead, the factfinder may rely on the failure of
the product to conform to present-day safety standards in deter- ___________
mining whether it is "unreasonably dangerous," under a breach of
warranty analysis, even though the risk against which the post-
design or post-manufacture safety standard was intended to
protect was unknown or not reasonably discoverable by the defen-
dant prior to the sale of the product. See id. (defendant may be ___ ___
liable for breach of warranty "regardless of the knowledge of
risks that he actually had or reasonably should have had when the
sale took place").
Moreover, although nonconformance with a present-day ___________
safety standard would be relevant evidence, it would not compel ______
the trier of fact to find the product "unreasonably dangerous" ____________
per se, see, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st ___ __ ___ ____ _______ _____________
Cir. 1991) (OSHA regulations do not preempt state tort law
principles), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992). Indeed, even _____ ______
the incorporation of a design feature currently perceived as a
dangerous condition might be found "reasonable" in the circum-
stances, based on the factfinder's application of the traditional
risk/utility balancing test to the particular product. See Back, ___ ____
378 N.E.2d at 970 (listing the factors to be weighed in
determining whether particular product is unreasonably dangerous, _______ ____________
including "'the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged
design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechani-
cal feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost
of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the
7
product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design'") (citation omitted).
Viewed against the applicable principles of Massachu-
setts law, the findings entered by the district court are plainly
deficient. The equivocal observation that "Trueblood's molding
press may very well violate current day OSHA regulations" pro- ___ ____ ____ _______
scribing one-handed presses, coupled with the court's negligence-
based assessment that "MUD has failed to establish that two-hand
operation was the industry standard for the manufacturing of ________ ________
mechanical power presses in 1966," strongly suggest that the __ ____
district court viewed any such OSHA violation as simply immateri-
al to Trueblood's liability. On the contrary, a finding that the
Trueblood press contravened the 1992 OSHA standards, a matter all
but conceded by the parties, clearly would be material to the
ultimate factual determination whether the press was "unreason-
ably dangerous," and hence gave rise to a breach of warranty.
On the other hand, such a finding would not compel the ______
conclusion that the Trueblood press was "unreasonably dangerous"
per se. Yet the district court's observation concerning the ___ __
"unfairness" of applying the 1992 OSHA standards to a product
manufactured in 1966, see supra p. 5, strongly suggests that the ___ _____
district court perceived a need to forefend against just such a
"compelled" conclusion. But see Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, ___ ___ _____ ____________________
Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. 1994) (contrasting Connecticut's ____
ten-year statute of repose after sale, and noting that Massachu-
setts breach of warranty claims are not rendered defeasible
8
simply by the passage of time). In addition, the district
court's free-form "unfairness" exception, especially in reference
to a durable product like the Trueblood press, is out of step
with the purpose and policy of the strict product liability
principles upon which breach of warranty liability is founded.
See Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313 n.13 ("'[P]ublic policy demands ___ ______
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intend-
ed for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A cmt. c. _______ _____________________________
(1965))).
Finally, we can discern no indication in the district
court ruling as to how, or whether, the required risk/utility
balancing was performed to determine if the one-handed control
feature made the press "unreasonably" dangerous. The court ____________
neither cites to apposite Massachusetts case law, nor adverts to
any risk/utility balancing test component, even though MUD
introduced evidence that Trueblood had available at slight
additional cost feasible, "safer" design alternatives.
Trueblood countered with evidence that one-handed control was
essential to permit a press operator to insert an implement into __ ______ __ _________
the work area to unjam a knockout plate, and that it was a
"reasonably" safe design provided the manufacturers of quick-
9
change frames did not incorporate an opening large enough to
accommodate the operator's hand. We in no sense suggest which ____
(if either) evidentiary proffer should be credited, but simply
emphasize that appellate review is utterly impracticable when
neither the conclusions of law which guided the district court
ruling, nor the findings of fact essential to a principled
decision under the applicable law, are discernible from its
decision.
As we have stressed repeatedly in the past, the Rule
52(a) requirements that facts be stated specially, and conclu-
sions of law separately, impose on the trial court an obligation
to ensure that its ratio decidendi is set forth with enough _____ _________
clarity to enable a reviewing court reliably to perform its
function; namely, to review the conclusions of law de novo and __ ____
the essential findings of fact for clear error. See, e.g., ___ ____
Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 1158, _____________________ ______________________
1160 (1st Cir. 1992); Peckham v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., _______ _____________________________
895 F.2d 830, 842 (1st Cir. 1990); Applewood Landscape & Nursery _____________________________
Co. v. Hollingsworth, 884 F.2d 1502, 1503 (1st Cir. 1989); ___ _____________
Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165-66 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (per _______ ____
curiam) (explaining that Rule 52(a) is "mandatory, not precato-
ry") (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292 ____________ __________
(1960)); Boston and Maine Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, ______________________ ___________________________
618 F.2d 137, 143 (1st Cir. 1980); see also 9 Charles A. Wright & ___ ____
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2571, at 679 _______________________________
(1971) (collecting cases).
10
The parties urge us to salvage the present appeal.
Each proposes plausible interpretations of the evidence and
conclusions of law favorable to itself. But neither has met with
notable success in divining the district court's essential
findings of fact and predicate conclusions of law. We note,
further, that although all responsibility under Rule 52(a) rests
with the trial judge, and the burden is not an onerous one, see ___
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment)
(requiring "brief, definite, pertinent findings" with "no neces-
sity for over-elaboration"), counsel might have avoided the un-
necessary expense and delay occasioned in this case simply by
submitting a timely request for reconsideration based on the need
for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required
by Rule 52(a). As neither party sought reconsideration under
Rule 52(a), each shall bear its own costs on appeal.
The district court judgment is vacated. The case is _______________________________________________________
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. _________________________________________________________________
Each party shall bear its own costs. ___________________________________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 94-1676
Filed Date： 1/5/1995
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015