Citizens Awareness v. NRC ( 1995 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion




    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 94-1562

    CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, INC.,
    Petitioner,

    v.

    UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
    Respondent.

    ____________________

    YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY,
    Intervenor.

    ____________________

    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
    UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

    _____________________

    Jonathan M. Block, with whom Robert L. Quinn and Egan, __________________ _________________ _____
    Flanagan and Cohen, P.C. were on brief for petitioner. ________________________
    Charles E. Mullins, Senior Attorney, Office of the General __________________
    Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with whom Karen D. ________
    Cyr, General Counsel, John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo ___ ____________________ ______
    Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, _______
    Anne S. Almy, Assistant Chief, and William B. Lazarus, Attorney, _____________ __________________
    Appellate Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief for respondent.
    Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., with whom Ropes & Gray, was on brief _____________________ ____________
    for intervenor.


    ____________________

    July 20, 1995
    ____________________













    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Citizens Awareness Network TORRUELLA, Chief Judge _______________________

    ("CAN") petitions for review of a final order and opinion of the

    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "the

    Commission") denying CAN's request for an adjudicatory hearing

    regarding decommissioning activities taking place at the Yankee

    Nuclear Power Station ("Yankee NPS"). CAN's petition for review

    rests on three grounds. First, CAN contends that the

    Commission's order violates CAN members' right to due process

    under the Fifth Amendment and 189a of the Atomic Energy Act

    ("AEA"), 42 U.S.C. 2239 (1988). Second, CAN argues that the

    NRC's action violates the National Environmental Policy Act,

    ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1988) by failing to conduct __ ___

    an environmental analysis ("EA") or an environmental impact

    statement ("EIS") prior to decommissioning. Finally, CAN argues

    that the Commission's actions violate its own precedents and

    regulations, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

    ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. Although we reject CAN's Fifth __ ___

    Amendment arguments, we grant CAN's petition for review on the

    other grounds stated.

    BACKGROUND BACKGROUND

    A. The Regulatory Framework A. The Regulatory Framework ________________________

    Operators of nuclear power plants must have a license

    issued by the NRC. That license describes the facility and the

    authorized activities that the operator may conduct. If the

    operator, called the "licensee," wishes to modify the facility or

    take actions not specifically authorized by the license, the


    -2-












    licensee may seek an amendment to its license from the

    Commission. See 42 U.S.C. 2131-2133, 2237 (1988). ___

    Section 189a of the AEA provides that:

    In any proceeding under this chapter, for
    the granting, suspending, revoking, or
    amending of any license or construction
    permit, or application to transfer
    control, and in any proceeding for the
    issuance or modification of rules and
    regulations dealing with the activities
    of licensees, . . . the Commission shall
    grant a hearing upon the request of any
    person whose interest may be affected by
    the proceeding, and shall admit any such
    person as a party to such
    proceeding. . . .

    42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A). The Commission has issued regulations

    specifically allowing a licensee to modify its facilities without

    NRC supervision, unless the modification is inconsistent with the

    license or involves an "unreviewed safety question." 10 C.F.R.

    50.59(a)(1). If the proposed change is inconsistent with the

    license, or does involve an unreviewed safety question (as that

    term is defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.59(a)(2)(ii)), the licensee

    must apply to the Commission for a license amendment, 10 C.F.R.

    50.59(c), and only then are the statutory hearing rights of

    189a triggered.

    The procedures for decommissioning1 a nuclear power

    plant are set forth principally in 10 C.F.R. 50.82, 50.75,

    51.53, and 51.95 (1990). The formal process begins with the
    ____________________

    1 "Decommissioning" means those activities necessary "to remove
    [a facility] safely from service and reduce residual
    radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property for
    unrestricted use and termination of the license." 10 C.F.R.
    50.2; 53 Fed. Reg. 24018, 24021 (June 27, 1988).

    -3-












    filing of an application by the licensee, normally after the

    plant has ceased permanent operations, for authority to surrender

    its license and to decommission the facility. Five years before

    the licensee expects to end plant operations, the licensee must

    submit a preliminary decommissioning plan containing a cost

    estimate for decommissioning and an assessment of the major

    technical factors that could affect planning for decommissioning.

    10 C.F.R. 50.75. Within two years after "permanent cessation

    of operations" at the plant, but no later than one year prior to

    expiration of its license, a licensee must submit to the

    Commission an application for "authority to surrender a license

    voluntarily and to decommission the facility," together with an

    environmental report covering the proposed decommissioning

    activities. 10 C.F.R. 50.82, 50.83. This application must be

    accompanied by the licensee's proposed decommissioning plan,

    which describes the decommissioning method chosen and the

    activities involved, and sets forth a financial plan for assuring

    the availability of adequate funds for the decommissioning costs.

    10 C.F.R. 50.82(b). The Commission then reviews the

    decommissioning plan, prepares either an environmental impact

    statement ("EIS") or an environmental assessment ("EA") in

    compliance with NEPA, and gives notice to interested parties. 10

    C.F.R. 51.95. If the NRC finds the plan satisfactory (i.e., in ____

    accordance with regulations and not inimical to the common

    defense or the health and safety of the public), the Commission




    -4-












    issues a decommissioning order approving the plan and authorizing

    decommissioning. 10 C.F.R. 50.82(e).

    The Commission has stated that its regulations allow a

    licensee to conduct certain, limited decommissioning activities

    prior to obtaining NRC approval:

    [I]t should be noted that [10 C.F.R.]
    50.59 permits a holder of an operating _______________________
    license to carry out certain activities _______
    without prior Commission approval unless
    these activities involve a change in the
    technical specifications or an unreviewed
    safety question. However, when there is
    a change in the technical specifications
    or an unreviewed safety question, 50.59
    requires the holder of an operating
    license to submit an application for
    amendment to the license pursuant to
    50.90 . . . . [T]his rulemaking do[es]
    not alter a licensee's capability to
    conduct activities under 50.59.
    Although the Commission must approve the _________________________________________
    decommissioning alternative and major _________________________________________
    structural changes to radioactive _________________________________________
    components of the facility or other major _________________________________________
    changes, the licensee may proceed with _______
    some activities such as decontamination,
    minor component disassembly, and shipment
    and storage of spent fuel if these __________
    activities are permitted by the operating _________________________________________
    license and/or 50.59. _______

    53 Fed. Reg. at 24025-24026 (emphasis added). The Commission

    adhered to this position from the issuance of this statement in

    1988 until 1993. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C. ___ ____ ________________________

    at 73 n.5 ("Major dismantling and other activities that

    constitute decommissioning under the NRC's regulations must await

    NRC approval of a decommissioning plan"); Sacramento Mun. Util. ______________________

    Dist. (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), 35 N.R.C. 47, 62 _______________________________________________

    n.7 (1992) (same).


    -5-












    B. Factual Background B. Factual Background __________________

    On February 27, 1992, licensee Yankee Atomic Electric

    Company ("YAEC") announced its intention to cease operations

    permanently at Yankee NPS, a nuclear power plant located near

    Rowe, Massachusetts. One month later, YAEC applied for a license

    amendment to limit its license to a POL, a possession-only

    license, thus revoking YAEC's authority to operate the plant.

    The NRC published a Notice of Proposed Action informing the

    public of its opportunity to be heard on the license amendment

    request, pursuant to 189a of the AEA. 57 Fed. Reg. 13126,

    13140 (April 15, 1992). There were no hearing requests;

    accordingly, the NRC issued the requested amendment to YAEC's

    license on August 5, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 37558, 37579 (Aug. 19,

    1992). In the cover letter accompanying YAEC's amended license,

    the Commission reminded YAEC that "[t]he NRC must approve . . .

    major structural changes to radioactive components of the

    facility . . . ." See Issuance of Amendment No. __ to Facility ___

    Operating License No. DPR-3 (N.R.C. Docket No. 50-029).

    At a meeting between YAEC and NRC representatives on

    October 27, 1992, YAEC proposed that the NRC grant permission for

    YAEC to initiate an "early component removal project" (the

    "CRP"), prior to submission and approval of its decommissioning _____

    plan, and hence prior to conducting an environmental assessment

    of decommissioning at the site. YAEC explained that it wished

    expeditious commencement of this early CRP because of the

    unexpected availability of space in the Barnwell, South Carolina


    -6-












    Low-level Waste Disposal facility. If made to wait for

    submission and approval of a decommissioning plan, YAEC would

    lose its chance to use the Barnwell facility.

    Pursuant to this proposed CRP, YAEC would first remove

    the four steam generators and the pressurizer from the nuclear

    reactor containment, remove core internals from the reactor

    pressure vessel, and transport all of these radioactive

    components to the Barnwell facility. After this dismantling,

    YAEC proposed to then cut up the nuclear reactor core baffle

    plate (which is too radioactive to meet low-level waste criteria

    and thus cannot be dumped in the Barnwell site), and store the

    pieces in canisters in the spent fuel pool for future delivery to

    a U.S. Department of Energy waste site. Finally, YAEC planned to

    remove and transport the four main coolant pumps to the Barnwell

    site. These CRP activities would result in the permanent

    disposal of 90% of the nonfuel, residual radioactivity at Yankee

    NPS, all prior to approval of the actual decommissioning plan. _____

    On November 25, 1992, YAEC sent a letter to the NRC

    which set forth YAEC's arguments as to how NRC regulations,

    Statements of Consideration issued with those regulations, and

    Commission precedents could be "interpreted" to allow approval of

    the early CRP, despite the fact that the Commission's

    interpretative policy at that time explicitly required NRC

    approval for major structural changes.

    During this period, CAN also wrote two letters to the

    NRC, on November 2, 1992 and again on December 21, 1992,


    -7-












    requesting inter alia that the Commission halt or postpone any _____ ____

    and all dismantling activities at Yankee NPS until a

    decommissioning plan was submitted, moved through the public

    notice-and-comment process, and approved. In a December 29, 1992

    letter to CAN, Kenneth Rogers, the Acting Chairman of the

    Commission, responded that the Commission was "considering a

    public meeting in the vicinity of the plant early in 1993 to

    provide information to the public on NRC's review of

    decommissioning in general and on expected site activities which

    will occur prior to the licensee's submittal of a decommissioning

    plan in late 1993."

    On January 14, 1993, following internal review of its

    decommissioning policies, the Commission issued a Staff

    Requirements Memo ("SRM"), setting forth a significant,

    substantial change from previously held agency positions on

    decommissioning activities, and essentially adopting YAEC's

    proposed "interpretation" of prior agency precedents and

    positions. Without any explanation for the substantial

    modification, or any further analysis, the SRM stated:

    Notwithstanding the Commission's _______________
    statements in footnote 3 of CLI-90-08
    [Long Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C. 61 _________________________
    (1991)] and the Statements of
    Consideration for the decommissioning
    rules at 53 Federal Register 24025-26,
    licensees should be allowed to undertake
    any decommissioning activity (as the term
    "decommission" is defined in 10 C.F.R.
    50.2) that does not -- (a) foreclose the
    release of the site for possible
    unrestricted use, (b) significantly
    increase decommissioning costs, (c) cause
    any significant environmental impact not

    -8-












    previously reviewed, or (d) violate the
    terms of the licensee's existing license
    (e.g., OL, POL, OL with confirmatory
    shutdown order etc.) or 10 C.F.R. 50.59
    as applied to the existing license. . . .
    The staff may permit licensees to use
    their decommissioning funds for the
    decommissioning activities permitted
    above . . ., notwithstanding the fact _________________________
    that their decommissioning plans have not _________________________________________
    yet been approved by the NRC. ____________________________

    Shortly after the Commission issued this SRM, YAEC advised the

    NRC that it planned to begin its CRP activities in accordance

    with this new policy.2

    On June 30, 1993, the Commission issued another SRM

    reiterating its new decommissioning policy, and stating that it

    had voted to formally amend 10 C.F.R. 50.59 to reflect this new

    position. This proposed rulemaking is still underway. The

    Commission also stated that approval of a decommissioning plan is

    not an action that triggers hearing rights under 189a of the

    AEA, but that the Commission staff could, in its discretion,

    formulate an informal hearing process for decommissioning plan

    approval.

    On September 8, 1993, CAN again wrote to the NRC, again

    requesting a hearing on the CRP at Yankee NPS. CAN also

    generally alleged that the NRC was in violation of its own

    regulations, and in violation of "the rule making process," by

    allowing a licensee to engage in a CRP without prior Commission
    ____________________

    2 Later, YAEC submitted a decommissioning plan, which is
    currently under NRC review. YAEC completed most of the CRP
    activities, however, before it ever submitted its decommissioning
    plan to the Commission, and well before any environmental
    assessment was performed.

    -9-












    approval. The Commission responded to these allegations in a

    letter dated November 18, 1993, stating that CAN had "failed to

    identify the proposed action that might be taken by the NRC Staff

    that requires the offer of a hearing."

    The next day, CAN filed a petition for agency review

    under 10 C.F.R. 2.206,3 requesting that the NRC halt the CRP

    activities pending an investigation by the Inspector General's

    office. In the petition, CAN reiterated its position that the

    CRP constitutes decommissioning, and that the NRC was thus in

    violation of its own regulations in allowing CRP activities at

    Yankee NPS prior to approval of a decommissioning plan. The NRC

    responded by letter dated December 29, 1993, explaining its

    policy change as set forth in the SRMs, and concluding that CAN's

    petition "does not provide any new information regarding why

    public health and safety warrants suspension of the CRP and

    therefore does not meet the threshold for treatment under 10 CFR

    2.206."

    After a flurry of letters, in which CAN repeatedly

    requested formal hearings on the CRP and the Commission

    consistently denied these requests on the grounds that the CRP

    was inaccord withthe newpolicy, CANfiled thispetition forreview.4
    ____________________

    3 Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, members of the public may request
    agency enforcement action against a licensee that is allegedly in
    violation of an NRC regulation or requirement.

    4 In April 1993, CAN also filed a motion in the United States
    District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a
    temporary restraining order to halt the CRP activities. The
    district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC, 854 F. Supp. ___________________________ ___

    -10-












    STANDARD OF REVIEW STANDARD OF REVIEW

    We review agency actions and decisions with substantial

    deference, setting them aside only if found to be "arbitrary,

    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

    accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle _____________

    ____________________

    16, 18-19 (1994). In so doing, however, the district court
    wrote:

    The court makes this decision with a
    heavy heart. The plaintiffs have been
    diligently attempting for months to get a
    hearing on the appropriateness and
    competence of the NRC's actions. Many of
    them live near the site of the
    decommissioned nuclear plant. They and
    their families are the most directly at
    risk if the job of removing contaminated
    materials is bungled. . . . Not only have
    the plaintiffs been denied the
    opportunity to present their concerns and
    to hear the response of the NRC at a
    formal hearing, they have not as yet even
    been afforded a forum in which to argue
    their entitlement to a hearing. They had ___________
    no incentive to seek a hearing when the
    NRC originally issued the POL, because at
    that time it was the policy of the NRC to ___
    require final approval and NEPA
    compliance before authorizing early
    component removal. Months later, the NRC
    now concedes, this policy changed and the
    NRC decided to view the POL as itself
    authorizing early component removal
    without more. Requests for hearing at
    this point were denied. . . . This course
    of conduct suggests a concerted
    bureaucratic effort to thwart the efforts
    of local citizens to be heard about an
    event that vitally affects them and their
    children. . . . The prospect that this
    tactic may be used nationally, as more
    nuclear plants shut down, . . . is, to
    put it mildly, disquieting.

    Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). __

    -11-












    Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). ___________ ________________________

    The scope of this review is narrow; a court should not substitute

    its judgment for that of the agency, and agency decisions will be

    upheld so long as they "'do not collide directly with substantive

    statutory commands and so long as procedural corners are squarely

    turned.'" Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting _____ ___

    Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993)). ________________________ ___

    This deference is especially marked in technical or scientific

    matters within the agency's area of expertise. Id. __

    While this is a highly deferential standard of review,

    it is not a rubber stamp; in order to avoid being deemed

    arbitrary and capricious, an agency decision must be rational.

    Id.; Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77. Moreover, when an __ ________________________

    administrative agency departs significantly from its own

    precedent, "it must confront the issue squarely and explain why

    the departure is reasonable." D vila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, _______________ ___

    5 (1st Cir. 1994). This is not to say that agencies must forever

    adhere to their precedents; agencies may "refine, reformulate and

    even reverse their precedents in the light of new insights and

    changed circumstances." Id. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. __ ________ ____ ________

    173, 186-87 (1991). An agency changing its course must, however,

    supply a reasoned analysis for the change. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. ___________________

    Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42; Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77. _____ ________________________

    With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of CAN's

    petition.

    ANALYSIS ANALYSIS


    -12-












    CAN raises three principal arguments. First, CAN

    contends that the NRC's refusal to grant CAN a formal hearing

    before allowing YAEC to conduct decommissioning constitutes a

    regulatory taking of their property without due process or

    compensation, denies CAN members their right to due process under

    the Fifth Amendment, and violates the hearing requirements of

    189a of the AEA. Second, CAN argues that the Commission has

    violated NEPA by allowing YAEC to accomplish almost 90% of its

    decommissioning activities before conducting any environmental

    assessment. Finally, CAN contends that the NRC's unexplained

    change in its decommissioning policy was irrational and contrary

    to its own duly-promulgated regulations, in violation of the

    procedural requirements of the APA. We address these contentions

    in reverse order.

    A. The NRC's Change In Policy A. The NRC's Change In Policy __________________________

    CAN argues that the Commission's significant policy

    shift, manifested in its two Staff Requirements Memos, improperly

    revoked duly-promulgated Commission regulations, interpretations

    and precedents, without the benefit of rulemaking procedures or

    even a rational explanation for the change. By allowing YAEC to

    commence the CRP activities notwithstanding its own precedents

    and regulations, CAN contends, the Commission acted arbitrarily

    and capriciously, in violation of the APA. In defense of the

    unexplained change in its decommissioning policy, the NRC

    maintains that the former policy had never been incorporated into




    -13-












    the regulations themselves, and, in any case, that agencies are

    free to alter their interpretations of their own regulations.5

    While this is certainly true, any such alteration or

    reversal must be accompanied by some reasoning -- some indication

    that the shift is rational, and therefore not arbitrary and

    capricious. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77-78. See also _______________________ ________

    Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 ___________________________________ _____________________

    U.S. 800, 808 (1973)("Whatever the ground for the [agency's]

    departure from prior norms, . . . it must be clearly set forth so

    that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency's

    action."). Courts should not attempt to supply a reasoned basis

    for the action that the agency itself has not given. Motor _____

    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. While this is not a ____________________

    difficult standard to meet, the Commission has not met it here.

    The prior Commission policy regarding decommissioning,

    embodied in 10 C.F.R. 50.59 and explicated in the Commission's

    published Statement of Consideration, required NRC approval of a

    decommissioning plan before a licensee undertook any major

    structural changes to a facility. This policy was developed

    through a lengthy notice and comment period, with substantial

    public participation. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24018, 24020 (a total of ___

    ____________________

    5 We are baffled by the Commission's assertion that "CAN has not
    challenged this modification of NRC policy," as we count three
    pages of argument in CAN's brief devoted to this precise issue.
    Nor can the Commission claim that CAN did not raise this issue
    prior to filing this petition for review. In both its September
    8, 1993 letter to the NRC and its 2.206 enforcement petition, CAN
    alleged that the Commission was in violation of its own
    regulations and of the "rule making process."

    -14-












    143 individuals and organizations submitted comments on proposed

    rule). The Commission adhered to this policy for almost five

    years, reiterating its position in at least two adjudicatory

    decisions. Then, rather suddenly, the Commission circulated two

    internal staff memos that completely reversed this settled

    policy, without any notice to the affected public. More

    troubling, however, was the Commission's failure to provide in

    those memos, or anywhere else, any justification or reasoning

    whatsoever for the change. The memos did not set forth any new

    facts, fresh information, or changed circumstances which would

    counsel the shift. Nor did they provide any legal analysis of

    how the new policy comported with, or at least did not conflict

    with, existing agency regulations. With nothing more than a

    breezy "notwithstanding," the Commission abruptly disposed of

    five years' worth of well-reasoned, duly-promulgated agency

    precedent.

    Moreover, the NRC's actions are inconsistent with the

    plain terms of the AEA, the NRC's enabling statute, which provide

    that "in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules ____________

    and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, . . .

    the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any

    person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding. . . ."

    42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). While the NRC's

    policy shift involved an interpretation of its regulation, and

    not the regulation itself, it was an interpretative policy that

    provided a great deal of substantive guidance on the rather


    -15-












    ambiguous language of the regulation, by specifically delineating

    the permissible activities of licensees. We think that the

    statute's phrase "modification of rules and regulations"

    encompasses substantive interpretative policy changes like the

    one involved here, and therefore that the Commission cannot

    effect such modifications without complying with the statute's

    notice and hearing provisions. See Natural Resources, Etc. v. ___ ________________________

    NRC, 695 F.2d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1982)("Fair notice to affected ___

    parties requires that the Commission not alter suddenly and sub ___

    silentio settled interpretations of its own regulations.").6 ________

    Finally, we agree with the petitioners that the

    Commission's new policy appears utterly irrational on its face. __________

    By allowing licensees to conduct most, if not all, of the

    permanent removal and shipment of the major structures and

    radioactive components before the submittal of a decommissioning

    plan, it appears that the Commission is rendering the entire

    decommissioning plan approval process nugatory. Why should a

    licensee be required to submit such a plan if its decommissioning

    is already irreversibly underway? Why offer the public the

    opportunity to be heard on a proposed decommissioning plan if the

    actual decommissioning activities are already completed? In
    ____________________

    6 The Commission points out that in June 1993 it held a public
    meeting, attended by several CAN members. Although the meeting
    was ostensibly to address the community's questions about the
    decommissioning activities at Yankee NPS, the transcript of the
    meeting indicates that the NRC representatives carefully
    sidestepped the few questions raised about the recent change in
    Commission policy regarding decommissioning. We do not think
    that this type of forum or proceeding meets the hearing
    requirements of the AEA.

    -16-












    short, the Commission's new decommissioning policy seems to

    render any regulatory oversight of the decommissioning process

    moot. Perhaps a rational basis for this policy exists, but we

    cannot see one, and the Commission has not provided one.

    The Commission's failure to provide any explanation for

    its seemingly irrational change in policy renders its new policy

    arbitrary and capricious, and not in accordance with the

    requirements of 42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A). We therefore remand

    the issue of the NRC's change in decommissioning policy for

    further proceedings, in accordance with the AEA's hearing

    requirements and this opinion.

    B. Petitioner's NEPA Arguments B. Petitioner's NEPA Arguments ___________________________

    CAN also contends that the Commission's irrational

    interpretation of its regulations has led to the agency's

    permitting YAEC to accomplish over 90% of the decommissioning

    activities at Yankee NPS prior to conducting any EA or EIS, in

    violation of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332.7 In response, the

    ____________________

    7 The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et __
    seq., requires all federal agencies, including the NRC, to ___
    prepare a "detailed statement," containing specified
    environmental information, for all proposed "major federal
    actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
    environment." 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2)(C). When the NRC plans to
    issue a license amendment or take some other form of regulatory
    action that requires NEPA compliance, the NRC will publish either
    an EA stating that there is no significant impact on the
    environment from the proposed action, or an EIS, reviewing the
    impact of the proposed action and listing alternatives. 10
    C.F.R. 51.20, 51.21. When approving a licensee's request to
    decommission, the NRC prepares either a supplemental EIS for the
    post-operating license stage, or an EA updating the prior
    environmental review for the facility, as it deems appropriate.
    10 C.F.R. 51.95(b).

    -17-












    Commission claims that the CRP activities do not constitute a

    "major federal action" triggering NEPA compliance. The

    Commission explains that it did not actively permit YAEC to

    initiate CRP activities; rather, it "simply reviewed YAEC's

    implementation of the CRP, as a part of its everyday oversight of

    its licensee's activities, and found no reasons to interfere with

    YAEC's plans." Because mere "regulatory oversight, as opposed to

    active permission, does not implicate NEPA," the NRC argues, no

    EA or EIS was required.

    This argument is completely devoid of merit. First,

    the Commission holds in trust certain funds set aside by

    licensees, including YAEC, to finance decommissioning activities.

    42 U.S.C. 2232(a). The Commission therefore had to approve the

    release of these set-aside funds in order to finance YAEC's CRP

    activities. See Letter from Morton B. Fairtile re: ___

    Decommissioning Funds, N.R.C. Docket No. 50-029 (April 16, 1993).

    In essence, the Commission had to actively permit the release of _______________

    funds, or YAEC could not have initiated the CRP. Far from being

    "mere oversight," we think the Commission's approval of financing

    certainly constitutes its active permission of the CRP. Second,

    it is undisputed that decommissioning is an action which, even

    under the Commission's new policy, requires NEPA compliance. 10

    C.F.R. 51.95(b). In "advising" YAEC that it could initiate

    decommissioning prior to submitting a decommissioning plan, the

    NRC effectively granted YAEC permission to commence activities

    normally conducted after decommissioning plan approval, including _____


    -18-












    the removal and storage of almost all of the radioactive

    components. This permission, in turn, allowed YAEC to

    decommission its facility without the benefit of NEPA compliance

    by the Commission.

    Regardless of the label the Commission places on its

    decision to release the necessary funds to YAEC and "advise" the

    licensee to go ahead with its CRP, it was effectively, even

    explicitly, permitting YAEC to decommission the facility. An

    agency cannot skirt NEPA or other statutory commands by

    essentially exempting a licensee from regulatory compliance, and

    then simply labelling its decision "mere oversight" rather than a

    major federal action. To do so is manifestly arbitrary and

    capricious.

    We note that the Commission's arguments on this issue

    are implicitly predicated on the assumed validity of its new

    interpretative policy. As we have explained, however, the

    Commission has failed to provide any rational explanation for

    this policy, thus rendering it arbitrary and capricious. The

    Commission therefore cannot rely on its new policy as a basis for

    its decision that NEPA compliance was unnecessary prior to

    decommissioning at Yankee NPS. Accordingly, we find that the

    Commission's action in allowing YAEC to complete 90% of the

    decommissioning at Yankee NPS prior to NEPA compliance lacked any

    rational basis, and was thus arbitrary and capricious. We remand






    -19-












    this issue to the Commission for actions in accordance with this

    holding.8

    C. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments C. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments ________________________________

    1. Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Arguments 1. Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Arguments ______________________________________

    CAN contends that because the property interests of its

    members have been "invaded by radiation due to the NRC's

    regulatory decisions concerning the decommissioning" of Yankee

    NPS, the NRC's actions constitute a regulatory taking of their

    property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We need not dwell

    on this argument, however, as CAN has not stated a cognizable

    takings claim. Beyond its general statement that its property

    interests have been "invaded" by radiation, CAN has not explained

    or argued even generally how this is so, nor does it offer any

    factual support for its claims regarding radiation.9 CAN also

    does not seek compensation for any alleged invasion of its

    property interests, but simply wishes a hearing on the CRP

    activities. Given the sparsity of its allegations and the

    ____________________

    8 We recognize that this holding comes too late to prevent much
    of the CRP activity. There remains, however, a significant
    amount of radioactive material and structures at the Yankee NPS
    site, the removal of which will continue to affect CAN members.
    This continued removal will undoubtedly continue to pose health,
    safety and environmental questions, thereby requiring NRC
    oversight and NEPA compliance. CAN's arguments on this point
    are therefore not moot.

    9 In its brief, CAN does point to the statement made in an
    affidavit by CAN member Will Sparks, describing the NRC's actions
    as "a form of invasion, like have [sic] a stranger in the house,
    like being burglarized." Even assuming that Mr. Sparks'
    affidavit is properly part of the record in this petition, this
    statement is simply insufficient to support a broad takings claim
    like the one put forth here.

    -20-












    complete lack of argument or factual support for its bare

    assertion, we see no reason to depart from the well-settled rule

    in this circuit that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

    unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are

    deemed waived." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st _____________ _______

    Cir. 1990). "It is not sufficient for a party to mention a

    possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to

    . . . put flesh on its bones." Id. Consequently, we reject __

    CAN's takings claim.

    Nor do we find any merit in CAN's rather vague allusion

    to a more general Fifth Amendment argument, presumably that the

    NRC's actions deprived its members of life, liberty or property

    without due process of law. This contention suffers from the

    same deficiencies as CAN's takings claim, being overbroad, vague,

    and unaccompanied by factual support or analysis. Moreover, as

    the NRC points out, "generalized health, safety and environmental

    concerns do not constitute liberty or property subject to due

    process protections." West Chicago, Ill. v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, __________________ ___

    645 (7th Cir. 1983). We simply cannot fashion a constitutional

    violation out of whole cloth on the basis of the kind of

    nonspecific and unsupported allegations raised by CAN here.

    Accordingly, we reject CAN's allegations that the NRC's actions

    violated its members' Fifth Amendment due process rights.

    2. Petitioner's Atomic Energy Act Arguments 2. Petitioner's Atomic Energy Act Arguments ________________________________________

    CAN contends that Commission approval of YAEC's CRP

    violated AEA section 189a, which requires the Commission to grant


    -21-












    a hearing upon request by any party in interest whenever it

    undertakes any proceeding to "amend" a license. 42 U.S.C. 2239

    (a)(1)(A). CAN argues that Commission approval of YAEC's CRP was

    a de facto "amendment" of YAEC's POL because it authorized YAEC __ _____

    (as well as other extant and prospective licensees) to engage in

    materially different conduct not permitted under the pre-1993

    POL, namely, major component dismantling absent prior NRC

    approval of a final decommissioning plan. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24018, ___

    24020 (1988). The Commission counters that its so-called

    "approval" of the CRP cannot be deemed a license "amendment"

    proceeding since the language requiring NRC approval for major

    structural changes was never expressly incorporated into YAEC's

    license.10 Instead, it says, the decommissioning plan

    procedure, which is subject to procedural protections (e.g., ____

    public hearings, preparation of environmental assessments)

    entirely different from those designated in section 189a, was __________________

    described only in a cover letter accompanying the license, and

    the Commission has never treated the decommissioning plan process

    as "amendatory" for section 189a purposes.

    We reject the Commission's claim that its abrupt policy

    change in 1993, to the extent it substantially enlarged the

    authority of an extant licensee (YAEC) retroactively, nonetheless ______

    ____________________

    10 As a threshold matter, the Commission repeats its contention
    that no 2239(a)(1)(A) "proceeding" occurred, because it took no
    affirmative action and merely refused to intervene to prevent
    YAEC from undertaking the CRP. For the reasons previously noted
    in our discussion of the Commission's NEPA violations, see supra ___ _____
    at 17-18, we disagree with this characterization.

    -22-












    did not entitle CAN to the requested section 189a hearing. As

    the Commission itself concedes, by its nature a license is

    presumptively an exclusive -- not an inclusive -- regulatory _________

    device. See Brief for Respondent at 5 ("Th[e] license describes ___

    the facility and the authorized activities that the operator may

    conduct under the license. If the holder of the licensee (sic) .

    . . wishes to modify the facility or to take actions that are not ______________________________________________________

    specifically authorized under the license, the licensee may need __________________________________________

    to seek a change or 'amendment' to the terms of the license.")

    (emphasis added). The sophistical suggestion that the

    decommissioning plan procedures were never formally incorporated

    into YAEC's POL license ignores licensing realities. Licenses

    customarily delineate the types of regulated conduct in which the

    licensee may engage. Regulated conduct which is neither

    delineated, nor reasonably encompassed within delineated

    categories of authorized conduct, presumptively remains

    unlicensed. YAEC's original license did not authorize it to

    implement major-component dismantling of the type undertaken in

    the CRP.

    Thus, if section 189a is to serve its intended purpose,

    surely it contemplates that parties in interest be afforded a

    meaningful opportunity to request a hearing before the Commission ______

    retroactively reinvents the terms of an extant license by voiding _____________

    its implicit limitations on the licensee's conduct. See Skidgel ___ _______

    v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1993) ___________________________

    (statutory language must be interpreted in context, including its


    -23-












    legislative purpose). The claimed right to deny such a hearing

    request undermines the integrity of the licensing process. At

    the time YAEC obtained its original license, and again when it

    amended the original license to a POL, parties in interest,

    including CAN, presumably refrained from any request for a

    section 189a hearing -- to which they would unquestionably have ______________

    been entitled -- in reasonable reliance upon such implicit

    limitations in YAEC's license.

    The Commission correctly points out that we have

    observed that the term "amend," as used in section 189a, is to be

    construed quite literally. See Commonwealth of Mass. v. United ___ ______________________ ______

    States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 878 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1st Cir. _________________________________

    1989). But we were careful to note as well that it is the

    substance of the NRC action that determines entitlement to a _________

    section 189a hearing, not the particular label the NRC chooses to ___

    assign to its action. Id. at 1521 (citing Columbia Broadcasting ___ _____________________

    Syst. Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942)).11 __________ _____________
    ____________________

    11 Moreover, Commonwealth is readily distinguishable on its ____________
    facts. There, the NRC decision approving resumption of
    operations by a licensee, which had shut down its facility
    voluntarily prior to any formal suspension or revocation of its
    operating license by the NRC, did not implicate section 189a.
    Rather, the NRC requirements for license "reinstatement" were
    simply additional interim license restrictions -- imposed ___________________________________________
    pursuant to pre-existing Commission regulations -- none of which ____________
    conflicted with, or required the alteration of, any term of the
    original license. Commonwealth, 878 F.2d at 1520-21 (citing and ____________
    adopting rationale in In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., 771 _____________________________________
    F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986)). _____ ______
    Thus, the operator obtained no greater authority (literally, _______
    "license") than it had before its license was reinstated by the
    NRC. Id. at 1520. Even though the Commission temporarily ___
    exempted the licensee from one restriction generally applicable
    to other licensees, the discretionary exemption was expressly

    -24-












    By contrast, the policy change adopted by the

    Commission in 1993, relating to "minor" component dismantling,

    was in no sense provisional. Moreover, it undeniably

    supplemented the operating authority of extant licensees ____________

    generally, and YAEC in particular, which might henceforth engage

    in major forms of component disassembly beyond the ambit of their

    original licenses. Prior to 1993, parties in interest reasonably

    could presume that YAEC was not authorized to undertake this type

    of CRP unless it submitted to the lapidary process of preparing a

    final decommissioning plan and environmental assessment

    acceptable to the NRC, or it moved to amend its existing license. _________________________________________

    Then, in 1993, the Commission, by ambiguous fiat,

    declared that some forms of "major component disassembly" hence-

    forth were to be outside the license-amendment process, whereas ___________________

    more "serious" types of component removal were to remain subject

    to the amendment process. See 10 C.F.R. 50.59. In our view, ___

    however, the latter provision plainly confirms that the

    Commission had always considered component disassembly, similar

    to that involved in YAEC's CRP, as action beyond the ambit of the

    presumptive authority granted under the licenses it issued.

    The Commission elevates labels over substance. It

    would have us determine that a "proceeding" specifically aimed at

    excusing a licensee from filing a petition to amend its license

    ____________________

    authorized and granted under pre-existing agency regulations, see ____________ ___
    id. at 1521, so that parties in interest were on notice from the ___ ________
    time the license was granted that NRC retained the discretion to ____________________________
    approve the limited exemption at any time in the future.

    -25-












    is not the functional equivalent of a proceeding to allow a de __

    facto "amendment" to its license. As this construct would _____

    eviscerate the very procedural protections Congress envisioned in

    its enactment of section 189a, we decline to permit the

    Commission to do by indirection what it is prohibited from doing

    directly. See 42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A) (Commission must afford ___

    hearing "in any proceeding for the . . . modification of rules

    and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees."). We

    therefore hold that CAN was entitled to a hearing under section

    189a in connection with the NRC decision to permit YAEC's early

    CRP.

    CONCLUSION CONCLUSION

    For the foregoing reasons, we grant CAN's petition for _____

    review in part, and remand to the Commission for proceedings ______

    consistent with this opinion.
























    -26-