United States v. Reyes Vejerano ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion











    December 1, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 94-1968

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    WILFREDO JIMENEZ-RODRIGUEZ,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    No. 94-2072

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    FRANCISCO REYES-VEJERANO,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

















    Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant Francisco Reyes-Vejerano. _____________________
    Rachel Brill with whom Carlos V. Garcia Gutierrez was on brief _____________ ___________________________
    for appellant Wilfredo Jimenez-Rodriguez.
    Sidney M. Glazer, Senior Appellate Counsel, Criminal Division, _________________
    Department of Justice, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States ______________
    Attorney, was on brief for the United States.


    ____________________


    ____________________




















































    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. In January 1994, a federal grand _____________

    jury indicted three men on drug-related offenses: Francisco

    Reyes Vejerano, Wilfredo Jimenez Rodriguez and Jaime Ocampo

    Ochoa. Ocampo pleaded guilty to one count, and his sentence

    was subsequently affirmed by this court in United States v. _____________

    Ocampo, No. 94-1897, 1st Cir. May 8, 1995. Reyes and Jimenez ______

    pled not guilty and were tried together in April 1994. Both

    were convicted, and they now appeal.

    Reyes and Jimenez were each convicted on two related

    conspiracy charges, one to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C.

    841, 846, and the other to make false statements in an

    application for a passport, 18 U.S.C. 1542, in order to

    secure a false travel document for a drug courier. Reyes was

    also convicted of three counts of possession with intent to

    distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841, for specific drug

    transactions related to the conspiracy. Reyes was sentenced

    to 188 months' imprisonment and a $50,000 fine, and Jimenez

    to a 33-month term of imprisonment.

    On this appeal, Reyes and Jimenez have filed over 100

    pages of briefs, together making several dozen claims of

    error. Most of these claims involve matters largely within

    the scope of the trial court's discretion or claims where no

    proper objection was taken. We direct most of our discussion

    to those few issues that seem to us fair ground for argument

    under the applicable standards of review and, in closing,



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    illustrate why the balance of the claims do not merit

    detailed discussion.

    1. Although the government offered ten witnesses, the

    brunt of its case rested on the testimony of Carmen Toledo

    Gonzalez who, by her own admission, had participated in both

    of the conspiracies and engaged in several of the drug

    transactions and the attempted passport fraud. Her evidence

    was bolstered by that of her boyfriend (Jeffrey Martinez) who

    also participated in certain of the events. Their testimony,

    with some gaps filled in by other witnesses, permitted the

    jury to conclude that Reyes and Ocampo were responsible for

    several efforts to import heroin into Puerto Rico.

    As to Reyes, the details need not be recounted since he

    does not deny that the evidence against him was adequate to

    convict. Crediting the government witnesses, the case

    against Reyes was a strong one. Toledo herself made two

    trips, one in October 1992 to Colombia and one in 1993

    (apparently in June) to Panama; and she helped recruit two

    other individuals for separate trips, both to Colombia in

    1993. These trips took place after consultation with Reyes,

    or so the jury was entitled to find. Some drugs were

    successfully imported, one effort resulted in an airport

    arrest, and one fell through because the drugs were not

    delivered to the courier.





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    By contrast, Jimenez--whose role was far more limited--

    argues that the government failed to prove the existence of a

    single conspiracy to possess heroin as charged in the

    indictment and that in any event it failed to show that

    Jimenez joined such a conspiracy. The evidence certainly

    permitted the jury to find that Reyes, Ocampo and Toledo were

    members of one drug trafficking conspiracy. The finding was

    supported by similarities in the participants, methods,

    geographic locations, and the like. See United States v. ___ ______________

    Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (1st Cir. 1994); United States ______ _____________

    v. Cloutier, 966 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1992). ________

    The more difficult question is whether Jimenez, who

    participated in only one of the trips, could fairly be found

    to have joined the charged conspiracy, or any drug conspiracy

    at all. The two issues are significantly different, and we

    address the latter one first. Taking the evidence in the

    light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could

    reasonably have found that the following occurred:

    After Toledo's passport was seized by police in an

    unrelated incident, Reyes and Ocampo gave Toledo

    identification papers to help her obtain a new passport under

    the name of Sarah Luz Velazquez Santiago. When Martinez

    declined to accompany Toledo on another trip, Toledo

    persuaded Jimenez to act as her escort, telling him that she

    was going to bring in narcotics and that she was asking him



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    to help. Before departing, Toledo applied for a passport in

    the name of Sarah Luz Velazquez; Jimenez accompanied her to

    the passport office; and he there signed a document

    identifying Toledo as Sarah Luz Velazquez. No passport was

    obtained, and Toledo changed the destination from Colombia to

    Panama.

    Jimenez then accompanied Toledo to Panama. He had been

    selected because he was a book importer, and it was thought

    that his legitimate business travels would provide cover for

    the scheme. There was some evidence that Jimenez sought to

    distance himself from the importation efforts, but other

    evidence that he requested (unsuccessfully) a third of "what

    was coming" and that, for the return trip to Puerto Rico,

    Jimenez made arrangements to make it "look like it was a

    [trip] having to do with books." Toledo alone collected the

    drugs in Panama and carried them back to Puerto Rico in the

    company of Jimenez.

    Jimenez' assistance was certainly limited, and it was

    open to him to argue that his role was too equivocal to

    justify conviction. But the jury was entitled to find that

    the facts were as Toledo represented them. Further, an

    illegal agreement need not be explicit, Ianelli v. United _______ ______

    States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975); United States v. Ruiz, ______ _____________ ____

    905 F.2d 499, 506 (1st Cir. 1990), and a rational jury could

    conclude that Jimenez' participation was sufficient to make



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    out an agreement. Jimenez was not helped by the fact that

    the evidence clearly showed his participation in the

    ancillaryconspiracy tosecurea passportbasedon falsedocuments.

    Assuming that the evidence allowed the jury to convict

    Jimenez of the heroin conspiracy, the question remains

    whether he joined the overarching conspiracy to import drugs

    as charged in the indictment or only a smaller encompassed

    conspiracy related to the specific Panama transaction. A

    conspirator can be part of a larger conspiracy without

    knowledge of all its details and dimensions. Blumenthal v. __________

    United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); United States v. _____________ _____________

    Cruz, 981 F.2d 613, 617 (1st Cir. 1992). Still, on the ____

    present facts there is a reasonable argument (which we need

    not resolve) that Jimenez, in addition to the passport

    conspiracy, was at worst knowingly engaged only in a single

    narrow conspiracy to import drugs on one occasion.

    Nevertheless, the evidence (as already noted) was

    sufficient to find that Jimenez conspired to possess heroin

    with intent to distribute in connection with the Panama

    episode; and the prosecution made clear at trial that he had

    not yet joined the conspiracy at the time of the prior acts

    of importation. Jimenez was sentenced based only on the 250

    grams of heroin imported with his assistance; in fact, the

    trial court generously based Jimenez' sentence on one-third

    of that amount, in view of the testimony that he had asked to



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    be given one-third of the drugs Toledo was to procure. Thus,

    Jimenez has not demonstrated prejudice as a result of the

    possible variance between the scope of the broader drug

    conspiracy charged and narrower drug conspiracy that was

    adequately proved. United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d at 1235. _____________ ______

    In a different variance argument, Jimenez protests that

    the indictment charged that the conspiracies were alleged to

    have continued to April 1993 (as to the heroin conspiracy)

    and until "on or about April 1993" [sic] (in the case of the

    passport conspiracy). In reality, the second application for

    the passport occurred in June 1993, and the Jimenez trip to

    Panama occurred shortly thereafter. But the indictment also

    identified as an overt act Jimenez' false identification of

    Toledo and said correctly that it occurred "on or about June

    7, 1993." There is no indication that Jimenez was misled by

    the mistaken reference to his trip as one that occurred in

    April. Again there was no showing of prejudice.

    2. Reyes argues that his sentence was substantially

    enhanced from a base level of 32 to one of 36, because the

    district court proposed a four-level increase under U.S.S.G.

    3B1.1(a). This section provides that a four-level

    increase, for an aggravating role, should be imposed "[i]f

    the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal

    activity that involved five or more participants or was

    otherwise extensive . . . ." The pre-sentence report



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    recommended that Reyes be deemed a leader-organizer on the

    ground that in addition to Reyes there were at least five

    other participants in the criminal activities, namely, Jaime

    Ocampo, Carmen Toledo, Jeffrey Martinez, Lourival Quinones

    and Wilfredo Jimenez.

    At the sentencing hearing, Reyes' counsel argued that

    Reyes and Ocampo had passed polygraph tests showing that they

    were not involved in drug trafficking and that other evidence

    showed that Toledo had lied at various points in her

    testimony. The district court, although it referred to the

    jury verdict, made clear that the court was making an

    independent judgment as to whether the facts supported the

    four-level increase. The court then imposed the four-level

    increase but on slightly different grounds than those

    suggested in the pre-sentence report.

    The district judge said although he might treat Martinez

    and Jimenez as participants, he was declining to do so; but

    that there were still the necessary five participants

    comprised of Reyes, Ocampo, Toledo, Quinones and an

    individual referred to at trial as "Negro." Alternatively,

    the court concluded that the criminal activity was "otherwise

    extensive"; under the explicit language of the guideline

    which uses the word "or," criminal enterprise of fewer than

    five would still be the basis for a four-level increase.

    U.S.S.G. 3B1.1.(a)



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    On appeal, Reyes continues to argue that the polygraph

    tests, and other information inconsistent with Toledo's

    version of events, undermines the district court's finding.

    The difficulty is that the district court, like the jury, was

    entitled to accept Toledo's version. While some of the

    information relied on by Reyes to impeach the verdict was not

    before the jury (e.g., the polygraph test), most of the ____

    evidence was considered by the jury and much is self-serving

    statements by other participants or impeachment material.

    The district court's decision to believe Toledo was not

    clearly erroneous.

    A slightly more troubling problem is presented by the

    district court's decision to exclude Martinez and Jimenez and

    to substitute Negro. While Reyes' appeals brief says nothing

    about Quinones, it says that Negro "had nothing to do with

    the present indictment" and therefore could not be included

    as a participant. The government in response points us to

    statements in the sentencing hearing that suggest that Toledo

    had met Negro through Reyes; but it is not clear that the

    transaction in which Negro played a role involved Reyes at

    all.

    In any event, the district court--faced with Reyes'

    objection to describing Negro as a participant--did not ___

    reaffirm that designation. Instead, the court said: "Well,

    Counsel, still you have--you have the other--other--the



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    `otherwise extensive.'" After further colloquy the court

    continued:

    [E]ven if you take Negro away from the
    picture, take it off the picture--out of
    the picture still there are `otherwise
    extensive,' and this was a conspiracy
    that went through Panama, Colombia,
    Puerto Rico and sometimes the Dominican
    Republic . . . . So that's my ruling.
    Let's move on.

    We conclude that the four-level adjustment can be

    affirmed without difficulty on the "otherwise extensive"

    branch of section 3B1.1. The district court was entitled to

    find that as to Reyes there were multiple participants, a

    number of trips, broad geographic scope and a substantial

    amount of heroin. Under the precedents, this is sufficient.

    See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1991); ___ _____________ _____

    United States v. Morphew, 909 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. ______________ _______

    1990). Reyes challenges other aspects of the sentencing--

    including the determination that he played a leadership role

    and could properly be sentenced to a fine of $50,000--but the

    remaining arguments are not substantial.

    3. As we noted at the outset, there are a large number

    of additional claims of error. Reyes, for example, argues

    that a continuance sought only six days before trial should

    have been granted, a matter that is largely within the trial

    court's discretion absent extraordinary circumstances not

    present here. United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, _____________ _______________

    487 (1st Cir. 1994). Reyes also asserts that his conviction


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    was based upon perjured testimony but the record reflects

    only the kinds of conflicts or discrepancies that are

    commonly left to juries.

    Both Reyes and Jimenez complain that testimony was

    admitted concerning extraneous criminal acts, including other

    drug transactions involving Toledo, and that the testimony

    was inadmissible (as irrelevant or as hearsay), highly

    prejudicial, or both. On examination, it appears that almost

    all of the evidence in question related to incidents that

    were relevant (e.g., to explain how Toledo came to need a ____

    false passport) or not made the subject of a contemporaneous

    objection or both. None of these claims needs separate

    discussion.

    Reyes objects now to three alleged misstatements by the

    prosecutor in closing arguments. The only one objected to at

    trial was a reasonable inference by the prosecutor; and the

    only actual misstatement (that the passport sought by Toledo

    was actually used) was the kind of slip of the tongue that

    could easily have been corrected at the time if an objection

    had been made; and the evidence plainly showed that the

    passport had been sought based on false statements but never

    issued. The jury instructions challenged on appeal were not

    objected to at the time and are not remotely plain error.

    Both Reyes and Jimenez argue that the government failed

    to disclose to the defense material that might have been used



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    to impeach Toledo and Martinez. The government stated in

    Reyes' sentencing hearing and again in its brief that it did

    not have the information that appellants argue should have

    been disclosed, and appellants bring to our attention no

    substantial evidence that the prosecution did have the

    information. The government has no obligation to disclose

    information it does not possess, United States v. Sepulveda, _____________ _________

    15 F.3d 1161, 1179 (1st Cir. 1993); the rule of Brady v. _____

    Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), imposes no general due ________

    diligence requirement. United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, _____________ _____

    569 (7th Cir. 1994).

    Finally, Reyes says that he was denied effective

    assistance of counsel based on a parade of alleged failures

    by counsel to investigate or object and also the failure to

    have Reyes testify at trial. These are fact-based claims

    that must be presented to the district court in the first

    instance and we therefore do not reach them. United States _____________

    v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _______ ____________

    112 S. Ct. 986 (1992).

    Affirmed. ________













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