Corcoran v. Twn of Sudbury ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    November 28, 1995
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 95-1557

    WILLIAM J. CORCORAN,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    TOWN OF SUDBURY, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    William J. Corcoran on brief pro se. ___________________
    Paul L. Kenny, Town Counsel, on brief for appellees Town of ______________
    Sudbury, et al.
    David J. Hatem, Warren D. Hutchison, Andrew J. McBreen and Burns ______________ ___________________ _________________ _____
    & Levinson on brief for appellee Elisa D. Cunningham. __________
    Wayne H. Scott on brief for appellee Wayne H. Scott. ______________
    Mark A. McCormack and Sloane and Walsh on brief for appellee __________________ __________________
    Cuddy, Lynch & Bixby.
    John E. Sutherland and Brickley, Sears & Sorett on brief for ___________________ ___________________________
    appellee Francis H. Clark.

    ____________________


    ____________________









    Per Curiam. Appellant William J. Corcoran appeals the __________

    dismissal by the United States District Court for the

    District of Massachusetts of his complaint alleging

    violations of his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983

    and 42 U.S.C. 1985, and a state law claim for attorney

    negligence. Both the federal and state claims arise out of a

    decision by the Sudbury Town Planning Board denying

    Corcoran's request for approval of a plan to subdivide a

    parcel of land. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

    eventually ordered that the plan be approved. We affirm the

    dismissal of the federal claims but vacate the dismissal of

    the Corcoran's state claim.

    Corcoran alleges violations of his federal rights to

    procedural and substantive due process, as well as his right

    to equal protection. However, in each case, he has failed to

    allege facts sufficient to support his claim. Therefore, his

    civil rights claims were properly dismissed.

    Corcoran's right to procedural due process was not

    violated because, even if the initial denial of his proposed

    plan by the Town Planning Board was unjustified, the state

    provided an adequate remedy through the appellate process.

    See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31 (1st ___ ___________________ _________

    Cir. 1991) (no violation of procedural due process where

    state provides adequate judicial remedies for administrative

    error). Moreover, this court has held repeatedly, in similar

    cases, that, when the state provides adequate postdeprivation

    relief, the mere delay in obtaining that relief is

















    insufficient to support a procedural due process claim. See ___

    Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing ______ ________

    cases).

    Corcoran's substantive due process claim fails because

    he has alleged no facts which in any sense constitute the

    sort of "conscience shocking" behavior necessary to support a

    substantive due process claim in the context of a zoning

    dispute. See id. at 350. ___ __

    Corcoran's claim that he suffered a violation of his

    right to equal protection is precluded by the fact that he

    has not alleged that any selective treatment he might have

    received was "based on impermissible considerations such as

    race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of

    constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to

    injure." Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. __________ ______

    1995) (quoting Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. ______________________________________________

    v. Board of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1989)). __________________

    "As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of

    a plaintiff's federal claims at the early stages of a suit,

    well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the

    dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state law

    claim." Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 _________ __________________

    (1st Cir. 1995). The district court has the authority, based

    on its assessment of the "totality of circumstances," to

    retain jurisdiction over state law claims in such cases. Id. __



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    (giving examples of some factors to be considered by the

    district court in this assessment).

    In the instant case, although the district court granted

    the motion to dismiss the claim for attorney negligence, it

    does not appear to have undertaken the requisite calculus.

    This failure might induce us to remand the case to the

    district court for a proper exercise of its discretion. See ___

    Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. ______ ____________________

    1994) (finding dismissal improper in part because of district

    court's failure to perform requisite calculus). However,

    having reviewed the record, we find nothing which indicates

    that this is an unusual case where supplemental jurisdiction

    should be exercised. See Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, ___ _______ _________

    196 (1st Cir. 1989).

    For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of Corcoran's

    federal claims is affirmed. The dismissal of his claim for ________

    attorney negligence is vacated and remanded to the district _______ ________

    court with instructions to dismiss the claim without

    prejudice to Corcoran's refiling the claim in state court.

    See Gloucester M.R. Corp. v. Charles Parisi, Inc., 848 F.2d ___ ______________________ ____________________

    12, 16 (1st Cir. 1988).











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