Diaz-Cruz v. United States ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion



    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________

    No. 95-2122

    OSCAR DIAZ-CRUZ,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Defendant, Appellee.



    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Stahl and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Oscar Diaz-Cruz on brief pro se. _______________
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, _____________ ________________________
    Senior Litigation Counsel, and Warren Vazquez, Assistant U.S. _______________
    Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    February 27, 1996
    ____________________






















    Per Curiam. Appellant Oscar Diaz-Cruz appeals from __________

    the denial of a motion to vacate his sentence filed under 28

    U.S.C. 2255. He claims that the disparity between his

    sentence and those of two of his co-defendants is unwarranted

    and unreasonable. For the following reasons, we agree that

    the 2255 motion was meritless.

    Only certain kinds of alleged sentencing errors may

    be raised in a collateral proceeding under 2255. These are

    that (1) a sentence violates the Constitution or the laws of

    the United States, (2) the district court was without

    jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence is

    greater than the statutory maximum, and (4) the sentence "is

    otherwise subject to collateral attack." See 28 U.S.C. ___

    2255; Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. ______ ______________

    1994). Appellant does not allege that his sentence violates

    the Constitution. Nor could he. A defendant has no

    constitutional right to receive the same sentence as another

    convicted of the same offense. Williams v. Illinois, 399 ________ ________

    U.S. 235, 243 (1970) ("[t]he Constitution permits qualitative

    differences in meting out punishment"). Appellant also does

    not assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction or

    that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

    This leaves the last ground. The Supreme Court

    "has narrowly confined the scope and availability of

    collateral attack for claims that do not allege



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    constitutional or jurisdictional errors." Knight, 37 F.3d at ______

    772.

    Such claims are properly brought under
    2255 only if the claimed error is "a
    fundamental defect which inherently
    results in a complete miscarriage of
    justice" or "an omission inconsistent
    with the rudimentary demands of fair
    procedure." The error must "present
    exceptional circumstances where the need
    for the remedy afforded by the writ of
    habeas corpus is apparent." _____________

    Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 ___ ____ _____________

    (1962)).

    Appellant's claim does not rise to the level of a

    miscarriage of justice. "Absent extraordinary circumstances,

    a defendant has no . . . fundamental interest in whether a

    sentence reflects his . . . relative culpability with respect

    to his . . . co-defendants." United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d _____________ _____

    8, (2d Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Rodriguez, ____ ___ ____ _____________ _________

    63 F.3d 1159, 1168 (1st Cir.) ("the mere fact of [a]

    disparity is of no consequence"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. ____________

    681 (1995). Appellant fails to state any extraordinary

    circumstances surrounding his case; he relies instead on a

    fairness argument. In this context, we note that the general

    rule in this circuit is that it is not proper for a district

    court to depart from a guideline range in an effort to

    equalize the sentences of similarly situated defendants.

    United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448 (1st Cir.), cert. _____________ _____ _____

    denied, 502 U.S. 969 (1991). Given appellant's lack in this ______


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    case of a "fundamental interest" in a sentence equal to those

    of his co-defendants, his claim of disparate treatment is not

    cognizable on a 2255 motion. See, e.g., Entrekin v. United ___ ____ ________ ______

    States, 508 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant's ______

    assertion that his sentence was harsher than that received by

    his co-defendant cannot be raised in a 2255 motion), cert. _____

    denied, 421 U.S. 977 (1975). ______

    We add only that to the extent appellant is

    separately challenging the trial court's enhancement of his

    base offense level by two, "[a] non-constitutional claim that

    could have been, but was not, raised on appeal, may not be

    asserted by collateral attack under 2255 absent exceptional

    circumstances." Knight, 37 F.3d at 772. We can perceive no ______

    obstacle that would have prevented appellant from challenging

    the two-level enhancement on direct appeal. "Having bypassed

    his opportunity to raise the claim on direct appeal, he

    cannot raise it now on collateral attack." Id. at 773. ___

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ________

















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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-2122

Filed Date: 2/28/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016