McGuiness v. Dubois ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion



    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT






    ____________________

    No. 95-1479

    BRENDAN MCGUINNESS,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellants.
    ___________________

    No. 95-1480

    BRENDAN M. MCGUINNESS,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.
    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
    ____________________
    Before
    Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________
    ____________________

    Brendan M. McGuinness on brief pro se. _____________________
    Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and ____________________
    Philip W. Silva, Department of Correction, on brief for appellees, ________________
    Larry E. Dubois, et al.
    ____________________

    February 12, 1996
    ____________________

















    Per Curiam. The defendants, John Treddin, a ____________

    disciplinary hearing officer at Massachusetts Correctional

    Institute - Cedar Junction (MCI-CJ) and Ronald Duval, the

    superintendent at MCI-CJ, appeal the grant of a declaratory

    judgment in favor of inmate Brendan McGuinness. McGuinness

    cross-appeals the grant of summary judgment on the ground of

    qualified immunity in favor of the defendants on his claims

    for damages. We reverse the declaratory judgment in favor of

    McGuinness and affirm the summary judgment on the damages

    claims.

    I.

    In November 1991, McGuinness got into an altercation

    with a prison guard, Sergeant John Andrade, and was charged

    with various prison disciplinary code violations, including

    being out of place, disrupting the security or orderly

    running of the institution, fighting and use of abusive

    language. A few days later, McGuinness was notified of a

    disciplinary hearing and moved to MCI-CJ's West Wing

    Segregation Unit ("West Wing").1 He was placed in the upper

    ____________________

    1. The West Wing is comprised of two sections. The two
    upper tiers are denominated as the "Awaiting Action Unit"
    ("AAU"). The AAU is a secure holding area for an inmate
    while he is awaiting a disciplinary hearing. The lower tiers
    of the West Wing are the Departmental Segregation Unit
    ("DSU"). According to prison regulations, an inmate may be
    placed in the DSU only after a finding by the Commissioner of
    Correction (or his designee) based on substantial evidence
    that, if confined in the general population, the inmate poses
    a substantial threat (i) to the safety of others, (ii) of
    damaging or destroying property, or (iii) to the operation of

    -2-













    tier of the West Wing, i.e., in the AAU. McGuinness'

    disciplinary hearing was held in the West Wing on January 9,

    1992. Both McGuinness and Andrade testified and Andrade

    submitted his written report. McGuinness admitted that he

    argued with, used foul language toward, and struck Andrade,

    but claimed that he was provoked when Andrade pushed him.

    Andrade acknowledged that he pushed McGuinness away when

    McGuinness got right up in his face. McGuinness' request to

    call three inmate witnesses from the general population, (who

    he alleged were eyewitnesses), was denied "for security

    reasons." However, Officer Treddin considered their written

    affidavits. Ultimately, Treddin deemed the three affidavits

    "non-credible" because in Treddin's opinion all three inmates

    saw the confrontation only in part. Treddin found McGuinness

    guilty based on McGuinness' own admissions and Andrade's

    written report and testimony. Treddin imposed a sanction of

    30 days in isolation and recommended that McGuinness lose 100

    days of good-time credit.

    McGuinness appealed the matter to defendant

    Superintendent Duval, claiming, inter alia, that Treddin

    wrongfully portrayed McGuinness as the aggressor and

    wrongfully denied his request for witnesses due to

    McGuinness' placement in the West Wing. He argued that his


    ____________________

    the correctional facility. Mass. Reg. Code tit. 103,
    421.09 (1990).

    -3- -3-













    witnesses "would have been able to explain what they saw much

    better if given a chance to give an oral testimony." Duval

    denied McGuinness' appeal. Eventually, the incident was

    referred to the DSU board and, pursuant to a finding, based

    on this November 1991 incident and a subsequent incident or

    incidents in January 1992, that McGuinness presented a

    substantial threat to the safety of others, McGuinness

    received a two year sentence of confinement to the DSU (in

    addition to the sanction of 30 days in isolation and loss of

    100 days of good-time credit).

    II.

    In November 1993, McGuinness filed an action in the

    district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming Officer

    Treddin and Superintendent Duval as defendants (as well as

    other prison officials not pertinent here). McGuinness'

    complaint raised several claims, most of which are not

    involved in these cross-appeals. The counts which remain

    relevant are these: Count 2 alleged that Treddin violated

    McGuinness' right to due process. In particular, McGuinness

    alleged that he had been unlawfully transferred to the West

    Wing prior to any guilty finding and that Treddin used this

    alleged illegal placement in the West Wing as the sole reason

    for denying his request for witnesses. Count 4 alleged that

    Superintendent Duval violated McGuinness' right to due

    process by denying his appeal without any explanation.



    -4- -4-













    McGuinness asked for compensatory and punitive damages on

    these claims. In Count 6 McGuinness requested a declaratory

    judgment that his placement in the West Wing was illegal and

    the denial of witnesses due to his placement there violated

    due process.

    The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In a

    memorandum and order, dated March 15, 1995, the district

    court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed

    as to whether (a) McGuinness' placement in the AAU

    constituted an unlawful placement in a segregation unit prior

    to a guilty finding, the imposition of sanctions, and the

    appropriate finding of "substantial threat" by the

    Commissioner; and (b) Treddin's refusal to allow McGuinness

    to call witnesses violated "the rule of Kenney [v. ______

    Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. 28 (1984)]." The ____________________________

    court, therefore, declined to enter a declaratory judgment,

    as requested in Count 6, in any party's favor. The court did

    conclude, however, that the state of the law on this issue

    was confused and, thus, Treddin and Duval were entitled to

    summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity on

    McGuinness' damages claims -- Count 2 (Treddin) and Count 4

    (Duval).2

    ____________________

    2. The district court construed Count 4 as a claim against
    Duval, not on the basis of respondeat superior (which would
    not lie, pursuant to 1983, in any event), but as a claim
    that Duval was personally liable for failing to take remedial
    action after learning of the alleged due process violation

    -5- -5-













    Count 6 then went to a one-day bench trial at which

    Officer Treddin testified. The court's findings of fact and

    rulings of law can be found at McGuinness v. Dubois, 887 F. __________ ______

    Supp. 20, 21-23 (D. Mass. 1995). In brief, the court ruled

    that the AAU is not a DSU. Thus, the court rejected

    McGuinness' initial premise, i.e., that his placement in the

    AAU constituted an unlawful placement in the DSU prior to the

    required findings by the Commissioner. Nonetheless, the

    court held that McGuinness was "not given the protections

    afforded him by Department of Correction regulations" as

    interpreted by Kenney and subsequent caselaw. The court ______

    declared that Treddin's determination must be set aside and

    that the rulings that followed the disciplinary hearing are

    void and of no effect and may play no part whatsoever in any

    further classification, penal, disciplinary, or release

    decisions with respect to McGuinness.

    As noted at the outset, Treddin and Duval appeal this

    declaratory judgment and McGuinness cross-appeals the March

    15 summary judgment denying his claims for damages.

    III.

    In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court _____ _________

    held that a state-created right to good-time credit for

    satisfactory behavior, forfeitable only for serious

    ____________________

    through McGuinness' appeal following the disciplinary
    hearing. Thus construed, the district court found Duval,
    nonetheless, entitled to qualified immunity.

    -6- -6-













    misbehavior, is a sufficient liberty interest within the

    Fourteenth Amendment to entitle the inmate to "those minimum

    procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required

    by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created

    right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Id. at 557.3 In ___

    ____________________

    3. Recently, the Court, in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 ______ ______
    (1995), refocused the due process inquiry away from the
    parsing of the mandatory/discretionary language in prison
    regulations and back to the nature of the deprivation, i.e.,
    whether the restraint "imposes atypical and significant
    hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
    of prison life" or "will inevitably affect the duration of
    his sentence." Id. at 2299-302. In Sandin, the Court ___ ______
    concluded that solitary confinement did not present the type
    of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might
    conceivably create a liberty interest. Id. at 2301. Nor did ___
    it inevitably affect the duration of Conner's sentence. Id. ___
    at 2302.
    Sandin, however, did not retreat from Wolff's holding ______ _____
    that, if a state statutory provision created a liberty
    interest in a shortened prison sentence which results from ________________________________
    good-time credits, revocable only if the inmate is guilty of
    serious misconduct, that inmate is entitled to the procedural
    protections outlined in Wolff. Id. at 2297; see also Gotcher _____ ___ ________ _______
    v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (opining that ____
    Wolff's due process principles remain applicable in the _____
    context of revocation of statutory good-time credits after
    Sandin). ______
    Massachusetts has a statutory provision, Mass. Gen. L.
    ch. 127, 129, awarding a good conduct deduction from an
    inmate's maximum imprisonment term, forfeitable for
    violations of prison rules. And, in the instant case, as a
    result of the guilty finding on the disciplinary charge,
    McGuinness forfeited 100 days of good-time. McGuinness,
    therefore, was entitled to the procedural protections of the
    Due Process Clause prior to the revocation of his statutory
    good-time credits. (Although Mass. Gen. L. ch. 127, 129
    was repealed on July 1, 1994, the repealing provision also
    provided that the law in effect at the time an offense is
    committed governs sentencing for that offense, i.e., the
    repealed section still applies to McGuinness, whose offense
    was committed prior to July 1, 1994.)
    As explained in greater detail, infra, the issue in _____
    these appeals is what process was due McGuinness at his

    -7- -7-













    Wolff, the Court determined that, at a minimum, due process _____

    entitled an inmate, facing a disciplinary hearing, to (1)

    advance (no less than 24 hours) written notice of the claimed

    violation, (2) a qualified right to call witnesses and

    present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting

    him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional

    safety or correctional goals, and (3) a written statement of

    the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the

    reasons for the disciplinary action taken. Id. at 563-67. ___

    These cross-appeals concern the second of these due

    process requirements -- the parameters of the inmate's

    qualified right to call witnesses. The district court found,

    and the defendants do not dispute, that MCI-CJ has an

    institutional policy of denying an inmate's request to call

    inmate witnesses from the general population at a

    disciplinary hearing held in the West Wing.4 This policy is

    based on the heightened security requirements in the West

    Wing, which houses inmates with a demonstrated proclivity for

    violence and disruption, and on the resulting effect that

    bringing witnesses into the West Wing has on the allocation

    of corrections officers there and in the rest of the prison.


    ____________________

    disciplinary hearing under federal constitutional law. _______

    4. The court also found, however, that there were occasions,
    although rare, when a disciplinary hearing involving an
    inmate housed in the West Wing had been moved outside that
    wing.

    -8- -8-













    Any inmate entering the West Wing from the general population

    has to be strip-searched and accompanied by two correction

    officers; restraints are required to move inmates within the

    West Wing; and restraints may, or may not, be used in the

    presence of hearing officers at disciplinary hearings.

    The court held that the Kenney decision, i.e., "the rule ______

    of Kenney," and subsequent caselaw prohibits the denial of ______

    witnesses' testimony simply based on an inmate's location in

    the West Wing and that the caselaw and the prison regulations

    require an individualized assessment that calling a

    particular witness would be unduly hazardous to institutional

    safety or correctional goals. The court found that no

    individualized assessment occurred in McGuinness' case and

    thus McGuinness was not given the protections afforded him by

    the regulations as interpreted by Kenney and its progeny. ______

    To a large extent, however, Kenney was simply an ______

    interpretation of the requirements of state law. In Kenney, _________ ______

    inmate Kenney had been transferred to the DSU prior to his __________

    disciplinary hearing on assault charges and confined there

    under the same conditions as those inmates transferred to the

    DSU pursuant to a finding by the Commissioner that their

    behavior posed a substantial threat to the residents,

    property, or operations of the institution. Kenney v. ______

    Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. at 29. At his ____________________________

    disciplinary hearing, Kenney's request that the two alleged



    -9- -9-













    victims (both inmates in the general population) be allowed

    to appear as witnesses was denied. Kenney subsequently

    brought an action in state court and on appeal the SJC found

    that the prison officials had violated their own regulations,

    which have the force of state law, by placing Kenney in a DSU

    cell for committing a disciplinary offense before Kenney had

    been found guilty, before sanctions had been imposed, and

    before the Commissioner had found that Kenney posed a

    substantial threat to the institution. Id. at 33-34. As ___

    Kenney was illegally incarcerated in the DSU, the court

    rejected the prison officials' attempt to justify their

    denial of his request to call witnesses on basis of his

    location in the DSU. Id. at 35. ___

    To the extent that "the rule of Kenney" is solely a rule ______

    of state law, it has no application in this 1983 action

    claiming a deprivation of McGuinness' rights secured by the

    federal Constitution and laws.5 "Federal constitutional

    standards rather than state statutes define the requirements

    of procedural due process." Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55, _______ ______

    60 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation

    omitted). "The failure of the [disciplinary] board to comply

    with its own regulation would constitute a denial of due


    ____________________

    5. To the extent that the prison officials arbitrarily
    violated their own state law regulations, it would appear
    that McGuinness could have pursued state judicial review.
    See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 n.11. ___ ______ ______

    -10- -10-













    process if the regulation were mandated by the Constitution

    or federal law." Domegan v. Fair, 603 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. _______ ____

    Mass. 1985); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250- ________ ____ __________

    51 (1983) ("The State may choose to require procedures for

    reasons other than protection against deprivation of

    substantive rights, of course, but in making that choice the

    State does not create an independent substantive right.")

    (Footnote omitted). "The rule of Kenney," therefore, is ______

    relevant to McGuinness' 1983 action only to the extent that

    Kenney accurately recites the parameters of federal due ______

    process.

    The SJC did consider whether Kenney's due process rights

    were violated by the denial of his request to call certain

    witnesses. Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. ______ ___________________________

    at 34. But that determination was based on its conclusion

    that due process requires some support in the administrative

    record to justify the denial and none was found in Kenney's

    case. Id. at 35, citing Real v. Superintendent, Mass. ___ ______ ____ _____________________

    Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 399, 407 (1983). ____________________________

    However, the Supreme Court has since held that due process

    does not require that support for the denial of witnesses ___

    exist as part of the administrative record; rather prison

    officials may satisfy due process by presenting testimony in

    court if the deprivation of a liberty interest is challenged

    because of that claimed defect in the hearing. Ponte v. _____



    -11- -11-













    Real, 471 U.S. 491, 496-97 (1985), vacating and remanding, ____ _______________________

    Real v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, ____ ___________________________________________________

    supra. _____

    Insofar as Kenney speaks to the commands of due process, ______

    therefore, we disagree with the district court's conclusion

    that, "properly interpreted," Kenney stands for the ______

    proposition that "witnesses cannot be denied in a

    disciplinary hearing simply based upon the location of the

    individual within the prison." McGuinness v. Dubois, 887 F. __________ ______

    Supp. at 22. Further, of import is the Kenney court's ______

    treatment of Devaney v. Hall, 509 F. Supp. 497 (D. Mass. _______ ____

    1981). In Devaney, the district court held that the "across- _______

    the-board" policy of MCI-CJ [then called MCI-Walpole] of

    permitting only written statements of witnesses in

    disciplinary hearings held in the DSU [then called Block 10]

    did not violate due process as it was not arbitrary nor

    beyond the discretion of prison authorities to adopt. Id. at ___

    500-01. In Kenney, the SJC distinguished Devaney on the ______ _____________ _______

    ground that, unlike Devaney, Kenney was not lawfully held in

    the DSU and reliance on his location as a justification for

    the denial of witnesses was therefore unreasonable. Kenney ______

    v. Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. at 35 n.11. If, ___________________________

    "properly interpreted," Kenney stands for the proposition ______

    that witnesses cannot be denied in a disciplinary hearing

    simply based upon the location of the individual within the



    -12- -12-













    prison, whether lawfully confined in that area or not, then

    the SJC would not have distinguished Devaney; rather, the SJC _____________ _______

    would have expressed disagreement with Devaney's holding. _______

    But the SJC did not do that.

    Although we disagree with the district court's

    interpretation of "the rule of Kenney," insofar as the ______

    district court interprets that rule as speaking to the

    requirements of federal due process,6 we note that to

    prohibit live defense witness testimony at a disciplinary

    hearing, numerous courts have interpreted the due process

    teachings of the Wolff opinion to require an individualized _____

    decision, based on the facts of each case. See, e.g., __________

    Mitchell v. Dupnik, 67 F.3d 216, 223 (9th Cir. 1995); Forbes ________ ______ ______

    v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 317 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, _____ ____________

    113 S. Ct. 1362 (1993); Ramer v. Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102, 1104 _____ _____

    (10th Cir. 1991); King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. ____ _____

    1985); Dalton v. Hutto, 713 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1983); ______ _____




    ____________________

    6. Similarly, we conclude that neither Guyton v. Dubois, No. ______ ______
    92-1819 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 20, 1992), nor Abrazinski v. __________
    Dubois, 876 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1995), further support any ______
    due process determination. Guyton was found to have been
    unlawfully held in the DSU and thus Guyton is simply a ______
    straightforward application of Kenney. The Abrazinski ______ __________
    court's discussion of Kenney was dicta and, in any event, for ______
    reasons discussed, supra, we disagree with that court's _____
    reading of Kenney as holding that "isolation in a segregation ______
    unit alone, even if legal, is not sufficient to support a ______________
    denial of witnesses." Abrazinski v. Dubois, 876 F. Supp. at __________ ______
    323 (emphasis added).

    -13- -13-













    Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1982)7; ___________ ______

    but see Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 749 (2d Cir. 1991). _______ ______ ________

    The Supreme Court, itself, has addressed the validity of an

    "across-the-board" policy denying witness requests only

    indirectly. While, in Ponte, it disagreed with the _____

    Massachusetts prison officials' contention that "'across-the-

    board' policies denying witness requests are invariably

    proper," Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. at 496, as the Second _____ ____

    Circuit has said, the Court "has not ruled that such policies

    are invariably improper." Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d at ______ ________

    749 (holding that an across-the-board policy barring the

    testimony of mental health staff in an inmate's presence at

    prison disciplinary hearings does not violate due process as



    ____________________

    7. We note that while the Bartholomew opinion stated that a ___________
    blanket proscription against calling certain types of
    witnesses violated the "suggestion" in Wolff that the _____
    decision to deny live witness testimony should be made on a
    case-by-case analysis of the potential hazards which may flow
    from the calling of a particular person, Bartholomew v. ___________
    Watson, 665 F.2d at 918, later cases, in citing Bartholomew, ______ ___________
    have, without comment, transformed this characterization of
    Wolff's "suggestion" into a requirement. See, e.g., Mitchell _____ _________ ________
    v. Dupnik, 67 F.3d at 223. ______
    We also note that, apart from Bartholomew, all of the ___________
    above-mentioned cases that opine that an across-the-board
    proscription against live witness testimony violates due
    process appear distinguishable from the present case in that
    nothing in those cases suggests that the absolute
    prohibitions on the calling of any witnesses or certain
    categories of witnesses were even purported to be based on
    institutional security. And, in each case cited, including
    Bartholomew, the across-the-board prohibition extended ___________ ________
    prison-wide in an undifferentiated fashion to all ___________
    disciplinary hearings.

    -14- -14-













    the policy is reasonably based on legitimate penological

    interests and is not an exaggerated response).

    Although some particular case in the future may present

    compelling evidence that MCI-CJ's policy of denying live

    testimony from inmate witnesses at a disciplinary hearing

    held in the West Wing violates due process, we leave

    consideration of such a case where it appears presently to

    reside -- in the future. We find that, on the facts of this

    case, the district court erred in concluding that the

    application of this policy to McGuinness violated his right

    to due process. McGuinness contends that he was provoked

    into striking Andrade and that should lessen any penalty

    imposed. McGuinness concedes that, contrary to the prison

    rules, he did not inform Officer Treddin in advance about the

    content of the expected testimony of Justin Holmes and Jack

    Shea, other than characterizing them as eyewitnesses.

    Nonetheless, Treddin obtained their affidavits, along with

    the affidavit of a third inmate, Michael Dowd, whose

    testimony McGuinness had not previously requested. Treddin

    concluded that none of the three saw the whole confrontation

    - a factual determination certainly within his discretion to

    make and not within a court's competency to overturn. See ___

    Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, v. Hill, ___________________________________________________ ____

    472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985) (holding that procedural due

    process is satisfied if the decision to revoke good-time



    -15- -15-













    credits is supported by "some evidence" in the record, which

    "does [not] imply that a disciplinary's board's factual

    findings ... are subject to second-guessing upon review").

    The guilty finding was based on the undisputed facts

    that McGuinness was out of his cell, acting disruptive, and

    used abusive language and assaulted a staff member.

    McGuinness was permitted to present his defense, supported by

    witness affidavits, that he was provoked. He has never

    suggested what their live testimony would have added, other

    than that they would have been able to "explain what they saw

    much better."8 The live testimony of the requested

    witnesses was denied on the basis of a policy -- the bona

    fides of which have not been challenged here -- rooted in

    legitimate institutional security concerns. In these

    circumstances, the defendants have carried their burden of

    proving that the denial of live testimony was neither

    arbitrary nor capricious, see Smith v. Mass. Dept. of ___ _____ ________________

    Correction, 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 (1st Cir. 1991), and that __________

    Treddin did not clearly abuse his considerable discretion,

    see Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979), in ___ ______ ______

    denying McGuinness' request for the live testimony of Holmes,

    Shea, and Dowd, even if the denial was based on a general

    ____________________

    8. And, it is not certain that even this suggestion was made
    at the disciplinary hearing so that Treddin could consider
    it. Rather, on the record before us, this suggestion first
    appears in McGuinness' written appeal of the disciplinary
    finding to the prison superintendent.

    -16- -16-













    policy of denying live witness testimony in the West Wing.

    "[S]o long as the reasons are logically related to preventing

    undue hazards to 'institutional safety or correctional

    goals,' the explanation should meet the due process

    requirements as outlined in Wolff." Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. _____ _____ ____

    at 497.

    IV.

    The declaratory judgment of May 1, 1995, in favor of

    plaintiff McGuinness on Count 6 is reversed. As we have ________

    concluded that McGuinness' constitutional rights were not

    violated, the March 15, 1995 order granting summary judgment

    in favor of defendants Treddin and Duval on Counts 2 and 4 is

    affirmed. So ordered. No costs. _________



























    -17- -17-






Document Info

Docket Number: 95-1479

Filed Date: 2/12/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (20)

John Hurney v. Norman Carver , 602 F.2d 993 ( 1979 )

Guy L. Smith, Jr. v. Massachusetts Department of Correction , 936 F.2d 1390 ( 1991 )

Bryan R. Ramer v. Dareld Kerby , 936 F.2d 1102 ( 1991 )

james-roscoe-dalton-v-td-hutto-gene-johnson-major-san-fillipio-capt , 713 F.2d 75 ( 1983 )

elizabeth-powell-dalree-mapp-katherine-purrington-althea-mcdaniels-paula , 953 F.2d 744 ( 1991 )

jerome-russell-v-donald-selsky-commissioner-designee-of-corrections , 35 F.3d 55 ( 1994 )

Jerry K. Forbes v. Clarence Trigg, Superintendent , 976 F.2d 308 ( 1992 )

Norman GOTCHER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Et ... , 66 F.3d 1097 ( 1995 )

Wesley King, (83-1705), (83-1774) v. H. Gary Wells and ... , 760 F.2d 89 ( 1985 )

95-cal-daily-op-serv-7572-95-daily-journal-dar-12992-anthony , 67 F.3d 216 ( 1995 )

michael-c-bartholomew-scott-m-baldwin-earl-w-branch-louis-chavarria , 665 F.2d 915 ( 1982 )

Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction , 393 Mass. 28 ( 1984 )

Abrazinski v. DuBois , 876 F. Supp. 313 ( 1995 )

Domegan v. Fair , 603 F. Supp. 360 ( 1985 )

Real v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional ... , 390 Mass. 399 ( 1983 )

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v.... , 105 S. Ct. 2768 ( 1985 )

Wolff v. McDonnell , 94 S. Ct. 2963 ( 1974 )

Ponte v. Real , 105 S. Ct. 2192 ( 1985 )

Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293 ( 1995 )

Olim v. Wakinekona , 103 S. Ct. 1741 ( 1983 )

View All Authorities »