Mitrano v. Jerry's Ford Sales ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    April 18, 1996
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ____________________


    No. 95-2127

    PETER PAUL MITRANO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    JERRY'S FORD SALES, INC.,

    Defendant, Appellee.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Peter Paul Mitrano on brief pro se. __________________
    Howard B. Myers and Brown, Olson & Wilson, P.C. on brief for _________________ _____________________________
    appellee.



    ____________________


    ____________________

    Per Curiam. We have carefully reviewed the record in __________














    this case, including the briefs of the parties. We affirm

    the dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's complaint for lack of

    personal jurisdiction.

    Plaintiff/appellant has failed to show that

    defendant/appellee "purposefully availed itself of the

    privilege of conducting activities within [New Hampshire].

    Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Where all ______ _______

    negotiations relevant to the purchase of the automobile took

    place entirely out of state, see United Electrical Workers v. ___ _________________________

    163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1st Cir. ___________________________

    1992) (location of negotiations vitally important to

    jurisdictional inquiry based on contract), the mere mailing

    of papers to New Hampshire is an insufficient contact to

    support the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant/appellee.

    Appellant contends, however, that defendant/appellee

    waived this defense because, although it raised the defense

    of lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer, it did not

    include that defense in its subsequent motion to dismiss.

    Appellant's position is not entirely without support. See ___

    Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., _______________________________ _________________________

    874 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defense of lack of

    personal jurisdiction waived by failure to raise it in first

    Rule 12 motion, even though defendant included it in answer);

    Committee v. Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 498 (D.Vt. _________ __________________

    1993) (same). However, we think that a careful reading of



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    the relevant language and purpose of Rule 12 indicates that,

    in this case, the defense was preserved.

    "The purpose of Rule 12 is to eliminate unnecessary

    delays in the early pleading stages of a suit so that all

    available Rule 12 defenses are advanced before consideration

    of the merits." Manchester Knitted Fashions v. Amalgamated, ___________________________ ___________

    967 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing cases). To effect

    this purpose, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) provides that certain

    defenses, including the lack of personal jurisdiction, are

    waived, in one of two circumstances: "(A) if omitted from a

    motion in the circumstances described in [Rule 12(g)], or (B)

    if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included

    in a responsive pleading . . ." Which of the two parts of

    this rule applies depends on the form of defendant's first

    defensive move. If defendant's first defensive move is a

    preanswer motion, section A requires that the motion contain

    all applicable defenses. That 12(h)(1)(A) applies to

    preanswer motions is made clear by the 1966 Advisory _________

    Committee's notes to Rule 12(h)(1) (Rule provides that

    "certain specified defenses, which were available to a party

    when he made a preanswer motion but which he omitted from _________________

    that motion, are waived") (emphasis added), as well as by

    part A's reference to Rule 12(g), see 1966 Advisory Committee ___

    notes to Rule 12(g) (Rule precludes "a defendant who makes a

    preanswer motion under this rule from making a further motion ________________________________



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    presenting any defense or objection which was available to

    him at the time he made the first motion and which he could

    have included but did not in fact include therein."); Pilgrim _______

    Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1988) __________________ _______

    ("'[s]ubdivision (g) contemplates the presentation of an

    omnibus preanswer motion in which defendant advances every _________

    available Rule 12 defense and objection he may have that is

    assertable by motion.") (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal _______

    Practice & Procedure: Civil 1384 at 837 (1969))). If, _____________________

    however, the first defensive move of defendant is a

    responsive pleading, 12(h)(1)(B) requires that the defense of

    lack of personal jurisdiction be raised in that pleading.

    Taken together, Rule 12(h)(1)(A) & (B) require "that

    defendants wishing to raise [a defense of lack of personal

    jurisdiction] must do so in their first defensive move, be it ________________________________________

    a Rule 12 motion or a responsive pleading." Glater v. Eli ______ ___

    Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983); see also ___________ ___ ____

    Roque v. United States, 857 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1988) _____ _____________

    (Under Rule 12(h)(1), "defense of [personal jurisdiction] is

    waived if not raised in the answer (or in a motion filed

    prior to or contemporaneously with the answer).") (emphasis _____

    in original).

    In the instant case, defendant/appellee raised the

    defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer to the

    complaint. Since this was defendant/appellee's first



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    defensive move, the waiver provisions of Rule 12(h)(1) do not

    apply. Nor did defendant/appellee waive that defense by

    failing to raise lack of personal jurisdiction in its

    subsequent postanswer motion to dismiss, see Bronlow v. Aman, __________ ___ _______ ____

    740 F.2d 1476, 1483 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984) (defense of lack of

    personal jurisdiction not waived even though not raised in

    answer to amended complaint since it had already been raised

    in an initial motion to dismiss), especially since

    defendant/appellee showed no lack of diligence in pressing

    this issue before the district court, cf. Rice v. Nova __ ____ ____

    Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1994) (although _________________

    raised in initial pleading, defense of lack of personal

    jurisdiction waived when not pressed again until appeal);

    Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). _______ ____

    Affirmed. ________























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