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USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 95-2088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT RAPOSA,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge, _____________
Aldrich and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________
____________________
Robert B. Mann, with whom Mann & Mitchell was on brief, for ______________ _______________
appellant.
Margaret Curran, with whom Sheldon Whitehouse, United States _______________ __________________
Attorney, and Zechariah Chafee, Assistant United States Attorney, ________________
were on brief, for the United States.
____________________
May 29, 1996
____________________
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Following a plea of guilty to one _____________
count of possessing heroin with intent to distribute, Robert
Raposa was sentenced to a term of 30 months imprisonment. He
appeals that sentence, arguing that the district court
erroneously included as "relevant conduct," see U.S.S.G. ___
1B1.3 (Nov. 1994), his possession, with intent to distribute,
of a substantial quantity of cocaine that the court had earlier
ordered suppressed as the product of an illegal search. The
consideration, inter alia, of the suppressed cocaine as
"relevant conduct" increased the defendant's Guidelines
sentencing range from 10-16 months to 30-37 months. The latter
was the same as the range that would have obtained if the
defendant had been convicted on the cocaine count as well as _________
the heroin count.
We are asked to decide whether the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule applies in the context of Sentencing
Guidelines proceedings, at least on the facts of this case. On
the record before us, however, the resolution of that question
is not necessary to the decision of this appeal. We decline,
therefore, to reach that important question here, preferring to
leave it for a future case. Instead, we affirm the defendant's
sentence on the ground that the district court's findings were
amply supported by statements concerning the cocaine provided
by the defendant and incorporated in the Presentence
Investigation Report ("PSR"), and on which he relied to obtain
a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility.
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I
On February 10, 1995, two narcotics detectives
interrupted a drug deal in progress in an alley in downtown
Providence. The defendant, Robert Raposa, was sitting in the
driver's seat of a parked white Mercury Sable, doing business
with several men standing at his window, when the detectives
approached and identified themselves as police officers.
Raposa bolted out of the car and ran, dropping a bundle of
heroin packets labelled "Die Hard" as he fled. One of the
officers picked up the heroin packets and gave chase. Raposa
was apprehended. The officers brought him back to the scene of
the drug deal, where they found another bundle of heroin marked
"Die Hard" and $140 in cash on the ground near the Mercury.
Two beepers were found on the defendant, and a cellular
telephone in the car. Raposa was arrested and taken to the
central police station.
After a short investigation, the detectives went to
Raposa's apartment, while the defendant remained in custody at
the station. A woman answered the door. The officers told her
that Raposa had been arrested. The woman stated that Raposa
was her boyfriend and lived with her in the apartment.
What happened next was disputed. The government would
later assert that the woman consented to a search of the
apartment, and that no search was undertaken until a consent
form had been signed. The defendant would contend that no
valid consent was ever given, and that his girlfriend's
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signature on the form had been coerced. In any event, the
officers conducted a warrantless search of the apartment. They
seized three large bags containing over $13,000 worth of
cocaine lying in a closet in one of the bedrooms. Back at the
police station, Raposa was informed of the seizures. Having
been read his Miranda rights, he agreed to talk, and confessed _______
that the cocaine was his.
Raposa was charged with possession of cocaine (375.21
grams) and heroin (less than 5 grams), with intent to
distribute. After initially pleading not guilty to both counts,
he moved to suppress all of the cocaine that the police had
found in his apartment, arguing that it was the fruit of an
illegal search. After an evidentiary hearing, the district
court granted the motion, finding that the government had
failed to prove that Raposa's girlfriend had consented to the
search. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to the
heroin charge (Count II), and the government voluntarily
dismissed the cocaine charge (Count I).
II
Raposa's sentence for his heroin conviction was governed
by U.S.S.G. 2D1.1. Under that guideline, the amount of
heroin possessed by the defendant (less than 5 grams)
corresponds to a base offense level of 12, which, charted
against a criminal history category of I, would yield a
Guidelines sentencing range of 10-16 months. However, the
district court found, over the defendant's objection, that the
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defendant's possession of the cocaine found at his apartment
constituted "part of the same course of conduct . . . as the
offense of conviction" under the Guidelines' "relevant conduct"
provision. U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2).
After expressing serious reservations about the fairness
of considering illegally seized evidence for purposes of the
Guidelines' relevant conduct provisions, the district court
concluded, relying on cases from other circuits, that the
exclusionary rule did not apply at sentencing. The court thus
incorporated the cocaine into the total drug quantity for which
defendant was to be sentenced, pushing the offense level up to
22. After subtracting three levels for acceptance of
responsibility, the court arrived at a total offense level of
19, yielding a final sentencing range of 30-37 months. The
court imposed a sentence of 30 months, and the defendant filed
this appeal.1
III
To date, five circuit courts of appeal have addressed
the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
prohibits a sentencing court from considering illegally seized
evidence for purposes of determining or enhancing a defendant's
____________________
1. After acknowledging that defendant had raised a substantial
issue for appeal, the district court granted the defendant's
request that he be permitted to remain released on bail pending
appeal of the sentence.
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Guidelines sentence.2 Each of these courts has held that the
exclusionary rule does not generally apply in the sentencing
context and that there is no blanket prohibition on the
consideration of illegally seized evidence for purposes of
making the findings required under the Guidelines. See United ___ ______
States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1345 (6th Cir. 1993) ______ _______
(rejecting, as dicta, contrary statements in United States v. _____________
Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1993), aff'd on other _______ _______________
grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1547 _______ _____ ______
(1994); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir.), _____________ ______
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 _____ ______ _____________ _____
F.2d 1226, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. _____ ______
1037 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 69 (D.C. _____________ _______
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037 (1992); United States _____ ______ ______________
v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1991). The rule adopted ______
in these cases has not been met with universal acclaim. See, ___
e.g., United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238-40 (7th Cir. ____ _____________ _____
1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); McCrory, 930 F.2d at 185- _______
87 (Silberman, J., concurring); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and __________
____________________
2. There are also several reported cases that address the
issue in the pre-Guidelines context. See United States v. Lee, ___ _____________ ___
540 F.2d 1205, 1210-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 _____ ______
(1976); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1021-25 (9th _____________ _________
Cir. 1975); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 27-28 (2d _____________ ________
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); Verdugo v. _____ ______ _______
United States, 402 F.2d 599, 610-13 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. ______________ _____
denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970). ______
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Seizure 1.6, at 40-41 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).3 This court has _______
not yet decided the issue.
Although the parties have ably argued to us the merits
of each side of the debate, a review of the record requires the
conclusion that this case does not present a proper occasion
for us to decide this important question.
After the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charge
of possessing heroin with intent to distribute, the district
court ordered that a PSR be prepared. In setting forth his
version of the facts for inclusion in the PSR, the defendant
(through his counsel) provided the federal probation officer
with a signed statement in which he voluntarily admitted that ___________ ________
he owned the cocaine that was found in his apartment on
February 10, 1995. The statement was incorporated verbatim
into the PSR. It declared, in relevant part:
I understand the police recovered two bundles of
heroin near my car [on February 10]. Those
bundles of heroin were my heroin. I accept
complete responsibility for my actions. I also
accept responsibility for the cocaine found at
[my apartment] . . . . I have always accepted
responsibility for this cocaine. At the police
station, on the day of my arrest I made a signed
statement. In that statement I clearly accepted
____________________
3. See also Todd Flaming, Comment, Laundering Illegally Seized ________ ___________________________
Evidence Through the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 59 U. Chi. ___________________________________________________
L. Rev. 1209 (1992); Victor J. Miller, Note, An End Run Around _________________
the Exclusionary Rule: The Use of Illegally Seized Evidence _______________________________________________________________
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. ________________________________________
241 (1992); Clinton R. Pinyan, Comment, Illegally Seized _________________
Evidence at Sentencing: How to Satisfy the Constitution and the _______________________________________________________________
Guidelines With an "Evidentiary" Limitation, 1994 U. Chi. Legal ___________________________________________
F. 523 (1994).
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responsibility for the cocaine.[4] The cocaine
was found in a spare bedroom closet. I accept
complete responsibility for my actions with the
cocaine[5] as I did with the heroin [footnotes
added].
The defendant lodged no objection nor attempted to reserve any
Fourth Amendment argument specifically with respect to the
PSR's recounting of these admissions.6 Indeed, based in part
on these statements, the defendant successfully argued at
sentencing for a three-level reduction in his Guidelines
offense level under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1.
Whatever force the exclusionary rule might have at
sentencing, it clearly could not have barred the district court
from considering the defendant's voluntary statements as set
forth in the PSR. Cf. United States v. Patino, 862 F.2d 128, ___ ______________ ______
132-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding second confession not to have
been obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment where sufficient
time had passed since illegal search and initial confession and
where intervening circumstances were benign), cert. denied, 490 _____ ______
____________________
4. It appears, although the record is not clear, that the
statement given by Raposa to the police on February 10 was also
covered by the district court's suppression order.
5. The defendant further admitted, elsewhere in this same
statement, that the quantity of cocaine he possessed was at
least equal to the amount charged in the indictment (375.21
grams).
6. Defendant's PSR statement was not made under any promise of
immunity. Cf. United States v. Conway, 81 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ ______
1996).
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U.S. 1069 (1989).7 The portion of the PSR containing those
statements, to which defendant declined to object (and as a
result of which he received acceptance-of-responsibility credit
under the Guidelines), provides an independently sufficient
ground for the district court's finding at sentencing that the
defendant possessed the cocaine at issue.8 See United States ___ ______________
v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 908-09 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting ______
proof at sentencing of uncharged quantities of drugs through
statements in PSR to which defendant failed to object).
Thus, on the record before us, the question of the
exclusionary rule's applicability at sentencing has no bearing
on the outcome of this appeal. Cf. New England Legal Found. v. ___ ________________________
Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 176 (1st Cir. 1989) _________________________
("longstanding precedent" requires courts to "avoid ruling on
constitutional issues when non-constitutional grounds are
dispositive"). Wholly apart from any consideration of the
suppressed cocaine evidence, the portions of the PSR that
____________________
7. Defendant does not and could not credibly argue that the
statements recounted in the PSR constituted a fruit of the
illegal search conducted on the day of his arrest. The
statement provided by defendant to the probation officer was
voluntarily submitted, presumably with the advice of counsel.
Furthermore, the statement was provided after the district _____
court had ruled on the defendant's suppression motion, so that
defendant could make no claim that he was unaware of his
rights. The provision of the statement to the probation
officer was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint" of the illegal search. Wong Sun v. United ________ ______
States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963); cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 ______ ___ _____ ________
U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing
attenuation doctrine).
8. Defendant does not argue that the relevant conduct
guideline itself is unconstitutional.
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recounted defendant's admissions as to cocaine possession, to
which no objection was recorded, provide clear and ample
support for the findings that resulted in the assignment to
defendant of a total offense level of 19 under the Guidelines.
Cf. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 538-41 (1988) ___ ______ ______________
(exclusionary rule does not affect information "cleanly"
obtained through "independent source" (quoting United States v. _____________
Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 739 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 _________ _____ ______
U.S. 1233 (1988))). Because this aspect of the record is
dispositive in favor of affirmance, we need not decide whether
the exclusionary rule applies at sentencing.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to reach the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
applies in the context of Guidelines sentencing proceedings,9
and we uphold the sentence imposed by the district court based
solely on our conclusion that it was adequately supported by
the facts established in the unobjected-to portions of the PSR.
____________________
9. We therefore need not comment on the merits of the
government's contention at oral argument that any unfairness
that might result from not applying the exclusionary rule at
sentencing could be alleviated by invoking, as warranted, the
due process prohibition against "sentencing factor
manipulation." See United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425 (1st ___ _____________ ________
Cir. 1995); United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. _____________ _______
1995); cf. Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1345 (exclusionary rule may be ___ _______
applied at sentencing, as exception to general rule, where
defendant shows that illegal search was conducted for specific
purpose of obtaining sentence enhancement); Tejada, 956 F.2d at ______
1263 (same); McCrory, 930 F.2d at 69 (same); cf. also Lynch, _______ ________ _____
934 F.2d at 1237 n.15 (reserving the question); Torres, 926 ______
F.2d at 325 (same).
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Affirmed. _________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 95-2088
Filed Date： 5/29/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015