Wilder v. Forte ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion











    July 5, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 95-1960
    No. 95-2018

    MARC E. WILDER, II, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
    JOHN MARSHALL,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Marc E. Wilder, II and Russell J. Carey on brief pro se. __________________ ________________
    Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and ____________________
    Margaret Melville, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for __________________
    appellees.


    ____________________


    ____________________















    Per Curiam. Prior to its repeal in 1994, a ___________

    Massachusetts statute providing for the award of good-time

    credits to state prisoners specifically withheld such credits

    from inmates who had been convicted of enumerated sex

    offenses. See Mass. Gen. L., ch. 127, 129. Plaintiffs ___

    here, a group of prisoners serving sentences for sex crimes,

    have brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging

    this statutory exclusion on various constitutional grounds.1 1

    The lower court rejected each of their claims at the summary

    judgment stage. On the arguendo assumption that plaintiffs' ________

    contentions are cognizable in a civil-rights action (rather

    than a habeas corpus proceeding), we summarily affirm for the

    reasons recited by the magistrate-judge in his June 23, 1995

    report. We add only the following.

    Underlying several of plaintiffs' claims is the

    assertion that their inability to obtain good-time credits

    constitutes a separate "punishment" apart from that incurred

    at sentencing. This is mistaken. The statutory exclusion

    was enacted in 1965, see Amado v. Superintendent, 366 Mass. ___ _____ ______________

    45, 48 (1974) (reviewing statutory history)--long before any

    of the plaintiffs had been convicted. Accordingly, their

    ineligibility for such credits can only be viewed as part of


    ____________________

    1 Of the more than fifty plaintiffs who joined in the 1
    action below, only some fourteen are participating in the
    instant appeals. We assume arguendo that each of the ________
    appellants has properly invoked this court's jurisdiction.

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    the punishment imposed by the sentencing court after trial.

    Plaintiffs' assertion that the exclusion constitutes a bill

    of attainder fails for this reason (among others). See, ___

    e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965). ____ ______________ _____

    Their additional claim that the exclusion violates double

    jeopardy (a claim which we assume arguendo is properly before ________

    us) falters on the same ground. Even if the exclusion were

    viewed as a cumulative punishment for the same offense,

    double jeopardy would not be offended. See, e.g., United ___ ____ ______

    States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir.) (per ______ ______________

    curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 208 (1995). ____________

    The allegation that the exclusion violates due process

    proves equally unavailing. Plaintiffs possess no liberty

    interest in receiving good-time credits. See, e.g., Sandin ___ ____ ______

    v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Riddle v. Mondragon, ______ ______ _________

    83 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1996). And the statutory

    scheme found violative of substantive due process in Young v. _____

    Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995), a case on ______

    which plaintiffs rely, bears no resemblance to the one before

    us. Finally, the contention that the exclusion violates

    equal protection runs into a wall of caselaw indicating

    otherwise. See, e.g., Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207-08; Artway v. ___ ____ ______ ______

    Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d ________________________________

    Cir. 1996); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th __________ ______





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    Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992); Amado, 366 Mass. ____________ _____

    at 46-51.

    Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. ____________________________















































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