United States v. Carrion-Cruz ( 1996 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    _________________________




    No. 96-1026


    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    ERIC JOEL CARRION-CRUZ,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges, ______________

    and McAuliffe,* District Judge. ______________

    ____________________

    Benicio Sanchez-Rivera, Federal Public Defender, and Juan E. ______________________ _______
    Alvarez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief for _______
    appellant.

    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles- ______________ __________________
    Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Miguel A. Pereira, ________ ___________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the United States.

    ____________________


    August 7, 1996

    ____________________













    Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Eric Joel Carrion-Cruz Per Curiam. __________

    pled guilty to violating the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C.

    2119(3). At the disposition hearing, the district court departed

    upward from the guideline sentencing range to impose a sentence

    of life imprisonment.1 Carrion-Cruz assigns error to the upward

    departure.

    We have carefully examined the transcript of the

    disposition hearing, the presentence investigation report, and

    the briefs. Since we are persuaded that the assignment of error

    lacks merit, we summarily affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. We add ___

    only four brief comments.

    First: U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 allows sentencing courts to _____

    depart from the guideline sentencing range in a given case if the

    court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances that render

    the case atypical and take it out of the "heartland" for which

    the applicable guideline was designed. See United States v. ___ ______________

    Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. ________ ______________

    Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 946 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Diaz- ______ _____________ _____

    Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 _________ _____ ______

    U.S. 862 (1989). Here, the multiple killings for which the

    defendant was responsible murdering four individuals (two of

    whom were good samaritans who had stopped to offer assistance)

    within an abbreviated time frame transport the defendant's

    ____________________

    1In effect, the court raised the defendant's offense level
    by three levels (from 40 to 43). Even for a first-time offender,
    Offense Level 43 commands a sentence of life imprisonment. See ___
    U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).

    2












    activities well outside the mine-run of carjacking cases. See ___

    U.S.S.G. 5K2.1 (encouraging courts to consider upward departure

    from the otherwise applicable guideline sentencing range if the

    relevant offense conduct results in multiple deaths).

    Second: The defendant points to his youth and limited ______

    intellect as mitigating factors. But his counsel made much the

    same argument below, and the district judge specifically

    commented upon these factors in passing sentence and took full

    account of them. Given the sentencing court's special coign of

    vantage, see Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49, we cannot brush ___ ______________

    aside that court's considered judgment on so interstitial a

    matter.

    Third: The defendant's challenge to the reasonableness _____

    of the upward departure is unavailing. Offense Level 40 permits

    sentences of up to 365 months for first offenders. The magnitude

    of the ensuing departure to a life sentence (Offense Level

    43) is reasonable, considering the sordid facts of the case.

    See, e.g., Quinones, 26 F.3d at 218 (explaining that "unusually ___ ____ ________

    brutal, cruel, and degrading treatment" of victims "is emblematic

    of the very sort of sociopathic behavior" that will sustain a

    substantial upward departure). The departure here meets any

    conceivable test of reasonableness. See, id. at 219-20 ___ ___

    (upholding 60% increase as reasonable); Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d ______________

    at 52 (upholding departure that more than doubled defendant's

    sentence as reasonable).

    Fourth: Relatedly, the Supreme Court's recent opinion ______


    3












    in Koon v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996), ____ _____________

    makes it clear that we must respect a district court's special

    competence in sentencing matters, see id. at 4516-17, and uphold ___ ___

    a departure sentence unless the court has abused its discretion,

    see id. at 4517. In light of the stark facts of this brutal ___ ___

    crime, a convincing case of discretion abused simply cannot be

    mustered.

    We need go no further.2 The Supreme Court has

    instructed us that "it is not the role of an appellate court to

    substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to

    the appropriateness of a particular sentence." Williams v. ________

    United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992) (citation and internal _____________

    quotation marks omitted). In essence, the defendant invites us

    to contravene that precept. On these facts, we have no reason to

    take so precipitous a step.



    Affirmed. ________














    ____________________

    2Because the upward departure is fully justified by the
    incidence of multiple deaths, we need not address the sentencing
    court's alternative justifications for the sentence.

    4