Pan American v. EPA ( 1996 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 95-1780

    PAN AMERICAN GRAIN MFG. CO., INC.,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

    Respondent.

    ____________________


    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE

    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    ____________________


    Romano A. Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt for petitioner. ________________________________
    Banumathi Rangarajan, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, ____________________
    Environmental Defense Section, with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant ________________
    Attorney General, Joseph A. Siegel, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. ________________
    Environmental Protection Agency, and Michael Prosper, Office of _______________
    General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, were on brief
    for respondent.


    ____________________

    September 6, 1996
    ____________________


















    CYR, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Pan American Grain CYR, Circuit Judge _____________

    Manufacturing Company, Inc. presents two claims on appeal.

    First, it challenges the United States Environmental Protection

    Agency's ("EPA") November 1991 designation of the Municipality of

    Guaynabo, Puerto Rico ("Guaynabo"), as a nonattainment area under

    the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") promulgated

    by the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671

    ("CAA"). Second, petitioner contests the EPA's May 1995 approval

    of a revised State Implementation Plan ("SIP") issued by the

    Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which banned further use of clam-

    shell devices in grain removal operations to ensure attainment of

    the NAAQS PM10 standard prescribed for Guaynabo. We conclude

    that the first claim is time-barred and reject the second claim

    on the merits.

    BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________

    The CAA was enacted "to protect and enhance the

    Nation's air quality, to initiate and accelerate a national

    program of research and development designed to control air

    pollution, to provide technical and financial assistance to the

    States in the execution of pollution control programs, and to

    encourage the development of regional pollution control pro-

    grams." Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, _______________________________ _____

    1256 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. 7401(b) (1988)). In

    furtherance of these objectives, the EPA promulgated NAAQS, which

    prescribe, inter alia, maximum allowable concentration levels of _____ ____

    fine particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter not greater


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    than a nominal ten micrometers ("PM10"). See 42 U.S.C. ___

    7409(a); see also id. 7407(d)(4)(B). The CAA requires States ___ ____ ___

    to develop and maintain implementation plans for achieving

    compliance with the NAAQS. See id. 7410(a). Accordingly, each ___ ___

    State, as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Common-

    wealth"), is required to submit for EPA approval a SIP which

    specifies the manner in which compliance with NAAQS is to be

    achieved. See id. 7407; American Auto. Mfr. Ass'n. v. Commis- ___ ___ __________________________ _______

    sioner, Mass. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 31 F.3d 18, 21 ________________________________________________

    (1st Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 464 (1st Cir. ___________ ______

    1993). A region that has not attained compliance with NAAQS is

    designated a "nonattainment" area, see 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(1)(A), ___

    which imposes upon the State the obligation to include more

    stringent provisions in its SIP. See id. 7513. ___ ___

    Under the 1990 amendments to the CAA, by operation of

    law, Guaynabo became a designated nonattainment area for PM10,

    based upon NAAQS violations which had occurred prior to January

    1, 1989. See id. 7407(d)(4)(B), 7513(a); 56 Fed. Reg. 11,105. ___ ___

    Accordingly, on March 15, 1991, the EPA published notice in the

    Federal Register announcing its initial designation of Guaynabo _______ ________

    as a "moderate" nonattainment area for PM10. See 42 U.S.C. ___

    7502(a)(1) (permitting EPA to "classify" nonattainment areas).

    On November 6, 1991, the EPA issued a final rule codifying its

    PM10 nonattainment designation for Guaynabo. See id. ___ __

    7407(d)(2); 56 Fed. Reg. 56,694.

    Thereafter, the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board


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    ("EQB") conducted a public hearing and received comments on a

    proposed SIP revision which would achieve PM10 compliance in

    Guaynabo. On November 14, 1993, the EQB submitted its SIP

    revision to the EPA; in March of 1994, it supplemented the

    revised SIP. On August 11, 1994, the EPA published for comment

    its proposed full approval of the SIP revision. See 59 Fed. Reg. ___

    41,265. On May 31, 1995, after conducting public meetings and

    evaluating the comments received, including those submitted by

    petitioner, the EPA approved the revised SIP and published notice

    of its approval and promulgation. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,333. The ___

    instant petition for review was filed on July 28, 1995.

    DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

    A petition to review a final EPA action must be filed

    in the appropriate court of appeals within sixty days after

    notice of the action appears in the Federal Register. See 42 _______ ________ ___

    U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); e.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. ____ ________ ________________

    578, 588-92 (1980). Appellate review is governed by the Adminis-

    trative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), and substan-

    tial deference is accorded final agency actions, which will not

    be set aside unless "`arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-

    tion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.'" Citizen's _________

    Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 59 _______________________ _________________________________

    F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); Puerto Rico ___________

    Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993). The deference ___________ ___

    due "is magnified when the agency interprets its own regula-

    tions." Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., EPA, 35 F.3d 600, ___________________________________ ___


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    604 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, ________ ________

    111-12 (1992)).

    We inquire whether the challenged EPA action was based

    on the wrong factors or whether there has been a clear error in

    judgment. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. __________________________________ _____

    402, 416 (1971). Although searching and careful, review under

    the `arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow in scope. See ___

    Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994). Moreover, we are _____ ___

    not empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the agency.

    See id.; Caribbean Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 28 F.3d 232, 234 (1st ___ ___ __________________________ ___

    Cir. 1994) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. __________________________ ________________

    Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). _____________

    I I

    Petitioner's challenge to the EPA's 1991 designation of

    Guaynabo as a PM10 nonattainment area is time-barred, see 42 ___

    U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (prescribing 60-day period), since the

    petition for review was filed in July 1995, three and one-half

    years after the designation. Consequently, we lack appellate

    jurisdiction. Petitioner attempts to circumvent the time-bar by

    claiming that the 1991 PM10 nonattainment designation did not

    constitute "final agency action" for purposes of judicial review

    under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), but became final in May 1995 when

    the EPA approved the revised SIP issued by the Commonwealth.

    Petitioner's interpretation lacks supporting authority and

    conflicts with the plain language of the statute.

    In its 1990 amendments to the CAA, Congress directed


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    the EPA to publish notice in the Federal Register announcing non- _______ ________

    attainment designations under 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(4)(B). See id. ___ __

    7407(d)(2)(A). On November 6, 1991, the EPA published its PM10

    nonattainment designation for Guaynabo, thereby constituting its

    designation a final EPA action in accordance with its terms: __ __________ ____ ___ _____

    "today's codification of the initial designations for PM10 in 40

    CFR part 81 represents final agency action for the purpose of _____ ______ ______

    section 307(b) of the CAA [42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).]" 56 Fed.

    Reg. 56,706 (emphasis added). Cases in other circuits likewise

    indicate that such nonattainment designations constitute final

    agency action. See Dressman v. Costle, 759 F.2d 548, 553 (6th ___ ________ ______

    Cir. 1985); City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1370 (5th _________________ ___

    Cir. 1981) ("We think that the designations [as NAAQs'

    nonattainment areas] were `final actions' subject to immediate,

    direct review under [42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1)] when they were

    promulgated."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982); United States _____ ______ _____________

    Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 211, clarified, 598 F.2d 915 ___________ ___ _________

    (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 ___ ____ _________________________ ___

    F.2d 283, 290 (7th Cir. 1979) (assuming, without discussion, that

    designations [of NAAQS nonattainment areas] were open to immedi-

    ate judicial review), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980). We _____ ______

    believe this to be both a permissible construction of the stat-

    ute, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense ___ ______________________ __________________________

    Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), and, from an adminis- ______________

    trative efficiency perspective, entirely rational. As the

    required SIP revision process itself is protracted, it is not


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    irrational to conclude that Congress did not intend that it be

    further extended indefinitely. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil ___ ____ ___ ____________

    Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) ("final agency action" status ___

    designed to promote "administrative efficiency"). Petitioner's

    counterargument that Congress intended to defer judicial review

    until the revised SIP has been promulgated is untenable, since it

    misconstrues the plain language of the statute and misapprehends

    the equally clear intent of Congress. Cf. Garcia v. Cecos Int'l __ ______ ___________

    Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1985) (plain language of 42 ____

    U.S.C. 6972(b), requiring sixty days' notice before commence-

    ment of "private citizen" suit is "not a technical wrinkle or

    superfluous formality that federal courts may waive at will . . .

    [but] part of the jurisdictional conferral from Congress that

    cannot be altered by the courts.").

    As the EPA points out, Congress well understood how to

    defer review had that been its intent. Indeed, it specifically

    provided for deferred judicial review of classifications of PM10 _______________

    nonattainment areas until agency action has been taken on the SIP

    or any SIP revision. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1)(B) with _______ ____

    7407(d)(2)(B); see also supra p.3. Thus, the absence of a ___ ____ _____

    similar deferment for nonattainment designations affords confir- ____________

    mation that these EPA actions were meant to be subject to immedi-

    ate review. We therefore conclude that the PM10 nonattainment

    designation for Guaynabo became a final agency action for purpos-

    es of judicial review upon its publication by EPA in the Federal _______




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    Register as directed in the 1990 CAA amendments.1 Thus, the ________

    petition for review is time-barred.

    II II

    Petitioner next claims that it was "arbitrary and

    capricious" to approve the revised SIP issued by the EQB. Since

    the revised SIP comports with the statutory requirement for

    ensuring attainment of the NAAQS for PM10 in a moderate non-

    attainment area, this claim fails on the merits.

    Congress has mandated various SIP criteria as prerequi-

    sites to EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. 7410, 7513(a) and (b). ___

    The CAA generally allows States considerable latitude in deter-

    mining how to meet these SIP criteria. See Train v. Natural ___ _____ _______

    Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 65, 79, 87 (1975). ________________________________

    In the instant case, the revised SIP submitted by the Common-

    wealth won EPA approval following an agency review for complete-

    ness and a finding that it reasonably ensured PM10 attainment in

    Guaynabo.

    Petitioner contends that the EPA failed to provide

    adequate responses to its objections to EPA's assessment of PM10

    violations, its "modeling" of grain processing operations, and
    ____________________

    1Petitioner's argument that the EPA "reopened" its non-
    attainment designation during the SIP revision process is without
    merit. Petitioner cannot revive its time-barred claim by solic-
    iting an EPA response to petitioner's comment challenging the
    designation, especially since the EPA in this case simply reiter-
    ated its original position. See, e.g., American Iron and Steel ___ ____ ________________________
    Institute v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (permitting _________ ___
    such bootstrapping would be contrary to congressional efforts to
    secure prompt and final review of agency decisions; petitioner
    cannot goad agency into replying, then claim agency "reopened"
    issue), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990). _____ ______

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    the resulting RACT/RACM ("reasonably available control technolo-

    gy/reasonably available control measures") requirements. We do

    not agree.
















































    9












    In each instance the EPA presented reasoned explana-

    tions for approving the revised SIP notwithstanding petitioner's

    objections. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,335-37. Moreover, petitioner's ___

    criticisms, which go to the heart of the EPA's approval methodol-

    ogy, involve areas in which "EPA's `expertise is heavily impli-

    cated,' and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the

    Administrator." Mision Industrial, Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 129 _______________________ ___

    (1st Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). Following a thorough review

    of the record, and careful consideration of petitioner's claims,

    we are not persuaded that petitioner has demonstrated "arbitrary

    and capricious" agency action which would warrant disturbing

    EPA's approval and promulgation of the revised SIP. See Citizens ___ ________

    to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 415. ______________________________

    The petition for review is denied. The petition for review is denied. _________________________________


























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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-1780

Filed Date: 9/6/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (19)

Puerto Rico Sun Oil Company v. United States Environmental ... , 8 F.3d 73 ( 1993 )

Caribbean Petroleum Corporation v. United States ... , 28 F.3d 232 ( 1994 )

Vincente Serrano Garcia v. Cecos International, Inc. , 761 F.2d 76 ( 1985 )

Sierra Club v. Larson , 2 F.3d 462 ( 1993 )

Mision Industrial, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency ... , 547 F.2d 123 ( 1976 )

Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. United States ... , 35 F.3d 600 ( 1994 )

honorable-james-a-dressman-judge-honorable-lambert-hehl-judge-and , 759 F.2d 548 ( 1985 )

United States Steel Corp. v. United States Environmental ... , 595 F.2d 207 ( 1979 )

American Iron and Steel Institute v. U.S. Environmental ... , 886 F.2d 390 ( 1989 )

City of Seabrook, Texas v. United States Environmental ... , 659 F.2d 1349 ( 1981 )

United States Steel Corp. v. United States Environmental ... , 598 F.2d 915 ( 1979 )

American Automobile Manufacturers Association v. ... , 31 F.3d 18 ( 1994 )

Adams v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency , 38 F.3d 43 ( 1994 )

conservation-law-foundation-inc-v-james-busey-administrator-federal , 79 F.3d 1250 ( 1996 )

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State ... , 103 S. Ct. 2856 ( 1983 )

Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co. , 101 S. Ct. 488 ( 1980 )

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 95 S. Ct. 1470 ( 1975 )

Arkansas v. Oklahoma , 112 S. Ct. 1046 ( 1992 )

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ... , 104 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1984 )

View All Authorities »