Azubuko v. Rufo ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 96-1075

    CHUKWU E. AZUBUKO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    ROBERT C. RUFO, SHERIFF,
    SUFFOLK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Chukwu E. Azubuko on brief pro se. _________________
    John M. Townsend, General Counsel, Suffolk County Sheriff's __________________
    Department, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    MARCH 4, 1997
    ____________________

















    Per Curiam. Appellant Chukwu E. Azubuko appeals __________

    from the sua sponte dismissal, under Fed. R. Civ. P.

    12(b)(6), of his complaint against Sheriff Robert C. Rufo.

    The court dismissed the complaint, stating that it failed to

    state a claim against the Sheriff.

    It is evident that appellant "can prove no set of

    facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

    relief." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ___ ______ ______

    (standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). First, it is plain

    that appellant is premising Sheriff Rufo's liability for the

    alleged false imprisonment solely on the Sheriff's status as

    a supervisor or employer. That is, the only person directly ________

    involved in the incident at the Roxbury District Court is an

    attorney who supposedly worked for Sheriff Rufo. A claim

    which is premised solely on respondeat superior is an

    improper basis for a 1983 action. See Figueroa v. Aponte- ___ ________ _______

    Rogue, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir. 1989) (a defendant may be _____

    found liable only for his or her own acts or omissions).

    Second, appellant cannot state a claim for false

    imprisonment under the Fourteenth Amendment. The

    availability of an adequate remedy under Massachusetts law

    for such a claim, see, e.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 ___ ____ _____ _______________

    Mass. 82, 508 N.E.2d 72 (1987), precludes a procedural due

    process challenge. See Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. ___ _____ ___________________________

    Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (1st Cir. 1996). Further, there exists ___



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    no substantive due process right to be free from such an

    alleged deprivation. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 ___ ________ ______

    (1994) (plurality opinion).

    Finally, appellant cannot state a Fourth Amendment

    claim in this case because he never was arrested or seized.

    A seizure occurs "only if, in view of all of the

    circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person

    would have believed that he was not free to leave." United ______

    States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J.). ______ __________

    The letter concerning the arrest warrant stated specifically

    that appellant would be arrested only if he failed to appear ______

    at a "voluntary" court appearance. Thus, a reasonable person

    reading this letter would understand that if he went to court

    on his own steam, he would not be arrested. In any event, ___

    appellant indicates that he, in fact, freely left the meeting

    at the Roxbury District Court.

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ________



















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