United States v. Johnson ( 1997 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion





    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________


    No. 96-1261

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    QUINCY D. JOHNSON,
    A/K/A QUINCY D. HAMEL,

    Defendant, Appellant.
    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
    ____________________


    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Theodore L. Craft, by Appointment of the Court, and Quincy _________________ ______
    D. Johnson, on brief pro se. __________
    Helen Kazanjian, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Jay P. ________________ _______
    McCloskey, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. _________

    ____________________

    March 18, 1997
    ___________________






















    Per Curiam. In this appeal from a conviction for conspiring __________

    to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession

    with intent to distribute, we have both a brief from counsel on

    appeal and a pro se brief from appellant. We have carefully

    considered them, as well as the record, and deem this a case

    where, regardless of the strength of defendant's arguments below,

    there remain no issues worthy of extensive consideration on

    appeal. We accordingly, without rehearsing the facts, which are

    well known to the parties, proceed briefly to deal with the

    arguments of appellant and his counsel.

    The first challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence.

    The government, inexplicably, asserts in its brief (p. 18) that,

    after the government finally rested, the defense did not renew

    its motion for judgment of acquittal. And appellant himself (p.

    13) has made the same assertion. But our reading of the record

    indicates that, after the government rested, the court said:

    I will treat the defendant as having renewed his
    motion at the close of the entire case, and the same
    ruling applies, that the motion for acquittal on each
    of Counts One and Two are denied. There is sufficient
    evidence to go to the jury.

    (Transcript p. 449). It also appears that after this statement

    there was no new evidence submitted. The only evidentiary

    discussion concerned the mechanics of redacting a record, which

    was to be done while the jury was being instructed.

    Therefore, we review for error, not "plain error." But we

    find no error.




    -2-












    Pullum, the major prosecution witness, was fair game for

    impeachment at trial, but the jury having found his testimony

    credible, it satisfies the sufficiency requirement under both

    counts. Moreover, Pullum's testimony was corroborated by two

    other witnesses, and the finding of a substantial amount of

    cocaine base and paraphernalia used in drug packaging in places

    and equipment associated with appellant.

    A generalized challenge was made to interruptions made by

    the prosecution to defendant's closing argument. But no specific

    interruptions have been identified by appellant. Nor were any

    objections made. And from the government's references to the

    interruptions in its brief, we see no possible prejudice, let

    alone plain error.

    Another issue, again to be judged on a "plain error" basis,

    is that the court failed to give, in haec verba, an instruction

    to treat an accomplice's testimony "with great care and caution."

    But instructions were given, spotlighting the vulnerabilities of

    witnesses Pullum and Motil. There was no plain error. See United ___ ______

    States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1989). ______ ______

    Two defects were alleged in the sentencing process. The

    first, an alleged failure to discount the weight of cocaine base

    previously purchased, was a matter clearly within the court's

    discretion. It committed no clear error in observing that

    different sources were involved and that the discount applied to

    the seized drugs should not be extended to those previously

    purchased. A variation of this issue, in which it was argued


    -3-












    that only the seized drugs should be considered, made for the

    first time on appeal, is not before us. As for the argument that

    the court improperly refused to assign a minor role to appellant,

    we see no clear error. This was clearly a judgment call for the

    district court, with sufficient supporting evidence.

    The final issue, made by appellant, pro se, is that

    appellant's counsel, both below and on appeal, gave ineffective

    assistance. We do not ordinarily hear ineffective assistance of

    counsel claims on direct appeal and have no reason to deviate

    from this rule here. None of the allegations relating to the

    trial are before us, for lack of a developed record and

    "extraordinary circumstances." See United States v. Diaz- ___ ______________ _____

    Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1995). ________

    As for appellant's pro se challenge to his counsel's

    effectiveness on appeal, we merely note that the only issue which

    counsel chose not to brief was that of the effectiveness of

    assistance at trial, which, as we have just explained, is not

    properly before us on direct appeal.

    Affirmed. ________
















    -4-






Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1261

Filed Date: 4/3/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015