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USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-2149
EDNA RODRIGUEZ-SURIS, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
BERTHA MONTESINOS, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Keeton, District Judge.
_____________________
Kevin G. Little for appellants.
Joe W. Redden, Jr., with whom Curt Webb, Linda K. McCloud,
Beck, Redden & Secrest , Edna Hernandez and Reichard & Escalera were
on brief for appellees.
____________________
August 11, 1997
____________________
Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
KEETON, District Judge. In this diversity action,
plaintiffs-appellants sued defendants-appellees for injuries
sustained after receiving facial collagen injections from defendant
Bertha Montesinos. Plaintiffs filed their complaint nearly four
years after receiving the injurious injections. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants (Montesinos
and Collagen Corporation), holding that all of plaintiffs' claims
were barred by the one-year Puerto Rico statute of limitation
applicable to tort actions. 935 F. Supp. 71 (D.P.R. 1996). We
reverse and remand with directions, as explained.
I. Issues Presented
The principal legal issues in dispute in this case
concern limitation of tort actions under the law of Puerto Rico.
More precisely, the dispute centers on the meaning of statutory
provisions and opinions of courts of Puerto Rico interpreting them,
particularly with respect to levels of awareness of injury, source
of injury, causal connection, and legal responsibility.
To what extent is the running of the statutory time limit
of one year for the filing of tort actions for damages affected by
lack of awareness of injury, a connection between injury and the
personal services or other conduct of a person, and legal
responsibility for the injury?
To what extent is the running of the statutory time limit
of one year affected by lack of awareness of a connection between
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injury and a product of a manufacturer or other supplier of the
product?
To what extent is the running of the limitation period
affected by the representations of the person who caused the
injury, or of third persons, regarding the nature and source of a
plaintiff's injury?
Answers to these questions must be determined as matters
of law. Accordingly, this court reviews the district court's
rulings on these issues de novo.
The matters of law we are deciding, of course, are
matters of the law of Puerto Rico. Both in the district court and
in this court on appeal, the determination of these questions of
law does not involve any discretion to fashion rules of law.
Instead, our objective is solely to determine what is the law as
indicated by authoritative sources. Primary among these
"authoritative sources" are the plainly expressed holdings of the
highest court of Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Daigle v. Maine Med.
Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that in
applying state law, a federal court is "absolutely bound by a
current interpretation of that law formulated by the state's
highest tribunal"). Where a jurisdiction's highest court has not
spoken on a precise issue of law, we look to "analogous state court
decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states,
learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in
state decisional law" in order to make an "informed prophecy" of
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how the state court would rule on the precise issue. Blinzler v.
Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996).
II. Puerto Rico Law Regarding the Statute of Limitation
A. An Overview
The Puerto Rico statute of limitation for tort actions
provides for a one-year limitation period that begins to run from
"the time the aggrieved person has knowledge of the injury." P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, S 5298 (1994). Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving when the "damage" became known. Rivera Encarnacion v.
Comm. of Puerto Rico , 113 P.R. Dec. 383, 385, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans.
498, 501 (1982).
What is it that one must know in order to have "knowledge
of the injury?" The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that
a plaintiff will be deemed to have "knowledge" of the injury, for
purposes of the statute of limitation, when she has "notice of the
injury, plus notice of the person who caused it." Colon Prieto v.
Geigel, 115 P.R. Dec. 232, __ (1984), 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313,
330 [citations hereafter to P.R. Offic. Trans.]. See also Fragoso
v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 886 (1st Cir. 1993); Santiago Hodge v.
Parke Davis & Co. , 909 F.2d 628, 632 (1st Cir. 1990); Barretto Peat
v. Luis Ayala Colon Sucrs., 896 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1990);
Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987).
"Notice of the injury," as explained in a later case, is
established by proof of:
some outward or physical signs through
which the aggrieved party may become aware
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and realize that he [or she] has suffered
an injurious aftereffect, which when known
becomes a damage even if at the time its
full scope and extent cannot be weighed.
These circumstances need not be known in
order to argue that the damage has become
known, because its scope, extent and
weight may be established later on during
the prosecution of the remedial action.
Delgado Rodriguez v. Nazario de Ferrer , No. CE-86-417, slip op. at
10 (Official English Translation) (P.R. May 16, 1988) (quoting H.
Brau del Toro, Los Danos y Perjuicios Extracontractuales en Puerto
Rico 639-40, Pub. J.T.S., Inc. (2d ed. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Once a plaintiff is on "notice of the injury," the
plaintiff may "not wait for his [or her] injury to reach its final
degree of development and postpone the running of the period of
limitation according to his [or her] subjective appraisal and
judgment." Ortiz v. Municipality of Orocovis, 113 P.R. Dec. 484,
487, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 619, 622 (1982).
In some circumstances, awareness of the existence of an
injury, on its own, will not be enough to trigger the running of
the limitation period. See, e.g., Galarza v. Zagury, 739 F.2d 20,
24 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that "knowledge of the author of the
harm means more than an awareness of some ill effects resulting
from an operation by a particular doctor"). If a plaintiff is not
aware of some level of reasonable likelihood of legal liability on
the part of the person or entity that caused the injury, the
statute of limitation will be tolled. In other words, a plaintiff
must also have "knowledge of the author of the injury," a concept
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articulated at length in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's
decision in Colon Prieto.
In Colon Prieto, the plaintiff experienced pain and
insensitivity in his tongue following dental surgery in November
1971. 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 317. Geigel, the dental surgeon,
told plaintiff that he had bitten himself on the tongue and that
the symptoms would subside in a short while. Id. For over a year,
Colon Prieto continued to see Geigel, who told him that the pain
would go away. Id. But the symptoms did not subside. In November
1972, plaintiff consulted with another physician, and learned for
the first time that the pain was the result of Geigel's having cut
a nerve during the initial operation.
Colon Prieto brought suit against Geigel on September 10,
1973, more than one year after the original operation. Geigel
asserted the statute of limitation as a defense. The Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico rejected Geigel's defense, holding that, because
Colon Prieto did not acquire knowledge of the nature of his injury
and Geigel's role in the injury until the November 1972
consultation with the other doctor, plaintiff was not barred under
the Puerto Rico statute of limitation.
Distinguishing Colon Prieto's case from the more
traditional tort case in which a plaintiff is aware from the moment
of the tortious act of the injury and its cause (for example, where
a defendant's act causes something to fall on a plaintiff
immediately), the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico observed that the
statutory phrase "' from the time the aggrieved person had knowledge
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thereof' ... rejects a literal and narrow reading." Id. at 327.
The court noted that the legal reasoning behind a plaintiff's loss
of rights under a statute of limitation is that the plaintiff is
deemed to have abandoned those rights. Id. (quoting A. Borrell
Macia, Responsabilidades Derivadas de Culpa Extracontractual Civil ,
66, Barcelona, Ed. Bosch (2d ed. 1958)). In order for this legal
reasoning to apply, therefore, "such abandonment [on the part of
the plaintiff] should really exist." Id.
B. Three Analytically Separable Questions
We conclude that within the larger structure regarding
the law of Puerto Rico on limitation of tort actions are three
analytically separable subsidiary issues. These issues concern the
circumstances in which a plaintiff can be said to have, or to lack,
the requisite level of awareness for statute of limitation
purposes.
First, the concept of "true knowledge" applies where a
plaintiff is actually aware of all the necessary facts and the
existence of a likelihood of a legal cause of action. Second,
concepts of "notice" and "deemed knowledge" apply. Under these
concepts a plaintiff's subjective awareness is measured against the
level of awareness that the plaintiff, having been put on notice as
to certain facts and having exercised reasonable care regarding a
potential claim, should have acquired. Third, the law or Puerto
Rico recognizes an exception to applicability of the concepts of
notice and deemed knowledge for circumstances in which a
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plaintiff's failure to make a timely filing of a claim is
reasonably based upon the assurances of the person who caused the
injury.
From a structural perspective, two of these questions
(about true knowledge and deemed knowledge) concern alternative
ways in which a defendant may establish that a claim is barred
because it is filed too late. If the defendant succeeds in showing
that plaintiff has not satisfied, or cannot satisfy, plaintiff's
burden of proving lack of true knowledge (that is, lack of full
awareness of all that need be known to preclude tolling), final
judgment for the defendant on the ground of late filing is
appropriate.
If, instead, the finder of fact finds (or the court, by
determining that the evidence of record is so one-sided as to
compel a finding) that the plaintiff was aware of enough facts to
constitute notice and to satisfy the deemed knowledge rule of the
Puerto Rico law of limitation of tort actions, final judgment for
the defendant on the ground of late filing is appropriate unless
plaintiff has proffered evidence sufficient to support a finding
that representations and assurances by the defendant persuaded
plaintiff to rely reasonably and delay institution of a civil
action.
The "unless" clause in the next preceding sentence may be
treated either as a condition to be satisfied before the deemed
knowledge rule applies, or as a negation of an otherwise adequate
showing of applicability of the deemed knowledge rule. Under
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either analytic treatment of the substantive requirement of the
legal test for deemed knowledge, this substantive requirement is
the third of the analytically separable issues to which we referred
above. It creates another possibility of a plaintiff's showing
that a genuine dispute of material fact precludes a judgment as a
matter of law for the defendant on the limitation ground.
1. Full Awareness: A Subjective Component of the Legal
Test
In circumstances where a plaintiff has not abandoned a
cause of action, but instead was never aware that such a cause of
action existed, the statute of limitation would not operate as a
bar to the exercise of the plaintiff's legal rights. See Colon
Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 327-328. As the court noted in
Colon Prieto, a plaintiff who is not aware of the existence of a
cause of action is essentially incapable of bringing suit within
the limitation period. Id. at 327. The emphasis on the
plaintiff's "subjective" ability to bring suit is justified, at
least in part, by the brevity of the limitation period. Id. at
328.
Reasoning from these premises, the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico held that, in order for the limitation period to start
to run, a plaintiff must be able to institute suit, which requires
knowledge of the existence of an injury and knowledge of the person
who caused the injury. Knowledge of who caused the injury, the
court held, was necessary so that the plaintiff would know whom to
sue. Id. at 330 (quoting I A. Barrell y Soler, Derecho Civil
Espanol 500, Barcelona, Ed. Bosch (1955)).
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In setting forth this standard, the court in Colon Prieto
stated that it was adopting a "subjective" standard. Id. at 328.
In the law of Puerto Rico, a legal test of this kind is sometimes
referred to as grounded in the "cognitive" theory of damages. See,
e.g., Barretto Peat, 896 F.2d at 657 (describing S 5298 of Puerto
Rico's Civil Code as codifying the cognitive theory).
To understand this component of the applicable legal
test, for the purpose of applying it to the case now before us, we
must understand what level of awareness is required as to
particulars of the injury and its source. Was the source in
personal services, or in some other form of conduct of some
identifiable person, or in a product used or supplied by some
person and obtained through a chain of distribution involving one
or more others, including a manufacturer?
Under the law of Puerto Rico, the plaintiff's level of
awareness about these matters may be relevant in more than a single
way, bearing upon more than a single sub-issue.
First. What effect is to be given to evidence, if
creditworthy, of the effect that post-injury conduct of a person
who was a cause of the injury, or post-injury conduct of other
persons, had on plaintiff's refraining from or delaying instituting
suit?
Second. What more would the plaintiff have learned about
the injury and authorship of the injury if the plaintiff, having
notice in the sense of awareness of some facts, had then made the
inquiries that a careful person would have made?
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2. Notice and Deemed Knowledge: The Objective Component
We understand the court in Colon Prieto to have been
speaking quite explicitly to the second of these two questions
(stated immediately above) in the passage of the opinion noting
that, if a plaintiff's ignorance of an injury and its origin was
due to the plaintiff's own negligence or lack of care, then the
statute of limitation would not be tolled. See Colon Prieto, 15
P.R. Offic. Trans. at 327-29 (quoting A. Borrell Macia,
Responsabilidades Derivadas de Culpa Extracontractual Civil 344-345
(Bosch ed. 2d ed. 1958)). This point is associated with the level
of awareness implicit in the concept of notice.
The law of Puerto Rico treats a person as being aware of
all that, having awareness constituting notice, that person would
have been likely to come to know through the exercise of care.
Thus, we understand the holdings of Puerto Rico decisions to mean
that "actual knowledge is not required where, by due diligence,
such knowledge would likely have been acquired." Villarini-Garcia
v. Hospital del Maestro, Inc., 8 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1993). It
follows, then, that to determine the point at which a plaintiff
should be held responsible for the required level of awareness of
whether another particular person was an author of the injury, a
court looks to "whether plaintiff knew or with the degree of
diligence required by law would have known whom to sue." Kaiser v.
Armstrong World Indus., 872 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1989)
(citations and internal quotation omitted).
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Once a plaintiff is made aware of facts sufficient to put
her on notice that she has a potential tort claim, she must pursue
that claim with reasonable diligence, or risk being held to have
relinquished her right to pursue it later, after the limitation
period has run. See, e.g., Villarini, 8 F.3d at 85.
In Villarini, a plaintiff was made aware of facts
sufficient for her to be able to file suit (as to two of her
claims) three weeks after her operation. We held that the
plaintiff was time-barred from bringing those claims roughly two
and a half years later. Id. We recognized in Villarini that the
plaintiff may not have understood fully the legal significance of
the facts known to her after her operation, but also recognized
that the meaning of authoritative declarations of the law of Puerto
Rico is that "there is nothing unfair in a policy that insists that
the plaintiff promptly assert her rights." Id. Thus, plaintiff's
failure to consult with a lawyer or otherwise investigate the claim
to which she had been alerted by the factual circumstances
associated with the operation barred her from commencing that claim
in the courts over one year after being on notice. Id.
Similarly, once a plaintiff is put on notice that someone
or some entity is the cause of the injury, the plaintiff may not
succeed in a late-filed claim by asserting ignorance about the
precise identity of the tortfeasor. Also, because corporate
identities and intracorporate relationships are a matter of public
record, knowledge of the precise corporate identity of the entity
responsible for a plaintiff's injury is not required before the
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period prescribed by the statute of limitation begins to run. See
Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1987).
3. An Exception to the Rule of Notice
An exception to the rule of notice (the objective
component of the law of limitation of tort actions) is recognized.
If a plaintiff's suspicions that she may have been the victim of a
tort are assuaged by assurances made by the person who caused the
injury, a plaintiff will not be held responsible for failing to
pursue her claim more aggressively. Colon Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic.
Trans. at 329-330.
In addition to holdings discussed above (in explanation
of both the subjective and the objective components of the law of
Puerto Rico), the court in Colon Prieto held that, where the
plaintiff's doctor (the person responsible for causing the injury)
assured the plaintiff that the pain was normal and was due to
plaintiff's biting his tongue during the operation, the plaintiff
would not be held to have "known" of the injury and the cause until
the later consultation. This ruling, the court observed, was
the fairest and most equitable. We
safeguard the aggrieved party's right to
seek redress, while we abstain from
rewarding the person who, having caused
the damage, took refuge in his patient's
trust and ignorance trying to avail
himself of the circumstances in order to
defeat the action.
Id. at 330.
In this context, where a diligent plaintiff reasonably
relies upon representations made by a tortfeasor that her symptoms
are not the result of a negligent or otherwise tortious act, that
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plaintiff is not barred, because of her "own negligence or lack of
care," from the benefit of tolling of the limitation period. See
Colon Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 329-330. See also
Villarini, 8 F.3d at 85-86. Stated another way, the condition
attached to a plaintiff's right of tolling -- the condition that
she act with care to make additional inquiries once she is on
notice -- does not apply (or is excused, or negated) when the
plaintiff reasonably relies on what others told her. The reliance,
however, must be reasonable, and the determination of the
reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance on the assurances of
others involves an evaluation that, depending upon the
circumstances, may or may not be a question for the finder of fact,
and thus may or may not preclude summary judgment. See id. at 86-
87.
Where facts sufficient to support every element of a
claim relating to an injury are apparent to a plaintiff at an
earlier time, it will not be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely
on assurances of a tortfeasor and fail to pursue the claim. See
id. at 86 (where plaintiff had all the information necessary for
a failure-to-warn claim, doctor's subsequent reassurances would not
excuse plaintiff's lack of diligence in pursuing the claim). Our
holdings, moreover, support the conclusion that a time will come at
which, if the tortfeasor's initial predictions are not borne out,
a plaintiff's reliance is no longer reasonable. Id. Finally,
representations made by third-party doctors constitute another
factor to consider in determining whether a plaintiff's continued
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reliance upon the reassurances of a tortfeasor is reasonable. See
Villarini, 8 F.3d at 86 (holding that varying diagnoses of
different doctors, along with the reassurances of the negligent
physician, "could have lulled a reasonable person into believing
for a year or more that the operation had not been botched").
C. Summary
In sum, we conclude (1) that within the larger questions
regarding the law of Puerto Rico on limitation of tort actions are
three analytically separable subsidiary questions; (2) that from a
structural perspective, two of these questions (about true
knowledge and deemed knowledge) concern alternative ways a
defendant may establish that a claim is barred because filed too
late; (3) that, if on the evidence proffered in a case, a finder of
fact might reasonably find that representations and assurances
persuaded plaintiff to rely reasonably and delay institution of a
civil action, summary judgment for defendants would be
inappropriate; and (4) that this remains true even if the record
would otherwise require judgment for defendant under the rule of
notice and deemed knowledge.
III. Record for Review
A. Factual Background
Collagen is a natural protein found throughout the body
that provides support to other bodily tissues, including the skin.
Since the 1970s, collagen obtained from animals has been used in a
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variety of medical procedures, including procedures designed to
improve the consistency and appearance of the skin. Defendant
Collagen Corporation manufactures and distributes at least two
types of bovine collagen (derived from cows), called Zyderm and
Zyplast. Both can be injected under the skin to improve the
appearance and structure of the skin. Collagen's products are
distributed only to be sold to and administered by licensed
physicians.
In 1989, each of the plaintiffs, Edna Rodriguez-Suris
("Rodriguez"), Maria Rosa Gonzalez San Juan de Cortes ("Gonzalez"),
Annette Perez de Pedreira ("Pedreira"), and Vanessa Perez de
Fernandez ("Fernandez"), received collagen injections from
defendant Bertha Montesinos. Montesinos, who was not a licensed
physician, obtained injectable collagen from a doctor in Miami,
Florida, and administered the injections at her apartment in
Santurce, Puerto Rico. In each instance, Montesinos injected
collagen into the forehead (between the eyebrows) and along the
"expression lines" surrounding the nose and lips of each of the
plaintiffs. None of the plaintiffs saw the material that was
injected. In some instances, Montesinos provided the plaintiff
with a brochure describing cosmetic collagen treatments, but none
of the plaintiffs saw Collagen Corporation product packaging or
inserts. In the fall of 1989, Montesinos gave each of the
plaintiffs a treatment involving injections. Shortly thereafter,
each plaintiff developed hard red nodules or bumps at the sites of
the injections.
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In the following summary of the evidence of record with
respect to each plaintiff's history of treatment and consequences,
we state the evidence as a finder of fact might find by a
preponderance of the evidence, where any genuine dispute exists,
since our purpose is to determine whether summary judgment for
defendants is appropriate.
1. Rodriguez
Plaintiff Rodriguez went to Montesinos for injections for
the third time in November 1989. Immediately after the treatment,
Rodriguez developed a redness, accompanied by a burning sensation,
around the area of the injections. Although the burning sensation
subsided within a week, Rodriguez was left with a "red, raised
ridge" on both sides of her nose and mouth. Over the next two and
a half years, Rodriguez received three to four more collagen
injections from Montesinos, who assured her that the marks would
gradually go away. The ridge, however, remained hard and did not
diminish in size. Rodriguez last saw Montesinos in March 1992.
Rodriguez spoke informally with two doctors about her
problem. In late November 1989, Rodriguez talked with Dr. Robert
Nevarez, a plastic surgeon, during a party they were both
attending. Rodriguez told Dr. Nevarez that she had received
collagen injections and that the red marks were a reaction to the
injections. Dr. Nevarez said that he thought that the marks were
an adverse reaction to collagen, but that they would go away.
Nevarez told Rodriguez to come to his office for a consultation,
but the plaintiff never followed up. At another social event some
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time between 1989 and 1992, but closer to 1989, Rodriguez talked
with Dr. Pedro Borras, a neurosurgeon, who told her that if the
marks were a reaction to collagen, then they would go away.
In September 1992, Rodriguez went to see Dr. Tolbert
Wilkinson in San Antonio, Texas, at which time, according to
Rodriguez, she first learned that the marks had been caused by
products of defendant Collagen Corporation and would be permanent.
2. Fernandez
Plaintiff Fernandez, sister of plaintiff Pedreira,
received her third collagen injection treatment from Montesinos in
October 1989. Fernandez did not see what was injected into her
face. The evening after her third treatment, Fernandez noticed
"slightly raised and red" marks in the places where she had been
injected. When the marks did not disappear as she expected,
Fernandez went to see Dr. David Latoni-Cabanillas, a dermatologist,
in early 1990. Fernandez told Dr. Latoni that she received
collagen injections from Montesinos in the areas where she
developed the marks. Dr. Latoni said that the marks looked
"strange" to him, and that he did not know if they would go away.
Dr. Latoni attempted to treat Fernandez' symptoms with
various techniques, including injections of other material and
dermabrasion. His attempts to remedy her symptoms were
unsuccessful. Fernandez also had a discussion with Montesinos, who
told plaintiff that the marks would go away.
In September 1992, Fernandez consulted with Dr. Wilkinson
in San Antonio. Fernandez claims that she was not aware of the
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source and extent of her injuries until the meeting with
Dr. Wilkinson.
3. Gonzalez
Plaintiff Gonzalez received two treatments from
Montesinos in 1989 and two or three in 1990 or 1991. Gonzalez did
not see the material injected into her face, or any packaging, but
Montesinos told her that it was "animal collagen." Gonzalez
received her second series of collagen injections on October 24,
1989. The day after this second series, Gonzalez developed a rash-
like reaction at the sites of the injections.
A few months after the development of the rash, Gonzalez
consulted Dr. Isabel Banuchi, a dermatologist who administered
collagen injections as part of her practice. Dr. Banuchi expressed
concern after hearing that Gonzalez had received injections from an
unlicensed person. Dr. Banuchi told Gonzalez that she did not know
whether the material that had been injected was in fact collagen,
and that she had never seen the type of reaction to collagen that
Gonzalez was experiencing.
Gonzalez also consulted with two other doctors between
1990 and 1992: Dr. Carranza, who told her that she should wait and
see what happened with the reaction, and Dr. Armando Silva, a
dermatologist who said he did not know what had been injected into
Gonzalez' face. According to Gonzalez, although she informed all
of these doctors that she developed the symptoms immediately after
being injected by what she was told was collagen, the physicians
said that her reaction seemed "strange" to them, because reactions
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to collagen injections normally disappear. Dr. Carranza, however,
did tell Gonzalez that her rash was a result of whatever had been
injected into her face.
Despite directions from the physicians with whom she
consulted not to have any more injections, Gonzalez received more
treatments from Montesinos two or three times after developing the
rash, in 1990 or 1991. Montesinos administered injections at the
site of the hard nodules because, she told Gonzalez, the reaction
might have been the result of "dead" collagen, and further
injections could help improve the condition of her facial skin.
Gonzalez also sought diagnosis and treatment from
Dr. Walter Benavent. On December 26, 1990, Dr. Benavent wrote to
a scientist at Collagen Corporation asking for assistance in
diagnosing one of his patients (Gonzalez) who had developed
"hardened nodules along both naso-labial folds, corner of the
mouth, and chin following injections of Collagen" some time in
September or October of 1989. According to Dr. Benavent, Gonzalez
stated that the person who administered the injections told her it
was collagen, but that Gonzalez suspected that the collagen might
not have been properly refrigerated because of power outages in
Puerto Rico following Hurricane Hugo.
Over a year later, in January 1992, Dr. Benavent received
a letter from Collagen Corporation stating that it was difficult to
determine whether his patients (by this time, Gonzalez and
Pedreira) had in fact been injected with collagen, because their
described symptoms were not typical of a reaction to collagen, and
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suggesting that Dr. Benavent send the patients' blood samples to
Collagen Corporation to test for the presence of collagen. At the
direction of Dr. Benavent, Gonzalez sent a sample of her blood to
Collagen Corporation. On March 4, 1992, Collagen Corporation wrote
to Dr. Benavent (who passed the letter on to Gonzalez) that
Gonzalez' blood tested negative for the presence of bovine collagen
antibodies. The letter stated that the results were a "research
tool only and should not be considered diagnostic."
After receiving the results from Collagen Corporation,
Dr. Benavent told Gonzalez that he did not think that the material
injected into her face was collagen. He did, however, tell her
that her symptoms might be permanent.
In September 1992, Gonzalez traveled to San Antonio to
meet with Dr. Wilkinson, who told her that the marks on her face
were a reaction to bovine collagen. According to Gonzalez, this
was the first time that she became aware of the permanency and
cause of her injury.
4. Pedreira
The small bumps that appeared on plaintiff Pedreira's
face after her third treatment with Montesinos in September 1989
became "quite noticeable" four to six weeks later, and have
persisted in that state ever since. Although Pedreira did not see
the material being injected, Montesinos told Pedreira that she was
using bovine collagen.
Starting in January or February of 1990, and continuing
over the next two years, Pedreira consulted a number of physicians
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for diagnosis and treatment. These physicians, whom Pedreira told
that she had received injections of what she thought was collagen
in the areas where the bumps appeared, tried various treatment
techniques to no avail. A dermatologist told Pedreira that she
should wait, because if it was collagen, the reaction would "wear
away," and a plastic surgeon stated that there was nothing he could
do to help her. After consulting some of the doctors, Pedreira
went to Montesinos, who told her to massage the affected area, and
to wait because the reaction would "wear away." Pedreira later
testified that in 1990, when she consulted the plastic surgeon, she
did suspect that collagen was the cause of her injury, but that,
based on the physicians' and Montesinos' assurances, she assumed
the marks would eventually go away.
In January 1992, after talking with her friend Gonzalez,
Pedreira went to see Dr. Benavent. In his notes following
consultation with Pedreira, Dr. Benavent stated that Pedreira had
nodules around her nose and mouth that appeared after receiving
injections of what was purportedly collagen from a "beautician."
Like Gonzalez, Pedreira submitted a blood sample to Collagen
Corporation for testing, the results of which were negative for the
presence of collagen. Finally, Pedreira saw Dr. Wilkinson in
September 1989, at which time she asserts she first became aware of
the permanency and cause of her facial deformities.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed their separate complaints on August 31,
1993. Their cases were subsequently consolidated. On August 20,
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1996, the district court granted summary judgment for defendant
Collagen Corporation, after concluding that plaintiffs' claims were
barred by Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations for tort
actions. Specifically, the district court concluded that, based on
the plaintiffs' own testimony, each plaintiff had reasonable notice
of her injury, "sufficient to file suit" well before they met with
Dr. Wilkinson in September 1992. Based on the district court's
determination that the record indisputably showed that plaintiffs
had sufficient notice of their cause of action, the court held
that:
the one-year statute of limitation for
plaintiffs' causes of action began to run,
at the very latest, in the beginning of
1992. At that time, plaintiffs had
knowledge of their injuries, and of the
entity ("collagen") that caused the tort.
With due diligence, the identity of the
manufacturer of the material injected
could have easily been ascertained by the
plaintiffs. Further, suit could have been
commenced in this court, or at state
court, against Montesinos and a fictitious
named company defendant, to describe the
collagen manufacturer, as allowed under
Puerto Rico law. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32,
App. III R15.4 (1983).
935 F. Supp. at 82.
In an order dated December 31, 1996, the district court
granted summary judgment, based on the same findings of fact and
conclusions of law, for defendant Bertha Montesinos, and denied
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
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IV. Application of Standards of Review to the Present Record
As an initial matter, both appellants and appellees argue
that a decision in their favor is required because the other party
is in some way bound to statements made in pleadings.
Appellants argue that appellee Collagen Corporation
cannot succeed in contending that the plaintiffs knew, or at least
had notice, for purposes of applying the law of limitation of tort
actions in Puerto Rico, that the material injected during
treatments by Montesinos was collagen, while at the same time
denying, as a primary defense, that the material injected was
indeed a collagen product of Collagen Corporation. This argument
fails adequately to take into account a procedural provision, in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2), that allows parties to
take inconsistent positions in their pleadings. Especially at the
early stages of litigation, a party's pleading will not be treated
as an admission precluding another, inconsistent, pleading. See
Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 573 & n.4 (1st Cir.
1997) (noting the relaxed standard of the Federal Rules that allows
alternative pleadings); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P&B Autobody, 43
F.3d 1546, 1555 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Because procedural law allows
alternative contentions, parties to a civil action involving such
an array of factual and legal theories as this case presents may be
allowed to defer choice at least until late stages of proceedings
in the trial court."); McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955
F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that allegations should not be
construed as an admission against inconsistent claims), cert.
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denied, 504 U.S. 957, 112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992); Molsbergen v. United
States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. dismissed ,
473 U.S. 934, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
Likewise, statements contained in plaintiffs' complaints
will not be construed as admissions by plaintiffs that they knew,
before Montesinos administered injections, that Montesinos was
using one of Collagen's products. Collagen argues, unpersuasively,
that statements contained in the plaintiffs' complaints that in
1989 Montesinos injected plaintiffs with "Collagen, a product of
Collagen Corporation," amount to judicial admissions that
plaintiffs knew in 1989 what was being injected into their faces.
The pleading was simply asserting the alleged fact as to what
happened, not as to when plaintiffs learned about that fact.
Turning to the central issues in this appeal, we
conclude that the factual record in this case is sufficiently
developed for this court to determine that the trial court
correctly concluded that the notice component (the objective
component) was established in favor of all defendants against all
plaintiffs as an initial or prima facie matter. We also conclude,
however, that we must nevertheless vacate the judgment for
defendants because a trialworthy dispute of fact exists, on this
record, with respect to the applicability of the recognized
exception to the notice rule as to each plaintiff's claim against
each defendant in this case.
Defendants' argument that plaintiff Rodriguez had
"notice" by early 1992, if not earlier, has support in the record.
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Plaintiff Rodriguez developed hard, red, raised bumps around the
area of injections shortly after Montesinos' treatment in the fall
of 1989. Over the next three years, these bumps did not dissipate
or change in any way. Rodriguez' discussions with Drs. Nevarez and
Borras between 1989 and 1992 show that she was already aware that
a raised ridge was a result of--or at least related to--the
injections she received from Montesinos. By March 1992 (if not
earlier), when Rodriguez discontinued injection treatments with
Montesinos, the intractable nature of Rodriguez' symptoms put her
on notice that she had been injured. By early 1992, enough facts
were available to Rodriguez to enable her to consult a lawyer and,
with the lawyer's help, investigate the manufacturing source of the
material injected by Montesinos into her face. Had she not
received the assurances of Montesinos and encountered the
uncertainty of the doctors, her failure to pursue a claim after two
years of unchanged symptoms would have barred her claim under the
objective rule of notice.
Plaintiff Fernandez developed the reactive bumps, at the
sites of the injections, the evening after receiving her third
treatment from Montesinos. At some time in early 1990, she
consulted with Dr. Latoni. Fernandez told Dr. Latoni at that time
that she had received collagen injections from Montesinos at the
site of the reaction. Dr. Latoni treated Fernandez "nine or ten
times," using kenalog injections and dermabrasion techniques, but
to no avail.
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Defendants contend, with support in the record, that by
the time Fernandez finished treatment with Dr. Latoni (the date is
not apparent from the record, but it was well before her visit to
Dr. Wilkinson), sufficient facts were available to put her on
notice that she had sustained an injury as a result of the
injections administered by Montesinos. That Fernandez was aware of
a possible link between the injections and her facial deformities
is evidenced in her statements to Dr. Latoni, and her discussions
with Montesinos, whom she told about the reaction. When the
symptoms persisted unchanged, even after numerous treatments by
Dr. Latoni, Fernandez was put on notice that the marks on her face
were not a normal reaction to collagen injections that would "wear
away."
Plaintiff Gonzalez had numerous indications, well before
her September 1992 visit to Dr. Wilkinson, that her reaction was a
result of the collagen injections that she received from Montesinos
on October 24, 1989. Montesinos told Gonzalez that she was using
collagen in the injections, and later told her that the reaction
might have been caused by "dead" collagen. Although some of the
doctors told Gonzalez that if it was collagen, the reaction would
go away, the bumps did not disappear for over two years. And at
least one of the doctors, Dr. Carranza, explicitly told Gonzalez
that the reaction was related to her facial injections.
The reaction did not subside over time, despite further
treatments from Montesinos. The fact that Gonzalez continued to
see the unlicensed cosmetologist after being advised by her
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physicians that she should not continue to have injections,
moreover, tends to undermine any claim by Gonzalez that she was not
on notice. Also, as she did with the other doctors that she saw,
Gonzalez told Dr. Benavent in 1990 that she had received what she
believed was collagen injected into her face, and that she had
developed the rash at the same location as the injections. In his
letter to the Collagen Corporation, Dr. Benavent related how
Gonzalez told him that she believed that Montesinos might have
injected collagen that was not properly refrigerated. Gonzalez was
informed of the letter from Collagen stating that her blood tested
negative for collagen antibodies. After receiving these results,
Dr. Benavent told Gonzalez that he did not know what had been
injected into her face.
Defendants contend, with support in the record, that
Gonzalez was aware, when she consulted with the various doctors
between 1989 and 1991, that her facial deformities were related to
the injection she received in the fall of 1989. She even told
Dr. Benavent that she suspected that the injection that resulted in
her deformities might have contained improperly stored collagen.
The representations of Collagen and Benavent were not enough to
undermine an impression, supported by facts known to Gonzalez at
the time, that she had been injured as a result of the particular
injection administered by Montesinos. We conclude that, as a
matter of law, she was on notice.
Like plaintiff Gonzalez, plaintiff Pedreira consulted
with Dr. Benavent; similarly, she received the results of the blood
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tests and Dr. Benavent's opinion that the reaction was probably not
caused by collagen. For the reasons just discussed, defendants
contend, with support in the record, that Pedreira told the doctors
with whom she consulted that the bumps on her face appeared after
receiving collagen injections into her face, and that the bumps
were located at the sites of the injections. Pedreira admitted
that in late 1990 she suspected the collagen injection as the
culprit in her injury, but that she believed that the symptoms
would just go away. It is true that this belief was based in part
on the representations of Montesinos, with whom she talked in the
summer of 1990, and who told her to massage the bumps, which would
eventually go away. We conclude, nevertheless, that as a matter of
law Pedreira was on notice.
In the present case, each of the plaintiffs had notice
well before September 1992 that her symptoms were related to the
collagen injections administered by Montesinos. Each of the
plaintiffs was told by Montesinos, either before the damaging
injections, or after the plaintiff developed the marks on her face,
that Montesinos had used injectable collagen. All of the
plaintiffs told their doctors that the marks appeared after
receiving the collagen injections, at the same sites as the
injections. Many of the doctors confirmed plaintiffs' suspicions
that the bumps or marks were a result of the collagen injections.
All of plaintiffs received more than one collagen reaction; most
received injections after the one that resulted in the rash. That
the red raised bumps were not a normal, more mild, reaction to
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collagen should have been apparent to plaintiffs, given that they
did not experience a similar reaction to any of the other
injections.
Even if the plaintiffs were on notice as to the
likelihood of a legal claim springing from their facial
deformities, an arguable question of fact remains as to whether the
representations of Montesinos and others contributed, in a material
way, to plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit. In other words, a
question of material fact remains as to whether the exception to
the notice rule applies in this case. Plaintiffs received repeated
reassurances from Montesinos that the reactions would go away. The
doctors consulted by the plaintiffs gave a wide range of diagnoses
and prognoses, including reassurances that the symptoms would
subside, statements of uncertainty as to the composition of the
injected material, and prescriptions for treatments that
purportedly would remedy the facial marks. The effect of these
representations, although not made by the alleged torfeasors, is a
factor to consider in determining whether plaintiffs reasonably
relied on Montesinos' assurances.
After full consideration of the factual record before us
in this appeal, we conclude that we cannot say that a finder of
fact, reasoning on the basis of the evidence in the record before
us, could come to only one finding, a finding for the defendants on
the limitation issue on all claims against all defendants. The
evidence in the record in this case is not so one-sided that we can
say that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
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that the exception to the notice concept does not apply. It is a
defendant's burden, in moving for summary judgment, to establish
that all material facts are undisputed, and that no finder of fact
could reasonably find a genuine dispute of material fact and
resolve that dispute in the plaintiff's favor. In view of the
relatively particularized nature of evidence favorable to each
plaintiff in this case with respect to reassurances after
suspicions were aroused, in relation to her claim against each
defendant, we cannot say that a finder of fact must find this
evidence not creditworthy.
First. The evidence does not compel a finding, as to any
plaintiff, that she has failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that she did not have true knowledge of injury, source of
injury, and awareness of all facts constituting the factual grounds
for legal responsibility of an identifiable actor or supplier of
collagen.
Second. The evidence does not compel a finding, as to
any plaintiff, that she has failed to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that she reasonably relied upon repeated assurances by
Montesinos and others.
For these reasons, even though we have ruled that but for
the second of the foregoing genuine disputes of fact defendants
would have been entitled to summary judgment under the notice rule
(the objective component of the legal test), the judgment for
defendants entered in the trial court must be vacated and the case
must be remanded. We direct, explicitly, that the only limitation-
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of-actions issue remaining for proceedings on remand is the issue
regarding reasonableness of reliance on assurances of the
defendants, evaluated in the context of evidence of assurances by
unaffiliated third parties.
It is so ordered. Costs are awarded to plaintiffs.
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Document Info
Docket Number： 96-2149
Filed Date： 8/11/1997
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015