Perlman, etc. v. Tenofsky ( 1997 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 97-9003

    ____________________

    IN RE: STEVEN J. TENOFSKY, DEBTOR
    ____________________

    SAMUEL PERLMAN AND HERBERT RUBIN,
    TRUSTEES OF H.D.S. REALTY TRUST,
    AND JOSEPH BRAUNSTEIN,
    TRUSTEE OF ESTATE OF STEVEN J. TENOFSKY,

    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    STEVEN J. TENOFSKY,

    Defendant, Appellant.
    ____________________

    No. 97-9004

    ____________________

    IN RE: STEVEN J. TENOFSKY, DEBTOR
    ____________________

    JOSEPH BRAUNSTEIN,

    Appellee,

    v.

    STEVEN J. TENOFSKY,

    Appellant.
    ______________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

    OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
    ____________________




    Stephen F. Gordon for appellant.
    John M. Timperio with whom Mark N. Berman was on brief for
    appellees.

    ____________________

    September 26, 1997
    ___________________




    Per curiam. Appellant Steven J. Tenofsky claims that he

    wrongly was denied a discharge in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case

    based on his failure to maintain recorded information from which

    his financial condition could be ascertained. See 11 U.S.C. S

    727(a)(3). The bankruptcy judge's conclusion that appellant's

    records were inadequate and incomplete was affirmed by the First

    Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Having reviewed the record, we

    find ourselves in full agreement with the reasoning expressed in

    the panel's thorough opinion, and also affirm. We add only the

    following brief comments.

    First, appellant's counsel emphasized at oral argument that

    the bankruptcy judge could not possibly have reviewed the 3,000

    pages of information contained in Mrs. Tenofsky's records during

    the thirty-minute recess between the conclusion of trial and her

    ruling, and that she therefore failed to consider carefully all of

    the evidence before rendering a decision. The judge, however, had

    ample time to review the nature of the material contained in Mrs.

    Tenofsky's records, and to make a judgment that it did not fill the

    gaps about which she was concerned. That the judge did not refer

    to the records in her bench ruling speaks to their relevance, not

    to her lack of consideration of them.

    Second, we may set aside the bankruptcy court's application of

    the law to the facts only if we detect clear error in its

    assessment of the facts, use of an erroneous legal standard, or an

    error or abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. See

    In re DN Associates, 3 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir. 1993). The


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    bankruptcy court here used the correct "case-by-case analysis,

    taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of the

    debtor's case," In re Ridley, 115 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr. D. Mass.

    1990). The judge's evaluation of the facts was informed by her

    view of appellant's credibility, "a key element" that she was in

    the best position to assess. See id. We find neither error nor

    abuse.

    If appellant had a fighting chance to persuade the bankruptcy

    judge, and, though "weak, indeed almost hopeless, [but not]

    frivolous" before the appellate panel, Lallemand v. University of

    Rhode Island, 9 F.3d 214, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1993), the case surely

    has lost all merit at this stage. We therefore order appellant to

    show cause, within ten days from the issuance of this opinion, why

    we should not award double costs to appellee. See Fed. R. App. P.

    38.

    Affirmed.






















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Document Info

Docket Number: 97-9003

Filed Date: 9/26/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015