United States v. Wilder ( 2008 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2213
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DARREN F. WILDER,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, was on
brief for appellant.
Dana Gershengorn, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Kayla Bakshi,
Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on brief
for appellee.
May 12, 2008
CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellant-defendant
Darren Wilder appeals from his conviction after a jury trial for
possession, transmission and receipt of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (2) and (b)(1) and § 2252(a)(4)(B)
in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. He challenges his conviction on five grounds: (1)
that the warrant permitting seizure of materials from his home was
issued without probable cause; (2) that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to establish knowing receipt of child pornography as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); (3) that the evidence was
insufficient to establish the knowing possession required by 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); (4) that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that the images alleged to evidence the
transportation and receipt of child pornography in Counts One and
Two depicted real children; and (5) that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that the images listed in Count
One of the indictment depicted a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. We affirm the conviction.
Background and Facts
A three-count superceding indictment charged Wilder with
knowingly transporting pornography involving minors, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Count One); knowingly receiving and
attempting to receive pornography involving minors, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Count Two); and knowingly
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possessing pornography involving minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count Three). The district court denied Wilder's
motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained pursuant to the
search warrant, ruling that the affidavit that had accompanied the
warrant application provided probable cause to issue the warrant.
After a week-long trial, the jury convicted Wilder on all three
counts in the indictment. The district court sentenced him to
fifteen years in prison, followed by five years' supervised
release.
The following facts are not in dispute. In 2002-03,
federal agents investigating online child pornography found a pay-
for-membership website called "Lust Gallery: A Secret Lolitas
Archive." A preview page through which users visited the website
showed naked female children who were identified on the page as
being under fourteen years old. Some of the children were shown in
the act of urinating. The page also noted that "everyone
understands there are reasons not to reveal everything right here."
An undercover investigator, John Johnson, joined the Lust Gallery
website. After entering contact and credit card information, he
received a confirmation email and a password from the site. The
charge on his credit card bill for the membership was from a
company called "Iserve." Johnson entered the site and saw several
photo galleries, each of which held 80-100 images of nude women in
different poses. Another investigator accessed the site and
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observed thousands of pictures of children in sexually explicit
activity or states of undress.
During their investigation, the agents identified Wilder
as being among the subscribers to Lust Gallery. In March 2003,
Wilder bought a one-month subscription to the site for $57.90. His
credit card bills also showed entries from a company called
"Iserve." Wilder had a previous conviction for possession of child
pornography and was still on supervised release when investigators
uncovered his subscription to Lust Gallery. When his house was
searched in connection with the earlier offense, investigators had
found fourteen computer disks containing child pornography.
The agents obtained and on January 15, 2004 executed a
warrant to search Wilder's home in Dracut, Massachusetts. Wilder
was not at home when agents arrived, but agent Colleen Forgetta
called him, and he returned to the house. After being advised of
the search warrant, Wilder agreed to speak with agents. He told
the agents, inter alia, that he "liked teenage girls" and that he
was "enticed by certain websites." When he was asked if had
subscribed to any child pornography websites, he said he had and
that he thought the name of the site was Lust Gallery. Asked
whether he thought agents would discover child pornography on his
computer, he responded, "Well, you're here so you must think there
is."
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Wilder initially told agents he had only an office
computer in his house. He later admitted, though, that he kept a
second computer in the basement. Agents took both computers and a
number of handwritten notes from Wilder's residence. One of these
notes contained an email address which was the same address used by
Wilder to subscribe to Lust Gallery. Other notes contained, inter
alia, a list, marked "downloaded," of 24 file names, including "pedo
raygold,10yofuck+cum in pussy," "childlover little collection videos
0154," "pthc open-f09," and "raygold 12yo daughter gets fucked," and
the names of websites related to child pornography, including
"www.lolita-photo.com," "www.youngxlolita," "pre-12 host,"
"lolitabuffet.com/index.html," "alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.young,"
and "www.preteendigest.net." Government witnesses testified that
"pthc" was an abbreviation for "pre-teen hard core," that "pedo" was
short for "pedophile," and that "r@ygold" referred to a "set of videos
of child pornography out on the Internet." Another note listed the
site, "www.evidence-eliminator.com/product."
All the files and programs on Wilder's office computer
were examined, and agents used software tools to discover what
files the computer user had deleted. The investigation revealed a
posting that had appeared on a newsgroup called "alt.sex.young."1
The posting was from the email address springbegins@hotmail.com and
1
A newsgroup is similar to a virtual bulletin board on the
Internet which is arranged by topic and on which a user can post
messages and images.
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stated, "I have many pics of my 12 yr old daughter in the shower
and dressing. I am looking for more of the same. Send me your
private pics and I'll send mine." Wilder had responded to the
posting with an email titled "trade pics." The posting contained
four explicit photos of child pornography and the statement, "Now
it's your turn." Investigators found six images of child
pornography showing a very young child located in the newsgroup
folder on the computer, nine images of child pornography which had
been downloaded from different websites, and several other child
pornography images, some of which were current and some of which
had been deleted. Several were images that had been posted on the
Lust Gallery website.2 About 14,000 images had been downloaded
from the newsgroup "Youth and Beauty" and thousands from one called
"Hussy." Some child pornography images from "Hussy" were charged
in the indictment.
Investigators also found a number of child pornography
video files, some of which had the same titles as those written on
the handwritten list found in Wilder's home. At least one video,
called "pedo r@ygold - 10-year-old fuck and cum in pussy1.mpg" had
been accessed from a CD-ROM in a drive of the computer. Also on
2
The government's expert testified that the images which had
been on the Lust Gallery website were downloaded to the computer in
December 2003, suggesting that Wilder had not downloaded them from
the site as part of his subscription but rather that they had come
from another source, perhaps a newsgroup.
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the computer was an email from Wilder to the support section of a
site to which he wrote,
Why is it each time I try and access your site I keep
getting put over to other adult sites with content I do
not wish to see. I joined to see Anya and her friends.
I have seen no videos and am quite disappointed. I want
to make sure I will not be rebilled. I have a platinum
member for 60 days. Why is your site so hard to
navigate and why do you have so many links to adult
content sites?
Investigators found on Wilder's computer an image called
"luda+anya092.jpg" showing three nude prepubescent children engaged
in sexually explicit conduct. The websites saved on Wilder's
computer as "favorites" included "Lolita Buffet free youngest girls
on the net galleries.url" and other sites with analogous names.
Discussion
I. Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrant
Wilder argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence found at his home because the
42-page affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge in support of
the search warrant application did not provide probable cause. We
disagree and conclude that the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress. We apply a mixed standard of
review to the district court's denial of a motion to suppress,
reviewing findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of
law, including whether a particular set of facts constitutes
probable cause, de novo. United States v. Dickerson, 514 F.3d 60,
-7-
65-66 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d
93, 95 (1st Cir. 2007)).
The affidavit summarized the investigation that had
resulted in the identification of Wilder, explaining that the
investigators had found information identifying individuals who had
purchased memberships to websites known to contain child
pornography. Investigators learned that Wilder had purchased a
one-month subscription to Lust Gallery in March 2003. The
affidavit contained information about the content of the website,
describing in detail six images showing one or more prepubescent
females with their genital areas exposed. The affidavit also
detailed the appearance of the website's "preview page," which
suggested that child pornography would be available on the site.
The description of the preview page included the fact that
thumbnail images featuring unclothed minors were displayed across
the width of the page. Some images focused on the minor's
genitalia. The top of the preview page read, "LUST GALLERY - a
Secret Lolitas Archive." The affidavit quoted text on the preview
page which stated,
All models inside are 14 or younger, every image shows at
least 2 or 3 girls, every gallery is at least 50
images.....Created by real young model lovers for real
young model lovers. Lust Gallery is truly an elite
product. We guarantee you complete satisfaction for a
truly unforgettable experience.
The affidavit also stated that Wilder had been convicted for
possession of child pornography and described the earlier
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investigation leading to that conviction. Using a computer, Wilder
had arranged through a website to buy a video of child pornography.
The tape had been advertised on the site as child pornography
involving a 12-year-old girl. Police officers searched Wilder's
residence with a warrant when the tape arrived. The search
revealed fourteen computer disks containing child pornography.
During that investigation, Wilder admitted that he had collected
child pornography from the Internet over several years. The
affidavit concluded with a discussion of characteristics of
individuals "involved in the receipt and collection of child
pornography," stating that such collectors retained their materials
in many different media and for a lengthy period of time for
viewing. The affidavit described Wilder as a collector, given his
history and his recent purchase of the Lust Gallery membership.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district
court concluded that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause to
support the issuance of the warrant. It wrote in a May 6, 2005
memorandum and order that it was "fairly inferable" from Wilder's
previous acquisition and retention of child pornography that he
would still desire to acquire it, and that his subscription to Lust
Gallery indicated this was indeed the case. The district court
also found that the magistrate could have reasonably inferred from
Wilder's past connection to child pornography and the affidavit's
information about the habits of child pornography collectors that
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he would have used his subscription not just to view child
pornography but also to download and retain it. The court noted
that Wilder had admitted in connection with his previous offense
that he had downloaded the images that had been found on fourteen
computer disks. In response to Wilder's argument that the evidence
against him was "stale," because the prior conviction was some
years earlier (2000) and the Lust Gallery subscription had expired,
the court ruled that the affidavit gave a basis sufficient for the
conclusion that Wilder was trying to obtain and preserve child
pornography images and that they would accordingly be discovered at
his residence, stating that "the inference that a search in January
2004 would yield evidence of images from Wilder's March 2003 access
to the lust-gallery website was, in the circumstances, a fair one."
We affirm the district court's analysis. Probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant based on an affidavit "exists where
information in the affidavit reveals 'a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. Probability is the touchstone' of this inquiry." United
States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 683 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 283 (1st Cir. 1997)).
"The standard of probable cause requires a probability, not a prima
facie showing, of criminal activity." United States v. Burke, 999
F.2d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 1993). The magistrate judge's assessment
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"should be paid great deference." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
236 (1983) (quotation omitted).
Wilder argues the affidavit did not provide a basis for
believing that he was actually downloading and preserving child
pornography. He contends the affidavit showed only that he had
subscribed to a website which included, among other types of
material, child pornography, and that such a subscription did not
provide "fair probability" that child pornography had been accessed
and might be found kept at his home.
But it was a fair inference from his subscription to the
Lust Gallery website, as described in the affidavit, that
downloading and preservation in his home of images of child
pornography might very well follow. The entrance page of the
website, as described, was plainly designed and written to attract
persons interested in viewing child pornography. As the district
court observed, "The affidavit establishes that before subscribing,
a viewer is tantalized by the advertisement of the availability of
child pornography through the subscription. That other material,
not child pornography, may also be available is not important.
First, other material is not featured in the way that child
pornography is. The preview page said, in essence, if you
subscribe, we'll provide you with images of child pornography."
The affidavit went on to state, moreover, that Wilder had been
convicted of, and was still on supervised release for, possessing
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child pornography. The affidavit noted that at the time of the
earlier conviction, he had admitted to collecting child pornography
for several years and had obtained the images associated with that
previous conviction over the Internet. Hence the reasonable
inference that someone subscribing to the Lust Gallery site would
have an interest in, and would likely download, child pornography
images was reinforced by the further evidence that defendant had
previously engaged in precisely such behavior.
Wilder fails in his attempts to distinguish relevant
precedent. In United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 578 (2006), the Ninth Circuit
held that defendant's subscription to a child pornography website
was sufficient to establish probable cause to search his residence.
The court held that the "reasonable inference that Gourde had
received or downloaded images easily meets the 'fair probability'
test." Id. Given especially the content of the Lust Gallery
preview page, as described in the affidavit, we see little merit in
Wilder's attempted distinguishing of that case on the grounds that
the site in Gourde was admitted by its owner to be a child
pornography site and Gourde's membership in the site continued
until it was shut down by authorities. See also United States v.
Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 596(2006) (probable cause existed where defendant previously had been
convicted for child pornography and had subscriptions to three
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websites containing child pornography, even if the websites may not
have contained only illegal images). Wilder cites various cases as
supporting his probable cause challenge, but we find all of them
factually distinguishable.
Finally, Wilder relies on Collazo-Leon v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995), which was not
a case about probable cause, for the proposition that previous
criminal activity alone should not lead to an assumption of future
criminal activity. But we need not address that point since the
instant case involved evidence not only that Wilder had a prior
child pornography conviction but also that he had since joined a
website featuring the dissemination of such pornography. See
United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1993) ("An
affiant's knowledge of the target's prior criminal activity or
record clearly is material to the probable cause determination.").
Here, given Wilder's history, including a prior
conviction for possession of child pornography for which he was
still on supervised release and his recent paid subscription to the
Lust Gallery, the entry page of which vividly indicated that child
pornography was a featured product, the district court did not err
in holding there was probable cause for the magistrate judge to
issue a warrant to search Wilder's residence for illegal child
pornography materials.
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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Knowing Receipt
Wilder argues that the jury did not have sufficient
evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had
knowingly received child pornography, as required to convict him of
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).3 We review a sufficiency
claim de novo, "affirm[ing] the conviction if, after assaying all
the evidence in the light most amiable to the government, and
taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, a rational
factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecution successfully proved the elements of the crime."
United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]t is not the appellate
3
The statute states, in relevant part:
Any person who . . . knowingly receives, or distributes,
any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
or which contains materials which have been mailed or so
shipped and transported, by any means including by a
computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction
for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or
through the mails, if--
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; . . .
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this
section [discussing penalties].
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
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court's function to weigh the evidence or make credibility
judgments. Rather, it is for the jury to choose between varying
interpretations of the evidence." United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d
707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Therefore, we "ought
not to disturb, on the ground of insufficient evidence, a jury
verdict that is supported by a plausible rendition of the record."
Id.Wilder moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of
the government's evidence and renewed it at the close of all
evidence. He argued at trial that the evidence could lead to one
of two equally plausible conclusions: that Wilder had used his
computer to access child pornography, or that when he saw the
material on his computer, he deleted it. On appeal, Wilder
contends that the foregoing was tantamount to his urging the
district court that there was insufficient evidence of knowing
receipt for the jury to convict and thus that he has preserved the
sufficiency claim for appellate review. We need not determine
whether the claim was preserved. Even assuming arguendo that it
was, our de novo examination convinces us that, in any event, there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Wilder of the
charged offense.
The government's evidence relating to knowing receipt
included evidence that Wilder used Internet newsgroups to collect
child pornography. Expert testimony supported the conclusion that
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Wilder downloaded child pornography, viewed it, and deleted it,
only to repeat the process again and again. The government's
computer expert, Lam Nguyen, testified that the computer user had
set his newsgroup software to download child pornography. He caused
the newsgroup software to go repeatedly to a newsgroup, "hussy,"
and download child pornography. Nguyen described the evidence
which showed that the computer user regularly entered the folder of
"hussy" downloads to access the images. Some of the images of
child pornography that were viewed were not deleted.
Nguyen also testified to having found an email sent to a
pay-to-view website on Wilder's computer, quoted supra, in which
Wilder expressed consternation at being transferred to adult
content sites when, he said, he joined the site, "to see Anya and
her friends . . . . Why is your site so hard to navigate and why do
you have so many links to adult content sites?" The government
introduced a photo of "Anya" into evidence that showed three pre-
pubescent girls engaged in sexually explicit conduct and which
Nguyen testified he had printed off from Wilder's computer.4 The
4
On appeal, Wilder notes that there was no evidence introduced
expressly linking the "Anya" image to the email. As for the image
itself, there was a conflict in testimony between the government's
expert and the defense expert regarding the discovery of the "Anya"
photo. Government expert Nguyen testified that he found the photo
on the defendant's hard drive, while defense expert Eric Cole
testified that he was unable to find the photo on the copy of the
hard drive he reviewed. A conflict in evidence is for the trier of
fact, in this case the jury, to resolve. United States v. Escobar-
de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 172 (1st Cir. 1999).
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jury also saw evidence of the websites "bookmarked" on Wilder's
computer, which included "Lolita Buffet free youngest girls on the
net galleries.url," "Youngest Girls Everyday," "Youngest 69," and
"Sexy Teen Club." Wilder argues that both government and defense
experts testified that the list could have been created without
conscious saving of individual websites by the user because the
bookmarking of one site would have prompted the automatic
bookmarking of the others. Evidence was introduced of a piece of
paper noting one of the websites, lolitabuffet.com, included on the
list of favorites. The government also presented evidence of a
piece of paper seized from Wilder's home on which was written
"members.i-lola.info" and a numbers and letter combination which
the government's expert testified was "typically how a username and
password looks." The jury could have inferred from this evidence
that Wilder had joined or intended to join a Lolita site.5 The
jury was also entitled to consider the evidence related to Count
One that Wilder had responded to a posting seeking photos of young
girls by sending four images of child pornography and writing, "Now
its your turn." While this evidence was not introduced
specifically as bearing on Count Two also, the jury was entitled to
considered it relative to both counts.
5
Wilder notes that there was no testimony that the computer
contained evidence of the joining of any of the listed Lolita
sites.
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Wilder points to United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040,
1042 (7th Cir. 2004), for the principle that a defendant who "seeks
out only adult pornography, but without his knowledge is sent a mix
of adult and child pornography" cannot be convicted for knowing
receipt. That case is inapposite, as there was ample evidence here
that Wilder was looking for, and received, child pornography.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Knowing Possession
Wilder challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he
knowingly possessed child pornography, a required element for
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).6 The government
asserts, as it did in connection with the previously described
knowing receipt charge, that the defendant did not adequately
preserve this argument, but, as there, we find the evidence more
6
The statute states, in relevant part:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses one or more
books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes or
other matter which contain any visual depiction that has
been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced
using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or
transported, by any means including a computer, if--
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this
section [discussing penalties].
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
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than sufficient, hence need not determine whether the argument was
sufficiently preserved.
The indictment in Count Three alleged that Wilder
knowingly possessed nine listed images and three movies containing
child pornography. Nguyen testified that each of the images had
been saved individually from a website. He stated, "There's really
no other way to save files like this . . . . I'm confident that
this is information stored--saved from a web site." He further
noted on redirect that the nine images had been saved on one date
and then accessed again on a later date. On cross-examination,
Nguyen also testified that those images could have been posted to
a newsgroup and then downloaded onto the computer from the
newsgroup. The defense's expert testified that the saved images
could have come from the web, a newsgroup, or an email. On cross-
examination, however, the defense's expert acknowledged that the
file names of the images suggested they were saved through Internet
Explorer or Microsoft Outlook and were not listed in the log of
automatic downloads from the newsgroup, suggesting they had been
individually saved by a user. From the opinion testimony of the
two experts, the jury was entitled reasonably to infer that the
images had been knowingly accessed, saved, and viewed by Wilder.
The three video files included in the count had been
downloaded from a website which advertised a variety of videos.
There was evidence suggesting that Wilder knew their contents,
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including a handwritten piece of paper found in Wilder's home which
listed almost all the video files on display in the website
advertisement. This list was headed "Downloaded" and contained
notations of check marks, circles, and the note next to one file
name, "same as above but longer version." Almost all the videos on
the list were recovered or partially recovered from Wilder's
computer. Nguyen testified that one of the videos, "pedo r@ygold
10 yo fuck and cum in pussy" had been viewed on the computer from
a CD, though that CD was never found in Wilder's house. Nguyen
testified that evidence on Wilder's computer showed that Wilder
accessed that video file through a CD-ROM. From that testimony,
the jury could also have inferred that Wilder deleted his child
pornography from his computer and stored it on removable media.
Wilder contests this point in his reply brief by arguing that
Nguyen's analysis was based on the assumption that a reference to
an "E" drive was a reference to a CD-ROM drive, an assumption that
was not supported in any further detail. But the jury was free to
accept Nguyen's expert testimony as to what had happened.
Wilder argues that the images at issue were downloaded
from a newsgroup and arrived with their content unknown and
likewise that the movies could not be viewed until after being
downloaded. He relies on United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091,
1096 n.11 (4th Cir. 1984), in which the Fourth Circuit held that a
defendant could be held responsible for the contents of a drug
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package only if he opened it and, upon seeing that drugs were
inside, "appropriated it for his own use." Wilder argues that he
would have been unaware of the contents of the newsgroup downloads,
but he does not address the distinction between the two cases--
namely that here, the government introduced testimony that the
images had been individually saved and that the videos had been
downloaded, at least one had been saved on a CD, and he had made a
list of video names that corresponded to files found on his
computer. From this and other evidence, the jury could reasonably
have inferred that Wilder sought out child pornography and that it
was in his possession knowingly.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Whether Children Depicted
Were Real
Wilder argues that the evidence was insufficient for the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the photographs on
which the convictions were based depicted real children. At trial,
the government introduced, besides the photographs, the testimony
of Dr. Celeste Wilson, a pediatric physician at Boston's Children's
Hospital. She testified that based on her examination of the
images at issue, keeping in mind factors such as facial features
and physical characteristics of sexual development, she believed
the children depicted were real and under the age of 18. When
asked by the defense, Dr. Wilson admitted she did not have
experience with computer technology. Wilson argues on appeal that
the expert testimony was insufficient because it did not
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specifically exclude the possibility that the children in the
images had been computer-generated, and the government "presents no
meaningful criteria for the jury to use in making an independent
determination that the image . . . is of a real child." Wilder did
not introduce any evidence during his defense that the children
were in fact computer-generated.
The difficulty with Wilder's contention is that this
court has previously determined that the government is not required
to produce a technologically expert witness in order to prove that
an image contains real children. United States v. Rodriguez-
Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 439 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that this
circuit has "rejected a per se rule that the government must
produce expert testimony in addition to the images themselves, in
order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the images depicted
are of real children"). Wilder acknowledges our holding in
Rodriguez-Pacheco but contends nonetheless that "[i]f virtual
images cannot be readily distinguished from real images, and an
expert can testify only that images are consistent with those of a
real child, a lay jury cannot reasonably find beyond a reasonable
doubt[] that the images are of real children." We held to the
contrary, however, in Rodriguez-Pacheco, saying that "[t]he
question of whether or not a particular image is of a virtual child
or a real child is an issue of fact, to be determined by the trier
of fact." Id. at 438.
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Wilder attempts to distinguish Rodriguez-Pacheco on the
grounds that in that case, the government's expert provided
criteria to distinguish between real children and computer-
generated children. But as noted, Rodriguez-Pacheco held that the
government need not provide expert testimony. Id. at 439. The
panel is bound by stare decisis in our circuit, except, of course,
if the Supreme Court or our circuit en banc rules otherwise. Id.
at 441.7
The question is one of the sufficiency of the evidence.
Here, the jury had before it the images themselves as well as the
testimony of the medical expert that the anatomical detail in the
images was "extraordinary" and was medically consistent with the
images being of real children. Dr. Wilson focused on the facial
features, physical characteristics of sexual development (including
absence of breast development and sparsity of pubic hair),
proportions of the body, anatomy and musculature of the positioned
body, and indications of genital development of children of a
particular age. The only evidence from defendant was the doctor's
statement that she had no experience with computer photo imagery.
We cannot reverse a jury verdict on these facts merely because the
doctor's expertise did not extend to distinguishing, as a
photography expert, between a virtual image and a real image. A
7
All circuits to have addressed this issue have reached a
similar result. See United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 733-34
(9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
-23-
rational jury could on this record find the government had met its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The anatomical detail
testified to by the doctor was extraordinary. See Rodriguez-
Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 445.
V. Whether Images Listed in Count One Depicted a Minor Engaged in
Sexually Explicit Conduct
Wilder argues that we should find that the evidence
presented to the jury was insufficient to establish that the four
images listed in Count One depicted a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Wilder's argument in his initial brief is so
undeveloped as to prompt a consideration of waiver, but the
argument fails even if we treat the issue as having been preserved.
As previously noted, we review a sufficiency claim de novo and
determine whether a rational jury could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the evidence met the legal standard. United
States v. Capozzi, 486 F.3d 711, 725 (1st Cir. 2007).
Under United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80 (1st Cir.
2006), this court held that it was "up to the jury to determine
whether the images . . . constitute visual depictions of 'sexually
explicit conduct.'" Id. at 85 (emphasis in original). The
question for our determination on appellate review -- to be sure,
a sensitive one which we will examine with care given the First
Amendment implications -- is whether a reasonable jury could have
reached the conclusion that the images were of sexually explicit
conduct. Certainly a jury could have done so on the facts here.
-24-
Id. at 86; see also United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50, 57 (1st
Cir. 2001); United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.
1999). The focal point of each image is the child's genital area,
and each child is placed on either a bed or a couch. Three of the
images show a child with her legs spread apart. In one image, the
child is holding a sexual device in the shape of a male penis in a
sexually suggestive way; in another, she is shown inserting the
device into her vaginal area. In each image, the child is largely
unclothed, and the clothing she is wearing is limited to black
thigh-high stockings, a white garter, and a white lacy hat. Her
chest and genital area are unclothed. In each image, the child is
posed in a way that suggests a willingness to engage in sexual
activity. The jury was plainly entitled to find that each of the
four images in Count One depicted a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.
Affirmed.
-Concurring Opinion follows-
-25-
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the majority's result, which is required by
precedent, and much of its reasoning. I write separately to
express my dissatisfaction with our current evidentiary standard,
as set forth in United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434(1st Cir. 2007), and applied in this case, for determining whether
the government has sufficiently proven that the photographs on
which the defendant's conviction was based depicted real children.
I.
The federal prohibition against child pornography cannot
extend to images that do not depict an actual child without running
afoul of the First Amendment. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (2002). Thus, "in order to establish guilt," the
government "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that the images
providing the basis for a child pornography prosecution depict
real, as opposed to virtual, children. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d
at 439. The Supreme Court has warned that this burden cannot be
lightly shifted onto the defendant:
[t]he Government raises serious constitutional
difficulties by seeking to impose on the
defendant the burden of proving his speech is
not unlawful. . . . [T]he evidentiary burden
is not trivial. Where the defendant is not the
producer of the work, he may have no way of
establishing the identity, or even the
existence, of the actors. If the evidentiary
issue is a serious problem for the Government,
as it asserts, it will be at least as
difficult for the innocent possessor.
-26-
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255-56.
This circuit, following in the footsteps of a number of
other circuits, has refused to interpret Free Speech Coalition as
"lay[ing] down 'the absolute requirement that, absent direct
evidence of identity, expert testimony is required to prove that
the prohibited images are of real, not virtual, children.'"
Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 441 (quoting United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003)); see also United
States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006)8; United States
v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004)(per curiam); United
8
The Irving prosecution was brought on the basis of video
files, not still photographs. The Irving court clearly restricted
its holding to "cases involving video images or MPEGs," reasoning
that "it does not appear that video technology is so far advanced
that a jury is incapable of determining whether a real child was
used to make a video." 452 F.3d at 121-22. This logic certainly
does not hold true with respect to photographs, as discussed below.
Indeed, it is far from clear that the Second Circuit's
understanding of video images truly reflects the current state of
that technology. Movie studios, at least, do possess video
technology so far advanced that they can conjure up a realistic
replica of practically any image desired. The movie Wag the Dog
(New Line Cinema 1997), for example, satirically depicts the
extremely convincing fabrication of an entire war out of whole
cloth by a conniving Washington spin-doctor seeking to distract the
electorate from a Presidential sex scandal. The recent HBO mini-
series John Adams (HBO Films 2008) featured feats of make-up and
other special effects that produced a depiction of 18th century
America unparalleled in its authenticity. See HBO Films: John
Adams, http://www.hbo.com/films/johnadams (follow "Making John
Adams" hyperlink)(last visited Apr. 25, 2008) (describing how
visual effects were used to create entirely digitized sets and
characters, indistinguishable from the real thing). Whether such
technology is readily available to the average child pornographer
is a question of fact that a court is not competent to answer on
its own.
-27-
States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003)(per curiam).
Nevertheless, we have emphasized that "[t]he burden of proof
remains on the government to prove the pornographic image is of a
real child." Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 444; United States v.
Hilton, 386 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2004)("It bears repeating that
the government is not released from its burden of proof by a
defendant's failure to argue, or by an absence of evidence
otherwise suggesting, the artificiality of the children portrayed.
That the children in the images are real amounts to an element of
the crime which the government must prove, the burden of which
should not be displaced to the defendant as an affirmative
defense.").
Thus, while we currently recognize no per se rule
requiring the government to present expert testimony as to the
reality of the children in the images, the government still must
present sufficient evidence to enable a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the children are real. The Rodriguez-Pacheco
court looked to United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir.
1987), for the proposition that a factfinder can, unaided,
distinguish photographs of actual children from virtual images.
The court in Nolan held that "the test for a factfinder's power to
judge evidence without expert help is ... whether the subject is
within the range of normal experience and knowledge." Id. at 1018.
Nolan was decided over twenty years ago, however, and the rapid
-28-
progress of digital imaging technology has rendered it obsolete
even on its own terms. Technological advances in recent years have
been such that an untrained eye simply cannot easily distinguish a
photograph of a real person from a virtual image by merely
eyeballing the photographs in question. Indeed,
determining whether an image is real or
virtually created is not only no longer within
the "range of normal experience and knowledge"
of the average person, but it may also very
well be difficult for even experts [to say]
whether the pictures were made by using real
children or by using computer imaging. . . .
The scientific evidence available today is
overwhelmingly contrary to that which existed
in Nolan's day. . . . There is simply no
question that today it is possible to create
virtual images of humans that are
indistinguishable from the real thing.
Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 462 (Torruella, J.,
dissenting)(internal quotation marks, citations omitted).9 The
situation is further complicated by the advent of technology that
enables the digital manipulation of images of actual people--for
example, by airbrushing away wrinkles, trimming extra pounds, or
even mixing and matching body parts from different individuals.
See, e.g., Switched.com, Worst Airbrushed Celebs of 2007...So Far,
http://www.switched.com/2007/08/30/worst-airbrushed-celebs-of-200
9
See, e.g., CG Society: Society of Digital Artists,
http://forums.cgsociety.org/showthread.php?f=121&t=399499 (last
visited Apr. 25, 2008). That link, cited by defendant in his brief
on appeal, shows a completely digital rendering of a Korean
actress. It is not a photograph of the actual actress, but to a
layperson might certainly appear to be so.
-29-
7-so-far/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2008)(comparing digitally
retouched and unretouched photographs of various celebrities).
I do not question that many, and perhaps most, of the
images traded daily by child pornographers depict actual children.
The government cannot prove its case by the law of averages,
however, but must prove it with reference to the particular images
that form the basis of the child pornography prosecution at hand.
Thus, the Rodriguez-Pacheco court gains little support by coopting
the Supreme Court's reasoning that "'[i]f virtual images were
identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be
driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if
fictional, computerized images would suffice.'" Rodriguez-Pacheco,
475 F.3d at 443 (quoting Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254).
The logic of adopting this rather odd assumption about
the dynamics of the child pornography market as a rationale for
concluding that the child in any given picture is unlikely to be
virtual rather than real is questionable at best. For starters,
the assumption itself is arguably premised on a fallacy. It seems
inappropriate to cast the pedophile, an individual seeking to
satiate a twisted sexual urge, as a rational economic actor. It is
more sensible to imagine that a large part of the depraved thrill
engendered by the creation of these images is in the abuse of a
live subject, which the pornography creator can then document in
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order to relive the experience and share it with like-minded
individuals. Also, while some child pornographers may be
sufficiently technologically adept to create realistic "virtual"
children, others may not be and so would have to rely on taking
pictures of the real thing, resulting in the production of a mix of
real and virtual images. If the real and the virtual are more or
less indistinguishable, once both are released into the marketplace
the real images would not be displaced by virtual substitutes
simply because most consumers of such images would not be able to
differentiate the two. And finally, whether the child pornography
market as a whole is composed of images of mostly virtual or mostly
real children does not change the government's burden to prove that
the images forming the basis of any specific child pornography
prosecution depict real children, in order for a conviction to be
sustained.
To meet its burden the government therefore should be
obliged to introduce, and indeed in many cases has introduced,
evidence that provides some reasonable basis for determining that
the children depicted in the images are real. See, e.g., United
States v. Hoey, 508 F.3d 687, 689 (1st Cir. 2007)(noting that
pornographic images found on defendant's computer were submitted to
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which
identified children in 131 images as real children); Rodriguez-
Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 437-38 (summarizing testimony of government
-31-
pediatric expert who testified as to children's age as well as FBI
technological expert who testified as to whether children were real
or virtual); United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 734-35 (9th
Cir. 2007)(holding that "[the court] need not decide whether the
jury may determine the reality of persons depicted in images based
solely on the images themselves" because government presented
additional evidence, including testimony of detective who had
interviewed one of the children depicted, "from which the jury
could conclude that the images depicted actual children").
II.
In the case presently before us, the only evidence
introduced at trial to aid the jury in determining whether the
children depicted were virtual or real, apart from the images
themselves, was the testimony of Dr. Celeste Wilson, a pediatric
physician. Dr. Wilson testified that the anatomical detail in the
images was "extraordinary" and consistent with that of real
children. The doctor admitted, however, that she had no
specialized technological expertise and could not testify as to
whether the images could have been digitally created.
The majority reasons that
[w]e cannot reverse a jury verdict on these
facts merely because the doctor's expertise
did not extend to distinguishing, as a
photography expert, between a virtual image
and a real image. A rational jury could on
this record find the government had met its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The anatomical detail testified to by the
doctor was extraordinary.
See slip. op. at 23-24. Dr. Wilson's testimony, however, is
helpful in determining that an image is anatomically consistent
with that of a child as opposed to an adult, but is of limited
utility to the jury in determining whether the child in question is
virtual or real. See Hilton, 386 F.3d at 18-19 (finding medical
expert's testimony that images depicted children rather than adults
insufficient to support inference that children depicted were real
and not virtual). The Hilton court noted:
someone manufacturing images to look like
children will try-and with sufficient
technology will manage-to produce images that
would be amenable to expert analysis . . .
Whatever parameters of body proportion, growth
and development serve as signs of age . . .
those parameters will be mimicked by the
virtual pornographer-whether by design or as a
byproduct of the goal of realism.
Id. at 19. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not
produce any evidence himself as to the nature of the images, the
burden remains squarely on the shoulders of the government to prove
that the children depicted are real.
Unlike the sentencing judge in Rodriguez-Pacheco, we are
not tasked here with weighing the preponderance of the evidence to
uphold a sentencing enhancement, but the sufficiency of the
evidence to uphold a conviction. And the district court in
Rodriguez-Pacheco at least had before it the testimony of the FBI
technological expert, who provided specific criteria upon which the
-33-
court could base its conclusion that the child in the disputed
image was a real child. Without providing the jury in this case
with some sturdier dock to which it can moor its conclusion that
the images depicted actual children, it is difficult to see how the
government can have proved this point beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.
Despite the foregoing, I concur in the judgment because
I recognize that the rule in this circuit, as it currently stands,
enables the factfinder to distinguish, unaided, between real and
virtual children. Until the law catches up with technology, we are
bound by stare decisis to this rule, and under this rule the
government presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden.
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