Cooper v. Charter Communications , 760 F.3d 103 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 13-1726; 13-1736
BRUCE M. COOPER; JOHN W. ROMITO; ROY L. BAKER;
WHITNEY TAYLOR THOMPSON, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS ENTERTAINMENTS I, LLC;
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Stahl, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey S. Morneau, with whom Nathan A. Olin and Connor,
Morneau & Olin, LLP, were on brief, for appellants.
Robert J. Wagner, with whom Kathleen M. Guilfoyle, Brian
P. Voke, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy, Roman P. Wuller, and
Thompson Coburn, LLP, were on brief, for appellees.
July 23, 2014
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. In the aftermath of a
substantial snowstorm, four customers sued cable provider Charter
Communications Entertainment I, LLC, and its parent company,
Charter Communications, Inc. (collectively, "Charter"), on behalf
of themselves and a putative class of others claimed to be
similarly situated. The plaintiffs contend that Charter violated
contractual, statutory, and common law duties by failing to provide
credits to its customers for their loss of cable, internet, and
telephone service during the storm. We hold that the district
court properly exercised its jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), but erred in granting Charter's
motion to dismiss. We therefore vacate in part the district
court's opinion and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
Except where otherwise noted, the facts in this opinion
are taken from the plaintiffs' complaint, with all reasonable
inferences drawn in the plaintiffs' favor. See Maloy v. Ballori-
Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 251 (1st Cir. 2014). We bear in mind, however,
that in assessing jurisdictional issues, we must weigh the evidence
without favoring either party. Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254
F.3d 358, 364 (1st Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs Bruce Cooper, John Romito, Roy Baker, and
Whitney Taylor Thompson are residents of Massachusetts who purchase
cable television, internet, or telephone services from Charter.
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The district court has not yet considered any motion for class
certification, so for now they are the only plaintiffs.
Beginning on October 29, 2011, Massachusetts experienced
a severe snow storm that damaged trees, made travel impossible on
many roads, and took down power and cable lines. During the storm,
the plaintiffs did not receive services from Charter, either
because they lost electrical power and therefore could not use
television or internet devices, or because Charter's own equipment
failed to provide service even where power was available, or due to
some combination of the two.
Cooper, Romito, and Baker filed the complaint in this
case in Massachusetts state court on November 22, 2011. Two weeks
later, having not yet served the complaint on Charter, the
plaintiffs' attorneys sent the company a demand letter seeking
relief on behalf of the three original plaintiffs and others
similarly situated. This letter was later incorporated into the
plaintiffs' first amended and second amended complaints, the latter
of which is the operative complaint here. The demand letter
specified when the three customers' services were interrupted.
According to the letter, for example, Cooper and Baker lost service
at 6:00 pm on October 29, 2011, and did not receive it again until
3:00 pm on November 7, 2011. As to Thompson, who was added as the
fourth plaintiff after the demand letter was sent, the record
contains no information regarding when her service was interrupted,
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aside from the allegation in the amended complaint that her
interruption lasted more than twenty-four consecutive hours.
A month after receiving the plaintiffs' demand, Charter
sent a letter to their attorneys, informing them that Charter had
issued credits to the accounts of Cooper, Baker, and Romito, which
the company said fully compensated them for the time they were
without service.
After the first amended complaint was served on Charter
in February 2012, the company removed the case to federal court,
invoking the Class Action Fairness Act. Charter then filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs' claims were moot
and that the complaint failed to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6). The district court ruled that removal was
proper and granted Charter's motion to dismiss. The court found
that the claims of Cooper, Baker, and Romito were moot because they
had received credits covering the time they were without service.
The court also found that, as to the fourth plaintiff, Thompson,
the complaint failed to state a claim. This appeal followed.
II. Legal Standard
This case presents two threshhold jurisdictional
questions: whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act and whether the
plaintiffs' claims are moot. We review both questions de novo.
See Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st
-4-
Cir. 2009); Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71,
80 (1st Cir. 2004). However, where the district court's assessment
of a jurisdictional issue turns on findings of fact, we accept
those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Amoche, 556 F.3d
at 48; Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir.
2001).
As to Charter's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, we also review de novo. Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d
250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014). We ask "whether the complaint 'state[s]
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,' accepting the
plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "To cross the plausibility
threshhold, the plaintiff must 'plead[] factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
Charter invokes federal jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act. The Act grants jurisdiction to federal courts
to hear state-law class actions if there is minimal diversity of
citizenship between the parties, as the parties agree there is
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here, and the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars.1
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Here, although a class has not been
certified, the district court properly treated the complaint as
asserting a class action, and therefore went on to consider the
size of the proposed class and the potential recovery. See College
Of Dental Surgeons Of Puerto Rico v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 585 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) ("CAFA . . . applies 'to any
class action before or after the entry of a class certification
order by the court with respect to that action.'" (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8))). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the
burden to show with a "reasonable probability" that the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied. Amoche v. Guarantee Trust
Life Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009).
The parties agree that for purposes of calculating the
amount in controversy, the plaintiffs seek at least $75 for each
member of the proposed class. The parties also agree that
approximately 95,000 Charter customers lost power during the storm.
The company provided that estimate in an affidavit, and the
plaintiffs then incorporated the figure into their own complaint,
characterizing it as a minimum number of affected customers. The
complaint asserts that all of these customers failed to receive
1
The diversity requirement, which is not at issue here,
requires at least one plaintiff to be a citizen of a different
state than at least one defendant, subject to certain exceptions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (4), (5), and (9).
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services from Charter, and the plaintiffs have offered no reason to
exclude any of those affected from their proposed class.
With a putative class of at least 95,000 people, and
possible damages of at least $75 per class member, the amount in
controversy is at least $7,125,000. The district court's exercise
of jurisdiction was therefore proper.
B. Mootness
Charter contends that the claims of Cooper, Baker, and
Romito became moot when, after this suit was filed, they accepted
credits proportional to the time they were without service.2 There
is no dispute that Thompson's claims remain live.
The dispute between the plaintiffs and Charter focuses on
whether and when Charter must provide a credit or rebate to any
subscriber whose service is interrupted. The plaintiffs say that
the service outages in October and November of 2011 triggered a
duty to provide credits or rebates under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 166A,
§ 5(l), and under Charter's licensing agreements. Importantly,
they also claim that Charter was obligated to provide those rebates
or credits to each affected customer without waiting to first
receive a request from that customer. Charter rejects both
contentions.
2
Charter presents its argument as a claim of mootness rather
than a challenge under the related doctrine of standing, a
characterization we accept because Charter did not give the
plaintiffs a credit until well after this lawsuit was filed. See
Ramírez v. Sánchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006).
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Yet, the plaintiffs have not contested that Cooper,
Baker, and Romito accepted credits from Charter proportional to the
time they were without service. And although the plaintiffs allude
to the existence of other types of damages they might have
suffered, they fail to identify any such damages, even by type or
category. In short, the individual damages claims of these three
putative class representatives were fully satisfied after they
filed this action. Consequently, they also may not receive
statutory or treble damages under the Massachusetts unfair business
practices law, which makes such relief available only where a
defendant has failed to offer a settlement "reasonable in relation
to the injury actually suffered." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §
9(3).3
Were the three original plaintiffs seeking only monetary
damages, and were Thompson not joined as a plaintiff, the foregoing
chronology would present complicated issues of standing and
mootness in the context of a putative class action. See, e.g.,
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529-32
(2013) (analyzing the viability of a collective action under the
3
The plaintiffs do not contest that Charter complied with
the formal requirements for a settlement under Chapter 93A when it
credited their accounts and informed them in writing that it had
done so. Whether the plaintiffs may be able to recover at least
partial attorneys' fees and costs under the Massachusetts unfair
business practices law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(4), we
leave to the district court to consider if and when the time is
right.
-8-
Fair Labor Standards Act, after assuming that the plaintiff's
individual damages claim was moot). In this case, though, the
plaintiffs also seek a declaration that Massachusetts law and
Charter's licensing agreements require the company to pay credits
without request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (allowing federal courts to
issue declaratory relief). Charter avows no agreement with the
plaintiffs' interpretation of Charter's duties under either
Massachusetts law or under the licensing agreements. Indeed,
Charter has made clear that it gave credits to the plaintiffs under
a policy it adopted "voluntarily," which was limited to this storm,
and which, according to Charter, "exceed[ed] requirements under the
law."
Charter also fails to argue that the request for
declaratory relief is itself either moot or unripe. Nor would it
appear unlikely that the New England weather will produce another
severe winter storm, as evidenced by the fact that Massachusetts
passed a law to address the situation in the first place. In these
circumstances, we find the dispute between the plaintiffs and
Charter about the extent of Charter's duties to the plaintiffs
under Massachusetts law and its licensing agreements to be live and
proper for judicial consideration. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) (holding that a defendant "bears the
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
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recur" when it claims that its own voluntary conduct has made a
plaintiff's claim moot (internal quotation marks omitted)); Knox v.
Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287
(2012) (finding no mootness where the defendant union had offered
a full refund of money the plaintiffs claimed was collected
unlawfully because "the union continue[d] to defend the legality"
of its action, making it "not clear why the union would necessarily
refrain from collecting similar fees in the future").4
All four plaintiffs therefore may pursue their unrequited
requests for declaratory relief regarding their present dispute
with Charter over the nature of its obligations to them. And
Thompson has an unsatisfied damages claim to pursue as well.
C. Failure to State a Claim
Each of the plaintiffs' claims arises under Massachusetts
statutory or common law, and so we look to that law in assessing
the plausibility of their claims. See Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994).
4
In these respects, this case is easily distinguishable from
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts v. United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013), on
which the district court relied. There, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that a government contract violated the Establishment
Clause, but the contract had already expired and had been replaced,
so the court could "safely assume that for the foreseeable future
the challenged contract terms will not recur." Id. at 56.
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With one exception, the plaintiffs' claims revolve around
a provision in Massachusetts law requiring that:
In the event a license is issued [to provide cable
service], each licensee shall agree to the following:
. . . (l) In the event its service to any subscriber is
interrupted for twenty-four or more consecutive hours, it
will grant such subscriber a pro rata credit or rebate.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 166A, § 5.
Charter has indeed included such language in its
licensing agreements, almost verbatim, albeit with the presumably
reasonable limiting gloss that credits or rebates need be provided
only when "the interruption was not caused by the Subscriber and
the Licensee knew or should have known of the service
interruption."
The parties dispute how to interpret the statute's
language, and thus the nearly identical language of the licensing
agreements. Charter asserts that the statutorily-mandated language
only requires the company to provide credits or rebates to
subscribers who ask for them. We reject this claim as inconsistent
with the statute's actual language. The language imposes no such
limitation, instead flatly imposing a duty to provide a credit or
rebate to any subscriber whose service is interrupted for
sufficient duration. Charter nevertheless claims that the
legislature would have used the plural form, "subscribers," rather
than the term "any subscriber," if it intended cable providers to
give credits to all subscribers who lost service. Charter does not
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cite any legal precedent, nor any grammatical rule, to support its
argument, and we find it illogical: the statute's language plainly
applies without limitation to all subscribers who lose service for
twenty-four hours or more, just as a rule prohibiting "any person"
less than thirty-five years old from becoming president applies to
all such people despite its use of the singular word "person." See
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Similarly, we see no basis for
Charter's claim that the legislature would have used the term
"automatic" if it intended cable providers to grant refunds to all
subscribers who lost service. Although inclusion of that word in
the statute would have provided belt-and-suspenders support for our
conclusion, it does not follow that the word's absence leads us to
disregard the clear meaning of the words the legislature actually
used.
Even the implicit limitation made express in Charter's
agreement -- that Charter knows or should have known of the
interruption -- is not so limited as to apply only when Charter's
knowledge arises from a consumer complaint or request. If Charter
knows, for example, that it is not transmitting to an entire area
because one of its own facilities is not passing along a signal, we
can conceive of no reason why the Massachusetts legislature would
have intended -- but not written into the statute -- a requirement
that subscribers in that area must communicate to Charter what it
already knows or should know in order to receive a credit.
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Of course we do not know -- or suggest -- that Charter
failed to provide a credit or rebate to subscribers whom it knew
(or should have known) suffered a service interruption for twenty-
four or more hours. Also not raised by this appeal is when exactly
service is "interrupted" under the statute.5 On a review of
dismissal of this complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), rather, we assume
that plaintiffs suffered a covered service interruption, of which
Charter was aware, simply because it is plausibly alleged.
We therefore assume that Charter has conducted itself and
is currently asserting a right to continue conducting itself in a
manner that we find to be violative of the licensing term that
Massachusetts' legislature viewed as sufficiently important as to
be a required term of all such licensing agreements. The question
is whether plaintiffs can maintain a private cause of action as a
result of this assumed breach. We now analyze that question,
bearing in mind that the following discussion, to the extent it
considers claims for damages, applies only to plaintiff Thompson.
1. Contract Claims
The plaintiffs contend that they can sue as third-party
beneficiaries to enforce the licensing agreements incorporating the
statutory mandate. Under Massachusetts law, to prevail on a third-
5
Charter argues as a matter of fact that the plaintiffs'
service interruption was outside its control, and as a matter of
law that it was therefore not obligated to provide credits. As
this appeal provides no occasion to find facts, we also express no
view whatsoever on Charter's proffered reading of the law.
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party beneficiary claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
"language and circumstances of the contract show that the parties
to the contract clearly and definitely intended the beneficiary to
benefit from the promised performance." Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v.
BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 455 Mass. 458, 466 (2009) (internal
quotation marks, alterations omitted). Because government
contracts by their very nature tend to benefit the public,
Massachusetts courts apply a presumption against finding third-
party liability in assessing those contracts, overcome only where
the language and circumstances of the contract make it particularly
clear that the parties intended members of the public to possess
enforcement power. See MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d
486, 491 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying Massachusetts law). In
assessing attempts by third parties to enforce government
contracts, we pay special heed to "[t]he distinction between an
intention to benefit a third party and an intention that the third
party should have the right to enforce that intention," with only
the latter supporting third-party enforcement. 9 J. Murray, Corbin
on Contracts § 45.6, p. 92 (rev. ed. 2007) (quoted in Laguer v.
OneWest Bank, FSB, 2013 WL 831055, at *11 (Mass. Super. Feb. 27,
2013)).
Here, the plaintiffs submitted with their complaint a
copy of one licensing agreement between Charter and a Massachusetts
municipality. We will assume for the purposes of this opinion that
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the agreement is identical in all material respects to any other
licensing agreement, with a different municipality, that might
apply to the plaintiffs' claims. The contract requires Charter to
"grant a pro rata credit or rebate to any Subscriber whose entire
Cable Service is interrupted for twenty-four (24) or more
consecutive hours, if the interruption was not caused by the
Subscriber and the Licensee knew or should have known of the
service interruption." The plaintiffs are correct that this
provision seems intended to benefit cable customers such as
themselves, and the contract requires Charter to make payment
directly to those customers, lending support to their claim. See
Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. Hudson Light & Power Dep't, 938
F.2d 338, 342 (1st Cir. 1991). The contract provision thus
resembles the illustration offered by the Second Restatement of
Contracts of a government contract that does create enforceable
rights in third parties: "A, a municipality, enters into a contract
with B, by which B promises to build a subway and to pay damages
directly to any person who may be injured by the work of
construction." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313 illus. 3
(1981); see also MacKenzie, 738 F.3d at 491 (relying on this
section of the restatement in applying Massachusetts law).
We are nevertheless persuaded by the language of the
contract as a whole that the parties did not intend individuals to
hold power to enforce it. The contract includes a separate section
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that spells out in detail how the contract can be enforced.
According to the contract, the municipality may seek specific
performance, monetary damages, or revocation of the license. It
must first notify Charter of an alleged breach, then wait thirty
days for Charter to either cure the default or explain why it feels
no cure is required. If the municipality is not satisfied, it must
schedule a public hearing at which Charter may offer evidence.
Only after those requirements have been fulfilled may the
municipality pursue a remedy. Where the parties have provided such
specific and elaborate procedures as prerequisites to enforcement,
we cannot treat the plaintiffs' attempt to circumvent those
procedures as consistent with the parties' intent.6
We note that the dismissal of the plaintiffs' third-party
beneficiary claim does not deprive them of any opportunity for
relief under the licensing agreement. Rather, in situations in
which an elected local government holds enforcement power, citizens
can seek recourse by acting through the political process to cause
the municipality to seek a remedy in the form of credits for all
affected consumers. But because the agreement here cannot
6
Although neither party cites Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara
County, California, 131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011), it provides further
support for our decision. See id. at 1347 (rejecting under federal
common law an attempt by a third party to enforce a government
contract where the contract incorporated statutory obligations, and
suits by third parties "would undermine the [government's] efforts"
to enforce the obligations "harmoniously and on a uniform . . .
basis").
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plausibly support a third-party beneficiary claim, the political
process is the plaintiffs' only recourse to secure enforcement of
the agreements qua agreements.
The plaintiffs' complaint also alleges breach of
"contracts and/or implied contracts" between the individual
plaintiffs and Charter. It appears that they refer here not to any
express contract but instead to an implied contract that arose when
they made advance payment for Charter's services. They have not
made anything other than a perfunctory effort to defend such a
claim on appeal, and so we affirm its dismissal. Finally, the
plaintiffs' claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing fails because, for the reasons we have described above, the
plaintiff's complaint does not establish any contractual
relationship between them and Charter. See MacKenzie, 738 F.3d at
493.
2. The Massachusetts Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Statute
Although third-party beneficiary principles provide no
basis on which the plaintiffs can sue Charter for breach of its
promise to municipalities, Massachusetts' legislature has provided
an alternative path to a similar destination, without requiring any
inquiry into common law notions of intended beneficiaries.
Specifically, Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts code authorizes
consumers to sue for "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or
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deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(a).
In considering whether a particular act or practice
violates the unfairness prong of Chapter 93A, Massachusetts courts
assess: "(1) whether the practice is within at least the penumbra
of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." Massachusetts
Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215,
243 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975)) (internal alterations omitted).
For the practice to fall within the penumbra of a statute's concept
of unfairness, it need not actually violate the statute.
Otherwise, there would have been no need for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court to refer to penumbras. Cf. Kattar v.
Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 12-13 (2000) (holding that Chapter 93A
"makes conduct unlawful which was not unlawful under the common law
or any prior statute" (internal alteration omitted)). Furthermore,
because "there is no limit to human inventiveness in this field,"
Massachusetts courts evaluate unfair and deceptive trade practice
claims based on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 13(internal quotation marks, alteration omitted). In general, the
evaluation of what constitutes an unfair trade practice is for the
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finder of fact, subject to the court's performance of a legal gate-
keeping function. Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass.
547, 563 (2008).
A recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court makes clear that a failure by Charter to pay a credit in
accord with its statutorily-imposed contractual obligation would
likely violate Chapter 93A. See Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 504 (2011). In Casavant, a state regulation
required sellers of travel services to disclose refund policies to
consumers. Id. The regulations further provided that, should a
seller fail to disclose its refund policy to a customer who had
purchased services, the customer could cancel his or her contract
and receive a full refund. Id. Analyzing a cruise line's failure
to provide a refund in accordance with these regulations,
Massachusetts' highest court found such a clear violation of
Chapter 93A that it reversed a contrary conclusion by the
factfinder. Id. at 504-05.
To be sure, this case differs from Casavant in that no
regulation literally required that Charter provide credits to
consumers. Rather, a regulation required Charter to promise it
would do so in specified circumstances. But actually providing a
credit is certainly within at least the penumbra of the statutory
mandate that Charter promise to provide credits. Why, after all,
would the legislature have required Charter to promise to pay if it
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did not intend for Charter to do so? And if Charter breached such
a promise, it caused precisely the injury to consumers that the
legislature sought to avoid. Whether such a breach violated 93A as
a matter of law, as in Casavant, we need not decide at this stage.
We need only decide whether the alleged conduct plausibly makes out
a Chapter 93A claim. It most certainly does.
We acknowledge that this conclusion seems at first blush
at odds with our conclusion regarding the third party beneficiary
claim. Any such appearance is misleading. To the extent a duty is
merely created by contract, it makes sense that Massachusetts law
would leave it to the contracting parties to decide who can enforce
it. To the extent that the duty also emanates from a legislative
judgment that it reflects fair treatment of customers, however, the
state legislature by enacting Chapter 93A has opted to let
consumers seek relief in court. In short, the Massachusetts
legislature created two potential causes of action in the event of
a breach by Charter: an action for breach of contract, and an
action under Chapter 93A, each subject to different procedures and
remedies. The fact that Massachusetts, like other states, allows
the contracting parties to decide who can maintain an action for
breach of the contract does not mean that Massachusetts has allowed
the contracting parties to take away the consumers' rights under
Chapter 93A.
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3. Unjust Enrichment, Money Had and Received
Finally, the plaintiffs' complaint asserts claims for
unjust enrichment and money had and received based on their own
individual dealings with Charter.7 Both claims rest on the notion
that Charter unfairly benefited by collecting money from the
plaintiffs for services not actually rendered.
Charter's only preserved argument against these claims
is that "an express contract governs the relationship between the
Plaintiffs and Charter," precluding any quasi-contract claim.8
Charter is correct that damages for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment are mutually exclusive. See Platten v. HG Bermuda
Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 130 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Massachusetts
law does not allow litigants to override an express contract by
arguing unjust enrichment."). Nevertheless, it is generally
permissible to pursue alternative theories at the pleading stage.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). And, in any event, we cannot determine
7
We have described these causes of action as "very close in
character--one rooted in common law and the other equity
jurisprudence." Jelmoli Holding, Inc. v. Raymond James Fin.
Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2006). Their elements are
as follows: "Money had and received is based on money, or its
equivalent, which in equity and good conscience should be returned
to the claimant and is often styled as money that should be
returned where one is unjustly enriched at another's expense.
Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim with the same elements save
that it is not limited to enrichment by money, or its equivalent."
Id. at 17 n.2 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
8
Because it was not raised below, we will not consider
Charter's alternative argument that the claims are "deficient for
lack of sufficient pleading."
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at this stage of the case whether Charter is correct that an
express contract between the parties exists. In assessing a motion
to dismiss, we focus narrowly on the plaintiffs' complaint along
with any incorporated documents. The plaintiffs say that their
complaint should not be interpreted as raising any claim based on
a contract between them and Charter, and the complaint undisputedly
did not incorporate any such contract, including the several formal
contracts that Charter later submitted. Although we suspect that
there is indeed an express contract between the parties that will,
by its existence, foreclose a claim for unjust enrichment, we
simply cannot say now that it is implausible to think otherwise.9
Consequently, we decline to find that the plaintiffs'
complaint forecloses their quasi-contract claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act but vacate the district court's grant of Charter's motion to
dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Costs are taxed against the appellees.
So ordered.
9
Rules 26(f)(3)(B) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure offer the district court plenty of discretion to have the
parties fish or cut bait on this specific issue without any
prolonged discovery, expense, or delay.
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