Inmates of Suffolk v. Rouse ( 1997 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    _________________________

    Nos. 97-1261
    97-1263

    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellants.

    _________________________

    No. 97-1262

    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.

    _________________________

    No. 97-1334

    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees,

    _________________________

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Intervenor, Appellant.

    _________________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    _________________________













    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    _________________________

    Max D. Stern, with whom Lynn Weissberg and Stern, Shapiro, ____________ ______________ ________________
    Weissberg & Garin were on brief, for plaintiffs. _________________
    John D. Hanify, with whom Robyn J. Bartlett, Owen P. Kane _______________ _________________ _____________
    and Hanify & King were on brief, for defendant Richard J. Rouse, ______________
    Sheriff of Suffolk County.
    Douglas H. Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, with whom __________________
    Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Thomas O. Bean, __________________ _________________
    Assistant Attorneys General, were on brief, for defendants
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Commissioner of Correction.
    Robert M. Loeb, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant ________________ _________________
    Attorney General, Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney , and ________________
    Barbara L. Herwig and John C. Hoyle, Attorneys, Civil Division, _________________ _____________
    Department of Justice, were on brief, for the intervenor.

    _________________________

    November 7, 1997

    _______________________







































    SELYA, Circuit Judge. The passage of the Prison SELYA, Circuit Judge. _____________

    Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 3626 (Supp. 1997) (the PLRA

    or the Act), brought cheers to the lips of many prison

    administrators. In its wake, the Sheriff of Suffolk County and

    the Massachusetts Commissioner of Correction (collectively, the

    defendants) cast their gaze toward a consent decree that has

    governed important aspects of the county's handling of pretrial

    detainees since 1979. Spying an opportunity to sever the

    shackles of judicial oversight, the defendants invoked the new

    law and asked the supervising tribunal, the United States

    District Court for the District of Massachusetts, to vacate the

    decree or, in the alternative, to terminate all prospective

    relief under it. The plaintiffs questioned the Act's

    constitutionality and raised a host of other objections to the

    defendants' motions. The district court repulsed the

    constitutional attack but construed the PLRA to require only the

    termination of prospective relief, not the vacatur of the consent

    decree itself. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of ___ ______________________________ __________

    Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1997) (D. Ct. Op.). ______________ __________

    After careful consideration of the meaning of the PLRA,

    we vouchsafe the Act's constitutionality against the challenges

    asserted here and construe it to entitle correctional officials

    to the termination of existing consent decrees in civil actions

    involving prison conditions (except in the presence of

    statutorily prescribed conditions that forestall such

    termination).


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    I. BACKGROUND I. BACKGROUND

    This litigation deals almost exclusively with the

    effect of the PLRA on an extant consent decree. Thus, the

    history of the conflict is of minimal import, and we merely

    sketch it. The shelves of any reasonably well-stocked law

    library afford readers who hunger for more exegetic detail ample

    opportunity to dine elsewhere. See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk ___ ____ ___________________

    County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 679-84 (D. Mass. ___________ __________

    1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974); Inmates of Suffolk _____ __________________

    County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 562-63 (D. Mass.), ____________ _______

    aff'd, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990) (table), vacated, 502 U.S. _____ _______

    367 (1992); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 928 F.2d _______________________________ _______

    33, 34 (1st Cir. 1991); D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 871-73. __________

    In 1971 the plaintiff class, which consists of present

    and future pretrial detainees held or to be held in the Suffolk

    County jail (collectively, the plaintiffs), brought a civil

    action alleging that the conditions of their confinement

    particularly double bunking violated the Eighth Amendment to

    the United States Constitution. After extensive skirmishing, not

    relevant here, the parties reached a rapprochement, subsequently

    approved by the district court and embodied in the 1979 consent

    decree, in which they ratified an architectural plan for a new

    facility featuring single-occupancy cells. The agreement

    contemplated the phasing-out of the existing Charles Street jail

    once the new structure was in place.

    As the Scottish poet warned, "the best laid schemes o'


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    mice and men gang aft a-gley," Robert Burns, To a Mouse (1785), ___________

    and in this case time proved a formidable opponent. Growth in

    prison population and delays in construction both exceeded

    expectations. The new facility (the Nashua Street jail) was not

    completed until mid-1990 and was hard-pressed from the start to

    cope with the Sheriff's escalating needs. In response to these

    volatile conditions, the consent decree was modified by court

    order in 1985, 1990, and 1994. The last of these changes

    permitted limited double bunking at the Nashua Street facility

    (the Sheriff having closed the Charles Street facility prior

    thereto).1

    In July 1996 the Sheriff initiated the current

    engagement. He grasped the weapon that Congress had forged and

    moved to terminate all prospective relief pursuant to the PLRA.

    Not to be outdone, the Commissioner moved to vacate the consent

    decree outright, thus formalizing a suggestion that the Sheriff

    had omitted from his motion but had included in the memorandum

    supporting the motion. When the plaintiffs indicated that they

    would challenge the Act's constitutionality as part of their

    opposition, the federal government intervened. After sorting out

    the components of the parties' extensive asseverational array,

    Judge Keeton gave the pertinent provisions of the PLRA a

    narrowing construction and on that basis upheld their

    constitutionality. He thereupon granted the Sheriff's motion to
    ____________________

    1Notwithstanding the several emendations that have been made
    to the original consent decree, we refer to the decree, as
    modified from time to time, as the "1979 consent decree."

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    the extent that the consent decree would "no longer be enforced

    by an order of specific performance," but declined either to

    vacate the decree or to "terminate the obligations stated

    [therein]" because those obligations represented "consensual

    undertakings of the defendants with court approval." Id. at 883. ___

    All parties appealed.

    In an effort to cut a passable swath through this legal

    thicket, we start by construing the termination provision of the

    PLRA. We then test its constitutionality and, finding no merit

    in the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, apply the Act and

    evaluate the extent of the remediation to which the defendants

    are entitled.

    II. THE PLRA II. THE PLRA

    In parsing the PLRA, we afford de novo review. See ___

    United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1994). _____________ _______

    Such an exercise in statutory interpretation always begins with

    the language of the statute itself. See Stowell v. Ives, 976 ___ _______ ____

    F.2d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1992). At this stage, an inquisitive court

    should assume that the words of the statute, if not specially

    defined, comport with their ordinary meaning, and that the words,

    so read, accurately express the legislature's intent. See FMC ___ ___

    Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990). In keeping with this _____ ________

    principle, the court should "resort to legislative history and

    other aids of statutory construction only when the literal words

    of the statute create ambiguity or lead to an unreasonable

    result." United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d _____________ ___________________________


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    685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks

    omitted).

    The PLRA is not a paragon of clarity. In regard to

    existing federal court orders, it declares that "in any civil

    action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or

    intervenor shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any

    prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the

    absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly

    drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation

    of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary

    to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C.A.

    3626(b)(2). Such prospective relief shall not terminate,

    however, "if the court makes written findings based on the record

    that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or

    ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than

    necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that

    the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive

    means to correct the violation." Id. 3626(b)(3). With regard ___

    to relief not yet obtained, the Act contains similar

    proscriptions. It forbids courts from granting or approving

    prospective relief "unless the court finds that such relief is

    narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

    violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

    necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." Id. ___

    3626(a)(1)(A).

    These iterations are clear enough, but uncertainty


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    arises when we examine the Act's definitional instructions. One

    such passage defines "prospective relief" to include "all relief

    other than compensatory monetary damages," and then defines

    "relief" to "mean[] all relief in any form that may be granted or

    approved by the court . . . includ[ing] consent decrees." Id. ___

    3626(g)(7), (9). "Consent decree," in turn, means "any relief

    entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the

    consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include

    private settlements." Id. 3626(b)(1). In a vacuum, the ___

    interaction of the Act's mechanics and these definitions is

    manageable: terminating "prospective relief" as prescribed by

    section 3626(b)(2) would terminate "all relief," see section ___

    3626(g)(7), which under section 3626(g)(9) "includes consent

    decrees." Read literally, therefore, once defendants or

    intervenors show their entitlement to terminate prospective

    relief, the Act seemingly requires termination of the consent

    decree itself.

    As the district court astutely observed, this result is

    counterintuitive in that it contradicts the usual understanding

    of both "relief" and "consent decree." See D. Ct. Op., 952 F. ___ __________

    Supp. at 878. The customary definition of "consent decree"

    likens such decrees to judgments, see Black's Law Dictionary 410 ___ _______________________

    (6th ed. 1990) (defining "consent decree" as "[a] judgment

    entered by consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to

    stop alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or

    wrongdoing"), and in ordinary usage a judgment is "[a] final


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    decision of the court resolving the dispute and determining the

    rights and obligations of the parties," id. at 841-42. "Relief," ___

    on the other hand, typically is equated with "remedy," id. at ___

    1292, which is "the means by which a right is enforced or the

    violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated,"

    id. at 1294. Inasmuch as a remedy effectuates the adjudication ___

    expressed in a judgment, one ordinarily would assume that

    "relief," by extension, effectuates the legal decision, arrived

    at by consent, in a "consent decree."

    Congress conflated the two terms when it described

    consent decrees as a form of relief rather than as a judgment ____

    that engenders relief. The PLRA's equation of "consent decree" _________

    and "relief" contradicts conventional understandings and creates

    a situation in which a strict, language-based construction of the

    PLRA requires that commonplace legal terms be used in curious

    ways. This circumstance fosters uncertainty, for a court cannot

    really tell, without further inquiry, whether the linguistic

    anomaly is accidental or purposeful (and, thus, whether Congress

    meant to uproot consent decrees themselves or merely to vitiate

    the relief attendant to them, when it directed federal courts to

    facilitate "the immediate termination of any prospective relief"

    at the behest of prison litigation defendants and intervenors).

    This uncertainty impels us to consult extrinsic sources in search

    of guidance as to Congress's intent.

    In this instance, the PLRA's legislative history

    persuades us to embrace the unusual. Congress passed the PLRA in


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    an effort, in part, to oust the federal judiciary from day-to-day

    prison management. See 141 Cong. Rec. 14,419 (1995) (statement ___

    of Sen. Abraham) ("[N]o longer will prison administration be

    turned over to Federal judges for the indefinite future for the

    slightest reason."); id. at 14,418 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I ___

    believe that the courts have gone too far in micromanaging our

    Nation's prisons."). This evidence of ambient intent inclines us

    to interpret the statute literally (i.e., as directing courts to

    terminate consent decrees outright), for it strongly suggests

    that the PLRA's sponsors wanted to truncate the federal

    judiciary's involvement in prison administration. The House

    Conference Report provides even more powerful direction on this

    score. The Report describes the "explanation of the effect of

    the action agreed upon by the [legislation's] managers" and

    states that, by virtue of the PLRA, "[p]rior consent decrees are

    made terminable upon the motion of either party, and can be

    continued only if the court finds that the imposed relief is

    necessary to correct the violation of the federal right." H.R.

    Conf. Rep. No. 104-378 at 166 (1995). This plain language leaves

    little room for doubt that Congress intended the PLRA as a last

    rite for those consent decrees that are incapable of surviving

    the rigors of section 3626(b)(2).

    Of course, we recognize that the plain meaning rule,

    while a bedrock principle of statutory construction, may yield if

    giving effect to literal meaning would produce a bizarre result.

    See Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993); Charles ___ ________ ___ _______


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    George Trucking, 823 F.2d at 688. But this exception is ________________

    sparingly employed, and the circumstances of this case give it no

    purchase. The result that Congress's plain language portends

    here involves a somewhat unusual use of terms, but it is not

    unreasonable.

    We will not paint the lily. Given the congruence

    between the text of the statute and the legislature's easily

    discerned intent, we conclude that Congress meant precisely what

    it said however deviant from ordinary usage that may be when

    it wrote the PLRA and specially defined its operative terms. We

    are therefore duty bound to interpret the PLRA as mandating the

    termination of extant consent decrees altogether unless the

    district court makes the specific findings that are necessary to

    keep a particular decree alive.2

    III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA

    Having construed the PLRA, we next must essay a de novo

    determination of whether it passes constitutional muster. The

    plaintiffs say that the Act's termination provision violates the

    Constitution three times over by transgressing (1) the separation

    of powers principle, (2) the Due Process Clause, and (3) the
    ____________________

    2Because Congress intended the PLRA to effect the
    termination of consent decrees, we need not elaborate upon what
    consequences might follow from the termination of prospective
    relief alone. We note, however, that the Second Circuit has
    invested substantial time in exploring the potential
    ramifications of terminating prospective relief while leaving a
    consent decree otherwise intact. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, ___ ___ ________ ________
    F.3d ___, ___ (2d Cir. 1997) [1997 WL 523896, at *15-16].
    Inasmuch as our interpretation of the PLRA obviates the need for
    any such exercise, we take no view of the Benjamin court's ________
    conclusions.

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    Equal Protection Clause. Though ably presented, none of these

    assertions carries the day.

    A. Separation of Powers. A. Separation of Powers. ____________________

    Few tenets are more central to the genius of our

    constitutional system than the separation of powers principle.

    See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) ___ __________ ______________

    (describing separation of powers as "basic and vital" to our

    scheme of government). This principle has many incarnations. In

    one such configuration, it insulates the judiciary from

    unwarranted legislative intrusions.

    The courts' historic independence has its roots in the

    Constitution, which explicitly provides that "[t]he judicial

    Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,

    and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time

    ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, 1. This

    delegation of power serves "to safeguard litigants' right to have

    claims decided before judges who are free from potential

    domination by other branches of government." Commodity Futures _________________

    Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citation and ______________ _____

    internal quotation marks omitted). The due administration of

    justice demands that this separation remain inviolate. The

    plaintiffs lament that the PLRA infringes upon the courts'

    guaranteed separateness in two distinct ways.

    1. Reopening Final Judgments. The separation of 1. Reopening Final Judgments. __________________________

    powers principle forbids Congress from reopening the final

    judgments of Article III courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, ___ _____ _________________


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    Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). After all, if the judiciary's ____

    power to render definitive judgments were subject to

    congressional control, then the judiciary would become, within

    its own sphere, subordinate to the legislature.

    Moving from the general to the particular, the

    plaintiffs maintain that the PLRA offends this principle by

    requiring a district court to rescind relief that the court

    already has seen fit to award. In mounting this argument, the

    plaintiffs rely heavily on the Justices' observation, made in an

    earlier round of this litigation, that "a consent decree is a

    final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that

    equity requires." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391. From this thread, the ____

    plaintiffs weave a syllogism: Congress cannot order the

    reopening of final judgments without offending the separation of

    powers principle, a consent decree is a final judgment, and

    therefore Congress cannot mandate the reopening of consent

    decrees.

    This reasoning frays because consent decrees of the

    type at issue here are not "final judgments" for the purpose of a

    separation of powers analysis. In a recent articulation of the

    rule that the legislature cannot interfere with final judgments

    of Article III courts, the Supreme Court carefully carved out an

    exception and endorsed a line of cases sanctioning legislation

    "that altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by

    Article III courts." Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232. This exception did _____

    not spring full-blown from Justice Scalia's brow. To the


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    contrary, its roots burrow deep into our constitutional soil. An

    early exemplar is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., ____________ ______________________________

    59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). That hoary case established that,

    although a judgment at law is impervious to legislative assault,

    a forward-looking judgment in equity can succumb to legislative

    action if the legislature alters the underlying rule of law. See ___

    id. at 431-32. More recent examples also exist. See, e.g., ___ ___ ____

    Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994); System ________ ________________ ______

    Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1961). ____________ ______

    Lower courts sometimes are required to follow precedent

    for precedent's sake, no matter how much the yoke chafes. Here,

    however, our burden is light, for the Wheeling Bridge exception _______________

    is not only mandated by precedent but also makes logical sense.

    The legitimacy of prospective equitable relief rests upon the

    presumed persistence of the conditions that originally justified

    the relief. If forward-looking judgments in equity were

    inviolate, then one of two scenarios would develop: either the

    legislature would be stripped of the ability to change

    substantive law once an injunction had been issued pursuant to

    that law, or an issued injunction would continue to have force

    after the law that originally gave the injunction legitimacy had

    been found wanting (and, hence, altered). The first of these

    possible results would work an undue judicial interference with

    the legislative process, while the second would create an

    intolerable tangle in which some laws applied to some persons and

    not to others. Since the separation of powers principle is a


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    two-way street, courts must be careful not to embrace a legal

    regime that promotes such awkward scenarios.

    To recapitulate, consent decrees are final judgments,

    but they are final judgments subject to revision "to the extent

    that equity requires." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391. Plaut and ____ _____

    Wheeling Bridge, read together, teach that equity requires, and _______________

    the separation of powers principle permits, legislatures to

    direct that courts respond to changes in substantive law by

    revisiting forward-looking injunctions. See Plyler v. Moore, 100 ___ ______ _____

    F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996). The Court stated the point with

    great clarity earlier in this litigation: "A consent decree must

    of course be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of

    the obligations [it imposes] has become impermissible under

    federal law." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388. ____

    The plaintiffs try to turn these verities to their

    advantage by asserting that the underlying law here the Eighth

    Amendment has not changed. This is resupinate reasoning. The

    relevant underlying law in this case is not the Eighth Amendment,

    as there has been no finding of an ongoing constitutional

    violation. Rather, the relevant underlying law relates to the

    district court's authority to issue and maintain prospective

    relief absent a violation of a federal right, and the PLRA has

    truncated that authority. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, ___ F.3d ___ ________ ________

    ___, ___ (2d Cir. 1997) [1997 WL 523896, at *9]. The termination

    of a consent decree in response to the PLRA, therefore, merely

    effectuates Congress's decision to divest district courts of the


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    ability to construct or perpetuate prospective relief when no

    violation of a federal right exists. Given this shift in the

    relevant underlying law, the termination of prospective relief

    pursuant to the PLRA does not amount to a legislative reopening

    of a final judgment.

    2. Rules of Decision. The plaintiffs next contend 2. Rules of Decision. __________________

    that the PLRA's termination provision violates a different aspect

    of the separation of powers principle, articulated in United ______

    States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Klein had its ______ _____ _____

    genesis in the aftermath of the Civil War, when Congress passed a

    statute that permitted noncombatant Confederate landowners to

    recover confiscated goods upon proof of their loyalty to the

    Union. Klein, the administrator of the estate of Wilson, a

    Confederate sympathizer, attempted to recover Wilson's goods

    pursuant to this statute. Mindful that the Supreme Court had

    previously declared that a presidential pardon was conclusive

    proof of loyalty, see United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 ___ ______________ _________

    Wall.) 531 (1869), Klein tendered evidence that Wilson had

    received such a pardon. While the case was pending, Congress

    passed a statute which declared that a presidential pardon was

    proof of disloyalty and directed the dismissal of any pending

    recovery action brought on behalf of a pardon recipient. See ___

    Klein, 80 U.S. at 131-34. _____

    The Supreme Court invalidated the new statute on

    separation of powers grounds. It ruled that if the law were

    allowed to stand, then the trial court would have "jurisdiction


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    of the cause to a given point; but when it ascertains that a

    certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and

    it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction."

    Id. at 146. Such a requirement "is not an exercise of the ___

    acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe

    regulations to the appellate power" and thus "passe[s] the limit

    which separates the legislative from the judicial power." Id. at ___

    146-47. The Klein Court distinguished Wheeling Bridge as a _____ ________________

    situation in which "the court was left to apply its ordinary

    rules to the new circumstances created by the act [whereas in

    Klein] no new circumstances have been created by legislation. _____

    But the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which,

    in its own judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed

    to give it an effect precisely contrary." Id. at 147. ___

    The plaintiffs argue that the case at hand resembles

    Klein more than Wheeling Bridge because the law underlying the _____ ________________

    consent decree the Eighth Amendment remains constant, yet the

    PLRA imposes a rule of decision by instructing courts to

    terminate prospective relief. This argument misapprehends the

    situation. As noted above, the relevant underlying law for

    present purposes is not the Eighth Amendment, but the power of

    federal courts to grant prospective relief absent a violation of

    a federal right. Thus, the PLRA does not run afoul of Klein _____

    because it does not tamper with courts' decisional rules that

    is, courts remain free to interpret and apply the law to the

    facts as they discern them. Because the PLRA leaves the courts'


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    adjudicatory processes intact, it does not transgress the Klein _____

    doctrine. See Gavin v. Barnstad, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (8th Cir. ___ _____ ________

    1997) [1997 WL 434633, at *7-8].

    B. Due Process. B. Due Process. ___________

    The plaintiffs base their next two objections on the

    Due Process Clause. The first rests on the postulate that the

    consent decree is a final judgment, the existence of which vests

    property rights in the parties that cannot be alienated by

    Congress. By purporting to terminate consent decrees, this

    thesis runs, the PLRA not only reopens final judgments but also

    robs the judgments' beneficiaries of rights secured to them

    thereunder. The plaintiffs' second objection posits that the

    1979 consent decree constitutes a contract and that due process

    limits the extent to which the federal government can enact

    legislation that has a deleterious effect on preexisting

    contracts. Both objections lack force.

    1. Vested Rights. The plaintiffs' first objection 1. Vested Rights. _____________

    fails because, at least in the absence of exceptional

    circumstances well beyond any that are present here, frankly

    modifiable decrees cannot create vested rights. See Landgraf, ___ ________

    511 U.S. at 273 (noting that "relief by injunction operates in

    futuro, and that [a party] ha[s] no vested right in the decree

    entered by the trial court") (citation and internal quotation

    marks omitted). As we have already pointed out, consent decrees

    are not merely final judgments, but a special species of that

    genre final judgments that can be "reopened . . . to the extent


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    that equity requires." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391. In the instant ____

    case, equity requires termination of the 1979 decree because

    Congress has withdrawn the power that animated the decree. See ___

    18 U.S.C.A. 3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(2).

    To be sure, the plaintiffs argue that this reasoning is

    circular. But, given the tenuous nature of consent decrees, that

    argument will not wash. There is a basic difference between a

    money judgment and a consent decree: the former is fixed,

    whereas the latter is necessarily impermanent. Thus, insofar as

    a consent decree has prospective effect, it must on motion be

    adjusted to accommodate material changes of fact or law germane

    to its issuance.3 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393. Here, the PLRA has ___ ____

    altered the standard by which courts can continue forward-looking

    relief, and this profound change in the relevant underlying law

    entitles the defendants to termination of the decree.

    2. Contract Rights. The plaintiffs' second due 2. Contract Rights. ________________

    process objection is equally unavailing. Even if we make two

    broad assumptions that are integral to their position namely,

    that the consent decree is a contract and that the PLRA impairs

    that contract the objection founders. The Supreme Court

    delineated the standard of review for federal legislation that

    impairs contractual relations in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. _____________________________

    ____________________

    3This precept could not come as a surprise to the
    plaintiffs. In the last modification of the consent decree,
    under date of June 14, 1994, the district court advised the
    parties that it would entertain future motions to modify "upon a
    showing of good cause . . . or upon a showing of material change
    in circumstances."

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    Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985). If a ____________________________________

    substantial impairment of a contract right is found or assumed,

    "the reviewing court next determines whether the impairment is of

    constitutional dimension." Id. at 472. It engages in this ___

    analysis by examining the statute and identifying the parties to

    the contract. See id. "When the contract is a private one, and ___ ___

    when the impairing statute is a federal one, this next inquiry is

    especially limited, and the judicial scrutiny quite minimal. The

    party asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation must

    overcome a presumption of constitutionality and establish that

    the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."

    Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ___

    Even though the federal government is not a party to

    the "contract" in issue here (the consent decree), the plaintiffs

    seek to upgrade the level of scrutiny. Their gambit depends upon

    the Court's opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit ______ ____________________________

    Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which, they say, stands for the _____

    proposition that the states have sufficient representation in the

    federal government to influence its actions, and that, by

    extension, the federal sovereign's actions should be attributed

    to the states. From this coign of vantage, they argue that,

    since federal laws are enacted by a government organized for the

    benefit of the several states, a federal act that impairs a

    contract to which a state is a party should receive the same

    degree of scrutiny as a federal act that impairs a contract to

    which the United States is a party.


    20












    This ratiocination is predicated on a strained reading

    of Garcia. The Garcia Court held that state participation in the ______ ______

    federal government provides a sufficient safeguard to prevent

    federal overreaching vis- -vis the states. See id. at 552. ___ ___

    There is, however, no basis in Garcia or elsewhere to suggest ______

    that federal legislation which benefits state governments is

    tantamount to self-dealing and thus subject to heightened

    scrutiny. We therefore summarily reject the plaintiffs' reading

    of Garcia and the attendant claim that the federal government ______

    somehow became a constructive party to the 1979 consent decree.

    This gets the grease from the goose. Because the

    federal sovereign is not a party to the consent decree, either in

    fact or by indirection, we need only subject the PLRA to a

    rational basis review. See National Passenger, 470 U.S. at 471- ___ __________________

    72; see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, ___ ____ ________________________ __________

    22 (1977) (holding that "[l]egislation adjusting the rights and

    responsibilities of contracting parties must be [based] upon

    reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the

    public purpose justifying its adoption").

    Stressing that the PLRA abrogates existing

    responsibilities, the plaintiffs make the obligatory argument

    that the law is arbitrary and irrational. But these

    animadversions vastly overstate the case. The PLRA only affects

    agreements that have at all times remained subject to

    modification should circumstances change. And, moreover, by

    facilitating termination, the PLRA's termination provision forges


    21












    a practical, commonsense linkage between a changed circumstance

    the district courts' newfound inability to grant or enforce

    prospective relief absent a violation of a federal right and an

    existing consent decree. Consequently, section 3626(b)(2)

    survives rational basis scrutiny.

    C. Equal Protection. C. Equal Protection. ________________

    The plaintiffs also advance a pair of arguments based

    on the Equal Protection Clause. First, they note that pretrial

    detainees, by definition, have not yet been convicted of the

    crime(s) with which they have been charged. Thus, they enjoy

    both the presumption of innocence, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. ___ _____________

    358 (1970), and the right not to be punished prematurely, see ___

    Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Building on this ____ _______

    foundation, the plaintiffs assert that the PLRA is subject to

    strict scrutiny (which it fails) because it abridges these

    fundamental rights. In the alternative, they claim that the Act

    violates core principles of equal protection because it has no

    rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

    1. Fundamental Rights. Although the PLRA 1. Fundamental Rights. ____________________

    circumscribes a district court's ability to provide prospective

    relief to pretrial detainees (as well as all other prisoners)

    absent a violation of a federal right, we conclude that this

    feature of the Act does not abridge the pretrial detainees' right

    to be free from punishment. Prison conditions either violate

    fundamental rights (in which event they also violate federally

    secured rights) or they do not violate fundamental rights (in


    22












    which event they do not violate federally secured rights). In

    the former case, the PLRA permits relief to redeem the

    fundamental right. In the latter case, the PLRA does not permit

    relief, but as no violation exists, the PLRA's denial of relief

    does not imperil pretrial detainees' fundamental rights.

    It is also possible to argue that the PLRA implicates

    the fundamental right of access to the courts, see Wolff v. ___ _____

    McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578 (1974), and that, by withdrawing the _________

    power to grant inmates prospective relief in a manner available

    to other classes of people, the PLRA trammels inmates' rights of

    access. This line of reasoning does not withstand close

    examination. Under the PLRA, the courthouse doors remain open

    and the withdrawal of prospective relief above and beyond what

    is necessary to correct the violation of federally protected

    rights does not diminish the right of access. In a nutshell,

    while there is a constitutional right to court access, there is

    no complementary constitutional right to receive or be eligible

    for a particular form of relief. See Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 ___ _______ _______

    F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by _______________________________

    Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). ______ __________

    2. Rational Basis. The plaintiffs' final 2. Rational Basis. ________________

    constitutional challenge suggests that the PLRA violates the

    Equal Protection Clause because it "singl[es] out a certain class

    of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardship[]."

    Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996). This suggestion is _____ _____

    ill-conceived. A statute that neither abridges a fundamental


    23












    right nor operates against a suspect class receives rational

    basis review when it is challenged under the Equal Protection

    Clause. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1993). The ___ ______ ___

    PLRA is such a statute: as we already have explained, it does

    not impair a fundamental right, and the plaintiffs do not assert

    that pretrial detainees are a suspect class. Thus, rational

    basis review applies.

    A statute survives rationality review if it "bear[s] a

    rational relationship to an independent and legitimate

    legislative end." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The PLRA's _____

    legislative history indicates that the drafters intended the Act

    to "address the alarming explosion in the number of frivolous

    lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners," to "mak[e] it

    much more difficult for Federal judges to issue orders directing

    the release of convicted criminals from prison custody," 141

    Cong. Rec. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole), and to wrest

    control of state penitentiaries from federal courts so that

    states "will be able to run prisons as they see fit unless there

    is a constitutional violation," id. at 14,419 (statement of Sen. ___

    Abraham). These purposes are clearly legitimate. They involve

    the allocation of public resources, the maintenance of public

    safety, and the desire to institutionalize a state-centric

    conception of our federal system. The means chosen to effect

    these ends are stern, but they certainly bear a reasonable

    relationship to the announced legislative goals. From this

    perspective, the PLRA easily passes rational basis review.


    24












    The plaintiffs try to undermine this appraisal by

    asserting that an anti-inmate animus drove Congress's approval of

    the PLRA. They claim that such an invidiously discriminatory

    intent violates the Court's admonition that a legislature cannot

    construct legislation "for the purpose of disadvantaging the

    group burdened by the law." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; see also _____ ___ ____

    United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) _____________________________ ______

    ("[I]f the constitutional conception of `equal protection of the

    laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare

    congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot

    constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").

    We need not grapple with the intriguing question of

    whether the Romer Court meant to add a new "animus test" to the _____

    armamentarium of rationality review. The short, entirely

    dispositive answer to the plaintiffs' supplication is that the

    evidence in the record simply does not show that the legislature

    inappropriately sought to disadvantage the plaintiff class.

    The only "proof" that the plaintiffs offer consists of

    political rhetoric, such as the statement on the Senate floor

    that "criminals, while they must be accorded their constitutional

    rights, deserve to be punished. Obviously, they should not be

    tortured or treated cruelly. At the same time, they also should

    not have all the rights and privileges the rest of us enjoy.

    Rather, their lives should, on the whole, be describable by the

    old concept known as `hard time.'" 141 Cong. Rec. 14,419 (1995)

    (statement of Sen. Abraham). Passing the obvious point that such


    25












    rhetoric must be taken with a grain of salt elected officials,

    after all, have been known to strike poses for public consumption

    the most that fairly can be said is that oratory of this sort

    may evince a philosophical shift; it hardly betokens an

    impermissible animus. In all events, the state is well within

    its right to punish persons convicted of crimes, and a

    retributive desire to effect such punishment consequently does

    not offend any supposed "animus test." Furthermore, the

    plaintiffs are not criminals, but pretrial detainees; they have

    not been found guilty of any crimes. Thus, even if the political

    rhetoric spotlighted by the plaintiffs qualified as animus

    directed at criminals, it would not constitute cognizable animus

    for present purposes.

    In sum, an objective reading of the legislative history

    demonstrates that the plaintiffs' inability to obtain prospective

    relief does not spring from Congress's wish to do them harm, but

    from its desire to minimize the occasion for federal courts to

    administer state prisons. Consequently, the PLRA does not

    succumb to any theoretical "animus test" contained within the

    Equal Protection Clause.

    IV. APPLYING THE PLRA IV. APPLYING THE PLRA

    The plaintiffs have a fallback position. They contend

    that, even if the PLRA is constitutional, the 1979 consent decree

    should remain intact because (1) the district court previously

    made findings sufficient to save the decree by operation of the

    Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(b)(2), or (2) if the findings to date ___


    26












    are inadequate, the district court should have conducted an

    inquiry into whether a violation of a federal right exists

    currently (or probably will come into existence if the strictures

    of the consent decree are lifted) before implementing the PLRA's

    termination provision. We reject both contentions.

    Answering the question of whether prison conditions

    constitute an ongoing violation of a federal right under the PLRA

    necessitates both a definition of the right at stake and an

    assessment of a specific compendium of prison conditions.

    Accordingly, such a question comprises a mixed question of fact

    and law, the answer to which we review "along a degree-of-

    deference continuum, ranging from plenary review for law-

    dominated questions to clear-error review for fact-dominated

    questions." Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1132 _______ ___________________

    (1st Cir. 1995). Here, the question is more factual than legal:

    inasmuch as the double bunking of pretrial detainees does not in

    and of itself violate the Constitution, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 ___ ____ _______

    U.S. at 541, the district court's conclusion that the double

    bunking of which the plaintiffs continue to complain is not in

    violation of a federal right must be challenged, if at all,

    principally on the facts. Thus, the standard of review is highly

    deferential. See Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 999 F.2d 142, ___ _______ ____________________

    146 (6th Cir. 1993).

    We have carefully reviewed the record and culled out

    the sparse factual findings that the court made in the relevant

    time frame. No useful purpose would be served by examining these


    27












    findings in minute detail. Judge Keeton concluded that they did

    not satisfy the requirements of section 3626(a) or (b). See D. ___ __

    Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 880. A trial court generally is thought _______

    to be the best interpreter of its own prior rulings and findings,

    see, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. ___ ____ _______________________________________________

    Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, ________________________________________________

    1066-67 (1st Cir. 1987); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st _________ ____

    Cir. 1987), and this case is no exception. At any rate, we agree

    with Judge Keeton's conclusion. It is simply implausible to

    suggest, on this record, that the district court's assessment of

    the existing factual findings is clearly erroneous.

    The plaintiffs' follow-on argument gains them no

    ground. As to the conditions that presently exist, we defer to

    the district court's intimate familiarity with this protracted

    litigation and to its informed evaluation of current prison

    conditions. See D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 880 (observing that ___ __________

    "no evidence is before the court to support findings that

    defendants are not in compliance with the terms of the modified

    Consent Decree"). Deference is especially appropriate here

    since, under the terms of an order that it entered on June 14,

    1994, the district court for some time had been receiving and

    evaluating periodic reports from the Sheriff concerning incidents

    of assaultive behavior, rape, disease, and the like at the Nashua

    Street jail.

    As to what the future may bring, we cannot criticize

    Judge Keeton's reluctance to play the oracle. Presented with the


    28












    opportunity to make further findings before deciding the

    defendants' motions, the judge declined. He noted several cogent

    reasons why it made sense to leave the question of whether a

    violation of a federal right might follow the termination of

    prospective relief under the consent decree to another day. See ___

    id. ___

    We discern no error. This is neither the time nor the

    place to press an inherently speculative claim of harm to come.

    The PLRA imposes no obligation on the trial court to make a

    predictive inquiry into future conditions before terminating an

    existing consent decree, and we are not aware of any other basis

    for burdening the court with such a requirement. Quite often,

    "[p]resent fears are less than horrible imaginings." William

    Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 1, sc. 3 (1605). If, in this instance, _______

    the plaintiffs' trepidation proves justified, they remain free to

    initiate a new round of proceedings designed to show that post-

    termination prison conditions actually do violate their federally

    protected rights.

    V. VACATING THE CONSENT DECREE V. VACATING THE CONSENT DECREE

    Having construed the PLRA and established that its

    termination-of-prospective-relief provision passes constitutional

    muster, that the conditions for exemption have not been met, and

    that the Act's mandate requires the district court to terminate

    the consent decree, we now mull whether that mandate means that

    an order must be entered not only terminating the consent decree

    but actually vacating it. The district court thought not. See ___


    29












    D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 883-84. We agree. __________

    The defendants' opposition is easily dispatched.

    Nothing in the PLRA or its legislative history speaks of vacating

    consent decrees. Congress chose to use the verb "terminate" and

    to eschew the verb "vacate." The distinction between these two

    words is clear: "terminate" means "to put an end to" or "to

    end," Black's Law Dictionary at 1471, whereas "vacate" means "to ______________________

    annul" or "to render . . . void," id. at 1548. ___

    In the present context, this distinction may well

    possess practical significance. Cf. Benjamin, ___ F.3d at ___ ___ ________

    [1997 WL 523896, at *15-16] (explaining that court's view of the

    distinction between terminating prospective relief and vacating a

    consent decree). While terminating a consent decree strips it of

    future potency, the decree's past puissance is preserved and

    certain of its collateral effects may endure. Vacating a consent

    decree, however, wipes the slate clean, not only rendering the

    decree sterile for future purposes, but also eviscerating any

    collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past actions

    taken under the decree's imprimatur. As nothing in the PLRA even

    hints that consent decrees must be vacated when prospective

    relief is terminated, we uphold the district court's ruling that

    the PLRA does not require vacation of the 1979 decree.

    VI. CONCLUSION VI. CONCLUSION

    We need go no further. To the extent that the parties

    advance other arguments, we reject them out of hand. None




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    requires elaboration.4

    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm so much of the

    judgment below that (a) found the PLRA to be constitutional, (b)

    terminated all prospective relief under the 1979 consent decree,

    and (c) refused to vacate that decree. We direct, however, that

    the judgment be revised to terminate the consent decree itself

    and we remand for the entry of a modified judgment (together

    with such further proceedings, if any, as the district court may

    deem necessary in light of this opinion).



    Affirmed as modified and remanded. All parties shall Affirmed as modified and remanded. All parties shall __________________________________ __________________

    bear their own costs. bear their own costs. ____________________



















    ____________________

    4The Commissioner moved below for vacation of the 1979
    consent decree under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and now appeals the
    denial of that motion. We need not address that aspect of the
    matter. At oral argument in this court, the Commissioner agreed
    that if the consent decree were to be terminated, the Rule 60(b)
    issue could be set to one side. We take the Commissioner at his
    word and therefore express no opinion as to the merits of the
    Rule 60(b) claim.

    31