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USCA1 Opinion
No. 96-2357
WILLIAM MAGEE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
and O'Toole*, U.S. District Judge.
____________________
Francis J. Caruso, III with whom Paul J. Gillespie and Gillespie &
Associates were on brief for appellant.
Julie S. Schrager, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
____________________
July 31, 1997
____________________
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant William
Magee appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant-appellee, the United States, with respect to his
personal injury action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. S 1346(b) ("FTCA").
Background
This case arose out of an automobile accident in
which Peter Puzzanghera, an outpatient at the Veterans
Administration Medical Center in Bedford, Massachusetts
("VAMC") rear ended Magee. As a result of the accident, Magee
suffered physical injuries and property damage for which he
seeks damages from the federal government. By way of
background, we describe the relationship between the Veterans
Administration ("VA") and Puzzanghera in order to explain how
Magee came to sue the United States.
Puzzanghera has long battled chronic, paranoid
schizophrenia. In August, 1988 he was involuntarily committed
to Metropolitan State Hospital. In July, 1989, he was
transferred to VAMC where he remained as an inpatient until
late June, 1990. On June 20, 1990, he was discharged to the
Fort Hill Community Care Home and continued to receive
treatment at VAMC on an outpatient basis.
Puzzanghera's treatment at VAMC included periodic
intermuscular injections of Prolixin Decanoate ("Prolixin").
VAMC physicians prescribed Prolixin to help Puzzanghera manage
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his schizophrenia. Following the onset of this treatment,
Puzzanghera experienced restlessness and difficulty in moving
his tongue, side effects that his doctors have attributed to
the Prolixin.
VAMC has established a policy entitled Veterans
Driver Evaluation Program for the purpose of aiding veterans in
obtaining driver's licenses from the Massachusetts Registry of
Motor Vehicles ("RMV"). Pursuant to this policy, VA doctors
refer "selected patients whose rehabilitative prospects might
be enhanced by having a driver's permit or license" to a VA
psychologist for evaluation as to suitability. Depending on
the outcome of this evaluation, the psychologist either
determines that the patient is not a suitable candidate for a
license, or submits a letter of support to the RMV on behalf of
the patient. The letter details the patient's medical
treatment and indicates that beyond the information in the
letter, the VA knows of no "contraindication" to the RMV's
consideration of the patient for restoration or continuance of
driving privileges. The VA acknowledges in the letter,
however, that the final decision regarding a given patient's
driving privileges rests with the RMV.
At some time prior to April 1990, Puzzanghera
requested his treating physician, Dr. Albert Gaw, to assist him
in obtaining a driver's license. Dr. Gaw referred Puzzanghera
to Dr. Robert Avey, a counselling psychologist at VAMC. After
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Dr. Avey evaluated Puzzanghera, he sent a letter to the RMV on
his behalf. Puzzanghera subsequently received driving
privileges.
In the afternoon of October 29, 1990, while Magee sat
in his car at a red light, Puzzanghera rear ended Magee's car,
causing bodily injury to Magee and damage to his vehicle. A
police officer who arrived shortly after the accident noted
that Puzzanghera appeared "very slow and deliberate in his
actions." The officer performed two field sobriety tests which
Puzzanghera "passed with no problem." Puzzanghera informed the
officer that he was an outpatient at VAMC and had recently
received a shot of Prolixin. In fact, Puzzanghera had received
this shot approximately four hours prior to the accident.
Magee filed a complaint against the United States
under the FTCA in which he alleged that the VA negligently
allowed or enabled Puzzanghera to qualify for and obtain a
driver's license while on Prolixin, negligently failed to warn
Puzzanghera of the side effects of Prolixin, negligently failed
to properly monitor and supervise Puzzanghera's Prolixin
treatment, and negligently "fail[ed] in other respects that
will be shown at trial." According to Magee, the VA's
negligence caused his injuries. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the United States on all of
Magee's allegations. This appeal followed.
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Standard of Review
We review the award of summary judgment de novo . See
Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, when the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
fact is material when it has the potential to affect the
outcome of the suit. See J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan
v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 81 (1996). Neither party may
rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials, but
must identify specific facts derived from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and
affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or absence of an
issue of fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & (e). The district
court's analysis does not bind us. See Mesnick v. General
Elec. Co. , 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991). Instead, we may
affirm or reverse on any independently sufficient ground. See
id.
Discussion
The FTCA vests federal district courts with
jurisdiction over claims against the United States for damages
caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the
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United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. S 1346(b). Fourteen statutory exceptions limit this
otherwise broad waiver of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. S
2680. To evaluate a claim brought pursuant to the FTCA,
therefore, we must first determine whether an exception
precludes the claim, and, if not, whether a private actor in
the state where the conduct occurred would be liable to the
plaintiff under the circumstances. We conclude that the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA bars Magee's claim
with respect to the VA's actions regarding Puzzanghera's
driver's license. We also conclude that Massachusetts
statutory law precludes his claims of negligent treatment.
A. The Letter
As indicated, several exceptions limit the breadth of
the government's potential liability under the FTCA. One, the
discretionary function exception, operates to deprive a
district court of jurisdiction over
1. The district court analyzed Magee's complaint in negligence
terms, holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, S 36B precluded
some of Magee's claims and that he failed to establish the
elements of common law negligence on his remaining claims. In
arriving at our conclusion we depart from the reasoning of the
district court in determining that the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA bars Magee's claims arising out of the
VA's efforts on behalf of Puzzanghera's driver's license. We
reiterate, however, that in evaluating an appeal from the grant
of summary judgment, we may affirm for any independently
sufficient ground supported by the record. See Mesnick, 950
F.2d at 22.
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[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. S 2680(a); see Kelly v. United States , 924 F.2d 355,
360 (1st Cir. 1991) ("When a claim is covered by the
discretionary function exception, it must be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.").
Though not abundantly clear from the statutory
language, ample authority guides our determination of whether
the discretionary function exception serves to bar a claim
against the government. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert,
499 U.S. 315, 322-25 (1991); United States v. Berkovitz, 486
U.S. 531, 536-39 (1988); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d
776, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1991); Irving v. United States , 909 F.2d
598, 600-03 (1st Cir. 1990). First, we must determine whether
the conduct in question was discretionary in nature. See
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322; Attallah, 955 F.2d at 783. If the
conduct was discretionary in nature, we must then consider
whether it "[was] of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23
(internal quotation and citation omitted); see Attallah, 955
F.2d at 783.
The discretionary nature of governmental conduct
depends on whether that conduct involved an element of judgment
or choice. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. We evaluate the
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nature of the conduct rather than the status of the actor to
determine "'whether the action is a matter of choice for the
acting employee.'" Attallah, 955 F.2d at 783 (quoting
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). An action, for example, does not
involve an element of choice "if a federal statute, regulation
or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employer to follow, because [t]he employer has no rightful
option but to adhere to the directive." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at
322 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The language of VAMC's Veterans Driver Evaluation
Program contemplates a series of steps VA staff must undertake
upon deciding to assist a veteran in obtaining a driver's
license. The program, however, cannot be characterized as
requiring a particularized course of conduct for the VAMC
staff. See, e.g., Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360-61 (interweaving of
"imperatives with weaker, precatory verbs and generalities" may
be more characteristic of discretion than of mandatory
directives). Within those steps, the program leaves broad
discretion to VA psychologists in their evaluation of the
patient and their ultimate decision whether to write to the RMV
on the patient's behalf. The program also grants broad
discretion to treating physicians in deciding whether to refer
interested patients to a psychologist for evaluation.
The uncontroverted deposition of Dr. Robert Avey, the
VA counselling psychologist who wrote on behalf of Puzzanghera,
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underscores the discretionary nature of the process. Dr. Avey
testified that his evaluation protocol included reviews of
patient treatment histories, interviews with patients and
consultations with other professionals such as physicians or
social workers if necessary, all aimed at gauging the propriety
of facilitating the restoration of a given patient's driving
privileges. Thus, we are satisfied that VAMC's program is
sufficiently discretionary to meet the first inquiry of the
discretionary function exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322
(indicating that conduct involving element of choice or
judgment is discretionary).
Having determined that the action was discretionary,
we turn to the second inquiry, whether the decision of VA
doctors to assist Puzzanghera in applying for his driver's
license was "of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield." Id. at 322-23 (internal
quotation and citation omitted). The exception does not serve
to protect all discretionary actions of governmental employees.
Instead, it "protects only governmental actions and decisions
based on considerations of public policy." Id. at 323
(internal citation omitted). In this way, the exception serves
its purpose of preventing "judicial second guessing" of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action
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in tort. See Attallah, 955 F.2d at 783; Irving, 909 F.2d at
600.
As the Supreme Court has indicated, "it will most
often be true that the general aims and policies of the
controlling [program] will be evident from its text." Gaubert,
499 U.S. at 324. A government statute or program that allows
the government actor discretion creates a presumption that the
isolated discretionary act reflects the same considerations
which led to promulgation of the program. See id. The
exception is not reserved solely for planning level decisions
establishing programs. See id. at 323. The exception also
protects "the actions of Government agents involving the
necessary element of choice and grounded in the social,
economic or political goals. . . ." Id. In short, "the
discretionary function exception insulates the Government from
liability if the action challenged . . . involves the
permissible exercise of policy judgment." Berkovitz, 486 U.S.
at 537.
We view VAMC's decision to assist Puzzanghera in
obtaining a driver's license as a clear, permissible exercise
of policy judgment. As we have already stated, the policy
contemplates significant discretion on the part of the VA staff
at every step of the process. The Veterans Driver Evaluation
Program includes a clearly stated policy objective, "to assist
veterans to apply for driving privileges" in cases where
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driving privileges are likely to enhance the patient's
rehabilitative prospects. This objective folds neatly into the
VA's mission of providing a range of care and assistance for
veterans. A series of judgments leading up to the ultimate
decision under this program, whether to write to the RMV, all
involve considerations of veteran rehabilitation.
Magee unpersuasively argues that VAMC's assistance to
Puzzanghera in obtaining a driver's license constituted part of
his medical treatment. In Collazo v. United States, 850 F.2d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988), we held that a claim of negligent medical
treatment by a government actor, unaccompanied by any
discretionary, policy based conduct, falls outside the
parameters of the discretionary function exception. We
distinguished conduct made on purely medical grounds from
conduct made pursuant to governmental policy, pointing out that
where "only professional, nongovernmental discretion is at
issue, the discretionary function exception does not apply."
Id. at 3 (internal quotation omitted).
The decision to write a letter to the RMV on
Puzzanghera's behalf fell within the parameters of VAMC's
rehabilitative policy. Puzzanghera, not VAMC physicians,
initiated the process by asking for a driver's license
referral. Pursuant to the program, Dr. Avey, a counseling
psychologist and not Puzzanghera's treating psychiatrist, made
the ultimate decision to write a letter to the RMV on behalf of
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Puzzanghera. The program creates a general process applicable
to all patients seeking a license; it did not constitute part
of Puzzanghera's individualized medical treatment. Puzzanghera
did not receive his license, for example, to help control his
schizophrenia. Rather, the decision to write a letter of
support was made in contemplation of his rehabilitative needs.
We conclude that VAMC's efforts on Puzzanghera's
behalf with respect to the Veterans Driver Evaluation Program
fall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
Accordingly, that exception bars the portion of Magee's claim
that rests on the VA's efforts on behalf of Puzzanghera's
driver's license.
B. The Prolixin
Magee also claims that the VA's negligent medical
treatment of Puzzanghera caused his injuries. Specifically,
Magee claims that the VA failed to properly monitor and
supervise Puzzanghera's Prolixin treatment and failed to warn
him adequately of the adverse side effects he might experience
as a result of the Prolixin doses. Magee attributes the
2. We point out that "where the government is performing a
discretionary function, the fact that the discretion is
exercised in a negligent manner does not make the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA inapplicable." Attallah, 955
F.2d at 784 n. 13 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 539). Whether
VAMC negligently exercised its discretion with respect to
Puzzanghera's driver's license, therefore, is irrelevant to our
analysis.
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accident to that alleged negligent failure to warn Puzzanghera
and properly supervise his treatment.
This claim derives from Puzzanghera's specific
medical treatment, which as we have indicated, falls outside
the protection of the discretionary function exception. See
Collazo, 850 F.2d at 3. We do not identify, nor does the
government point us to, any other statutory exception that
might bar this claim. In the absence of a statutory exception,
the FTCA imposes liability on the government for conduct of its
employees within the scope of their employment "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place" where the conduct occurred. 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b).
"To identify the applicable rule of substantive law,"
therefore, "the FTCA directs us to determine the substantive
law that would apply to 'a private individual under like
circumstances' in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred."
In re All Maine Asbestos Litig. , 772 F.2d 1023, 1027 (1st Cir.
1985) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153
(1963)); see Kelly, 924 F.2d at 359. We turn to the law of
Massachusetts, the situs state, to determine whether Magee can
hold the government liable in this case.
We agree with the district court that Magee failed to
provide evidence in the record from which a jury could have
found that the VA's treatment of Puzzanghera caused the
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accident. See Borden v. Betty Gibson Assoc., Inc. , 574 N.E.2d
1020, 1022 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (indicating that causation is
necessary to recovery for negligence). Magee points to the
Prolixin shot Puzzanghera received four hours prior to the
accident, the various side effects Puzzanghera experienced as
a result of the Prolixin, namely restlessness and difficulty
controlling his tongue, the police officer's notation that
Puzzanghera appeared slow and deliberate at the scene of the
accident, Magee's own impression of Puzzanghera at the scene,
and Puzzanghera's inability to remember the details of the
accident.
Magee does not, however, explain how any of these
pieces of evidence, either in isolation or in the aggregate,
would allow a jury to conclude that the VA's alleged negligent
treatment of Puzzanghera caused the accident. Nothing in the
record suggests, for example, that the restlessness or tongue
control side effects somehow caused Puzzanghera to drive into
Magee. Nor does the record offer a basis to conclude that the
police officer's characterization of Puzzanghera related to his
3. We note that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, S36B would appear to
bear on the question of whether VAMC had any duty to Magee.
Given that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not yet
construed S 36B and our own conclusion that the record fails to
support at least one essential element of negligence, we need
not determine the applicability of S 36B to this case.
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treatment at VAMC. In short, Magee lacks any evidence that
would allow a jury to base a conclusion as to causation on
anything other than speculation. See id. (indicating that a
recovery in negligence cannot be based on speculation as to
causation).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court's disposition of Magee's complaint.
Affirmed. Costs to Appellee.
4. Magee's expert, Dr. Catherine Larned, points to
Puzzanghera's medical records and notes that on one occasion
(June 12, 1990) Puzzanghera appeared "somewhat lethargic" at an
appointment, and that on another occasion (June 19, 1990)
Puzzanghera reported that a nap on his lunch break caused him
to return late to work. The record, however, in no way
supports even an inference that Puzzanghera was either
experiencing these indications at the time of the accident, or
that they were caused in any way by Puzzanghera's treatment at
VAMC.
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Document Info
Docket Number： 96-2357
Filed Date： 7/31/1997
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/3/2016