Roman, Emil v. INS ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-3510
    EMIL ROMAN and DOCHITA ROMAN,/1
    Petitioners,
    v.
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
    and JANET RENO, Attorney General of the
    United States,
    Respondents.
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigrations Appeals.
    Nos. A72 412 189, A21 365 054
    Argued August 9, 2000--Decided December 5, 2000
    Before POSNER, RIPPLE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Emil Roman and his wife
    Dochita are Romanian natives and citizens who
    seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
    ("BIA") decision to deny their application for
    asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act
    ("INA") sec. 208(a), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1158(a), and
    for withholding of deportation pursuant to INA
    sec. 243(h), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1253(h). Mr. Roman
    claims that he and his wife are unable to return
    to Romania because he has suffered, and will
    continue to suffer, political persecution from
    former members of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist
    regime who now hold positions of power in the new
    democratic government. For the reasons set forth
    in the following opinion, we affirm the decision
    of the BIA.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    A.  Facts
    Mr. Roman’s troubles began in 1963 as a high
    school student in Sibiu, Romania, when he refused
    to join the Youth Communist Union. He claims
    that, as a consequence, he "had no position" in
    the school even though he was one of the best
    students, and his application to college was
    initially rejected. R.61. He ultimately was
    admitted to "mechanic[s’]" college two hundred
    miles away in Bucharest, where he believed that
    he could more freely express his political
    opinions. R.62. One year later in 1968, Mr. Roman
    took part in a student demonstration against
    Ceausescu’s Communist regime. According to Mr.
    Roman, he was constantly under surveillance
    because of his participation in the
    demonstration.
    After college, Mr. Roman was hired by the
    government-owned Tarom Airlines as an aviation
    engineer. He worked at Tarom for twenty years
    until he left for the United States in 1992. Mr.
    Roman claims that every time he left the country
    for business, he was warned that, if he tried to
    apply for asylum, his possessions would be
    confiscated, his wife (a flight attendant at the
    same company) would be fired, and his daughter
    would be placed in an orphanage. The Securitate
    (secret police) questioned him hundreds of times,
    once for nine hours; however, he was never
    jailed. According to Mr. Roman, his wife Dochita
    had been married to a Securitate officer, and,
    after she divorced the officer, she "lost
    everything including her son." R.149. Mr. Roman
    also alleges that Dochita’s ex-husband informed
    the Securitate that her family had "subversive
    characteristics." Id.
    While at Tarom Airlines, Mr. Roman was asked to
    join the Communist Party many times, but always
    refused. As a result, he contends, he never was
    promoted. He claims that he never was fired,
    however, because he was highly qualified. About
    twice a year he would travel outside Romania for
    the company and, on one occasion, he was sent to
    the United States for training.
    Mr. Roman was in Nigeria on business when
    Ceausescu’s regime was overthrown in December
    1989. He returned to Romania in January of 1990
    and participated in demonstrations against the
    Communists who remained in power after the
    revolution. According to Mr. Roman, in September
    1991, he was beaten by three miners because, he
    suspects, of his political beliefs.
    At that time, Mr. Roman belonged to a group at
    Tarom that was attempting to privatize the
    company. The new leaders at Tarom told Mr. Roman
    that his efforts were futile, demoted him, and
    warned him that, if he did not mind his own
    business, he would have an "accident." R.72. Mr.
    Roman also was threatened over the telephone. In
    May 1992, he discovered that the tires of his car
    were punctured; one week later, the lug nuts on
    one wheel were loosened. Afterward, Mr. Roman
    received an anonymous phone call warning him that
    if he did not "shut up," he would have more
    serious problems. R.153. According to Viorica
    Seceleanu, a former Tarom flight attendant, Mr.
    Roman was considered a "troublemaker" at Tarom,
    although she did not know why. R.114-15.
    After the 1989 overthrow of Ceausescu’s
    Communist regime, there were no restrictions on
    Mr. Roman’s travel outside of Romania. Prior to
    his July 1992 arrival in the United States, he
    was permitted to travel to this country with his
    wife for vacation in December 1991 and again in
    April 1992. Mr. Roman decided to leave Romania
    for good when the "new Communists" (who were part
    of the old regime) came into power and threatened
    that, if he did not mind his own business, they
    would create a "file" for him and tell everyone
    that he was an "informer." R.84, 154. The
    Romanian government granted Mr. Roman an exit
    permit to leave the country.
    B.   Administrative Proceedings
    1.
    Mr. Roman and his wife entered the United States
    in July 1992 as nonimmigrant visitors authorized
    to stay in the country for six months. They
    remained in the country after the authorization
    period ended, and, on May 11, 1993, the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
    issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of
    Hearing charging the Romans with deportability
    under INA sec. 241 (a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. sec.
    1251(a)(1)(B) (1994). A deportation hearing was
    held on November 12, 1993, in which the Romans
    admitted that they overstayed their authorized
    visit and requested asylum, withholding of
    deportation, and, in the alternative, voluntary
    departure.
    Mr. Roman attached an eleven-page narrative
    statement to his asylum application detailing his
    claims of past persecution and his fears of
    reprisal should he return to Romania; he also
    submitted 75 published articles commenting on the
    repressive Ceausescu regime and the aftermath of
    the 1989 overthrow. On March 9, 1994, the
    immigration judge ("IJ") held an evidentiary
    hearing on the Romans’ application for asylum and
    withholding of deportation. The IJ’s demeanor at
    the hearing fairly could be described as brusque
    and impatient; the judge often criticized Mr.
    Roman’s counsel for not getting to the point
    quickly enough./2 Further, the IJ repeatedly
    interrupted counsel’s examination to ask
    questions of the witnesses.
    At the request of the IJ, the State Department’s
    Board of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
    ("BHRHA") issued an advisory opinion in January
    1994, observing that under the Ceausescu regime,
    Mr. Roman and his wife "prospered in terms of
    education, employment, and travel abroad" and
    that "[there] is no way that somebody repeatedly
    threatened and harassed as he claims would have
    been so successful [for] so long under
    Ceausescu." R.118. The BHRHA further noted that
    Mr. Roman’s account of persecution after the
    overthrow "comports badly with country
    conditions." Id. In a December 1993 country
    profile, the BHRHA opined that Romania has
    undergone fundamental changes since the overthrow
    of Ceausescu’s repressive Communist regime in
    1989. Although the country still struggles with
    the transition from a totalitarian and
    centralized state to a democracy with a free-
    market economy, civil liberties (i.e., freedom of
    speech, press, assembly, association, religion
    and travel) are respected. The BHRHA observed
    that anti-Communist sentiments cited by many
    asylum applicants now place them within the
    mainstream of political opinion. Although the
    BHRHA deemed the 1992 national elections a
    success, it noted that some Romanians are still
    suspicious of their leaders, many of whom held
    office under the previous regime. But the BHRHA
    opined that "current country conditions have so
    altered as to remove any presumption that past
    mistreatment under Ceausescu or in the chaotic
    first year after his overthrow will lead to
    mistreatment in the future. . . . Most Romanians
    have a difficult task in plausibly establishing
    that they would face severe and targetted [sic]
    mistreatment upon return to their country."
    R.120-21. The BHRHA also noted that a number of
    Romanians have abandoned refugee status and
    returned to Romania to claim property or arrange
    for relatives to join them in the United States.
    After considering Mr. Roman’s testimony as well
    as his narrative statement, the IJ denied the
    Romans’ application for asylum and withholding of
    deportation, finding that Mr. Roman’s claim was
    based "upon generalized statements, speculation,
    all of which are uncorroborated by any credible
    evidence." R.48. The IJ noted that Mr. Roman was
    never imprisoned in Romania, was not prevented
    from attending school or college, and was able to
    keep his job at a government-owned airline for
    twenty years until he left for the United States.
    The IJ then granted the Romans’ alternative
    request for voluntary departure on or before June
    9, 1994. The Romans appealed the IJ’s decision to
    the BIA.
    2.
    Over five years later in September 1999, the BIA
    rendered its decision dismissing the Romans’
    appeal. First, the BIA addressed the Romans’
    argument that the IJ limited their right to
    present their case, finding any alleged errors to
    be harmless because they did not identify any
    specific additional testimony that would likely
    change the result in the case. Nonetheless, the
    BIA did not adopt the analysis of the IJ, nor did
    the Board credit the opinion of the BHRHA as to
    Mr. Roman’s treatment prior to the 1989
    overthrow. Instead, the Board found credible Mr.
    Roman’s account of events before the revolution,
    observing that "it is not inconsistent with pre-
    1989 country conditions in Romania that a needed
    ’technocrat’ such as [Mr. Roman] would be subject
    to surveillance, threats, and harassment,
    particularly if he was seen as not following the
    Communist party line. . . . Clearly the
    management of the government owned airline for
    which [Mr. Roman] worked viewed him as not
    supporting the Communist Party philosophy." R.3.
    The BIA concluded, however, that such conduct did
    not rise to the level of persecution.
    Relying on the BHRHA’s December 1993 country
    profile, the BIA also found that the Romans
    failed to show a well-founded fear of future
    persecution, observing that the post-1989 changes
    in Romania were inconsistent with Mr. Roman’s
    perception that he may be harmed in the future if
    he returned. The BIA also deemed Ms. Seceleanu’s
    testimony unhelpful and the voluminous
    documentary evidence provided by Mr. Roman
    irrelevant to present country conditions. The
    Romans timely appealed the BIA’s denial of
    asylum.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, the Romans argue that (1) the IJ
    violated their due process rights at the
    deportation hearing by repeatedly interrupting
    Mr. Roman’s testimony and cutting off
    questioning; (2) the BIA violated their due
    process rights by failing to decide their appeal
    for more than five years; (3) the BIA erred in
    finding that Mr. Roman had not suffered past
    persecution; and (4) the BIA erred in finding
    that Mr. Roman had not established a well-founded
    fear of persecution.
    A.   Due Process Violations
    1.   Full and Fair Hearing
    The Romans first argue that the IJ denied their
    right to a full and fair deportation hearing by
    repeatedly interrupting Mr. Roman’s testimony and
    cutting off his counsel’s questioning. They cite
    Podio v. INS, 
    153 F.3d 506
    , 509-11 (7th Cir.
    1998), for the proposition that, in the past, the
    particular IJ who presided over their hearing has
    flouted asylum applicants’ due process rights.
    This court reviews de novo the BIA’s
    determination that the IJ did not violate due
    process. See 
    id. at 509
    .
    First, unlike in Podio, the IJ in this case
    allowed the Romans’ corroborating witness to
    testify. Cf. 
    id.
     (IJ refused to allow asylum
    applicant’s siblings to testify that Ukrainian
    police were looking for him.). Although the IJ
    did appear to curtail counsel’s examination of
    the witnesses (in a less-than-courteous manner),
    the judge’s interruptions and follow-up questions
    were apparently intended to focus the hearing
    more directly on Mr. Roman’s specific allegations
    of persecution. The IJ assured Mr. Roman at the
    hearing that he had read Mr. Roman’s eleven-page
    narrative statement and, in the decision, noted
    that Mr. Roman "testified and essentially
    reaffirmed the contents of this narrative" which
    he had "carefully read and considered," R.47.
    See, e.g., Iliev v. INS, 
    127 F.3d 638
    , 642-43
    (7th Cir. 1997) (possibly "brusque" conduct of IJ
    did not deny asylum applicant a fair trial based
    on lack of opportunity to fully present case).
    Moreover, Mr. Roman was permitted to testify
    about specific instances of mistreatment,
    including the problems he endured at Tarom even
    after the revolution. The IJ’s impatience with
    the Romans’ attorney does not suggest bias (he
    was equally brusque with the INS attorney), nor
    does it prove that the Romans were deprived of a
    fair hearing. See, e.g., Morales v. INS, 
    208 F.3d 323
    , 327-29 (1st Cir. 2000) (an alien’s right to
    fair hearing was not violated despite IJ’s
    impatience when alien was allowed to testify as
    to association with labor union and record did
    not indicate IJ ignored evidence); Mikhailevitch
    v. INS, 
    146 F.3d 384
    , 391-92 (6th Cir. 1998)
    (judge’s questioning of alien’s counsel was not
    intended to prevent alien from presenting
    evidence but to clarify time period and focus on
    alien’s situation).
    Second, to prevail on a due process claim, an
    asylum applicant must show prejudice. See
    Mojsilovic v. INS, 
    156 F.3d 743
    , 749 (7th Cir.
    1998). The Romans fail, however, to allege any
    testimony excluded by the IJ that, if admitted at
    a new hearing, would potentially affect the
    outcome of their case. See Shahandeh-Pey v. INS,
    
    831 F.2d 1384
    , 1389 (7th Cir. 1987) (alien must
    produce concrete evidence that violation of
    procedural protection actually had potential to
    affect outcome of deportation proceedings). Thus,
    their claim that the IJ violated due process is
    without merit.
    2.   Undue Delay
    Citing our decision in Batanic v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 662
     (7th Cir. 1993), the Romans argue that the
    BIA’s five-year delay in rendering its decision
    denied them due process and, as a consequence,
    they should be granted asylum retroactively to
    the date of their application. The Romans’
    reliance on Batanic is wholly misplaced. There,
    the petitioner was found deportable at a hearing
    in which he was denied the right to counsel. See
    
    id. at 663-64
    . The BIA provided Mr. Batanic a new
    hearing, but in the interim, Congress enacted an
    amendment to the INA that rendered Mr. Batanic
    ineligible for asylum. See 
    id. at 664
    . In
    reliance on the amendment, the IJ denied Mr.
    Batanic’s asylum application, and the BIA
    affirmed. See 
    id.
     On appeal, we noted that a
    procedural defect, such as the denial of the
    right to counsel, is generally cured by holding a
    new hearing in which the defect is not present
    (i.e. with the assistance of counsel). See 
    id. at 667
    . However, where the procedural defect has
    also resulted in the loss of an opportunity for
    statutory relief, we observed that a new hearing
    alone cannot cure the defect. See 
    id.
     The delay
    caused by the procedural defect in Mr. Batanic’s
    case operated to deprive him of his statutory
    right to apply for asylum. See 
    id.
     As a result,
    we allowed Mr. Batanic to apply for asylum nunc
    pro tunc to the time of his initial hearing. See
    
    id. at 668
    .
    By contrast, in this case, "there was no
    evidence that a procedural defect worked to
    deprive [the Romans] of a specific statutory
    right." Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 
    222 F.3d 417
    , 427
    (7th Cir. 2000). The Romans’ argument that they
    would have been granted asylum had the BIA
    rendered its decision earlier is no more than
    mere speculation. See 
    id.
     Mr. Batanic, in
    comparison, was unequivocally barred from seeking
    asylum because of an intervening amendment to the
    statute. Thus, the Romans have failed to show a
    denial of due process comparable to that in
    Batanic.
    The Romans also appear to argue that had the BIA
    timely adjudicated their appeal, it would have
    granted them asylum in view of this court’s
    opinion in Borca v. United States, 
    77 F.3d 210
    (7th Cir. 1996). In Borca, this court reversed
    the BIA’s asylum determination because it had
    employed the wrong standard. The Romans do not
    assert, however, that the BIA reviewed their case
    under an improper standard; they simply contend
    that the BIA erred in crediting the 1993 State
    Department report over Mr. Roman’s own account of
    his fears of reprisal. Thus, Borca also does not
    help the Romans.
    We are troubled, however, by the BIA’s prolonged
    and unexplained delay, as we are faced with the
    predicament of reviewing a decision that may be
    based on information that is now outdated and
    obsolete. But because the Romans do not contend
    that this is the case, we fail to discern any
    prejudice from the delay.
    B.   Asylum
    To qualify for asylum, Mr. Roman must show that
    he is a refugee, or a person who is "unable or
    unwilling" to return to his native country
    because of "persecution or a well-founded fear of
    persecution on account of race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. sec.
    1101(a)(42)(A). To meet his burden of
    establishing the requisite fear of persecution,
    an asylum applicant "must present specific facts
    demonstrating that he has actually been the
    victim or [sic] persecution or has good reason to
    believe that he will be singled out for
    persecution." Petrovic v. INS, 
    198 F.3d 1034
    ,
    1037 (7th Cir. 2000). Our review of the BIA’s
    determination of asylum eligibility is
    deferential; we shall reverse only if the record
    lacks substantial evidence to support the BIA’s
    factual conclusions. See Sofinet v. INS, 
    196 F.3d 742
    , 746 (7th Cir. 1999).
    1.   Past Persecution
    Although there is no statutory definition of
    "persecution," we have described it as
    "punishment or the infliction of harm for
    political, religious, or other reasons that this
    country does not recognize as legitimate." See
    
    id.
     (quoting Mitev v. INS, 
    67 F.3d 1325
    , 1330
    (7th Cir. 1995)). The alleged conduct need not
    threaten the asylum applicant’s life or freedom,
    but it must rise above mere harassment to
    constitute persecution. 
    Id.
     Here, Mr. Roman
    argues that the constant surveillance, threats,
    and beatings, as well as the sabotaging of his
    car and his demotion at Tarom, compel a finding
    that he was persecuted on account of his
    political beliefs./3 The BIA deemed Mr. Roman’s
    account believable but concluded that such
    conduct did not rise to the level of persecution.
    Our difficulty with the BIA’s finding as to
    persecution is that it only appears to address
    events that occurred before the 1989 revolution;
    the decision ignores Mr. Roman’s allegations of
    more serious mistreatment that occurred after
    Ceausescu’s overthrow. See Dobrota v. INS, 
    195 F.3d 970
    , 974 (7th Cir. 1999) (BIA failed to
    consider submissions detailing unchanged
    political situation despite fall of Ceausescu);
    Hengan v. INS, 
    79 F.3d 60
    , 63 (7th Cir. 1996) (IJ
    neglected to fully consider Romanian asylum
    applicant’s mistreatment after Ceausescu’s
    overthrow). Two incidents in particular were
    never discussed: the September 1991 beating and
    the tampering with Mr. Roman’s car in May 1992.
    Although we conclude that substantial evidence
    supports the BIA’s determination that Mr. Roman’s
    account of surveillance, threats and harassment
    prior to Ceausescu’s overthrow did not amount to
    persecution, we cannot discern whether the BIA
    found that the post-1989 events likewise did not
    constitute persecution.
    As to the first incident, Mr. Roman alleged that
    he was attacked by three miners visiting
    Bucharest because (as he originally thought) he
    was wearing "Western" clothes; he "later came to
    believe that the real reason was political."
    R.153. Although a finding of persecution does not
    require that the government actually perpetrate
    or incite the attack, an applicant must show that
    the government "condoned it or at least
    demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect
    the victims." Galina v. INS, 
    213 F.3d 955
    , 958
    (7th Cir. 2000). The record here, however, does
    not support a conclusion that Mr. Roman’s beating
    was orchestrated or allowed by the government.
    Although the articles Mr. Roman submitted with
    his asylum application suggest that in June 1990,
    miners from the western part of the country came
    to Bucharest at the behest of then-president Ion
    Iliescu to violently subdue the pro-democracy
    demonstrations, the record also indicates that
    when the miners returned to Bucharest in
    September 1991, they were there to protest
    Iliescu’s democratic reforms and the steep
    economic downturn they believed the reforms had
    spawned.
    The second incident is more troubling. Mr. Roman
    alleges that after Ceausescu’s overthrow, he
    became a member of a group at Tarom Airlines who
    sought to reform the company toward
    democratization. This apparently angered the new
    management (who wanted to keep the Communist
    system intact), and, as a result, Mr. Roman
    claims that he was subjected to repeated threats
    and harassment. In May 1992, Mr. Roman contends
    that his tires were punctured in the Tarom
    parking lot and, one week later, the lug nuts
    were loosened. Afterward, Mr. Roman received an
    anonymous phone call warning him that if he did
    not "shut up," he would have more serious
    problems. R.153.
    Although these actions appear to rise above
    "mere harassment," because the perpetrators
    attempted to follow through on their threats,/4
    their connection to the government is unclear.
    See Nenadovic v. INS, 
    108 F.3d 124
    , 129 (7th Cir.
    1997) (threats by manager at armaments plant,
    where the connection to government was unclear,
    did not amount to persecution); Mitev, 
    67 F.3d at 1330-31
     (threats by coworkers as a result of
    applicant’s anti-communist activism did not
    amount to persecution). Nor is there any
    indication that Mr. Roman reported the tampering
    with his car to the police or requested
    protection and, if so, whether that effort was in
    vain. Cf. Hengan, 
    79 F.3d at 63-64
     (persecution
    found where applicant, a Romanian of Hungarian
    descent, received repeated, personal threats and
    authorities did nothing to protect her but
    instead began interrogating her weekly). Mr.
    Roman bears the burden of presenting specific
    facts to show he was persecuted, notably, that
    the government orchestrated, or at least
    sanctioned, the tampering with his car. See
    Petrovic, 
    198 F.3d at 1037
    . Because Mr. Roman has
    not come forward with such evidence, we cannot
    fault the BIA for concluding that Mr. Roman did
    not suffer past persecution.
    2.   Fear of Future Persecution
    Although Romania is now a democracy, Mr. Roman
    insists that the country is run by former
    Communists. At the time of the asylum hearing,
    the elected president of Romania was Ion Iliescu,
    a former Communist who is now a member of the
    Social Democratic Party./5 Mr. Roman believes
    that, if he returns to Romania, he will be
    arrested and interrogated because he would be
    considered a "betrayer" for leaving the country.
    R.87. Further, former Securitate officers who
    previously had threatened him during the old
    regime, and who now occupy high positions in the
    government and at Tarom Airlines, might try to
    harm him because he was fighting for freedom. The
    BIA concluded, however, that "post-1989 changes
    in Romania are inconsistent with [Mr. Roman’s]
    perception that he may be harmed in the future
    upon return to Romania." R.4. The record before
    us does not compel a contrary finding.
    To establish a well-founded fear of future
    persecution, an asylum applicant must show both
    that the fear is genuine and that a reasonable
    person in his circumstances would fear
    persecution. See Asani v. INS, 
    154 F.3d 719
    , 724
    (7th Cir. 1998). First, as discussed above, many
    of the past incidents identified by Mr. Roman do
    not rise to the level of persecution under the
    statute and, thus, cannot form the basis for a
    well-founded fear of persecution. See Tamas-
    Mercea, 
    222 F.3d at 426-27
    . Further, the 1993
    State Department report belies Mr. Roman’s
    contention that former members of the Communist
    Party would harm him because of his past
    political activities. To the contrary, the report
    states that "Romania has been profoundly
    transformed since the overthrow of . . .
    Ceausescu in 1989," R.119, and that "[a]nti-
    communist sentiments cited by many applicants
    place them now well within the democratic
    mainstream of political opinion and activity,"
    R.120. The report also notes that a new law
    governing the Romanian Intelligence Service
    ("heir to the justly-hated Securitate") has
    "established parliamentary oversight over that
    organization and prohibits the hiring of most
    former Securitate officers." 
    Id.
     Further, the old
    Securitate files are to be archived for 40 years,
    after which they are to be made public. The
    report concludes that "current country conditions
    have so altered as to remove any presumption that
    past mistreatment under Ceausescu or the chaotic
    first year after his overthrow will lead to
    mistreatment in the future." R.120-21.
    We recently have reminded the BIA that it should
    treat the State Department’s country report "with
    a healthy skepticism, rather than, as is its
    tendency, as Holy Writ." Galina, 
    213 F.3d at 959
    .
    Mr. Roman, however, has failed to identify any
    highly credible source of expert knowledge to
    contradict the State Department’s evaluation of
    the likelihood of persecution if he is forced to
    return to Romania. See Vaduva v. INS, 
    131 F.3d 689
    , 691 (7th Cir. 1997). All of the articles Mr.
    Roman includes in the record predate the State
    Department report, most by at least two years. We
    have no reason to believe that conditions in
    Romania have worsened since the State Department
    issued its report in 1993, nor does Mr. Roman
    suggest that the BIA’s decision was based on
    outdated information./6 See Tamas-Mercea, 
    222 F.3d at 425
     (asylum applicant did not meet burden
    of showing well-founded fear of persecution
    should he be returned to Romania, where country
    profile indicated new intelligence organization
    did not have inclination or resources to pursue
    same type of surveillance as Securitate); Vaduva,
    
    131 F.3d at 690-92
     (asylum applicant lacked well-
    founded fear of persecution when he failed to
    rebut 1995 State Department Report citing
    profound changes in Romania since the overthrow
    of Ceausescu). Therefore, we believe there is
    substantial evidence to support the BIA’s finding
    that Mr. Roman failed to show a well-founded fear
    of persecution./7
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
    review is denied, and the decision of the BIA is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    /1 On October 4, 2000, we granted the petitioners’
    motion to dismiss the appeal only as to the
    Romans’ daughter, Diana.
    /2 For example, the IJ commented, "Just tell, have
    him testify as to what actions he took. Period.
    I’m not interested in his philosophy. Okay?"
    R.59; "Come on, Mr. Geman. Now, let’s get down to
    the claim. I don’t care about his family history.
    I’ve got your claim here. I’ve read. Now, stick
    to this claim." R.64; "Now Mr. Geman, I’m going
    to tell you one final time. You’ve got your
    package here with his story, with his claim and
    its all set out in narrative form. All right?
    Now, let’s get on with it." R.67.
    /3 Mr. Roman also argues that his wife has been
    subject to persecution following her divorce from
    a Securitate officer, when she lost everything
    including her son. The record, however, contains
    no evidence indicating a nexus between this
    occurrence and her political opinions, thereby
    making a finding of persecution based on these
    events inappropriate. See Sofinet, 
    196 F.3d at 747
     (upholding BIA’s denial of asylum in part
    because there was no nexus between employer’s
    reprimands and applicant’s status as Seventh Day
    Adventist).
    /4 See Galina, 
    213 F.3d at 957
     (after receiving
    threats, phone call linked attack on asylum
    applicant’s daughter to applicant’s discovery of
    employer’s list of prospective deportees); Boykov
    v. INS, 
    109 F.3d 413
    , 416 (7th Cir. 1997)
    (threats of immediate and menacing nature may, in
    some circumstances, constitute past persecution).
    /5 Iliescu was since defeated in a 1996 election.
    /6 There is no indication that Mr. Roman moved to
    reopen the case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. sec. 3.2 to
    supplement the record with more current
    information on conditions in Romania. See
    Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 
    933 F.2d 588
    , 597 (7th Cir.
    1991).
    /7 Last, Mr. Roman argues that the BIA erred in
    denying his request for withholding of
    deportation. The standard for withholding of
    deportation, however, is even more stringent than
    the standard for asylum. See Dobrican v. INS, 
    77 F.3d 164
    , 168 (7th Cir. 1996) (alien must
    establish "clear probability" of persecution).
    Since the BIA’s decision that Mr. Roman failed to
    demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution is
    supported by substantial evidence, its
    determination that he failed to establish a
    "clear probability" of persecution is likewise
    supported by the evidence.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-3510

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 12/5/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (20)

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Ivan Batanic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 12 F.3d 662 ( 1993 )

Jenica Borca v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 77 F.3d 210 ( 1996 )

Anguel Iliev and Elena Iliev v. Immigration and ... , 127 F.3d 638 ( 1997 )

Sever Vaduva v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 131 F.3d 689 ( 1997 )

Zoran Nenadovic and Biljana Nenadovic v. Immigration and ... , 108 F.3d 124 ( 1997 )

Sefadin Asani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 154 F.3d 719 ( 1998 )

Petar Mojsilovic, Anka Mojsilovic, Jelena Mojsilovic v. ... , 156 F.3d 743 ( 1998 )

Vasile Dobrican v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 77 F.3d 164 ( 1996 )

Valentin Boykov and Krassimira Boykova v. Immigration and ... , 109 F.3d 413 ( 1997 )

Mariusz Kaczmarczyk v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 933 F.2d 588 ( 1991 )

Vladimir Podio v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 153 F.3d 506 ( 1998 )

Nikola Mitev v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 67 F.3d 1325 ( 1995 )

Ioan Sofinet v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 196 F.3d 742 ( 1999 )

Dragan Petrovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 198 F.3d 1034 ( 2000 )

Teodor Tamas-Mercea v. Janet Reno and the Immigration and ... , 222 F.3d 417 ( 2000 )

Abdul Hamid Shahandeh-Pey v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 831 F.2d 1384 ( 1987 )

Ana Maria Hengan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 79 F.3d 60 ( 1996 )

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