Com. v. Harris, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S64010-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STEVEN LESLIE HARRIS
    Appellant                 No. 3334 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered July 22, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003632-2014
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STEVEN LESLIE HARRIS
    Appellant                 No. 3335 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 22, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003633-2014
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2016
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S64010-16
    Appellant, Steven Leslie Harris, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed on July 22, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    following his conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”), possession of
    a small amount of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated
    assault upon a police officer, and resisting arrest.1 Appellant contends the
    trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, in limiting evidence
    relating to his mental treatment and behavior, and in instructing the jury
    regarding Appellant’s mental status. Following review, we affirm.
    In its May 15, 2015 order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress and
    in its December 17, 2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court provided
    detailed factual and procedural histories of this case. We incorporate those
    histories herein as if fully set forth. Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1 n. 2
    (pp. 1-2)2 and Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 1-3. Briefly, on August
    30, 2014 at approximately 12:44 a.m., Pennsylvania State Trooper Lori
    Edgar (“Trooper Edgar”) was on DUI roving patrol in full uniform but in an
    unmarked car in Chester County, when she observed Appellant operating his
    vehicle slowly.     She followed Appellant’s vehicle and engaged her mobile
    vehicle recordings (“MVR”) system for approximately a mile and one-half.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1); 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(31) and § 780-
    113(a)(32); and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3) and § 5104.
    2
    Footnote 2 of the May 15, 2015 order begins on the first page of the order
    and spans seven pages.
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    Based on her training and her observations of Appellant’s vehicle, Trooper
    Edgar concluded the operator of the vehicle might be under the influence of
    alcohol or a controlled substance.        Believing further investigation was
    warranted, she activated her lights and sirens to initiate a traffic stop.
    The traffic stop was conducted near an intersection in West Bradford
    Township.     Trooper    Edgar   asked   Appellant   for    his   driver’s   license,
    registration and insurance card.      When Appellant failed to produce the
    registration, Trooper Edgar advised Appellant that she believed he was
    smoking marijuana in the vehicle. When Trooper Edgar instructed Appellant
    to exit the vehicle, he instead rolled up his window and locked the doors.
    A second trooper arrived on the scene but Appellant also ignored the
    second trooper’s direction to exit the vehicle. Eventually, Appellant unlocked
    the doors and was assisted in exiting his vehicle.         He then became more
    uncooperative and combative.        When he began wrestling with Trooper
    Edgar, the second trooper tased Appellant. Appellant yelled for the trooper
    to tase him again and attempted to strike the trooper in the face.               The
    trooper did tase Appellant again and Appellant was taken into custody. He
    was charged with DUI and related offenses under one docket number and
    with aggravated assault and related offenses under a separate docket
    number. The two cases were consolidated before the trial court and before
    this Court.
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    After his preliminary hearing and waiver of arraignment, Appellant
    filed a motion to suppress, claiming the vehicle stop and vehicle search, as
    well as the search of his person, were unlawful for lack of warrant and lack
    of probable cause. Motion to Suppress, 2/2/15, at 1-2.
    At the suppression hearing conducted on April 16, 2015, Trooper
    Edgar testified as to the events occurring before and after the traffic stop.
    The video from the MVR system was shown during the hearing.          The trial
    court denied the motion to suppress by order dated May 15, 2015. The case
    proceeded to trial on June 2, 2015, with a jury returning a guilty verdict on
    all charges.     On July 22, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate
    sentence of three months and three days to 18 months in county prison,
    followed by four years and thirty days of probation.           The trial court
    subsequently modified the sentence to allow Appellant to participate in the
    prison’s re-entry and work release programs at the warden’s discretion. This
    timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925.
    Appellant now asks this Court to consider three questions:
    1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to
    Suppress where the contemporaneous video recording of
    [Appellant’s] driving clearly establishes that police had no
    authority or justification to stop his vehicle?
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in limiting and
    excluding evidence regarding [Appellant’s] mental status and
    behavior, when [Appellant’s] intent was central to the
    resolution of the case, and when he and his mother had long,
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    relevant experience with the effects of his autism spectrum
    disorder?
    3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its instruction to the
    jury regarding consideration of [Appellant’s] mental status
    and intent, where that specific intent was the crux of the
    issue to be resolved by the jury?
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    In his first issue, Appellant asserts trial court error for denying his
    motion to suppress. This Court has recognized:
    An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
    to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
    whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported
    by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
    those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed
    before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
    of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
    the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual
    findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is
    bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal
    conclusions are erroneous.
    Commonwealth v. (Patrick Scott) Jones, 
    121 A.3d 524
    , 526 (Pa. Super.
    2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. (Curtis) Jones, 
    988 A.2d 649
    , 654 (Pa. 2010)).
    Appellant contends the video recording established that the officer
    lacked authority or justification for stopping his vehicle based on his driving.
    In its order denying suppression, the trial court stated:
    Trooper Edgar testified that she . . . observed [Appellant’s]
    vehicle sitting at the stop sign for approximately 45 seconds
    before proceeding through the intersection at three to five miles
    per hour.
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    J-S64010-16
    Having observed [Appellant’s] vehicle traveling at an
    unreasonably slow speed in the early morning hours, Trooper
    Edgar turned her unmarked patrol vehicle around and activated
    the MVR system. Given the slow rate of speed of [Appellant’s]
    vehicle, Trooper Edgar was easily able to catch up to it. As
    [Appellant’s] vehicle approached the town of Marshallton,
    Trooper Edgar observed it weaving within the lane of traffic,
    braking, and failing to maintain a constant speed. Based on the
    trooper’s training and experience, she believed this conduct was
    indicative of an impaired operator warranting further
    investigation. After continuing to follow [Appellant’s] vehicle for
    approximately a mile and [a] half, Trooper Edgar activated her
    lights and siren to initiate a vehicle stop.      Although Trooper
    Edgar stated on her police radio that she was conducting a
    routine traffic stop, she testified that she stopped [Appellant’s]
    vehicle for the sole purpose of investigating whether he was
    impaired. The vehicle stop was initiated for suspected DUI and
    may have led to further incriminating evidence such as an odor
    of alcohol/drugs, glassy/blood-shot eyes, or slurred speech.
    Because the trooper neither observed [Appellant] commit a
    violation of the Motor Vehicle Code nor stopped the vehicle for
    any such violation, probable cause was not required to initiate
    the stop.      Rather, Trooper Edgar articulated specific facts
    establishing that she stopped [Appellant’s] vehicle for suspicion
    of DUI.      The trooper objectively pointed to specific and
    articulable facts leading to a suspicion of criminal activity.
    Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1, n. 2 (pp. 4-5).
    Our review confirms that the trial court’s factual findings are supported
    by the record.    Appellant’s assertions that Trooper Edgar was following
    Appellant’s car at a distance less than the driver’s manual “four second rule”
    or that Appellant’s braking was appropriate in response to caution signs do
    not change our conclusion. Appellant specifically challenges a statement by
    the trial court that “no warning signs existed on the bridge where [Appellant]
    displayed the aforementioned behavior.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. However,
    Appellant acknowledges that the 15 mph sign in question is not on the
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    J-S64010-16
    bridge but rather before the bridge. Id. at 28. The additional sign on the
    bridge designated a curve in the road. See id. at 29.
    We recognize, as did both the trial court and Trooper Edgar, that there
    were signs along the roadway that would appropriately prompt a driver to
    apply brakes to decrease speed. However, that does not account for all of
    the braking or general slow travel or for the weaving with his lane of travel.
    We agree with the trial court’s determination that Trooper Edgar’s testimony
    was credible and that “when viewed objectively through the eyes of a
    trained police office, the totality of [Appellant’s] behavior establishes
    suspicion of DUI. A trained and experienced officer could reasonably infer
    that based on the time of day coupled with his erratic driving that
    [Appellant] may be operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated.”          Trial
    Court Order, 5/15/15 at 1 n.2 (p. 5) (citing Commonwealth v. Holmes, 
    14 A.3d 89
     (Pa. 2011) (citations to notes of testimony and exhibit omitted).
    Because we conclude that the suppression court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, we are bound by those findings.            Further, we
    discern no error in the court’s legal conclusions, which we adopt and
    incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1 n.2
    (pp. 2-5). Appellant’s first issue fails.
    In his second issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its
    discretion by limiting and excluding evidence regarding Appellant’s mental
    treatment, status and behavior.             Appellant argues that preclusion of
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    evidence of his autism spectrum disorder rendered him incapable of proving
    his lack of criminal intent. As a challenge to the admissibility of evidence,
    our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Braun v. Target Corp., 
    983 A.2d 752
    , 760 (Pa. Super. 2009). As this Court reiterated in Braun,
    Pennsylvania trial judges enjoy broad discretion regarding the
    admissibility of potentially misleading and confusing evidence.
    Relevance is a threshold consideration in determining the
    admissibility of evidence. A trial court may, however, properly
    exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Generally, for the
    purposes of this evidentiary rule, prejudice means an undue
    tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. The
    erroneous admission of harmful or prejudicial evidence
    constitutes reversible error.
    
    Id.
     (citations and brackets omitted).
    As the trial court explained, Appellant was allowed to testify at trial
    about his status and behavior.      Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15 at 5-6
    (quoting Notes of Testimony, 6/3/15, at 143-44).       However, limiting that
    testimony and excluding testimony of Appellant’s mother relating to an
    autism spectrum disorder was warranted under the circumstances. As the
    trial court explained, Appellant did not provide the requisite notice of intent
    to offer a mental health defense. 
    Id.
     at 6 (citing R.Crim.P. 568). We find
    no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning, which we adopt and
    incorporate herein by reference. See id. at 4-8. Appellant’s second issue
    does not provide any basis for relief.
    -8-
    J-S64010-16
    In his third issue, Appellant asserts trial court error stemming from the
    instruction delivered in response to a question posed by the jury in the
    course of its deliberations. As the trial court explained:
    During deliberation, the [c]ourt received several written
    questions from the jury, one of which stated as follows: “The
    defense started with a direction of prior mental health issues.
    The questioning stopped, but the jury was not instructed to
    consider or not consider the information.” (N.T., 6/4/15, at 38;
    Court Ex. 1). Before responding to the jury’s question, the
    [c]ourt called counsel to the courtroom and discussed it with
    them and obtained their respective positions regarding how the
    jury would be instructed.
    Because the evidence introduced in this case did not support a
    mental health defense[,] the [c]ourt returned the jurors to the
    courtroom and instructed them as follows: “There is no mental
    health diagnosis in the record. You are to consider all of the
    facts of record when deliberating on a verdict on any of the
    charges brought against [Appellant.]” (Id. at 54.)
    Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 8-9.
    Our standard of review in assessing a trial court’s jury
    instructions is as follows:
    [W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this
    Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not
    simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions
    were improper. We further note that, it is an
    unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a
    trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions,
    and may choose its own wording so long as the law is
    clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury
    for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of
    discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there
    reversible error.
    Commonwealth v. Trippett, 
    932 A.2d 188
    , 200 (Pa. Super.
    2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kerrigan, 
    920 A.2d 190
    ,
    198 (Pa. Super. 2007)).
    -9-
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    Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 754 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    We agree with the trial court that the instructions as a whole, including
    its response to the jury’s inquiry, were proper.        Again, as the trial court
    recognized, there was no mental health diagnosis for the jury to consider.3
    We find no abuse of discretion or inaccurate statement of law in the
    instructions. We adopt, and incorporate herein by reference, the trial court’s
    thorough discussion of this issue. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 8-10.
    Appellant’s third issue lacks merit.
    Judgment affirmed.        In the event of further proceedings, the parties
    shall attach to their filings copies of the trial court’s May 15, 2015 Order and
    its December 17, 2015 Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/15/2016
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The court acknowledged that Appellant’s mental health status was properly
    considered for sentencing. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 9-10.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 3334 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 11/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/16/2016