4747 Mann, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 2011 Ohio 2593 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as 4747 Mann, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    2011-Ohio-2593
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 95596
    4747 MANN, LLC
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF
    REVISION, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Administrative Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-569963
    BEFORE: Stewart, P.J., Sweeney, J., and Keough, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 26, 2011
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Charles J. Pawlukiewicz
    Christina E. Niro
    McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A.
    101 West Prospect Avenue, Suite 1800
    Cleveland, OH 44115-1088
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION, ET
    AL.
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Saundra J. Curtis-Patrick
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
    BOARD OF EDUCATION
    David A. Rose
    David H. Seed
    Jennifer A. Hoehnen
    Brindza, McIntyre & Seed, LLP
    111 Superior Avenue, Suite 1025
    Cleveland, OH 44114
    MELODY J. STEWART, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} Appellant-landowner,    4747   Mann,   LLC,    appeals   from   the
    dismissal of its administrative appeal of a land valuation issued by the
    Cuyahoga County Board of Revision.        The board rejected 4747 Mann’s
    complaint for a reappraisal of its property, finding the market value of the
    property to be unchanged from the original appraisal. 4747 Mann appealed
    to the court of common pleas, but the court dismissed the appeal on two
    grounds: (1) that 4747 Mann failed to name the county auditor as a party to
    the appeal and (2) that 4747 Mann’s complaint to the board had been signed
    by a non-attorney.
    {¶ 2} R.C. 5717.05 states that “an appeal from the decision of a county
    board of revision may be taken directly to the court of common pleas of the
    county by the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be
    listed for taxation” and that “[t]he county auditor and all parties to the
    proceeding before the board, other than the appellant filing the appeal in the
    court, shall be made appellees, and notice of the appeal shall be served upon
    them by certified mail unless waived.”
    {¶ 3} The jurisdiction of the common pleas court is fixed by statute.
    Mattone v. Argentina (1931), 
    123 Ohio St. 393
    , 397,
    175 N.E. 603
    . See, also,
    Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution (“The courts of common pleas
    and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
    matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers
    and agencies as may be provided by law.”). When the right to appeal to the
    court of common pleas is conferred by statute, “[t]he exercise of the right
    conferred is conditioned upon compliance with the accompanying mandatory
    requirements.” Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp. (1949), 
    151 Ohio St. 123
    , 
    84 N.E.2d 746
    , paragraph one of the syllabus. In Huber Hts. Circuit Courts Ltd.
    v. Carne, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 306
    , 308, 
    1996-Ohio-157
    , 
    658 N.E.2d 744
    , the
    supreme court held that the requirements of R.C. 5717.05 are “mandatory
    and jurisdictional.” Id. at 307.
    {¶ 4} 4747 Mann concedes that its notice of appeal to the court of
    common pleas failed to name the county auditor as party.            It tries to
    distinguish Huber Hts., however, arguing that unlike the appellants in that
    case who both failed to name the correct party and serve notice to that party,
    the present case involves only the failure to name the auditor – 4747 Mann
    did serve the auditor with notice of appeal by certified mail. By serving the
    auditor with the notice of appeal, 4747 Mann argues that it complied with the
    spirit of the statute because the auditor had notice of the pending appeal.
    {¶ 5} The supreme court impliedly rejected this argument in Olympic
    Steel, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 1242
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-4091
    , 
    852 N.E.2d 178
    , stating that the “mandatory and
    jurisdictional” language used in R.C. 5717.05 and addressed in Huber Hts.
    applied to “the requirement of joinder and service[.]” Id. at ¶2 (emphasis
    added).   By stating joinder and service in the conjunctive, Olympic Steel
    confirmed that these were separate statutory requirements, both of which
    were mandatory and jurisdictional.
    {¶ 6} Olympic Steel is consistent with a long line of cases that require
    strict compliance with statutorily-granted rights of appeal in administrative
    law cases.   See, e.g., Austin Co. v. Cuyahoga Bd. of Revision (1989), 
    46 Ohio St.3d 192
    , 193, 
    546 N.E.2d 404
     (actual notice insufficient substitute to satisfy
    appeal notice requirements); Clippard Instrument Lab., Inc. v. Lindley (1977),
    
    50 Ohio St.2d 121
    , 122, 
    363 N.E.2d 592
     (letter an insufficient substitute for
    statutorily required copy of a notice of appeal); Salem Med. Arts & Dev. v.
    Columbiana Cty., 
    80 Ohio St.3d 621
    , 
    1998-Ohio-657
    , 
    687 N.E.2d 746
     (delivery
    of a copy of a notice of appeal to an assistant prosecutor with whom the
    taxpayer had been negotiating a settlement did not satisfy the R.C. 5717.01
    requirement that an appellant must file a copy of its notice of appeal from a
    Board of Revision with the Board of Revision).
    {¶ 7} 4747 Mann cites to decisions suggesting that the need for strict
    compliance with the notice requirements of a statute authorizing an appeal
    from an administrative decision arises only when “notice goes to the very core
    of procedural efficiency.” Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 591
    , 596, 
    1988-Ohio-179
    , 
    687 N.E.2d 723
    . But those
    decisions do not address the type of jurisdictional component omitted in this
    case — the failure to join a party. The courts have, for example, cautioned
    that liberality in construing App.R. 3(A) procedural defects should not be
    applied to administrative appeals that set forth specific jurisdictional
    limitations: “Of critical importance is the fact that the defect in the present
    case [attaching an opinion to a notice of appeal rather than a judgment entry]
    does not involve an administrative appeal:         administrative appeals are
    authorized by statutes that set forth the conditions for the exercise of judicial
    authority, and those conditions call for strict compliance.” See State ex rel.
    Arcadia Acres v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 
    123 Ohio St.3d 54
    ,
    
    2009-Ohio-4176
    , 
    914 N.E.2d 170
    , ¶12. See, also, Hafiz v. Levin, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 447
    , 
    2008-Ohio-6788
    , 
    900 N.E.2d 181
    , ¶8.
    {¶ 8} It is uncontested that 4747 Mann failed to name the auditor as a
    party in its notice of appeal. This was a jurisdictional failure of joinder, thus
    depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. George
    Whalley Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 21, 1984), 8th Dist. Nos.
    47890 and 47984. Our holding necessarily moots any consideration of the
    second assignment of error:     whether 4747 Mann’s complaint was invalid
    because it was signed by a non-attorney. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
    {¶ 9} Finally, we reject 4747 Mann’s complaint that the case should be
    remanded because the board failed to serve the named corporate
    representative with notice of its decision as required by R.C. 5715.20(A).
    That section states that whenever the board issues a decision, it “shall certify
    its action by certified mail to the person in whose name the property is listed
    or sought to be listed and to the complainant if the complainant is not the
    person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed.”
    Assuming without deciding that R.C. 5715.20(A) is jurisdictional, the statute
    falls within that limited class of jurisdictional defects that may be waived
    under certain circumstances. Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 493
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4641
    , 
    873 N.E.2d 298
    , at ¶7. R.C.
    5715.20(A) only requires the board to send notice of its decision by certified
    mail to “an address that is reasonably calculated to give notice to the owner.”
    Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 349
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-249
    , 
    922 N.E.2d 209
    , ¶18. The board issued notice to the attorney
    who represented 4747 Mann in proceedings before the board. In Meadows
    Dev., the court found this sufficient compliance with R.C. 5715.20(A), stating
    that issuing notice to the owner’s attorney is reasonable when the attorney
    has actively represented the owner at proceedings before the board, and
    noting that “sending the [board of review] decision to the attorney generally
    constitutes the best practice for the [board of review] to follow.” Id. at ¶21.
    4747 Mann plainly had notice of the board’s decision as shown by its timely
    appeal to the court of common pleas, so its failure to raise this issue to the
    court constituted a forfeiture of the right to raise it in an appeal to this court.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
    County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR