Cox, Ralph M. v. Zale Delaware Inc ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-4239
    Ralph M. Cox, on behalf of himself
    and others similarly situated,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Zale Delaware, Inc.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 99 C 1670--Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
    Argued September 12, 2000--Decided February 8, 2001
    Before Posner, Coffey, and Manion, Circuit Judges.
    Posner, Circuit Judge. A large class-action suit
    has grown out of a tiny acorn of a dispute. In
    1993 Ralph Cox filed a voluntary petition for
    bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
    Code. In the list of debts that he submitted to
    the bankruptcy court he listed a debt to Zale,
    from which he had bought (on credit) a ring in
    which Zale retained a security interest. About a
    month after the submission of the list of debts
    he signed an agreement with Zale reaffirming the
    debt and agreeing to pay the unpaid balance of
    $218.93 at the rate of $15 a month. The next
    month the bankruptcy proceeding wound up with an
    order discharging Cox from all his listed debts--
    including the debt to Zale, because the
    reaffirmation agreement had not been filed with
    the bankruptcy court.
    The failure to file had an additional
    significance besides preventing the court from
    learning of the agreement and so deleting the
    debt to Zale from the list of discharged debts.
    Section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
    that an agreement reaffirming a dischargeable
    debt "is enforceable only if . . . such agreement
    has been filed with the court." 11 U.S.C. sec.
    524(c)(3). The purpose is to help assure that the
    agreement is voluntary on the debtor’s part
    rather than coerced and does not put such a
    crushing weight on his shoulders that it prevents
    him from making the "fresh start" that is one of
    the goals of bankruptcy law. In re Turner, 
    156 F.3d 713
    , 718 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Duke, 
    79 F.3d 43
     (7th Cir. 1996); see generally Grogan v.
    Garner, 
    498 U.S. 279
    , 286 (1991); In re Renshaw,
    
    222 F.3d 82
    , 86 (2d Cir. 2000). Provided there is
    no coercion or harassment of the debtor, the
    creditor’s offer of reaffirmation is not deemed
    an attempt to collect the debt and therefore does
    not violate the automatic stay, the statutory
    injunction against creditors’ seeking to collect
    their debts from a debtor after he’s entered
    bankruptcy. In re Duke, 
    supra;
     Pertuso v. Ford
    Motor Credit Corp., 
    233 F.3d 417
    , 423 (6th Cir.
    2000); In re Brown, 
    851 F.2d 81
    , 84 (3d Cir.
    1988). Cox’s argument that Zale’s offer violated
    the automatic stay is therefore frivolous.
    But the reaffirmation agreement was never filed,
    and was therefore invalid even though the offer
    itself had not been improper. Bessette v. Avco
    Financial Services, 
    230 F.3d 439
    , 444 (1st Cir.
    2000); In re Turner, 
    supra,
     
    156 F.3d at 718
    .
    Section 524(c) is explicit that such an agreement
    is enforceable only if all the statutory
    conditions, including filing, are satisfied. The
    record is silent on why the agreement was not
    filed. Cox argues that Zale has a practice of not
    filing such agreements because it fears that
    bankruptcy judges will disallow them, though the
    judge cannot do that if the debtor is represented
    by counsel, as Cox was. 11 U.S.C. sec.
    524(c)(6)(A); In re Grinnell, 
    170 B.R. 495
    (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994); In re Dabbs, 
    128 B.R. 307
    ,
    309 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1991). The argument, though
    implausible in a case such as this in which the
    debtor was represented by counsel in his
    bankruptcy proceeding, cannot be evaluated on the
    present record.
    The reader may be wondering why a debtor would
    ever agree to pay a dischargeable debt, and why a
    secured creditor would care about securing an
    agreement that the debtor pay, since a discharge
    in bankruptcy does not extinguish a secured
    creditor’s right to enforce his security
    interest. Dewsnup v. Timm, 
    502 U.S. 410
     (1992);
    In re Penrod, 
    50 F.3d 459
    , 461 (7th Cir. 1995);
    In re Be-Mac Transport Co., 
    83 F.3d 1020
    , 1025
    (8th Cir. 1996). The answer to the second
    question, as explained in our Penrod opinion, 
    50 F.3d at 461-62
    , is that secured creditors are
    frequently undersecured, especially when the cost
    of foreclosing on a security interest is factored
    in, and so they would like to collect the debt
    directly from the debtor rather than liquidate
    their security interest. The answer to the first
    question is that the debtor may prefer to retain
    the property in which his creditor holds a
    secured interest, rather than avoid paying the
    creditor but lose the property to repossession or
    foreclosure. An understanding of the incentives
    of the parties to debt-reaffirmation agreements
    will turn out to be important to deciding on the
    proper remedy for violation of the statutory
    requirement that such agreements be filed with
    the bankruptcy court.
    Back to our case. Years passed and the
    bankruptcy proceeding was long over with and Cox
    had paid off the reaffirmed debt in full when he
    brought this suit on behalf of himself and all
    others similarly situated--meaning all other
    customers of Zale who had signed debt-
    reaffirmation agreements that Zale had not filed
    with the bankruptcy court. The suit sought to
    rescind the agreement and recover the amounts
    that Cox (and the other members of the class in
    similar situations) had paid Zale after the
    bankruptcy court had entered its order
    discharging his listed debts. Cox based federal
    jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. sec. 1334(a), which
    gives the federal district courts exclusive
    jurisdiction over suits arising under the
    Bankruptcy Code. The district court referred the
    suit to the bankruptcy court (which technically
    is a division of the district court) pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. sec. 157(a) (see also 28 U.S.C. sec.
    1334(b)), which authorizes such references. That
    court permitted Cox to reopen his bankruptcy case
    in order to present his claim for rescission. Why
    the old case should have been reopened rather
    than a new one filed is a mystery that the
    parties have not explored; but it has no
    practical importance beyond the question whether
    a filing fee had to be paid, Central Laborers’
    Pension, Welfare & Annuity Funds v. Griffee, 
    198 F.3d 642
    , 644 (7th Cir. 1999), so we ignore it.
    But the court then dismissed the reopened case
    on the ground that section 524(c) does not create
    a private right of action for violation of its
    requirement that a debt-reaffirmation agreement,
    to be enforceable, be filed with the bankruptcy
    court. Cox’s exclusive remedy, the judge ruled,
    was a motion in the reopened bankruptcy
    proceeding that Zale be adjudged in contempt of
    court for violating the order of discharge by
    trying to collect a discharged debt, and be
    suitably sanctioned. To similar effect, see
    Bessette v. Avco Financial Services, supra, 230
    F.3d at 444-45. A still more recent decision,
    Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., supra, 
    233 F.3d at 421-23
    , agrees with Bessette that section
    524(c) creates no private right of action, but
    disagrees that the contempt power can be used to
    punish violations of the filing requirement, 
    id.
    at 423 n. 1, though its disagreement may have
    been shaped by the facts of the case, as we’ll
    see. Both cases hold, correctly in our view, that
    remedies against debt-affirmation agreements
    contended to violate the Bankruptcy Code are a
    matter exclusively of federal bankruptcy law. 
    Id. at 426
    ; Bessette v. Avco Financial Services,
    supra, 230 F.3d at 447-48; see also MSR
    Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 
    74 F.3d 910
    , 913-14 (9th Cir. 1996). That extinguishes
    the plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment,
    which is based on state law.
    In holding that section 524(c) does not create
    a private right of action, the Sixth Circuit in
    Pertuso and the district court and bankruptcy
    court in the present case emphasized that
    Congress explicitly created a private right of
    action for violation of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362, the
    provision that creates the automatic stay to
    which we referred earlier, yet did not do so in
    section 524(c), and that the Supreme Court is
    reluctant to imply private rights of action in
    federal statutes. E.g., Suter v. Artist M., 
    503 U.S. 347
    , 363-64 (1992); Thompson v. Thompson,
    
    484 U.S. 174
    , 187 (1988); California v. Sierra
    Club, 
    451 U.S. 287
    , 297-98 (1981); Transamerica
    Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 
    444 U.S. 11
    , 24
    (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
    442 U.S. 560
    , 576 (1979). With all due respect, we think
    those emphases misplaced. The private rights of
    action that the Court is reluctant to read into
    federal statutes are rights to obtain damages for
    statutory violations remediable by public
    agencies. Cox is not seeking damages, and section
    524(c) is enforceable only by private parties. A
    statute regulating purely private rights that
    makes a contract void makes the contract
    rescindable by a party to it, especially when the
    other party to the contract is trying to enforce
    it, so that the contract’s illegality is
    interposed by way of defense, rather than as the
    basis for an independent suit. E.g., Transamerica
    Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 
    supra,
     
    444 U.S. at 18
    . If a statute declaring a type of contract
    unenforceable does anything, it creates a defense
    to a suit to enforce such a contract.
    It is thus a non sequitur for Zale to argue that
    because section 524(c) does not create a right to
    seek damages for violation of the requirement
    that a debt-reaffirmation agreement be filed with
    the bankruptcy court, Cox would have had no
    defense to a suit by Zale to enforce the
    agreement. Suppose Cox had realized the agreement
    was unenforceable before he had completed paying
    off the debt and so had refused to complete
    payment. Had Zale sued him for breach of
    contract, he could have successfully interposed
    the defense that the contract was unenforceable.
    (Otherwise an unenforceable contract would be
    enforced!) In other words, he could have sought
    rescission in that suit. It is true that to
    obtain rescission and thus get his $219 back, he
    would have to revest Zale with its security
    interest in the ring and perhaps compensate Zale
    for the rental value of the ring during the
    period since he signed the debt-reaffirmation
    agreement, on the theory that had it not been for
    that agreement Zale would have repossessed (or at
    least would have had the right to repossess) the
    ring. When a contract is rescinded, the parties
    have to be put back to where they were before the
    contract was made, more precisely to where they
    would have been had they not made the contract in
    the first place. Fleming v. United States Postal
    Service, 
    27 F.3d 259
    , 262 (7th Cir. 1994);
    Resolution Trust Corp. v. FSLIC, 
    25 F.3d 1493
    ,
    1504 (10th Cir. 1994). Hence the relevance of the
    rental value of the ring.
    It makes no difference, however, whether the
    contract is rescinded in a suit for rescission or
    by the successful interposition of a defense to a
    suit to enforce the contract. Hogue v. Pellerin
    Laundry Machinery Sales Co., 
    353 F.2d 772
    , 774
    (8th Cir. 1965); Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 
    263 N.E.2d 833
    , 838 (Ill. 1970); Amato v. Edmonds,
    
    408 N.E.2d 1172
    , 1175 (Ill. App. 1980). The
    effect of rescinding a debt-reaffirmation
    agreement is the same in either case: the debt is
    discharged in bankruptcy but the creditor is
    revested with his security interest. That does
    not make the debtor’s victory Pyrrhic (if we
    disregard the minuteness of the stakes in
    relation to the expense of litigation), because
    often the value of the security interest is too
    slight to incite the creditor actually to enforce
    it.
    If we are right so far, it can make no
    difference, at least as regards drawing any
    inference from the right conferred by section
    362(h) to seek damages for violation of the
    automatic stay, that Cox sought rescission after
    rather than before completing payment under the
    reaffirmation agreement. A contract may be
    rescinded after full performance on both sides,
    see, e.g., Finke v. Woodard, 
    462 N.E.2d 13
    , 18
    (Ill. App. 1984); Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B.
    Leach & Co., 
    159 N.E. 700
    , 702 (N.Y. 1928); E.
    Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, sec. 4.4, p. 228 and
    n. 2; sec. 4.15, p. 261 (3d ed. 1999), provided
    that it is possible to put the parties back in
    the position they would have occupied had they
    not made the contract in the first place, and
    that was possible here, as we have just seen. The
    debtor cannot wait forever to rescind an invalid
    debt-reaffirmation agreement, or he’ll be met
    with a defense of statute of limitations or of
    laches, but neither is pleaded here. We add that
    suits under the Bankruptcy Code, presumably
    including suits for rescission, can proceed as
    class actions in appropriate circumstances. Fed.
    R. Bankr. Pro. 7023; In re American Reserve
    Corp., 
    840 F.2d 487
     (7th Cir. 1988); Bolin v.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    231 F.3d 970
    , 973, 975 (5th
    Cir. 2000); Bessette v. Avco Financial Services,
    Inc., supra, 230 F.3d at 446.
    But--and it is a big "but"--we have yet to
    consider the remedial scheme of section 524
    itself, a matter potentially of great relevance
    to the question whether a suit for rescission of
    a debt-affirmation agreement invalidated by that
    section is proper. Section 524(a)(2) provides
    that an order discharging the debtor from his
    debts "operates as an injunction against the
    commencement or continuation of an action, the
    employment of process, or an act, to collect,
    recover, or offset any such debt as a personal
    liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
    of such debt is waived." Until the addition of
    section 14(f) to the Bankruptcy Act in 1970 (the
    section that is now section 524(a)(2) of the
    Bankruptcy Code), a discharge was merely an
    affirmative defense that the debtor could plead
    if later sued by the holder of one of the
    discharged debts. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy para.
    524.LH.[1] (15th rev. ed., Lawrence P. King ed.
    2000). Section 524(a)(2) not only prohibits but
    also enjoins such suits, as well as other
    collection actions, and so the creditor who
    attempts to collect a discharged debt is
    violating not only a statute but also an
    injunction and is therefore in contempt of the
    bankruptcy court that issued the order of
    discharge. Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Corp.,
    supra, 
    233 F.3d at 421
    ; In re National Gypsum
    Co., 
    118 F.3d 1056
    , 1063 (5th Cir. 1997); 4
    Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, para. 524.02[2][c].
    The question we have to decide is whether that
    remedy is exclusive, or whether, as Cox has done,
    a debtor can sue to rescind a contract by which a
    creditor attempted to collect a debt that had
    been discharged.
    If the debt-reaffirmation agreement was
    ineffective to take Cox’s debt to Zale off the
    list of debts that were discharged in the
    bankruptcy proceeding, it may seem to follow as
    the night the day that Zale violated the
    discharge order (which section 524(a)(2), to
    repeat, deems an injunction) by "an act to
    collect" a discharged debt, namely billing Cox
    periodically in accordance with the reaffirmation
    agreement. Bessette v. Avco Financial Services,
    Inc., supra, 230 F.3d at 445, so holds, but
    Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., supra, 
    233 F.3d at 424-25
    , is to the contrary, pointing out
    that the debtor, there as here represented by
    counsel when he signed the reaffirmation
    agreement, made the payments called for by the
    agreement voluntarily. He wanted to hold on to
    the property that he would have lost had the
    creditor repossessed the property to enforce its
    lien in it (though we have noted that often the
    creditor will not bother to do this because of
    the small value of the lien). The violation of
    section 524(c) thus was technical, trivial, and
    arguably, indeed, condoned and hence no violation
    at all, and certainly not the sort of thing that
    would warrant a proceeding for contempt. The
    debtor or his lawyer could have found out by a
    simple inquiry whether the agreement had been
    filed, had either of them thought that important,
    as doubtless neither did, since the debtor wanted
    to honor the agreement even though not legally
    obligated to. It is the same here. Cox’s debt to
    Zale was listed on his schedule of discharged
    debts; his lawyer could have advised him that,
    the debt having been discharged, Cox didn’t have
    to keep paying Zale--though the consequence of
    not paying might be that Zale would repossess the
    ring. Zale might not be able to enforce Cox’s
    agreement to pay it $219, but it could enforce
    its security interest, which the order of
    discharge had not touched.
    In these circumstances, as Pertuso holds, the
    inference that continued payment is voluntary,
    having only to do with the debtor’s desire to
    retain his property and nothing to do with an
    unenforceable promise to pay, is compelling.
    Advised by counsel, Cox obtained the deal with
    Zale that he wanted: keep the ring, but keep
    paying for it, since otherwise Zale could
    repossess it. This implies that the stakes in
    this case are negative--that Cox would be worse
    off if he won than if he lost--since if he can
    get his $219 back, Zale can get the ring back,
    together with the rental value of the ring during
    the period since Zale, by signing the debt-
    reaffirmation agreement, forwent its right to
    repossess it. So Cox’s suit for rescission is,
    not unusually when a class action is in the
    offing, both a frivolous suit and a nuisance
    suit--frivolous because the payments that Cox
    seeks to recoup were made voluntarily, a nuisance
    suit because its net expected value to Cox is
    negative. The purpose of the suit is to lay the
    groundwork for a frivolous, nuisance class
    action.
    In the unlikely event that Zale really has
    committed a deliberate, indeed a flagrant, breach
    of the filing requirement (unlikely because, the
    bankruptcy court lacking power to void a debt-
    reaffirmation agreement when the debtor is
    represented by counsel, Zale would have no
    incentive not to file the agreement), Cox could
    ask the bankruptcy court to hold Zale in contempt
    of the discharge order, which the statute makes
    an injunction. In such a proceeding he could
    obtain not only restitution of the payments he
    made (as in a suit for rescission), assuming they
    were involuntary, but also a reasonable
    attorney’s fee to enable so small a claim to be
    litigated. These are standard remedies in cases
    of civil contempt. United States v. United Mine
    Workers of America, 
    330 U.S. 258
    , 303-04 (1947);
    In re General Motors, 
    61 F.3d 256
    , 259 (4th Cir.
    1995) (per curiam); South Suburban Housing Center
    v. Berry, 
    186 F.3d 851
    , 854-55 (7th Cir. 1999);
    BPS Guard Services Inc. v. International Union of
    Plant Guard Workers, 
    45 F.3d 205
    , 211 (7th Cir.
    1995); Bessette v. Avco Financial Services,
    
    supra,
     230 F.3d at 445; 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law
    of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution sec.
    2.8(2), pp. 194-95 (2d ed. 1993). The victim of a
    violation of the statutory injunction might even
    be able to obtain punitive damages, though
    presumably only if he could prove criminal
    contempt, In re General Motors, 
    supra,
     
    61 F.3d at 259
    ; In re Power Recovery Systems, Inc., 
    950 F.2d 798
    , 802 (1st Cir. 1991); but see Bessette v.
    Avco Financial Services, 
    supra,
     230 F.3d at 445,
    since punishment is the purpose of criminal but
    not of civil contempt.
    The remedy authorized by section 524(a)(2) has
    the advantage of placing responsibility for
    enforcing the discharge order in the court that
    issued it. That makes more sense than a suit
    seeking more limited relief (a suit for
    rescission would not entitle the successful
    plaintiff to attorneys’ fees or punitive damages,
    Estate of Jones v. Kvamme, 
    449 N.W.2d 428
    , 432
    (Minn. 1989); 2 Dobbs, supra, sec. 9.4, pp. 613-
    14), which could be filed in any federal district
    in which Cox could serve Zale. The court that
    issued the discharge order is in a better
    position to adjudicate the alleged violation,
    assess its gravity, and on the basis of that
    assessment formulate a proper remedy. In the
    context of debt-reaffirmation agreements the
    rescission remedy is, for the reasons we’ve
    explained, hokey.
    Cox points out that an interpretation of the
    Bankruptcy Code that makes contempt the sole
    remedy for violation of the requirement that
    debt-reaffirmation agreements be filed precludes
    class-action relief, since the other debtors
    whose debt-reaffirmation agreements Zale failed
    to file with the bankruptcy court in which the
    debtor’s bankruptcy was pending are scattered all
    over the country. Cox argues that given the small
    size of the debts and hence the small stakes in
    individual actions, only class-action treatment
    can assure adequate relief. Maybe so. But if
    really engaged in a nationwide scheme of flouting
    discharge orders Zale can readily be humbled in a
    proceeding for criminal contempt, with the
    unlimited monetary sanctions that are available
    for such contempts when grave. Granted, it is
    unsettled whether bankruptcy judges have
    criminal-contempt powers. Compare In re Ragar, 
    3 F.3d 1174
     (8th Cir. 1993), with In re Hipp, 
    895 F.2d 1503
    , 1515-16 (5th Cir. 1990). Their power
    to determine civil contempt is explicitly
    conferred by Fed. R. Bankr. 9020(b); see also 11
    U.S.C. sec. 105; In re Power Recovery Systems,
    Inc., supra, 
    950 F.2d at 802
    ; In re Rainbow
    Magazine, Inc., 
    77 F.3d 278
    , 284-85 (9th Cir.
    1996); In re Skinner, 
    917 F.2d 444
    , 447-48 (10th
    Cir. 1990) (per curiam), but there is no
    corresponding grant of power to determine
    criminal contempt. It is true that 362(h) of the
    Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes an award of
    punitive damages for the willful violation of the
    statutory injunction created by section 362 (the
    automatic stay), and it has been assumed that
    bankruptcy judges can enforce that subsection as
    well as the rest of section 362. In re Knaus, 
    889 F.2d 773
    , 775-76 (8th Cir. 1989); Budget Service
    Co. v. Better Homes of Virginia, Inc., 804 289,
    292 (4th Cir. 1986). Since punitive damages are--
    punitive, and it is punitive purpose that
    distinguishes criminal from civil contempt,
    section 362(h) implies that bankruptcy judges do
    have some criminal contempt power; but there is
    no corresponding grant of power in section 524
    and the omission may have been deliberate. We can
    save the issue of the bankruptcy judges’
    criminal-contempt powers for another day,
    however. It is peripheral to the issue of the
    adequacy of criminal contempt as a remedy for
    violations of that section, since the district
    court, the court with primary jurisdiction in
    bankruptcy as we noted, can hold a party in
    criminal contempt for violating a statutory
    injunction. United States v. Guariglia, 
    962 F.2d 160
    , 162-63 (2d Cir. 1992).
    We conclude, agreeing with Pertuso though
    without endorsing its analysis of private rights
    of action, that a suit for violation of section
    524(c) can be brought only as a contempt action
    under section 524(a)(2). But recurring to our
    hypothetical case in which Zale sues Cox under
    the debt-reaffirmation agreement because Cox
    stops paying before the debt is paid off
    completely, we remind that in such a case the
    debtor can interpose section 524(c) as a defense
    to the suit as an alternative to seeking a
    contempt sanction in the bankruptcy court that
    issued him his discharge. If all he wants is to
    be left alone, and all the court in which Zale
    sues has to decide is whether the agreement was
    filed in the bankruptcy court, we cannot see any
    statutory or other objection to his being allowed
    to elect that remedy. But once he has paid the
    debt in full and is not in jeopardy of being
    sued, affirmative relief can be sought only in
    the bankruptcy court that issued the discharge.
    In such a case the proper procedure would indeed
    be to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding, since the
    debtor would be seeking to enforce the order of
    discharge issued in that proceeding. A court
    retains jurisdiction to enforce its injunctions.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-4239

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/8/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (36)

In Re Power Recovery Systems, Inc., Debtor (Two Cases). ... , 950 F.2d 798 ( 1991 )

in-re-stephen-wayne-skinner-and-marlene-mccausland-skinner-debtors , 917 F.2d 444 ( 1990 )

In Re General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation , 61 F.3d 256 ( 1995 )

United States v. Anthony Guariglia , 962 F.2d 160 ( 1992 )

In Re: Kevin Renshaw, Debtor. Cazenovia College v. Kevin ... , 222 F.3d 82 ( 2000 )

In Re Delores C. Brown, Debtor v. Pennsylvania State ... , 851 F.2d 81 ( 1988 )

Central Laborers' Pension, Welfare and Annuity Funds v. Ted ... , 198 F.3d 642 ( 1999 )

In the Matter of Hipp, Inc., Debtor. Thomas J. Griffith, ... , 895 F.2d 1503 ( 1990 )

Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 231 F.3d 970 ( 2000 )

in-the-matter-of-john-penrod-and-alyce-j-penrod-debtors-appellees-appeal , 50 F.3d 459 ( 1995 )

In the Matter of American Reserve Corporation, Debtor. ... , 840 F.2d 487 ( 1988 )

South Suburban Housing Center, an Illinois Not-For-Profit ... , 186 F.3d 851 ( 1999 )

David J. Pertuso, Karen A. Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit ... , 233 F.3d 417 ( 2000 )

in-the-matter-of-national-gypsum-company-a-delaware-corporation-aancor , 118 F.3d 1056 ( 1997 )

In Re John Rothwell Knaus, Debtor. John Rothwell Knaus v. ... , 889 F.2d 773 ( 1989 )

Vernon Hogue and Standard Laundry and Cleaners, Inc., of ... , 353 F.2d 772 ( 1965 )

Beatrice Fleming v. United States Postal Service Amf O'Hare ... , 27 F.3d 259 ( 1994 )

bps-guard-services-incorporated-doing-business-as-burns-international , 45 F.3d 205 ( 1995 )

In the Matter of William Duke, Debtor-Appellant , 79 F.3d 43 ( 1996 )

In the Matter Of: Chad TURNER, Et Al., Debtors-Appellants , 156 F.3d 713 ( 1998 )

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