United States v. Fish , 758 F.3d 1 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1791
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DAVID FISH,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk,* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Thomas J. O'Connor, Jr., for appellant.
Alex J. Grant, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
February 26, 2014
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Federal law makes it a crime to
possess body armor after having been convicted of a "crime of
violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 ("section 16"). See 18
U.S.C. § 931. Appellant David Fish possessed body armor after
having been convicted of several crimes, and the district court
ruled that at least one of those several offenses qualified as a
crime of violence under section 16. Following that ruling, Fish
entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to
challenge on this timely appeal the determination that he had
previously been convicted of a crime of violence.
In defense of the district court's determination, the
government points to four crimes under Massachusetts law for which
Fish had previously been convicted: breaking and entering in the
daytime, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, §§ 17-18, breaking and
entering at night, see id. § 16, assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon, see id. ch. 265, § 15A(b), and possession of a
burglarious instrument, see id. ch. 266, § 49. Notwithstanding
their aptly-styled titles, we find that none of those crimes, as
defined under Massachusetts law, qualifies as a crime of violence
under section 16. We therefore reverse Fish's conviction.
I. Facts
The following facts are taken from the prosecution's
presentation at Fish's plea colloquy. At the colloquy, Fish
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admitted to all facts necessary to support his guilty plea. The
facts are uncontested on appeal.
On June 18, 2009, Fish, who was working as an auto
mechanic at a repair shop in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, reported to
the Pittsfield Police Department that someone had broken into a
police vehicle that had been left at the shop for repair. After
examining the vehicle, police discovered that several bulletproof
vests were missing. In early July, the department learned through
a cooperating witness that Fish was offering to sell six
bulletproof vests. An undercover officer contacted Fish through
the cooperating witness and purchased five vests, which the
department afterwards identified as five of the vests that had been
stolen from its vehicle. The vests, manufactured outside
Massachusetts, had traveled interstate for sale in the
Commonwealth.
A federal grand jury eventually returned an indictment
charging Fish with a single count of possessing body armor in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a), the federal body armor statute,
which prohibits any person who "has been convicted of a felony that
is . . . a crime of violence (as defined in [section 16])" from
possessing body armor that has been "sold or offered for sale[] in
interstate or foreign commerce." See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(35).
Fish moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that none of his
prior convictions qualified as a "crime of violence" under
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section 16, and that the body armor statute was unconstitutional.
In response, the government argued that Fish's convictions for
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and breaking and
entering all qualified as crimes of violence under section 16, and
that the body armor statute was constitutional.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding
that "[a]t a minimum, the convictions for breaking and entering
satisfy the requirement[s of section 16]." The court also rejected
Fish's challenge to the constitutionality of the body armor
statute. Fish entered a conditional guilty plea under Rule
11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, preserving his
right to challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his
motion to dismiss the indictment. On June 7, 2012, the district
court entered a final judgment, sentencing Fish to forty-eight
months' probation, with ten months to be served in a community
corrections facility. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Whether a prior conviction is a qualifying offense under
section 16 is a question of law that we review de novo. See Aguiar
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 2006).
III. Analysis
The difficulty posed by this and similar cases arises
from the fact that there is no master list of offenses that qualify
as crimes of violence. Rather, section 16 sets forth two
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qualitative definitions of the term "crime of violence," leaving it
to the courts to measure each crime against these definitions,
which read as follows:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16.
The candidates for satisfying these definitions are
legion and varied. Each state defines its own crimes, generally
without reference to (and often, we presume, without knowledge of)
the section 16 definitions. Similar-sounding crimes may have
different elements from state to state. E.g., Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2295 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The
elements of each crime may be defined by statute, e.g., Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 266, § 16, or by case law, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burno,
396 Mass 622, 625 (1986) (discussing the elements of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 265, § 15A).
Compounding the difficulty of working with section 16's
two qualitative definitions is the fact that Congress has also
adopted an entirely separate, but quite similar, definition of the
term "violent felony" as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) ("ACCA"). ACCA defines "violent felony" as
follows:
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[T]he term "violent felony" means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . that
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
The partially overlapping, two-pronged definitions of the
terms "crime of violence" and "violent felony" have given rise to
multiple lines of precedent, each offering both the advantages and
the limitations of cross-over application by analogy. E.g., United
States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 412 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that
although we and the Supreme Court have treated the "risk of
physical injury" provisions as reaching conduct beyond the scope of
section 16(b), neither our decisions nor the Supreme Court's "in
any way suggest[] that the reverse is true"). Adding further
insight, but perhaps further confusion as well, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines define the term "crime of violence" using
language that is almost, but not quite, the same as the language
that ACCA uses to define the term "violent felony." See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2 (defining "crime of violence" under the career offender
guideline); compare United States v. Willings, 588 F.3d 56, 58 n.2
(1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he terms 'crime of violence' under the career
offender guideline and 'violent felony' under the ACCA are nearly
identical in meaning, so that decisions construing one term inform
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the construction of the other.") with United States v. Giggey, 551
F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc) (pointing out differences).
A third and greater complexity arises from the fact that
many crimes are defined in a manner broad enough to cover both
conduct that clearly meets one or both of the section 16
definitions and conduct that clearly does not. For example, in
Massachusetts, the broad definition of simple assault and battery
encompasses both a devastating beating and a tap on the shoulder.
See generally United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.
2011) (discussing the Massachusetts simple assault and battery
statute).
The Supreme Court has grappled repeatedly with this third
complexity, establishing and then refining a set of rules to be
employed in classifying a defendant's prior offenses of conviction.
These rules derive in great part from the need to honor the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial. Their
principal purpose is to ensure that before we send a person to jail
for doing "X," either the person must admit to "X" or a jury (or
jury-waived court) must convict the person of doing "X" following
a fair trial. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24
(2005).
The first set of rules to be applied forms what is known
as the "categorical" approach. Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 86, 88
(1st Cir. 2006). The categorical approach requires an assessment
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of "the elements of the statute of conviction, not . . . the facts
of each defendant's conduct." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 601 (1990). In other words, without regard to the specific
facts of each defendant's offense, we compare the elements of the
crime for which the defendant was previously convicted with
Congress's definition of the type of crime that may serve as a
predicate offense. Under this approach, we "look[] only to the
statutory definition of the state crime and the fact of conviction
to determine whether the conduct criminalized by the statute,
including the most innocent conduct, qualifies as a crime of
violence." Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 567 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aguiar, 438 F.3d at
89. For example, if a state defines the elements of burglary so as
not to require unlawful entry, such that its statute encompasses
both shoplifting and a classic midnight break-in of a bank, then
under the categorical approach a conviction under that law is not
considered to be a conviction for so-called "generic" burglary.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281, 2293 (2013)
(defining the "generic" version of a crime as "the offense as
commonly understood"); Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16-18.1
1
In the context of statutes other than section 16, courts
are occasionally tasked with defining an offense by the full range
of conduct it proscribes, inquiring not into whether that conduct
is overbroad, but instead into whether it "typically" involves
certain characteristics. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137(2008).
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A second set of rules recognizes an exception to the
categorical approach. If an offense's elements are overbroad--if,
that is, they encompass conduct that does not require all the
elements necessary to render the offense a predicate--we are
sometimes authorized to apply the "modified" categorical approach.
Under that approach, we first determine whether the prior
conviction took place under a "divisible" statute. Descamps, 133
S. Ct. at 2281-82. A statute is divisible if it sets forth one or
more elements of a particular offense in the alternative. Id. ("[A
divisible] statute sets out one or more elements of the offense in
the alternative--for example, stating that burglary involves entry
into a building or an automobile."). When confronted with such a
statute, we are permitted to "consult a limited class of documents,
such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which
alternative formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction."
Id.; see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17, 26. We then analyze the
prior conviction not in relation to all the statute's elements, but
instead in relation only to the narrower subset of elements that
actually gave rise to the conviction. E.g., Descamps, 133 S. Ct.
at 2281-82.
Third, in assessing whether the elements of the candidate
proposed as a predicate crime are overbroad, we need not consider
fanciful, hypothetical scenarios. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) ("[T]o find that a state statute creates
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a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a
federal statute requires more than the application of legal
imagination to a state statute's language. It requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would
apply its statute . . . . "); see also James v. United States, 550
U.S. 192, 208 (2007) ("We do not view [the categorical approach] as
requiring that every conceivable factual offense covered by a
statute must necessarily present a serious potential risk of injury
before the offense can be deemed a violent felony."). But the two
approaches remain stringent: they are governed by the basic
principle that a state's definition of a crime is overbroad if its
elements allow for a conviction without satisfying the elements
Congress has provided to define the required predicate offense.
See generally Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283-85 ("[I]f the statute
sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a conviction under that
law cannot count as an ACCA predicate, even if the defendant
actually committed the offense in its generic form."); Taylor, 495
U.S. at 599 ("If the state statute is narrower than the generic
view . . . the conviction necessarily implies that the defendant
has been found guilty of all the elements of generic burglary. And
if the defendant was convicted of burglary in a State where the
generic definition has been adopted, with minor variations in
terminology, then the trial court need find only that the state
statute corresponds in substance to the generic meaning of
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burglary."). With these rules in mind, we turn now to analyzing
whether any of the four crimes to which the government points
qualifies as a crime of violence under section 16.
A. Daytime and Nighttime Breaking and Entering
Because the district court based its judgment on Fish's
prior convictions for "B&E Daytime Felony" under an unidentified
statute and for breaking and entering a building in the nighttime
with the intent to commit a felony, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266,
§ 16, we begin our analysis by considering the applicability of
section 16 to these offenses. The government's brief on appeal
argues that even though the records of the former conviction state
only that Fish was convicted of a "B&E Daytime," one could conclude
from them that Fish had been convicted under a statute, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 266, § 17, which requires as an element that a person
lawfully in the structure broken into have been put in fear.
Before oral argument, however, the government submitted a Rule
28(j) letter in which it withdrew that interpretation of the
records of conviction. Then, at oral argument, the government said
it had "trouble making sense of" the records of conviction as they
related to the statute, ultimately conceding that we should analyze
the least culpable conduct that qualifies as daytime B&E, see
Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 2006). Because that
conduct overlaps in all material respects with nighttime B&E, we
analyze the two offenses together.
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Both daytime and nighttime B&E may be committed by
breaking into a "building, ship, vessel or vehicle." Id. at § 16;
see also id. at § 18 (" . . . building, ship or motor vehicle or
vessel . . . "). Presumably because the breaking need not involve
the use of force, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 688, 688-
90 (1984), but instead may involve simply walking through an
unlocked door, see Commonwealth v. Tilley, 355 Mass. 507, 508
(1969), the government does not argue that either of Fish’s B&E
convictions qualifies as a crime of violence under section 16(a),
which is limited to felonies having "as an element," the "use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." We therefore
limit our analysis to section 16(b), which applies to all felonies
that, by their nature, "involve[] a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used."
Though the applicability of section 16(b) to the two
Massachusetts B&E offenses is a question of first impression in
this circuit, our analysis does not take place on a blank slate. In
United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 573 (1st Cir. 2011), we analyzed
the nighttime B&E statute and held that, even as narrowed under the
modified approach to include only "night-time burglary of a
building," nighttime B&E did not qualify as a "crime of violence"
under the residual clause of the career offender provision of the
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sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.2 A year later, we held in
United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), that in
light of Brown, a district court had committed plain error by
holding that Massachusetts' section 18, the daytime B&E statute,
was a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e).
We based our holding in Brown almost entirely on the
breadth of the "building" element under Massachusetts law.
Acknowledging that the term "includes not just stores and office
buildings but an array of structures--detached garages and storage
facilities, for example--that may invite theft of property but
would only rarely expose individuals to violence," we found the
"threat of violence" in "so broadly defined a universe" to be
"fairly speculative." 631 F.3d at 79. Then, in Farrell, when we
considered the "building" element alongside the possibility of
"ship" and "vessel" break-ins, we found that the Brown rationale
"applie[d] with even more force." 672 F.3d at 35. We noted that
"happening upon a person is far less likely to take place while
breaking and entering a vessel than it is while burglarizing a
building." Id. at 37.
2
The guidelines provision covers any offense that "is
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another." Id.-13-
The government concedes the correctness of Brown and
Farrell, but asks us to limit those holdings on the ground that,
unlike section 16(b), neither ACCA nor the guidelines provision
takes account of the risk of the use of force against property.
This is a fair point. The problem, though, is that the
Massachusetts offense plainly does not require any conduct that
involves or substantially risks the use of force against property.
Rather, it reaches such non-forceful acts as walking through an
unlocked door without permission. See Tilley, 355 Mass. at 508("In this Commonwealth the opening of a closed but unlocked door or
window is a breaking." (internal quotation marks omitted)). And
since we are limited to our common sense--the government has given
us nothing else on which to rely--we must view it as entirely
plausible that the offense frequently involves such conduct (which
is presumably why police frequently remind property owners to lock
doors and windows).
This conclusion likewise dooms the government's final
argument, that we should write off as not the "ordinary case" any
application of the Massachusetts statutes to conduct that does not
pose the relevant risks. Without an empirical foundation for its
proposed application of the "ordinary case" approach, the
government directs our attention to the Supreme Court’s suggestion
in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004), that generic burglary
is the prototypical section 16(b) offense. At oral argument, the
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government pressed the analogy to Leocal, implying that Leocal's
discussion had turned on the risk of violence to property. But
that opinion, though it discussed section 16(b) in great depth, did
no such thing. Rather, the Supreme Court suggested that burglary
of a building is a section 16 offense because it "involves a
substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim,"
not because it raises any concern about harm to property. Id. And
since we already held in Brown and Farrell that the breaking and
entering statutes at issue here are broader than generic burglary
and do not present a requisite risk of the type with which Leocal
was in fact concerned--that is, the risk of harm to persons--we
fail to see how Leocal supports the government’s position.
Having twice determined that the Massachusetts breaking
and entering statutes, applying as they do to nonviolent entries of
rarely-occupied structures through unlocked doors or windows, do
not necessarily involve conduct that would pose a risk of physical
injury or of the use of force, we now hold that Fish's prior
convictions for daytime B&E and nighttime B&E are not categorically
crimes of violence under section 16(b).
B. Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon
The next offense to which the government points is the
Massachusetts crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon
("ABDW"), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b). The name of this
offense marks it as a strong candidate for classification as a
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crime of violence. Indeed, convictions for ABDW often arise from
the intentional use of dangerous force against another, causing
serious injury. E.g., Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418 (2009)
(shooting with intent to murder and causing serious bodily injury).
The government, with good reason, nevertheless declines
to argue that ABDW qualifies under section 16(a). As we have
noted, section 16(a) requires that a predicate offense have "as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force." The Supreme Court recently held, in the context of ACCA's
force clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), that "the phrase
'physical force' means violent force," see Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), and we see no reason to think the
same would not apply to the same phrase in section 16(a). And
since ABDW may be accomplished by a mere "touching, however
slight," see United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir.
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2012), it does not have "as an element the use" of physical force.3
As a result, it is overbroad.
The government therefore focuses its argument on section
16(b), which contains no requirement that violent force be
employed. Section 16(b) does, however, require a "substantial
risk" that physical force "may be used" in the course of committing
an offense. In theory, it might be possible to construe the
reference to the "use[]" of force so broadly as to encompass
offenses involving strict liability, negligence, or recklessness,
so long as some adequate level of violent impact were involved.
Just such a construction was urged on the Supreme Court in Leocal
v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004), a section 16(b) case involving
a Florida conviction for driving under the influence and causing
3
As we explained in Hart,
Massachusetts ABDW may be committed (1) intentionally or
(2) wantonly or recklessly. The former theory requires
the intentional and unjustified use of force upon the
person of another, however slight. The latter calls for
the intentional commission of a wanton or reckless act
(something more than gross negligence) causing physical
or bodily injury to another. In the case of reckless or
wanton ABDW, the victim's injury must be more than
transient or trifling and severe enough to interfere with
health or comfort.
674 F.3d at 43 n.7 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Both theories of ABDW require that the offense involve
the employment of a dangerous weapon, but the definition of
"dangerous weapon" includes both items that are dangerous "per se"
and otherwise innocuous items that, as used, are "capable of
producing serious bodily harm." Id. at 42-43 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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bodily injury. The Court, however, rejected the government's
argument that "the 'use' of force does not incorporate any mens rea
component." Id. Rather, it reasoned, "'use' requires active
employment," because "[w]hile one may, in theory, actively employ
something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say
that a person actively employs physical force against another
person by accident." Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). Although
the Supreme Court explicitly limited its reasoning to negligence-
or-less crimes, Leocal's rationale would seem to apply equally to
crimes encompassing reckless conduct wherein force is brought to
bear accidentally, rather than being actively employed. It is
therefore not surprising that our sister circuits have concluded,
with striking uniformity, that section 16(b) does not reach
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recklessness offenses.4 On the force of Leocal's logic, we hold
the same.
So the key question is whether Massachusetts ABDW allows
convictions based on mere recklessness. The answer is clearly yes,
as long as the recklessness causes non-trivial bodily harm. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Burno, 396 Mass. 622 (1986). Indeed, "[i]n
Massachusetts, conduct that underlies a conviction for operating
under the influence and causing serious bodily injury may also be
4
See Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 2003);
Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[U]se of
force is an intentional act."); Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413
F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he conclusion of the Leocal
Court that 'in no ordinary or natural sense can it be said that a
person risks have to use physical force against another person in
the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and causing
injury' strongly indicates that the result in Leocal would have
been the same even had a violation of the statute there at issue
required recklessness rather than mere negligence."); United States
v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001) (felony driving while
intoxicated does not qualify under section 16 because it does not
necessarily involve intentional use of force or recklessness as to
the possibility of intentional use of force); United States v.
Portela, 469 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] crime requiring only
recklessness does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under 18
U.S.C. § 16."); Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 560 (7th
Cir. 2008) ("Today we join our sister circuits and hold that
reckless crimes are not crimes of violence under Section 16(b)");
United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 615 (8th Cir.
2007) (reckless manslaughter not a "crime of violence" after
Leocal); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1129-30 (9th
Cir. 2006) (cited in Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049(9th Cir. 2010) (intentionally discharging firearm with reckless
disregard as to whether it will hit an inhabited dwelling is not a
crime of violence)); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110,
1124 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[R]ecklessness falls into the category of
accidental conduct that the Leocal Court described as failing to
satisfy the use of physical force requirement under either of
§ 16's definitions of 'crime of violence.'"); United States v.
Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2010).
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charged as ABDW." Hart, 674 F.3d at 43 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012). The
government does not challenge the accuracy of this description of
Massachusetts ABDW. Instead, the government argues that, in fact,
Massachusetts ABDW is typically applied to conduct involving the
active employment of force against another, so we should simply
ignore, as not the "ordinary case," convictions involving mere
recklessness.
In support of this position, the government relies on
United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 41-44 (1st Cir. 2012), in which
we determined that Massachusetts ABDW qualifies as a "violent
felony" under ACCA's residual clause. In analyzing ACCA's
applicability to the ABDW offense, we first found that ABDW posed
a "serious risk of injury, comparable to the degree of risk posed
by [ACCA's] enumerated offenses." Id. Clearly ABDW does, in all
of its applications (and thus in the "ordinary case," see James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)), pose such a risk--even in
its reckless form, which expressly requires injury that is "more
than transient." Burno, 396 Mass. at 627; see also United States
v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that because
ABDW requires as an element that a defendant have effected a
touching with a dangerous weapon, the offense "ineluctably poses a
serious potential risk of physical injury"). Equally clearly, and
contrary to the dissent's suggestion that section 16(b) "does not
differ from the ACCA's residual clause in any relevant respects,"
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see Dissenting Op. at 43, this is not the risk that must be
assessed in a section 16(b) analysis. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10
n.7 (holding that section 16(b) "plainly does not encompass all
offenses which create a 'substantial risk' that injury will result
from a person's conduct", because "[t]he 'substantial risk' in
§ 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible effect of
a person's conduct"); Aguiar, 438 F.3d at 88.
Having determined that ABDW posed a sufficient risk of
injury to qualify under ACCA's residual clause, we proceeded,
pursuant to the Supreme Court's analysis in Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008), to inquire into whether ABDW was "roughly
similar in kind to the [offenses enumerated in ACCA's residual
clause]." Hart, 674 F.3d at 43-44; see also Begay, 553 U.S. at 143("[T]o give effect to every clause and word [of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)], we should read the [example crimes in section
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)] as limiting the crimes that clause (ii) covers to
crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of
risk posed, to the examples themselves." (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)). In order to satisfy Begay's test for
"rough[]" similarity to burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes
involving the use of explosives--crimes that are listed in ACCA,
but not in section 16(b)--an offense must "typically involve
purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct." Hart, 674 F.3d at 43-
44 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Over protest from the defendant to the effect that ABDW
is occasionally applied to reckless conduct--and, in particular, to
reckless driving causing injury--we found that such a fact pattern
did not "represent the vast majority of ABDW convictions," 674
F.3d at 44, and could therefore not defeat the conclusion that ABDW
was "typically" purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Id.We need not question Hart's holding as to ABDW's
similarity to ACCA's listed offenses. But that holding, based as
it is on an inquiry into whether ABDW is "typically purposeful,
violent, and aggressive," cannot establish that ABDW satisfies
section 16(b). To the extent that the "typically purposeful,
violent, and aggressive" test requires that an offense involve
purposefulness at all,5 the test looks only to the "usual
circumstances of the crime." See 674 F.3d at 44 ("'Adjectives like
"purposeful" and "aggressive" denote qualities that are ineluctably
manifested in degree and appear in different combinations.'"
(quoting United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 7 n.7 (1st Cir.
2008)). Section 16(b), by contrast, requires that an offense, in
5
Though the phrase "purposeful, violent, and aggressive"
would seem, on its face, to require purposefulness, violence, and
aggression, it is by now well-established that the test may be
satisfied by any offense that "contemplates purposefulness, but not
necessarily conduct that is deliberately violent or aggressive as
a matter of course." Hart, 674 F.3d at 44 n.9; see also United
States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 7 n.7 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that
even ACCA's example crimes "satisfy [the 'purposeful, violent, and
aggressive'] requirements only in some measure" and that drug
trafficking crimes, which "involve purposeful conduct but are only
sometimes violent or aggressive," may satisfy Begay).
-22-
every realistically probable application, involve a substantial
risk that physical force will be brought to bear in a manner such
that it can be said to have been "used." See Leocal, 543 U.S. at
8-12; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) ("[To
find that a state statute is overbroad] requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would
apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic
definition of a crime. To show that realistic probability, an
offender, of course, may show that the statute was so
applied . . . "); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192,
208 (2007) (citing Duenas-Alvarez with approval and noting that
"[o]ne can always hypothesize unusual cases in which even a
prototypically violent crime might not present a genuine risk of
injury--for example, an attempted murder where the gun, unbeknownst
to the shooter, had no bullets.").
Finding no comfort in Hart's holding, the government
points out that our opinion in Hart employed language that can be
read to go beyond what Begay required. Specifically, Hart's
analysis of the "purposeful, violent, and aggressive" test contains
the following references to the "ordinary case":
It is true that an ABDW conviction may rest on a
recklessness theory, and it is not insignificant that
reckless ABDW may be committed with a seemingly innocent
object used in a dangerous fashion, as in the case of
reckless, vehicular ABDW. But this fact pattern does not
represent the vast majority of ABDW convictions, and our
analysis under the residual clause is explicitly, and
-23-
necessarily, limited to the "ordinary case." James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007).
. . .
. . . In considering the 'ordinary case []' of ABDW,
James, 550 U.S. at 208, we must conclude that a composite
of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct is the
norm. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45.
674 F.3d at 43-44 (some citations omitted). The government argues
that this language, in combination with Hart's citations to James,
should be read as license to use the "ordinary case" approach to
ignore reckless ABDW in determining whether Massachusetts ABDW
satisfies the section 16(b) test. For the following reasons, we
disagree.
As an initial matter, the license the government would
draw from this language rests on dictum. As we have explained,
Begay's test for similarity to ACCA's enumerated offenses was never
intended to operate as a rigorous comparison between the conduct
necessarily underlying a prior conviction and the conduct described
in a recidivist statute. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2267, 2275 (2011) ("The phrase 'purposeful, violent, and
aggressive' has no precise textual link to the residual clause.").
Rather, after first employing the categorical approach to define
the elements of an offense without reference to the actual facts of
a defendant's conduct, Begay trains its focus on whether that
offense is, in addition to meeting ACCA's textual requirement,
"roughly similar" to the offenses listed in ACCA, so as to avoid
the absurd application of ACCA to crimes that "though dangerous,
-24-
are not typically committed by those whom one normally labels
'armed career criminals.'" Begay, 553 U.S. at 146. Because our
observation in Hart that reckless, vehicular ABDW "does not
represent the vast majority of ABDW convictions" was enough to
satisfy this permissive standard, it was unnecessary to further
inquire into whether the "ordinary case" of ABDW involves a risk of
the "use" of physical force as required by Leocal. Any conclusion
we drew as to that question would, as dictum, therefore not bind us
here. See Koseiris v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 213 (1st Cir.
2003) ("Dicta, of course, is not binding on future panels."); see
also Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[A]lthough a newly constituted panel ordinarily may not disregard
the decision of a previous panel, principles of stare decisis do
not preclude us from disclaiming dicta in a prior decision.");
Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta,
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1263 (2006) ("Among the most common
manifestations of disguised dictum occurs where the court ventures
beyond the issue in controversy to declare the solution to a
further problem--one that will arise in another case, or in a later
phase of the same case.").
The government concedes that Hart is, "to be
sure, . . . not dispositive" of this case, and we take that
concession at face value. The dissent, however, overshoots the
government, proposing that we transform the Begay test--an inquiry
-25-
designed to narrow ACCA's application even when a crime, in all its
actual applications, poses the risk that ACCA's text requires--into
one that broadens section 16(b)'s application. For this simple
reason, we cannot accede to the dissent's suggestion that Begay's
focus on the "usual circumstances" of an offense now binds us to
conclude that everything outside those "usual circumstances" is, in
James's terms, "hypothesize[d]." See James, 550 U.S. at 208.6
Neither James nor Begay suggests such an approach, and to adopt it
would be to abandon section 16(b)'s requirements in favor of an
ill-fitting and less demanding test designed to accommodate the
text, purpose, and legislative history of a materially different
statute. Such a result simply cannot be what Begay, which
6
The dissent suggests that "the examples of 'unusual' cases
that James gave are not so far-fetched." See Dissenting Op. at 46.
But James gave no examples of merely "unusual" cases. Rather,
James made clear that the examples it provided were of
"hypothesize[d] unusual" cases, see 550 U.S. at 208 (emphasis
added), provided in order to demonstrate only that "ACCA does not
require metaphysical certainty" that a defendant's underlying
conduct would have met a federal recidivist statute's requirements.
Id. (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 550 U.S. at 193). Notwithstanding our
dissenting colleague's objection to the examples provided in James,
that case's warning against relying on imagined, hypothetical
scenarios has no application here, because the defendant points to
cases in which the ABDW statute has in fact been applied to conduct
falling outside section 16(b)'s bounds.
-26-
mentioned the "risk" inquiry only to demonstrate that it was not
the inquiry at issue, had in mind.7
Our analysis under section 16(b) is therefore governed by
James, Duenas-Alvarez, and Leocal, not by Begay. And in defining
the "ordinary case" as it applies to the "risk" inquiry, James
explains that sentencing courts may disregard only "hypothetize[d]"
factual scenarios. 550 U.S. at 208. Duenas-Alvarez, which James
cites in the course of its explanation of the "ordinary case,"
likewise permits exclusion only of applications that exist solely
in "legal imagination." 549 U.S. at 193. Unlike Begay's "roughly
similar" test, the analysis described in James and Duenas-Alvarez
grants us no license to ignore actual cases on the ground that they
are not "typical" or do not represent the "majority" of
convictions. Thus, though we do not read our opinion in Hart as
having gone out of its way, in cryptic dictum, to violate James and
Duenas-Alvarez, we conclude that we would be bound to follow those
two Supreme Court cases over any dictum the government might find
to the contrary in Hart's application of the less-demanding
"typically purposeful, violent, and aggressive" test. See
7
Moreover, we are unable to reconcile the dissent's
suggestion that section 16(b) "does not differ from the ACCA's
residual clause in any relevant respects," Dissenting Op. at 43,
with the Supreme Court's suggestion in Leocal that the two statutes
are meaningfully distinct. See 543 U.S. at 10 n.7; see generally
John v. United States, 524 U.S 236, 252-53 (1998) (Supreme Court
decisions "remain binding precedent" until that Court "see[s] fit
to reconsider them").
-27-
generally United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 470 (1st Cir.
2011).8
In so concluding, we acknowledge that at least one court
has, in an analogous situation, relied on James to find license
under the "ordinary case" approach to look only to what it imagined
might be the typical case of conviction, in the process ignoring a
state statute's overbreadth even in the face of actual applications
of the statute to conduct that failed to meet the textual
requirements of the federal statute at issue. See, e.g., United
8
In agreeing with the government that Hart is not
dispositive of the case before us, we do not, as the dissent
suggests, "apply[] the ordinary case rule differently to Section
16(b) than the ACCA." Dissenting Op. at 45. To the contrary, we
acknowledge that the ordinary case rule allows courts to disregard
imagined, hypothetical scenarios when matching an offense to the
two statutes' "risk" requirements. But what does not apply to
section 16(b) (particularly to broaden it) is the assessment, under
Begay, of what an offense "typically" involves. That assessment,
which permits a court to look only to the usual circumstances under
which an offense is committed, applies only to ACCA.
-28-
States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 960-63 (9th Cir. 2009).9 Such a
freewheeling interpretation of James would seem to conflict not
only with James and Duenas-Alvarez, but also with the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2276, 2285-86 (2013), which again reaffirmed that the only way a
facially overbroad statute can qualify as an ACCA predicate is by
application of the modified categorical approach. Though it is
theoretically possible to read Descamps as having no application to
the theory the dissent proposes, we think it unlikely that the
9
Though our dissenting colleague also claims support in
Delgado-Hernandez v. Holder, 697 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012),
and United States v. Johnson, 616 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2010), see
Dissenting Op. at 47-48 & nn.15-16, neither opinion even feints
toward an analysis different from the one we employ. In Delgado-
Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that California's kidnapping
statute was a crime of violence only after scouring reported cases
to ensure that only by "adopt[ing] a Pollyannaish outlook at the
margins of the statute" could it "imagine" a scenario in which the
offense did not involve at least "a substantial risk of force."
Delgado-Hernandez, 697 F.3d at 1129. And in Johnson, the Second
Circuit applied James precisely as we understand it, concluding
that Connecticut's prison rioting statute applied (both in theory
and in fact) only to conduct involving the requisite risk. See 616
F.3d at 94 ("Every violation of prison rules creates a risk that
fellow inmates will join in the disturbance, oppose it with force,
or simply use its occurrence to engage in other acts of
violence."). If the language our colleague quotes from Johnson
seems inconsistent with that understanding of James, see Dissenting
Op. at 48 n.16, that is perhaps because the language is plucked not
from the section of Johnson entitled "Similar in Degree of Risk
Posed," but instead from a separate section of the opinion--one
entitled "Similar 'In Kind.'" See 616 F.3d at 89-93. The latter
section, which makes not a single reference to the "ordinary case,"
demonstrates little more than that like us, the Second Circuit
understands the Begay inquiry to permit a court to look only to the
usual circumstances of an offense. See supra note 8. Neither case
contains any indication whatsoever that the same applies to either
ACCA's or section 16(b)'s "risk" requirement.
-29-
Supreme Court took and decided the Descamps case, in which it yet
again clarified the ornate rules that govern the categorical and
modified categorical approaches, all in the service of a procedure
that ends with the excision of real applications of broad offenses
based on non-empirical determinations that they do not present the
ordinary case.
We are guided here not merely by the thrust of Descamps,
but by its language, as well. Descamps contains myriad warnings to
the effect that "[w]hether the statute of conviction has an
overbroad or missing element, the problem is the same: Because of
the mismatch in elements, a person convicted under that statute is
never convicted of the generic crime." Id. at 2292. In this case,
the dissent can avoid the application of that principle only by
suggesting that we not consider whether the statute is overbroad
until we have already whitewashed its overbroad, actual
applications.
To adopt that approach would ensnare us into deciding how
big a "minority" of actual convictions for unqualifying offenses
under an overly broad definition we may permissibly ignore. One
option, in theory, would be to find empirical tools for confidently
gauging whether actual convictions met whatever definition of
minority we might invent. See Mayer, 560 F.3d at 952 (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Don't even
think about how a court is supposed to figure out whether a statute
-30-
is applied in a certain way 'most of the time.' (A statistical
analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence?
Google? Gut instinct?)"). The only alternative would be to wipe
out the categorical approach and directly reject Descamps. The
first option is impossible, the second foreclosed.
In view of the unavoidable complexity of the foregoing,
we also consider a simple hypothetical. Imagine that Massachusetts
defined the current elements of ABDW solely by statute, rather than
in its case law. Keeping the elements the same, the statute would,
in substance, read as follows:
Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon is:
(1) The intentional and unjustified touching of another
by use of a dangerous weapon,
or,
(2) The intentional commission of a wanton or reckless
act causing more than transient or trifling injury to
another.
See Hart, 674 F.3d at 42, 43 n.7.
We do not understand the dissent or the government to go
so far as to argue, counter to the law of ten circuits, that a
conviction under part (2) of our hypothetical statute would serve
as a predicate offense under section 16(b). See, e.g., Leocal, 543
U.S. at 9-10. And if a defendant's conviction were simply for ABDW
(as in the present case), with no indication as to whether the
charge was under a particular subdivision, one would have to assume
that the conviction might have taken place under part (2). Aguiar
-31-
438 F.3d at 89 ("[O]nly the minimum criminal conduct necessary to
sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant." (internal
citation omitted)). So the question arises: given such a statute,
and an actual conviction not specified as to whether it arose
under part (1) or part (2), would the possibility of a conviction
under part (2) be ignored as outside of the "ordinary case"?
Clearly, the answer must be no.
If that is the case, then why would one reach a different
result here? True, our hypothetical is easy because the elements
are plainly defined by statute. But because the provenance of a
crime's elements tells one nothing about how the crime is
committed, we see no reason why that fact should be decisive.
This hypothetical also serves to illustrate our reading
of Hart. Absent any Shepard-approved documents telling us which
provision of the hypothetical statute had given rise to a
conviction, our analysis of the statute under ACCA would replicate
Hart's holding that ABDW is a violent felony under ACCA's residual
clause. Thus, we would first ask whether, in all but imagined,
hypothetical circumstances, the statute involved a "serious
potential risk of physical injury." We would have to conclude that
it did: section (2) makes injury an explicit textual requirement,
and although section (1) does not explicitly require injury, it
plainly requires conduct that creates a serious potential risk
thereof. Under ACCA (unlike section 16(b)), we would then apply
-32-
Begay's similarity test to see whether ABDW should nevertheless be
disqualified. Because that inquiry, unlike the "ordinary case"
analysis, is satisfied so long as the "typical" violation of the
statute involves purposefulness, we would, just as in Hart, find
Begay satisfied. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 616 F.3d 85, 91 n.4
(2d Cir. 2010) (finding Begay's "roughly similar" test satisfied
even on the assumption that an "overwhelming majority" of
convictions under a statute, but not all of them, "involve[d]
violent and aggressive behavior").
To summarize our analysis of ABDW: the elements of
Massachusetts ABDW are satisfied when the intentional commission of
a reckless act causes more than trifling injury; convictions for
ABDW for such reckless conduct are not merely hypothetical
possibilities, but instead actually occur; we agree with ten
Circuits that reckless conduct bereft of an intent to employ force
against another falls short of the mens rea required under section
16(b) as interpreted in Leocal; no Shepard-approved documents tell
us that Fish's ABDW conviction was not such an offense; therefore,
his ABDW conviction is not a crime of violence under section 16(b).
And in response to our learned colleague's considered dissent, we
agree with both Fish and the government that Hart does not dictate
a contrary result. To the extent that Hart can be read as using
the "ordinary case" notion of James to erase from our consideration
of ABDW its actual applications to reckless conduct, we find such
-33-
a construction of James to be unnecessary to Hart's actual holding
that Massachusetts ABDW survives examination under Begay's
similarity test. The similarity test requires only that an offense
"typically" involve a purposeful use of force.10
Finally, the very complexity of the government's attempt
to prove that every person convicted of ABDW in Massachusetts is,
per se, a violent offender, without any adjudication or admission
necessitating the conclusion, should itself give us pause. If
someone with Fish's record had asked whether he could lawfully buy
body armor, no one (other than five Supreme Court Justices) could
have confidently answered the question. In such a case, we cannot
simply combine intricate statutory interpretations with judicial
hunches about the conduct underlying prior convictions in order to
imprison as a violent felon one whose conduct no jury has
necessarily found to satisfy the elements that make an offense a
10
Our dissenting colleague, proposing that we should "treat
Begay and James interchangeably," points to two cases that he
suggests have so held. See Dissenting Op. at 44 (citing United
States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466 (3d Cir. 2010)). But neither of those
cases supports our colleague's conclusion that the James rule
permits us to disregard actual applications of a statute to conduct
that fails to meet ACCA's "risk" requirement. Rather, in Dismuke,
the defendant conceded that the "risk" requirement was satisfied,
thus taking it off the table completely. See 593 F.3d at 591 n.3.
And in Stinson, the Third Circuit concluded that although the
language of Pennsylvania's resisting arrest statute suggested the
possibility of overbroad application, the statute had never been so
applied. See 592 F.3d at 466 ("[W]e have found no decision under
Pennsylvania law that affirmed a conviction for resisting arrest
based on a defendant's inaction or simply 'lying down' or 'going
limp.'").
-34-
crime of violence as defined by Congress. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at11 n.8 (noting that because "§ 16 is a criminal statute", "the rule
of lenity applies"); cf. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
2156 (2013) ("The Sixth Amendment . . . , in conjunction with the
Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be proved
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."). We therefore hold that
because ABDW, as defined by Massachusetts law, does not in form or
application require a risk of the use of force, it is not a crime
of violence as defined in section 16(b).
C. Burglarious Tools
The government points us last to Fish's prior conviction
under the Massachusetts statute prohibiting the making, possession,
and use of burglarious instruments. That statute reads as follows:
Whoever makes or mends, or begins to make or mend, or
knowingly has in his possession, an engine, machine, tool
or implement adapted and designed for cutting through,
forcing or breaking open a building, room, vault, safe or
other depository, in order to steal therefrom money or
other property, or to commit any other crime, knowing the
same to be adapted and designed for the purpose
aforesaid, with intent to use or employ or allow the same
to be used or employed for such purpose, or whoever
knowingly has in his possession a master key designed to
fit more than one motor vehicle, with intent to use or
employ the same to steal a motor vehicle or other
property therefrom, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in
jail for not more than two and one half years.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 49. Fish argues that because the
government never raised the burglarious instruments conviction
until this appeal, we should not consider the offense. While we
-35-
note the peculiarity of placing an appellate court in the position
of finding facts to satisfy an element of an offense, we need not
address Fish's contention: We ultimately conclude, as perhaps the
government did when it determined not to argue the issue in the
district court, that the burglarious tools statute is overbroad, as
well.
The problem for the government is that Massachusetts
courts have made clear that a “tool or implement . . . designed
for . . . breaking open a building, room, vault, safe or other
depository” as described in the first clause of section 49 can be
a master key, so long as the master key is not one for an
automobile. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 306 Mass. 412, 417 (1940)
(“Keys expressly made to fit a particular lock for the purpose of
wrongfully gaining access to a depository in which goods were kept,
in order to steal them, are tools and implements of the kind and
character described in the statute.”).11 Given the possibility that
a defendant might be convicted of making or possessing a master key
without any attempt to use it--a crime that strikes us as posing a
relatively low risk of the ultimate use of physical force against
persons or property–-we cannot conclude that the burglarious tools
11
Though the offense of possession of an automobile master
key may no longer be charged under the first clause, see
Commonwealth v. Collardo, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1013, 1013-14 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1982), the government provides us no reason to conclude
that the possession of a non-automobile master or duplicate key
could not be charged under the first clause.
-36-
offense, even as limited under the modified approach, categorically
constitutes a crime of violence.
IV. Conclusion
It is no secret that the statutes Congress chose to enact
in its understandable effort to focus on violent conduct are
imperfect. See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,
2293-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If Congress wishes to pursue
its policy in a proper and efficient way without mandating
uniformity among the States with respect to their criminal statutes
for scores of serious offenses, and without requiring the amendment
of any number of federal criminal statutes as well, Congress should
act at once."); Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2858 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and so
criticizing ACCA's residual provision); Sykes v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2267, 2295 (2011) (Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting and lamenting the Supreme Court's difficulties in
crafting a workable approach); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S.
122, 131-32 (2009) (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("[O]nly Congress can rescue the federal courts from
the mire into which ACCA's draftsmanship and Taylor's 'categorical
approach' have pushed us."). As has been pointed out elsewhere,
see, e.g., Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the
great variation between the different states' criminal statutes has
flummoxed the federal courts. Though the duty here undertaken
-37-
seems a better fit for Congress or an administrative agency, we
have for now no choice but to do our best to give effect to
Congress's expressed intent.
As a result, our holding may appear odd to the reasonably
discerning citizen, particularly from afar. Convictions under
statutes with names connoting violence are sometimes deemed not to
be crimes of violence, even if it is likely that most such
convictions arise from violent conduct. This apparent anomaly
arises largely because many states have stretched these violence-
connoting rubrics to encompass conduct that Congress does not
define as a crime of violence. Driving under the influence and
accidentally causing serious injury thus gets grouped together with
pistol-whipping a bank teller, and prosecutors and courts are left
to choose between two unpalatable options: either we may deem non-
violent individuals who likely are in fact violent, or we may
falsely assume that every person convicted under an overbroad
statute is in fact a violent criminal. Since the constitution
prohibits us from charting the latter course, we will take the
former unless Congress changes the law or the Supreme Court
instructs otherwise.
Fish's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded
for dismissal. So ordered.
-- Dissenting Opinion Follows --
-38-
DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Like the majority, I
find problematic the government’s arguments here that breaking and
entering and possession of burglar’s tools constitute crimes of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16. I part company with the majority
when it holds that Massachusetts ABDW is not a crime of violence.
This court has previously held in United States v. Hart,
674 F.3d 33, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2012), and United States v. Glover,
558 F.3d 71, 79-82 (1st Cir. 2009), that Massachusetts ABDW is a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and a “crime of violence” under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The question in
this case is whether Massachusetts ABDW--assault and battery with
a dangerous weapon--is similarly a “crime of violence” under
Section 16(b).12 The majority, deciding not to follow Glover and
Hart, holds that Massachusetts ABDW is not a “crime of violence”
for purposes of Section 16(b), and reverses Fish’s conviction.
Nothing in the language of the three provisions supports
such an inconsistent result, and in my view the majority’s decision
is directly contrary to the reasoning of this court’s decision in
Hart, reasoning which the majority dismisses as “dictum.” Majority
12
Section 16(b) defines “crime of violence” for purposes of
the body armor statute under which this defendant was charged as
well as for many other criminal statutes. E.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (allowing deportation of any alien who commits
a crime of violence against a domestic relation); 18 U.S.C. § 25(doubling the statutory maximum sentence if a defendant
intentionally uses a minor to commit a crime of violence).
-39-
Op. at 24. In my view the majority’s decision is also inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision in James v. United States, 550
U.S. 192, 208 (2007). I respectfully dissent.
I.
When a federal statute makes reference to crimes defined
by state law in order to determine what constitutes a crime of
violence or violent felony under federal law, courts apply a
“categorical approach” to determine whether the state law crime
meets the federal definition. See, e.g., Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); James, 550 U.S. at 202;
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89, 600-02 (1990). The
court must consider the state law crime generically, i.e., with “a
focus on the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime,”
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285, except to the extent that the statute
of conviction is divisible and the charging and similar documents
reveal under which subdivision of the statute the conviction was
obtained. See id. at 2281, 2285 n.2. The government does not rely
on such documents here.
Section 16(b) defines a crime of violence as an offense
that “is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense.” This
language has been interpreted to require a higher degree of intent
than is present in “merely accidental or negligent” applications of
-40-
physical force. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The
majority holds that the inclusion of reckless conduct, such as
reckless driving, within Massachusetts ABDW excludes ABDW from the
definition of Section 16(b). But the categorical approach does not
require a court to consider “every conceivable factual offense”
covered by the state statute. James, 550 U.S. at 208. When
applying a federal statute that contains “inherently probabilistic”
language such as “potential risk of injury,” under James courts
consider only “the conduct encompassed by the elements of the
[statute of conviction] in the ordinary case.” Id. at 207, 208(emphasis added).
II.
This court in Glover held that “the ordinary ABDW
offense” is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Glover, 558 F.3d at 82. Hart applied Glover’s holding to the ACCA.
674 F.3d at 41-42. In my view, Hart disposes of this case by
holding that reckless driving, while within the scope of the ABDW
statute, is not the ordinary case under James and does not prevent
ADBW from being a crime of violence under the categorical
approach.13
The precise question in Hart was whether ABDW is a
violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA, which
13
Glover did not explicitly address the reckless driving
scenario. 558 F.3d at 82.
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encompasses felony offenses that “present[] a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another” and are similar in kind to
certain listed offenses such as burglary, arson, and extortion. 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Hart, 674 F.3d at 41. To be similar to
the enumerated offenses, a crime must “‘typically involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.’” Id. at 41 (quoting
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2008)). The
defendant in Hart argued that Massachusetts ABDW failed that
requirement because a conviction could rest on reckless conduct
such as drunk driving. 674 F.3d at 43. The court nonetheless
concluded that “a composite of purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct is the norm” under Massachusetts ABDW. Id. at 44.
In reaching that conclusion, the Hart court specifically
rejected the ground on which today’s majority rests:
It is true that an ABDW conviction may rest on
a recklessness theory, and it is not
insignificant that reckless ABDW may be
committed with a seemingly innocent object
used in a dangerous fashion, as in the case of
reckless, vehicular ABDW. But this fact
pattern does not represent the vast majority
of ABDW convictions, and our analysis under
the residual clause is explicitly, and
necessarily, limited to the “ordinary case.”
Id. at 43 (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting James, 550
U.S. at 208). This same point was reiterated on the very next page
of the opinion:
ACCA’s enumerated offenses must only typically
involve purposeful conduct, and so we must
look to the usual circumstances of the crime,
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not allowing hypothetical fact patterns to
negate commonsense. In considering the
“ordinary case” of ABDW, we must conclude that
a composite of purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct is the norm.
Id. at 44 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 208) (citations, alterations,
and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Hart twice concluded
that reckless ABDW is not the ordinary case under James. This
panel is bound to follow Hart. In addressing the residual clause
of Section 16(b), which does not differ from the ACCA’s residual
clause in any relevant respects, the court need not concern itself
with reckless ABDW because it “does not represent the vast majority
of ABDW convictions.” Id. at 43.
The majority suggests that Hart’s discussion of the
ordinary case was “dictum.” Majority Op. at 24. I disagree.
Begay specifically held that drunk driving is outside the scope of
the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct requirement of the
ACCA, 553 U.S. at 144-45,14 and other courts of appeals have agreed
that the ACCA definition of “violent felony” does not include
reckless conduct, e.g., United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 782
(7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Morris, 527 F.3d 1059, 1061 (10th
14
Begay stated: “The listed crimes [in the ACCA] all
typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct. . . . By way of contrast, statutes that forbid driving
under the influence, such as the statute before us, typically do
not . . . . [U]nlike the example crimes, the conduct for which the
drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be
purposeful or deliberate.” 553 U.S. at 144-45 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 59-60
(1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that an offense requiring “criminal
negligence” did not meet the purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct requirement of Begay). Hart could find that Massachusetts
ABDW was a “violent felony” under the ACCA only by finding that
reckless driving was not the ordinary case under James (itself a
case under the ACCA residual clause), which is exactly what Hart
did. See 674 F.3d at 43-44. The James ordinary case discussion in
Hart was not dictum.
The majority appears to suggest that Hart unnecessarily
applied James’s “ordinary case” standard because it should have
applied Begay’s “typical[]” case standard, which is more
“permissive.” Majority Op. at 25-25, 27, 28 n.8. Of course, that
is contrary to Hart, which viewed the James and Begay standards as
being the same. 674 F.3d at 43-44; see also United States v.
Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 470 (1st Cir. 2011). It is also contrary to
the views of at least two other circuits which treat Begay and
James interchangeably. United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 594
(7th Cir. 2010) (under the ACCA, court must ask whether the crime,
“in the ordinary or typical case,” meets both prongs of Begay);
United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“[W]e
must determine whether the ‘ordinary’ or ‘typical’ fact
scenario . . . is sufficiently ‘purposeful, violent, and
aggressive’ to qualify as a crime of violence after Begay.” (citing
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both Begay and James)). Contrary to the majority, Begay’s
“typical[]” case is not different from James’s “ordinary case.”
There is also no basis for applying the ordinary case
rule differently to Section 16(b) than the ACCA. The ACCA defines
a “violent felony” as a crime that “is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Section 16(b) defines a “crime
of violence” as an “offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.” Both statutes require purposeful action;
both statutes exclude negligent conduct. See Begay, 553 U.S. at
144-45; Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
I do not think the ACCA and Section 16(b) are “materially
different statute[s],” as the majority suggests. Majority Op. at
26. As I see it, there are only two differences between the two
provisions: one, the ACCA enumerates certain offenses while
Section 16(b) does not, and two, the ACCA refers to a “serious
potential risk of physical injury” while Section 16(b) refers to a
“substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used.” Those differences are certainly
important. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 n.7; Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438
F.3d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 2006). But neither difference suggests that
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the “ordinary case” inquiry under James should be different under
the two provisions, or that Hart’s analysis of the ordinary case of
ABDW as to the ACCA should not apply to Section 16(b).
III.
The majority also suggests that Hart was wrongly decided
because its application of James was too broad, and should have
excluded only “fanciful, hypothetical scenarios.” Majority Op. at
9; see also id. at 27. But James did not define the inquiry so
narrowly. The Court defined “the proper inquiry” as “whether the
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary
case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.” 550
U.S. at 208. The Court cautioned that one can always “hypothesize
unusual cases in which even a prototypically violent crime might
not present a genuine risk of injury.” Id. To be sure, this means
that courts applying the categorical approach to residual clauses
need not concern themselves with absurd hypotheticals. But the
examples of “unusual” cases that James gave are not so far-fetched.
James explained:
One can always hypothesize unusual cases in
which even a prototypically violent crime
might not present a genuine risk of injury--
for example, an attempted murder where the
gun, unbeknownst to the shooter, had no
bullets. Or, to take an example from the
offenses specifically enumerated in [the
ACCA], one could imagine an extortion scheme
where an anonymous blackmailer threatens to
release embarrassing personal information
about the victim unless he is mailed regular
payments. In both cases, the risk of physical
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injury to another approaches zero. But that
does not mean that the offenses of attempted
murder or extortion are categorically
nonviolent.
550 U.S. at 208. And, as described above, Begay (following James)
looked to the “typical[]” case of a crime, 553 U.S. at 144-45, not
to “fanciful, hypothetical scenarios,” Majority Op. at 9.
Other courts have not interpreted James so narrowly as
the majority does today. Relying on James, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Oregon’s burglary law meets the ACCA’s residual
clause. United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009).
Even though the statute had been applied to the act of entering
public phone booths to steal change, the Ninth Circuit found that
that was not the ordinary case. See id. at 952-53 (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).15 The Second
Circuit concluded that Connecticut’s prison rioting statute was a
violent felony under the ACCA although in two cases inmates were
convicted for non-violent conduct.16
15
See also Delgado-Hernandez v. Holder, 697 F.3d 1125, 1129
(9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e too may imagine a non-custodial parent who
refuses to return with her children from a vacation abroad, thereby
effectuating a kidnapping under § 207, with minimal risk of force.
However, we cannot adopt a Pollyannaish outlook at the margins of
the statute; the evidence before us is that the ordinary case of
kidnapping involves a risk of violence.” (citation omitted)).
16
United States v. Johnson, 616 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting James, 550 U.S. at 208). The court’s reasoning was quite
similar to Hart:
The fact that some arguably nonviolent conduct--such as
a hunger strike–-might violate the statute, or even that
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Finally, the majority suggests that James is no longer
good law after Descamps. See Majority Op. at 29-30. But Descamps
only addressed whether courts may consult charging and similar
documents when a defendant was convicted under an indivisible
statute. 133 S. Ct. at 2281. Descamps did not discuss James or
the ordinary case rule, and the parties in Descamps never suggested
that James should be overruled. We are obligated to follow Supreme
Court precedent until it is explicitly overturned. Hohn v. United
States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998) (“Our decisions remain binding
precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing
vitality.”). James is still good law.
some convictions under the statute have actually involved
nonviolent conduct, is not dispositive. We recently
held, in United States v. Thrower, that “larceny from the
person” is a violent felony under the ACCA. 584 F.3d 70,
74 (2d Cir. 2009). We did so notwithstanding the fact
that some conduct that is neither violent nor aggressive-
-such as pickpocketing--would surely be covered by the
statute at issue in that case. Similarly, the fact that
the sexual assault statute at issue in [United States v.
Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2009)] could have been
applied to the conduct of consenting teenagers did not
foreclose a holding that a ‘typical instance of this
crime’ will indeed involve violent and aggressive
conduct.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
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IV.
In my view, the majority’s decision is inconsistent with
Hart and James. I respectfully dissent.17
17
Fish also argues that the body armor statute exceeds
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. As he appears to
concede, that argument was all but foreclosed by Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), which appeared to assume the
constitutionality of a similar statute banning felon possession of
firearms. Scarborough remains good law, see United States v.
Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1997), and I see no basis for
distinguishing the body armor statute. Other circuits have upheld
the body armor statute on the basis of Scarborough. United States
v. Cook, 488 F. App’x 643, 644-46 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished);
United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 645-48 (9th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Scott, 245 F. App’x 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634-36 (10th
Cir. 2006).
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