Desjardins v. Willard , 777 F.3d 43 ( 2015 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-1786
    DANA DESJARDINS,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    DONALD WILLARD; MICHAEL REYNOLDS,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Souter, Associate Justice,* and
    Selya, Circuit Judge.
    John S. Campbell, with whom Campbell & Associates, P.A. was on
    brief, for appellant.
    Daniel J. Murphy, with whom Bernstein Shur was on brief, for
    appellees.
    January 23, 2015
    *
    Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
    Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
    LYNCH, Chief Judge.      What is left of this case after
    dismissal of the federal claims involves state law defamation and
    false light claims by one town official for the town of Raymond,
    Maine, against another town official.1       This case started in state
    superior court, and was removed based on federal claims under the
    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.        The federal claims were, as we
    discuss below, correctly dismissed. The remaining state law claims
    under supplemental jurisdiction involve resolution of a potential
    conflict   between    Maine's   Anti-SLAPP   statute,   Me.   Rev.   Stat.
    tit. 14, § 556, and Maine's state constitution, a conflict that is
    best resolved by the Maine courts. The foundational federal claims
    having been dismissed, we vacate and direct that the remaining
    state law claims be remanded to state court.        See Camelio v. Am.
    Fed'n, 
    137 F.3d 666
    , 672 (1st Cir. 1998).
    I.
    Dana Desjardins alleges that, beginning in late 2012,
    defendant Michael Reynolds, a fellow town official, told the
    Cumberland County Sheriff's Department that Desjardins had attended
    public meetings drunk and driven while intoxicated.             Reynolds
    allegedly knew, or should have known, that these reports were false
    because he also attends these meetings and knows that Desjardins
    rarely drinks.       Desjardins alleges that these false statements
    1
    At oral argument, Desjardins voluntarily withdrew his
    appeal of the dismissals of similar claims against the Town
    Manager, Donald Willard.
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    damaged his reputation and caused the Sheriff's Department to red-
    flag Desjardins and pull his car over without cause.
    In August 2013, Desjardins brought suit in Cumberland
    County Superior Court. The heart of this case is Desjardins' state
    law claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy.2           He
    also alleged federal claims under § 1983 for violations of the
    Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures and a
    Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection of a liberty interest
    in   avoiding reputational harm.      The removal to federal court in
    September 2013 was on the basis of these federal claims.
    We   affirm   the   dismissal     of     the   federal    claims.
    Desjardins' Fourth Amendment claim fails because there is no
    proximate causation between Reynolds' actions and the allegedly
    unconstitutional   traffic    stop:   the   most    that   the     complaint
    plausibly alleges is that Reynolds requested that the Sheriff's
    Department send a deputy to the January 8, 2013 selectboard
    meeting, but instead accepted the sheriff's proposed plan to
    monitor for erratic driving.       See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-
    Burset, 
    640 F.3d 1
    , 16 (1st Cir. 2011).     Desjardins     fails to state
    a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because the alleged stigma
    from defamatory statements and the resulting harm to tangible
    2
    Desjardins conceded in the district court that his state
    law claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed
    under Rule 12(b)(6).
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    interests, being red-flagged and having his car pulled over,
    "'derive from distinct sources.'"        Mead v. Independence Ass'n, 
    684 F.3d 226
    , 233-34 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting URI Student Senate v.
    Town of Narragansett, 
    631 F.3d 1
    , 10 (1st Cir. 2011)) (holding that
    to state a Due Process claim based on stigmatization, a party must
    allege "stigma-plus" -- "'an adverse effect on some interest more
    tangible than reputational harm'" that is "'directly attributable'"
    to, and derives from the same source as, the challenged action
    (quoting 
    URI, 631 F.3d at 9-10
    )).
    II.
    This leaves only the state law claims.         Where a federal
    court has dismissed the anchoring federal claims over which it has
    original     jurisdiction,   the   court    "may    decline   to   exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction" over the remaining state law claims.
    28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also 
    Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672
    ("If
    . . . the court dismisses the foundational federal claims, it must
    reassess its jurisdiction . . . .").               Whether a court should
    decline supplemental jurisdiction depends on a "pragmatic and case-
    specific evaluation of a variety of considerations," including "the
    interests of fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity."
    
    Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672
    .
    The district court faced competing considerations as to
    retention of jurisdiction that differ somewhat from those now
    before us.     At the time of its decision, the case still included
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    defendant Donald Willard, the state claims against whom the court
    found were readily dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).     The district
    court implicitly concluded that the interests of fairness, judicial
    economy, and convenience at that time weighed in favor of resolving
    these state claims. Cf. 
    Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672
    (finding relevant
    whether "the district court's disposition of some but not all of
    the state law claims will materially shorten the time it will take
    to resolve the parties' dispute").    On the other hand, the claims
    against Reynolds were less readily resolved: The Supreme Judicial
    Court of Maine has held that Desjardins' alleged injury, the
    "'damages per se' traditionally associated with libel or slander
    . . . do not satisfy the actual injury requirement of [Maine's
    Anti-SLAPP law]."   Schelling v. Lindell, 
    942 A.2d 1226
    , 1232 & n.4
    (Me. 2008).3   But, as the district court acknowledged, Schelling
    may be in tension with Maine's constitutional protections for the
    right to judicial remedies and the new approach to Maine's Anti-
    SLAPP law announced in Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader I),
    
    41 A.3d 551
    , 559-63 (Me. 2012).4   The district court acknowledged
    3
    The district court also found that that Desjardins had
    failed to meet his burden of production that he suffered actual
    injury in addition to damages per se. For the reasons that follow,
    we need not reach Desjardins' arguments on these findings.
    4
    Nader I overturned prior precedent to avoid an
    unconstitutional application of the Anti-SLAPP law in light of the
    constitutional guarantee to "a speedy remedy for every wrong
    recognized by law as remediable." Nader 
    I, 41 A.3d at 559-63
    ; cf.
    
    id. at 565-66
    (Silver, J., concurring) (explaining Anti-SLAPP may
    problematically deprive some defamation plaintiffs of their right
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    these tensions, but felt it was "constrained" to follow Schelling
    and so, in the perceived interests of judicial economy and fairness
    to both Willard and Reynolds, the district court exercised its
    discretion to resolve the case.    Desjardins v. Willard, No. 2:13-
    cv-00338-NT, 
    2014 WL 2815698
    , at *12-13, 19 (D. Me. June 20, 2014)
    (dismissing state law claims against Willard under Rule 12(b)(6)
    and state law claims against Reynolds under Maine's Anti-SLAPP
    law).
    Defendant Willard is no longer part of this case, and so
    concerns about fairness to him are no longer implicated.       As a
    result, the balancing of factors now more closely resembles those
    in Camelio, where the court held that the surviving state law
    claims should be remanded to state court, from whence they 
    came. 137 F.3d at 672
    .   As in Camelio, the federal claims that formed the
    basis for removal here have been dismissed "well before trial," and
    the remaining state law claims against Reynolds "raise substantial
    questions of state law that are best resolved in state court." 
    Id. In light
    of these factors, we hold now -- as we did then -- that
    the surviving state law claims should be remanded to state court
    where they began.     See 
    id. at 672-73;
    see also Rivera-Díaz v.
    Humana Ins. of P.R., Inc., 
    748 F.3d 387
    , 392 (1st Cir. 2014) ("The
    Supreme Court has made pellucid 'that in the usual case in which
    all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of
    to petition the court for per se damages).
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    factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
    over the remaining state-law claims.'" (alteration in original)
    (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
    484 U.S. 343
    , 350 n.7
    (1988))).
    We do not reach, and so do not decide, whether the
    district court abused its discretion in resolving the state claims
    when it did.     We find only that, from our vantage point now, the
    issues are better resolved by the state courts, where this case
    began.   In the words of the Supreme Court, "'[n]eedless decisions
    of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
    promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-
    footed reading of applicable law.'"       
    Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672
    (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. 715
    , 726
    (1966)).    This is particularly true of interpretations of state
    constitutions.
    We affirm the dismissal of the federal claims and all
    claims as to Willard, with prejudice.    We vacate the dismissal of
    Desjardins' state law defamation and false light claims against
    Reynolds, and remand with instructions to remand those claims to
    state court.
    So ordered.   No costs are awarded.
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