United States v. Delgado-Flores , 777 F.3d 529 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2064
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN DELGADO-FLORES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Barry S. Pollack, Peter J. Duffy and Pollack Solomon Duffy LLP
on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United States
attorney, on brief for appellee.
February 6, 2015
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to a drug
conspiracy charge, appellant Jonathan Delgado-Flores was sentenced
to 135 months' imprisonment. Writ small, the conspiracy involved
the use of boats to smuggle drugs from Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic to the mainland United States. Delgado now
seeks to have his sentence reduced or his case remanded for a new
sentencing hearing, claiming that the government materially
breached a plea agreement. The parties dispute whether Delgado
preserved for appeal the issue of whether the government breached
the agreement. We do not resolve that issue, as the result is the
same regardless of the standard of review. See United States v.
Gonczy, 357 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2004) (observing that if a proper
objection is brought before the district court, breaches of plea
agreements present questions of law for plenary review, but
unpreserved arguments are reviewed for plain error). Finding no
breach, we affirm the sentence.
Two provisions of Delgado's plea agreement are central to
this appeal. First, the agreement stipulated that Delgado would be
held responsible for the importation of between fifteen and fifty
kilograms of cocaine. This drug quantity would, assuming a
Criminal History Category I and agreed-upon adjustments yield a
sentencing guideline range of 135 to 168 months. The second
salient provision called for the government to recommend a sentence
at the low end of the range -- 135 months -- while Delgado could
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argue for the statutory minimum of 120 months, which the
government, in turn, could oppose. The agreement explicitly stated
that it was not binding on the court. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1)(A), (B).
Consistent with the agreement, at sentencing defense
counsel sought a 120-month sentence, arguing essentially that
Delgado was less culpable than others in this particular
conspiracy, and that the statutory minimum sentence was "sufficient
but not greater than necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553. For its part,
the government argued for the agreement's 135-month maximum.
Two primary issues were then discussed. First, the judge
expressed concern that Delgado also had been involved in firearms
sales related to the drug conspiracy and rejected any defense
argument that the firearms were unrelated to the conspiracy.1
Next, in response to defense counsel's observation that Delgado's
role was limited to helping construct secret storage compartments
(known as "clavos") on a vessel, the judge accepted the
government's argument that the compartments were complicated and
required expertise to build. For example, the following colloquy
took place, referencing evidence introduced at the trial of a co-
conspirator:
1
At the time of sentencing, Delgado already had been
convicted of a related firearms charge, for which he received a
twenty-four month sentence. Because the firearms activity was
relevant conduct with respect to the drug conviction, the sentences
would run concurrently.
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MS. GRAY [defense counsel]: Okay. Judge, but
we are talking about things we were not a
party to.
THE COURT: No. He's talking to me about the
clavos and how sophisticated the clavos were.
MS. GRAY: Right, but we weren't there.
THE COURT: His argument is if he was involved
in the clavos, the involvement in the clavos
is a very sophisticated thing. It's not
necessarily getting a hatchet and a hammer and
saw and making a hole in the floor.
Delgado takes direct aim at comments by the prosecutor that
followed soon after and drew the ire of defense counsel:
MR. CARDONA [prosecutor]: And the point being
Mr. Delgado was there, because he was in
charge that this would go in and out as fast
as possible, because they were moving in that
particular load 500 kilograms. The only
reason the transaction's not completed is
because the mothership did not make it to the
rendezvous point. But otherwise it was going
to be a major transaction.
THE COURT: The clavo would take 500 kilograms?
MR. CARDONA: Absolutely, Judge. Actually,
pictures were presented to the jury --
THE COURT: I saw them.
MR. CARDONA: -- in which 150 were only one
corner.
MS. GRAY: That's what I'm saying, we keep
talking about the jury saw that. We were not
able -- that's Sixth Amendment, he had no
ability to cross-examine or see what you guys
are talking about.
THE COURT: All we're talking about is a clavo.
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MS. GRAY: He's talking about 500 kilos and
what he saw --
THE COURT: He is responsible for at least 15
kilos, not more than 50 kilos. Not 500 kilos.
MS. GRAY: Exactly.
THE COURT: But the fact is the clavos are a
sophisticated mechanism that requires -- you
know, you need to be able to use these
plungers, which are electrically operated, to
be able to use them as locks. And, you know,
the point he's making, that your colleague
from the Government is making, that it's not
as simple as getting a saw and a hammer and
just making a hole on the bottom of a -- on
the deck of a ship, and that's it, like any
carpenter would do. You need more than that.
That's what he's saying. He's not saying
anything else.
MS. GRAY: Okay.
THE COURT: That's all.
Then the discussion returned to the plea agreement:
MR. CARDONA: Just to be clear on the record, I
am recommending exactly what is in the Plea
Agreement, Judge.
THE COURT: What are you recommending?
MR. CARDONA: It's 135 months, which is the
recommendation in the Plea Agreement.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CARDONA: So there cannot be arguments
later on appeal that I was recommending more.
THE COURT: You have done nothing wrong here.
All you have done is explain the nature of the
clavo. And the operation is something he
knows and everybody knows. I mean, we're not
talking about -- this is not a rudimentary
hole that you would make in, as I said before,
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with a little lid or something like an old man
would do to put a kind of box full of money or
something of the sort. That's not it. This is
a very complicated mechanism that is intended
to deceive even Customs people, look likes
[sic] part of the boat, is made for that
purpose.
MR. CARDONA: Very well.
THE COURT: Could be an inspection compartment.
It could be a compartment for maintenance. It
could be so many things.
Delgado asserts that the prosecutor's reference to "500
kilograms" was a not-so-subtle argument for a drug amount in excess
of that specified in the plea agreement, and that the argument
convinced the district court to impose the 135-month sentence
rather than 120 months. Neither part of Delgado's hypothesis
withstands scrutiny.
Here, the government was obligated to proceed at
sentencing pursuant to a stipulated drug amount and sentencing
recommendation and it did exactly that, making repeated, explicit
references to both. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part
of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.”); see also United States v. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84,
89 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding no breach where prosecutor "said
nothing that could reasonably be construed as an indication" of
support for a higher than agreed-upon offense level). Here, the
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mention of the capacity of the clavos came up only in the context
of the compartment's complexity and in response to defense counsel
downplaying the issue. "There is no basis for concluding that the
prosecutor reaffirmed a promise to the defendant out of one side of
[his] mouth and tried to subvert it out of the other side."
Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 91.
Finally, we reject Delgado's argument that the
government's alleged breach caused the judge to treat the
stipulation as "conservative" and thus impose the maximum sentence
that the agreement recommended. This claim is based on the court's
following comment about the plea agreement:
THE COURT: Right. There was a conservative, if
you will, conservative drug relevant conduct
stipulation. Could have been a lot more, but
he was -- he signed for at least 15, less than
50 kilos, which if you think about it in the
context of this kind of case, is a
conservative amount.
But, contrary to Delgado's assertion, in describing the
"conservative" drug amount stipulation, the sentencing judge
specifically referred to the "context of this kind of case," which
suggests that he was thinking far more broadly than just the
prosecutor's comment. Moreover, the judge's concern over Delgado's
firearms involvement also played a role in sentencing Delgado in
accordance with the government's within-guidelines sentence
recommendation. Against this backdrop, we find no breach of the
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plea agreement, and, therefore, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
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