Sheedy v. Bankowski , 875 F.3d 740 ( 2017 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 17-1407
IN RE: LAURA M. SHEEDY,
Debtor
LAURA M. SHEEDY,
Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN A. BANKOWSKI, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee; and
WILLIAM K. HARRINGTON, United States Trustee for Region I,
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Allison Dale Burroughs, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
David G. Baker, on brief for appellant.
Patricia A. Remer, Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee, on brief
for appellee Bankowski.
Robert J. Schneider, Jr., Trial Attorney, Department of
Justice, Executive Office for United States Trustees, Ramona D.
Elliott, Deputy Director/General Counsel, P. Matthew Sutko,
Associate General Counsel, John P. Fitzgerald III, Assistant
United States Trustee, and Eric K. Bradford, Trial Attorney,
Department of Justice, Office of the United States Trustee, on
brief for appellee Harrington.
November 16, 2017
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. The single issue before us
is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying
Appellant Laura Sheedy's ("Sheedy") motion for extension of time
to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)
(1)(B) for failing to show excusable neglect. Sheedy's motion was
filed one business day late as a result of her attorney's
preoccupation with his second job as a church's music director.
After a review of the arguments, we discern no abuse of discretion
and affirm.
I. Background
The facts surrounding this appeal are undisputed and we
briefly summarize them here. On June 8, 2010, Sheedy filed for
Chapter 13 relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Massachusetts. After five years, the bankruptcy court
had not confirmed Sheedy's plan. Carolyn Bankowski ("Bankowski"),
the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee,1 filed a motion to dismiss, which
the bankruptcy court granted on October 20, 2015. On December 8,
2015, Bankowski submitted her Final Report and Account ("Final
Report"). Sheedy filed an Objection to the Final Report and,
after a hearing, the bankruptcy court overruled Sheedy's objection
1 William K. Harrington ("Harrington") is the appointed United
States Trustee. Harrington and Bankowski are collectively referred
to as "Trustees."
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and entered an order to that effect on March 10, 2016. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Rule 8002(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, Sheedy had fourteen days, until Friday,
March 25, 2016, to file a notice of appeal.2 A bankruptcy court
may extend this appeal period if an appellant files a motion to
extend: (1) within the fourteen-day period, Fed. R. Bankr. P.
8002(d)(1)(A); or (2) within twenty-one days after the fourteen-
day appeal period, upon a showing of excusable neglect by the
moving party. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(d)(1)(B). Sheedy did not
file an appeal or a motion to extend by March 25, 2016. On Monday,
March 28, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order closing
Sheedy's bankruptcy case. Later that same day, Sheedy filed an
untimely notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time.
In her motion, Sheedy claimed, through counsel, that her
attorney missed the fourteen-day deadline due to inadvertence and
oversight. Specifically, Sheedy alleged that, in addition to his
legal practice, counsel was employed as a music director in a
church and the "important religious holidays of the last week
2 Rule 9006 explains how to compute time periods specified in the
Bankruptcy Rules. Subsection (a)(1)(A) states that when the time
period is stated in days -- fourteen days in this case -- the day
of the triggering event (i.e., an order being appealed) is excluded
from the computation. As the bankruptcy court order in this case
was issued on March 10, 2016, the fourteen day clock started on
March 11, 2016, and expired on March 25, 2016.
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occupied his full attention." According to Sheedy, this one day
delay constituted excusable neglect. The Trustees, in turn, filed
their respective objections to Sheedy's motion for extension of
time. Specifically, Bankowski argued that both the deadline to
file the notice of appeal and counsel's obligations of his other
employment were known and anticipated. Thus, Sheedy failed to
provide sufficient justification for her counsel's error.
Harrington pointed out that Sheedy's counsel identified no unique
or extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing the
very simple two-page notice of appeal.
The bankruptcy court denied Sheedy's motion in one
sentence: "The Motion is denied for the reasons stated in the
Objections to this Motion filed by [the Trustees]." Sheedy then
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision. Sheedy v. Bankowski, No. 16-cv-10702-ADB, 2017
WL 74282, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2017). The district court found
that Sheedy's counsel knew about his responsibilities around
Easter 3 well in advance of the appeal deadline. Id. at *3.
Therefore, counsel's explanation for the delay "seem[ed] to amount
3 In her motion for extension, as well as her brief, Sheedy refers
to "the important religious holidays" of the week leading up to
March 25, 2016, but does not specifically name the holidays to
which she is referring. However, the district court referred to
these holidays as those "leading up to Eastertide."
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to mere inadvertence," and did not constitute excusable neglect.
Id. at *3-4.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Sheedy once again argues that the bankruptcy
court should have granted the requested "de minimus" extension as
counsel's inadvertent oversight and absence of any "deliberately
dilatory" tactics constituted excusable neglect. Further, the
delay was not due to a misunderstanding of clear law or misreading
of an unambiguous judicial decree, but rather because counsel was
preoccupied with his responsibilities as music director in a church
during the important and "unique" religious holidays of the week
of March 25, 2016. These circumstances, she contends, provide
sufficient justification as the religious holidays around March 25
occur only once a year and are therefore "unique."
Great deference must be afforded to a bankruptcy court's
determination regarding whether counsel's neglect is excusable; we
may not set it aside without a definite and firm conviction that
the court below abused its discretion and committed clear error.
In re Power Recovery Sys., Inc., 950 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir. 1991).
Absent the existence of some exceptional justification, an
appellate court will not intervene. Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union,
Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 6-7
(1st Cir. 2001). "Demonstrating excusable neglect is a demanding
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standard" and the trial judge has "wide discretion" in dealing
with litigants who make such claims. Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 169 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Quebecor, 270 F.3d at 6-7.
Of course, the lower court's analysis must be cabined
within the confines of the law. The Supreme Court has provided
guidance, advising that trial courts utilize their equitable
powers by weighing the following four factors: (1) the danger of
prejudice to the non-moving party;4 (2) the length of delay and
potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the
delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer
Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380,
395 (1993) (interpreting "excusable neglect" in Rule 9006(b)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Rules); see Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 19
(1st Cir. 1997) (the trial court must weigh the "latitudinarian
standards" outlined by the Supreme Court). While inadvertence,
ignorance, or other such excuses "do not usually constitute
'excusable' neglect," Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392, this Court has not
strictly defined the term's boundaries. We recognize, however,
4 In her belated motion for extension of time, Sheedy argued that
"the fee collected by the [Standing Chapter 13] trustee . . . is
a not insignificant amount, [and the] loss of which would be
prejudicial to [her]." However, the correct measure of prejudice
is to the non-moving party, or the Trustees in this case. See
Rivera v. ASUME, 486 B.R. 574, 578 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013).
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that, in carving out the excusable neglect exception, "Congress
plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted, where
appropriate, to accept late filings caused by [these reasons]."
Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
The reason for the delay is the most important of the
Pioneer factors. See Quebecor, 270 F.3d at 5-6; see also Nansamba
v. N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2013) ("At
a bare minimum, a party who seeks relief from judgment . . . must
offer a convincing explanation as to why the neglect was
excusable." (quoting Cintrón-Lorenzo v. Departamento de Asuntos
del Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 2002))). Even where
there is no prejudice, impact on judicial proceedings, or trace of
bad faith, "[t]he favorable juxtaposition of the[se] factors" does
not excuse the delay where the proffered reason is insufficient.
Hosp. del Maestro v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 173, 175 (1st Cir. 2001); see
Dimmitt v. Ockenfels, 407 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (an attorney
who does not submit a valid reason for non-compliance with the
rules cannot thereafter avail himself under the good faith factor).
The trial court has "the best coign of vantage" to
determine the adequacy of the proffered reason upon consideration
of the totality of the relevant circumstances. Bennett v. City
of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004); see Quebecor, 270 F.3d
at 6. Absent some extraordinary circumstance, it would be unwise
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for us to second guess its judgment. Bennett, 362 F.3d at 5.
We find no such circumstance, and see no error in the
bankruptcy court's rational conclusion that counsel's carelessness
is an insufficient reason for the delay. While we do not doubt
the demanding nature of counsel's musical duties during this time
of year, the religious holidays occur annually and their dates
were known well in advance of the two-week filing deadline.
Counsel could and should have planned his legal responsibilities
accordingly. See Stonkus v. City of Brockton Sch. Dep't, 322 F.3d
97, 101 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Most attorneys are busy most of the time
and they must organize their work so as to be able to meet the
time requirements of matters they are handling or suffer the
consequences." (quoting de la Torre v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 15 F.3d
12, 15 (1st Cir. 1994))).
In addition, Sheedy provided no reason why counsel could
not have fulfilled his legal obligation during the first week of
the two-week filing deadline. Sheedy's motion for extension, a
two-page submission, simply stated that "the important religious
holidays of the last week occupied [counsel's] full attention,"
but failed to address counsel's schedule during the first week of
the appeals period. As with many other professions, attorneys are
expected to manage deadlines even when they fall around holidays.
See Farris v. Shinseki, 660 F.3d 557, 565 (1st Cir. 2011) (missing
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a deadline because it fell between Christmas and New Year's Day
was "highly unconvincing"). The bankruptcy court acted well
within its bounds in finding that counsel, who has considerable
federal appellate experience, was fully capable of following
procedural requirements despite his directorial duties. Cf.
Dimmitt, 407 F.3d at 24 (affirming district court's grant of
summary judgment following counsel's failure to comply with local
procedural rules).
In support of her position that this one-day inadvertent
delay was excusable, Sheedy cites Local Union No. 12004, United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, in which we affirmed the
district court's finding of excusable neglect for counsel's notice
of appeal filed fourteen days late. 377 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir.
2004). The district court allowed the late filing without comment
based upon counsel's representation that he was preoccupied taking
care of his severely ill infant son. Id. This Court found that,
although the plaintiffs were represented by multiple other
attorneys who presumably could have timely filed, the district
court acted within its discretion. Id. Sheedy argues that, like
the attorney in Local Union No. 12004, her attorney was preoccupied
with personal matters not related to his legal practice.
Sheedy's case is distinguishable. In Local Union No.
12004, we were reviewing the district court's decision to grant a
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motion for an extension of time, whereas we are now reviewing the
bankruptcy court's denial of a similar motion. This distinction
is worth emphasizing, especially in light of the deferential
standard that we must apply. Notably, in Local Union No. 12004,
this Court declared that the district court would not have abused
its discretion had it reached the opposite conclusion. Id. In
addition, unlike in Local Union No. 12004, Sheedy's counsel's
miscue was not for an unforeseen situation such as a severely ill
infant, but rather as a result of annually occurring religious
holidays. In light of these differences, we see no clear error
in the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Sheedy's justification
did not meet the most important Pioneer factor. See Quebecor, 270
F.3d at 5-6.
Our decision is not meant to imply that the lower court's
discretion is absolute. Recently, in Keane v. HSBC Bank USA, this
Court found that the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed Keane's case after his counsel failed to appear at a
scheduled motion hearing. No. 16-1045, 2017 WL 4900587, at *2
(1st Cir. Oct. 31, 2017). One day later, Keane's counsel filed a
motion for relief, citing that his failure to appear was
unintentional, and that, because his only two office assistants
were on maternity leave, he simply failed to calendar the hearing
date. Id. at *1. While acknowledging the deference owed to a
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district court's ruling, we found that, because counsel's behavior
was not intentional, egregious, or repetitive, and resulted in no
prejudice to the defendants, dismissal was an inappropriate
sanction. Id. at *3.
Our holding in Keane, however, is not inconsistent with
our holding here, as that decision relied heavily on our "strong
preference for adjudicating disputes on the merits . . . where
there has never been any consideration of the merits." Id. at 2.
We distinguished Keane's circumstance from ones such as Sheedy's,
stating that "negligence in that [latter] context" -- in which a
judge has previously ruled on the merits -- "forfeits the right to
seek review of a merits adjudication." Id. at 3.
In the present situation, the bankruptcy court made a
ruling on the merits, overruling Sheedy's objection to the Final
Report. Absent a timely notice of appeal, the bankruptcy court
correctly assumed that Sheedy agreed with its ruling, see Templeman
v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985), and closed this five-year-old case.
We see no error in the bankruptcy court's decision that counsel's
neglect forfeited any further review.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
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Sheedy's counsel's inadvertence did not constitute excusable
neglect, and she is bound by his misstep. The bankruptcy court's
order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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