Murphy v. Molino ( 1995 )


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    January 30, 1995
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 94-1924

    WILLIAM J. MURPHY, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    DARWIN MOLINO,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________


    William J. Murphy, Jr. on brief pro se. ______________________
    Darwin Molino on brief pro se. _____________




    ____________________


    ____________________



















    Per Curiam. Darwin Molino rented a cabin from a __________

    trust of which William J. Murphy, Jr. is trustee. After a

    dispute about Molino's non-payment of rent, the Bristol

    housing court at Murphy's behest issued a summons and

    complaint on December 20, 1993. An attempted settlement

    broke down, and in May 1994, Molino sought unsuccessfully to

    transfer the pending case to the Massachusetts Supreme

    Judicial Court.

    When this effort failed, Molino on June 3, 1994,

    filed a petition to remove the case to federal district court

    relying on federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. ___

    1441(c), and on a provision allowing removal by defendant who

    is denied or cannot enforce in state court his "equal civil

    rights." 28 U.S.C. 1443(1). Removal was improper. No

    federal question arises on the face of the complaint,

    Oklahoma Tax Commis. v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989); and the _____________________ ______

    equal rights provision relates to racial equality, Johnson v. _______

    Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975), whereas Molino's ___________

    concern is with a supposed violation of his "right to

    confidentiality" during a mediation proceeding.

    On July 29, 1994, the district court dismissed

    Molino's removed action for lack of jurisdiction. Judgment

    was entered on August 1, 1994, and Molino filed a timely

    appeal. Apparently after the dismissal the Bristol housing

    court ordered the sheriff to take possession of the cabin and

















    to collect past rent, interest and costs. Molino sought a

    temporary restraining order from the district court, seeking

    to prevent the eviction. The district court denied the

    motion. On this appeal, Molino continues to insist that the

    district court did have jurisdiction over the case and asks

    that the housing court's writ to the sheriff be vacated.

    Molino's brief on appeal is a two-page document

    that is mainly a cross-reference to appended statutes and

    other papers. Despite Molino's conclusory assertion, there

    is no basis for believing that federal question jurisdiction

    exists in the district court or that this is a case in which

    equal rights removal is justified. If Molino were asking for

    a remand rather than dismissal, he would arguably be entitled

    to that relief, see 28 U.S.C. 1447(c); Ronan v. Stone, 396 ___ _____ _____

    F.2d 502, 503 (1st Cir. 1968), but apparently the housing

    court is the last place he wants to be, and we have no reason

    to consider relief that Molino himself does not seek.

    Molino's more interesting argument is that the

    housing court should not have proceeded with the case after

    dismissal by the district court since the case had been

    removed, never remanded, and apparently never refiled in the

    housing court. If the state court had proceeded while the

    case was pending in federal district court, it would be

    acting contrary to the district court's plenary authority

    over the removed action, and the district court would indeed



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    have had authority to protect its own jurisdiction. See ___

    generally Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 842 _________ ________________________ ________

    (1st Cir. 1988). But here the housing court apparently acted

    only after the federal court had dismissed the case and

    relinquished authority over it.

    Whether the housing court should have required the

    papers to be refiled by Murphy is a matter of state law. If

    there was any error in the manner in which the state court

    reassumed authority over the case, Molino was free to seek

    review in the state system. This court, however, is not

    entitled to engage collaterally in review of a state court

    judgment where federal jurisdiction has not been infringed

    upon. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). ______ ______________

    We affirm the judgment of the district court. ______

    Molino's motion to expedite this appeal is dismissed as moot. _________























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Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1924

Filed Date: 1/30/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015