United States v. Mercedes Amparo ( 1992 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion









    November 23, 1992
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    _____________________

    No. 92-1483
    No. 92-1483

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,
    Appellee,

    v.
    v.

    JOSE MERCEDES-AMPARO,
    JOSE MERCEDES-AMPARO,

    Defendant, Appellant.
    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________
    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________
    ____________________

    Before
    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________

    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________

    and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
    and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    ____________________
    ____________________


    Luz M. R os Rosario for appellant.
    Luz M. R os Rosario for appellant.
    ___________________
    Esther Castro Schmidt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
    Esther Castro Schmidt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
    _______________________
    whom Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, and Jos A. Quiles
    whom Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, and Jos A. Quiles
    ____________________ ______________
    Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief for appellee.
    Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief for appellee.
    ________


    ____________________
    ____________________


    ____________________
    ____________________




















    CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellant Jose Mercedes Amparo
    CYR, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    pled guilty to attempting to bring illegal aliens into the United

    States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A). He claims that

    the twenty-four month prison term imposed by the district court

    was disproportionately severe and premised on an improper upward

    departure. We remand for resentencing due to the government's

    breach of its plea agreement obligation to recommend a sentence

    within the applicable guideline sentencing range ("GSR").



    I
    I

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
    __________


    On September 27, 1991, the United States Border Patrol

    intercepted a 38-foot yawl carrying ninety-five illegal aliens

    from the Dominican Republic to Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, which is

    not a designated port of entry into the United States. Border

    Patrol agents found neither food nor water aboard the vessel, nor

    did they find life jackets, safety or emergency equipment,

    sanitary facilities, or a radio for communication. Appellant was

    identified as a captain of the vessel and arrested. The co-

    captain was arrested as well, and both men were indicted under 8

    U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A).

    Appellant entered into a plea agreement whereby he

    would plead guilty to one count, in return for the government's

    recommendation of a sentence within the applicable GSR and

    dismissal of the two remaining counts. At sentencing, the

    district court assigned a base offense level of nine for the
















    offense of conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A), see U.S.-
    ___

    S.G. 2L1.1(a)(2), which was reduced by two levels for accep-

    tance of responsibility, then offset by a two level increase

    because appellant, as a captain of the vessel, provided a special

    skill to facilitate the commission of the offense, see U.S.S.G.
    ___

    3B1.3. The adjusted offense level of nine, combined with a

    category I criminal history, yielded a 4-to-10 month GSR. The

    court decided to depart upward to offense level fifteen, which

    resulted in an 18-to-24 month GSR, then sentenced appellant to a

    twenty-four month prison term.

    At oral argument on appeal, appellant asserted for the

    first time that the government had breached an express provision

    in the plea agreement by not recommending a sentence within the

    4-to-10 month GSR. Government counsel conceded that no such

    recommendation had been made. Moreover, we note, sua sponte,
    ___ ______

    that the presentence report ("PSR") misstates the pertinent

    provision in the plea agreement.1








    ____________________

    1Although the plea agreement plainly states that "the
    parties have agreed to recommend that the sentence to be imposed
    be within the guideline range," the PSR states: "On December 12,
    1991, the defendant pled guilty to count one pursuant to the plea
    agreement which proposes that in exchange for the defendant's
    plea of guilt [sic] the government will not make a recommendation
    ___ ____ _ ______________
    as to sentencing, but will move the Court for dismissal of the
    __ __ __________
    remaining counts." (Emphasis added.) Elsewhere, the PSR states:
    "Under the plea agreement, the defendant has pled guilty to count
    one in exchange for the dismissal of count[s] two and three."

    3














    II
    II

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________


    "Plea bargaining is a fundamental part of our criminal

    justice system . . .," Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944,
    ________ _____________

    947 (1st Cir. 1973), but though it promotes efficiency and

    expedition in the administration of criminal proceedings, its

    benefits "flow . . . from the defendant's waiver of almost all

    the constitutional rights we deem fundamental. There must

    accordingly be safeguards to insure that the waiver is knowledge-

    able . . . and voluntary . . . ." Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama,
    ___ ______ _______

    395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
    __________ ______________

    487 (1962)). "Though a legitimate prosecution promise does not

    render a guilty plea legally involuntary, Brady v. United States,
    _____ _____________

    397 U.S. 742 (1970), its fulfillment is a necessary predicate to

    a conclusion of voluntariness when a plea 'rests in any signifi-

    cant degree' on it." Correale, 479 F.2d at 947 (quoting Santo-
    ________ ______

    bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
    _____ ________

    Ordinarily, "an issue not presented in the district

    court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal."

    United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1989). See
    _____________ _____ ___

    also United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 359 (1st Cir. 1989);
    ____ ______________ ___

    United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1025 (1st Cir. 1987);
    _____________ ________

    United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 791 (1st Cir. 1987).
    ______________ _________

    An appellate court nevertheless has the discretionary power, in

    an exceptional case, to resolve an issue not passed on below.

    Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). See United States
    _________ _____ ___ _____________

    4














    v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990); United States
    __________ _____________

    v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982). Although the discre-
    ________

    tionary appellate power to consider an unpreserved issue should

    be exercised sparingly, La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013, it is
    ___________

    appropriately invoked if "'injustice might otherwise result.'"

    Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S.
    _________ ______ _________

    552, 557 (1941)).

    The issue belatedly raised on appeal exhibits charac-

    teristics which we have considered sufficiently exceptional to

    warrant appellate review in other cases. The issue is one of

    law, as there is no dispute that the plea agreement was breached;

    and the issue is susceptible of resolution on the present record.

    See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291; see also La Guardia, 902 F.2d at
    ___ ________ ___ ____ __________

    1013. Moreover, due to the nature of the breach, the only

    question remaining is the appropriate remedy. See Krynicki, 689
    ___ ________

    F.2d at 292; see also La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013. Finally,
    ___ ____ ___________

    appellate deferral of the belated claim would not "aid the

    administration of the criminal justice system," see Krynicki, 689
    ___ ________

    F.2d at 292; see also La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013, and, most
    ___ ____ ___________

    importantly, it might well result in a miscarriage of justice in

    the present case. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121; La Guardia,
    ___ _________ __________

    902 F.2d at 1013; Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292.
    ________

    There is no conceivable basis for concluding that the

    government's promise to recommend a sentence within the GSR was

    not a significant factor in inducing appellant's plea. See
    ___

    Correale, 479 F.2d at 947. Moreover, the material misstatement
    ________


    5














    in the PSR that the government would make no sentencing

    recommendation may well have misled the district court to

    believe that the government was under no duty to recommend a
    __ ____

    sentence within the GSR. In these circumstances, we are not

    prepared to assume either that the government's commitment to

    recommend a sentence within the GSR was a matter of no signifi-

    cance in obtaining appellant's guilty plea, see id., or that the
    ___ ___

    court would not have given serious consideration to the govern-

    ment's sentencing recommendation had it been made. Thus, we

    cannot exclude all likelihood that appellant's waiver of consti-

    tutional rights lacked the requisite voluntariness, see Correale,
    ___ ________

    479 F.2d at 947, or that our failure to address the issue would

    result in a miscarriage of justice. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at
    ___ _________

    121 (appellate resolution of unpreserved issue may be appropriate

    where injustice would otherwise result).2

    The undisputed breach of a core provision in the plea

    agreement, requiring the government to recommend a sentence

    within the GSR, must be remedied.3 Normally, a plea bargain

    breach by the government may be remedied either through specific

    performance of the unperformed provision or by allowing the

    defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial. Kingsley v.
    ________

    United States, 968 F.2d 109, 133 (1st Cir. 1992); United States
    _____________ _____________

    v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 271 (1st Cir. 1992); see Santobello v.
    ______ ___ __________

    ____________________

    2We note as well that appellant is illiterate.

    3Although we accept the government's assurances at oral
    argument that its breach was inadvertent, "[t]hat . . . does not
    lessen its impact." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.
    __________

    6














    New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). "In choosing a remedy, a
    ________

    court must exercise its 'sound discretion . . . under the circum-

    stances of each case.' . . . Specific performance, the less

    extreme remedy, is preferred." Kingsley, 968 F.2d at 113 (cita-
    ________

    tions omitted) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 37
    _____________ ______

    (1st Cir. 1983)).

    We believe specific performance is appropriate in these

    circumstances. Although it misapprehends the nature of the

    breach,4 appellant's request for "resentencing with the express

    instruction that appellant be sentenced within the [GSR]" indi-

    cates appellant's preference for specific performance, rather

    than withdrawal of the plea. Moreover, the choice of remedy

    rests with the court, not with the defendant. Kingsley, 968 F.2d
    ________

    at 113; Canada, 960 F.2d at 271. As specific performance would
    ______

    not be "meaningless" in these circumstances, see id. at 114, but
    ___ ___

    more appropriate than other remedies we might fashion, we vacate

    the sentence and remand for resentencing before a different judge

    in accordance with our normal practice. See Canada, 960 F.2d at
    ___ ______

    271 (remanding for resentencing before a different judge to

    remedy government's plea bargain breach).

    Vacated and remanded for resentencing.
    _______ ___ ________ ___ _____________




    ____________________

    4Appellant's brief on appeal faults the district court's
    failure to impose a sentence within the GSR. However, the plea
    ______
    agreement expressly provides that "the sentence will be left
    entirely to the sound discretion of the court . . ." Thus, the
    appellant was not entitled to a sentence within the GSR, but to
    the government's recommendation of such a sentence.
    ______________

    7