United States v. Cofresi-Ruiz ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    November 18, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 92-1031

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    EDWIN COFRESI-RUIZ,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Skinner,* Senior District Judge.
    _____________________

    ____________________

    Edwin Cofresi on brief pro se.
    _____________
    Daniel F. Lopez Romo, United States Attorney, Antonio R. Bazan,
    ______________________ ________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles Espinosa, Senior
    ________________________
    Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.

    ____________________

    ____________________



    _______________________________
    *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.



















    Per Curiam. Edwin Cofresi-Ruiz was convicted of
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    aiding and abetting co-defendant, Evaristo Carrasquillo-

    Ramos, in distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

    841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and of carrying a firearm during

    and in relation to that drug trafficking offense in violation

    of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). He now challenges the sufficiency

    of the evidence and the district court's denial of his motion

    to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant. We affirm.



    BACKGROUND
    __________

    The relevant facts are not in dispute. In a taped

    telephone call, a confidential informant for the government

    arranged to purchase cocaine from Carrasquillo. By pre-

    arrangement, the informant met Carrasquillo at a shopping

    center where the exchange of cocaine for cash was to take

    place. Cofresi, whose name had not been mentioned in the

    telephone conversation, drove Carrasquillo to the shopping

    center. While seated in the car with Cofresi, Carrasquillo

    instructed the informant to drive to a restaurant parking lot

    located nearby since there were too many people at the

    shopping center. Cofresi drove Carrasquillo to the

    restaurant parking lot. While waiting for the informant to

    arrive at the new location, Carrasquillo and Cofresi were

    seen standing and conversing next to Cofresi's car. After

    the informant arrived, Carrasquillo gave her the cocaine.



















    During the transfer of cocaine, Cofresi stood apart from

    Carrasquillo and the informant, and at one point was observed

    to have leaned into his car. Carrasquillo then accompanied

    the informant back to her car to pick up the money, and was

    arrested when the informant opened her car trunk. As the

    police arrested Carrasquillo, Cofresi, who had seated himself

    in his car, got out of the car and moved swiftly toward the

    front of the car. At that point, police officers approached

    and arrested him. When one of the officers looked into

    Cofresi's car, he saw a .44 Magnum revolver located in a

    console between the driver's and front passenger's seat with

    the handle turned up. The gun, which was loaded at the time

    and licensed to Cofresi, subsequently was found to be

    operable.

    DISCUSSION
    __________

    I. Aiding and Abetting
    ___________________

    Cofresi claims that the evidence was insufficient

    to show that he had aided and abetted Carrasquillo in the

    sale of the cocaine. He points out that the informant had

    not seen whether the cocaine had been taken from his car and

    had not testified that she knew Cofresi or knew that he was

    involved in drug trafficking activity. Rather than engaging

    in a drug transaction, he contends that he was giving

    Carrasquillo a ride home, and thought that they were stopping

    at the restaurant for a beer. Because his only demonstrated



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    involvement in the drug sale was his presence at the scene of

    the sale, Cofresi claims that the evidence was insufficient

    to convict him even if he knew that a drug sale was taking

    place.

    Although the evidence may not have shown that

    Cofresi was a prime mover behind the drug sale, we are

    satisfied that it showed that he participated willingly in

    the transaction in order to ensure its success. He drove

    Carrasquillo to the site of the prearranged drug deal, he was

    in the car with Carrasquillo when Carrasquillo told the

    informant to move to a new location since he apparently

    believed that the presence of so many people could interfere

    with the sale, and he drove Carrasquillo to the new location.

    He made no attempt to go into the restaurant upon their

    arrival there, but remained in conversation in the parking

    lot with Carrasquillo while Carrasquillo awaited the

    informant's arrival, and he stood by as the cocaine was given

    to the informant. He was also observed leaning into his car

    at one point, and subsequently a loaded gun registered to him

    was found in the console next to the driver's seat with the

    handle turned up. Finally, when Carrasquillo was arrested,

    he attempted to leave the scene. These facts are almost

    identical to those in United States v. Paone, 758 F.2d 774
    ______________ _____

    (1st Cir. 1985), in which we sustained the defendant's

    conviction for aiding and abetting a cocaine sale. There we



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    stated that defendant's presence at "several critical steps

    of the transaction" made it "entirely reasonable for the jury

    to conclude that his appearances were not coincidental and

    that he was a participant who sought to bring about the

    cocaine sale." Id. at 776. See also United States v. Ortiz,
    ___ ______________________ _____

    966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992) (suggesting that "a person

    . . . brought to a neutral site by a drug trafficker

    preliminary to the actual consummation of a narcotic

    transaction" is unlikely to be an "innocent bystander", and

    affirming the conviction of a defendant who had accompanied

    the principal drug dealer to the prearranged site of a drug

    sale because there was no evidence that he came

    involuntarily, the cocaine was in plain view on the car seat

    next to the defendant, and the defendant listened to the drug

    dealer's negotiations with an undercover agent and was

    subsequently found to have been carrying a beeper). Thus, we

    find that the evidence supports the jury's determination that

    Cofresi was a willing participant who aided and abetted

    Carrasquillo in the drug sale.

    II. Carrying a Firearm
    __________________

    Cofresi argues that his conviction on the aiding

    and abetting charge precludes his conviction for using or

    carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug offense.

    Cofresi contends that the evidence showed that he was away

    from his car during the delivery of the cocaine and that his



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    gun was in the car. Because it was not on his person and not

    within his immediate reach, he claims that he cannot be found

    to have used or carried the gun during and in relation to the

    sale of the cocaine. This argument has no merit in light of

    our cases on this point. In United States v. Castro-Lara,
    ______________ ___________

    970 F.2d 976 (1st Cir. 1992), a defendant named Obijo claimed

    that his conviction for using or carrying a firearm during

    and in relation to any drug crime was erroneous. In that

    case Obijo's co-defendant Castro had placed a bag of cocaine

    into Obijo's car, and both men were preparing to drive away

    together when they were arrested. While searching the trunk

    of the car, the police found a briefcase owned by Obijo. In

    the briefcase was an unloaded but operable gun, live

    ammunition and a large amount of cash. We rejected Obijo's

    argument that the gun had not been within his immediate

    reach. We explained that our "concern is not whether the gun

    was 'instantly available' or 'exclusively dedicated to the

    narcotics trade,' but whether it was 'available for use' in

    connection with the narcotics trade." Id. at 983. We
    ___

    concluded that a jury reasonably could have found that the

    gun was "available for use" during and in relation to a drug

    trafficking crime because the gun had been found in Obijo's

    car at the scene of a drug pickup near a large sum of cash

    and live ammunition. Id. See also United States v. Wight,
    ___ ___ ____ _____________ _____

    968 F.2d 1393 (1st Cir. 1992) (the court sustained a



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    defendant's conviction for using a firearm during and in

    relation to a drug trafficking crime where the gun was

    delivered to a co-defendant to be used, if necessary, during

    the drug deal; the defendant was arrested while attempting to

    sell drugs in the van in which the gun was found; the gun was

    found under some newspapers behind the defendant's seat in a

    half-open case with the open end toward the place where the

    defendant had sat). Here, Cofresi remained in the vicinity

    of the car, at one point was observed to have leaned into the

    front seat, and had reseated himself in the car by the time

    the arrests were made. Clearly, the gun, which was located

    in the car between the driver's seat and the front

    passenger's seat, was available to him for use in connection

    with the drug transaction then taking place in the parking

    lot.

    III. Severance
    _________

    Finally, Cofresi argues that the district court

    erred in denying his motion for severance of his trial from

    Carrasquillo's. In his appellate brief Cofresi contends that

    the evidence against Carrasquillo was so strong that he

    became "guilty by association" and was not convicted on the

    basis of evidence as to his "individual involvement."1 He


    ____________________

    1. In his Motion for Severance, Cofresi also stated that he
    intended to take the witness stand to testify that he did not
    know that Carrasquillo intended to effect a drug sale at the
    restaurant parking lot. Without describing what
    Carrasquillo's defense would be, he contended that his

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    also states that the government would have had no evidence to

    present against him had his trial been severed from

    Carrasquillo's.

    We review the district court's denial of this

    motion for "manifest abuse" of discretion, see United States
    ___ _____________

    v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
    ______ _____ ______

    Ct. 139 (1990), and find no such abuse here. Cofresi's

    burden on appeal is to make a "strong showing" that the

    court's failure to sever his trial prejudiced him, a burden

    which we have characterized as a "difficult battle for a

    defendant to win." Id.
    ___

    There were only two defendants in this case and

    only four counts arising out of a single, uncomplicated drug

    transaction. Counts one and two alleged use of a

    communication facility, i.e., the telephone, to commit a drug
    ____

    crime, and were brought against Carrasquillo. We cannot

    conceive that the jury mistakenly would believe that Cofresi


    ____________________

    defense was antagonistic to Carrasquillo's defense, so that
    "extreme prejudice" to him would result and the jury would
    not be able to "compartmentalize the evidence against each
    defendant." The government's reply noted that, as drafted,
    Cofresi's motion described a situation prejudicial to
    Carrasquillo so that Cofresi had no standing to bring the
    motion. The government also argued that the conflict Cofresi
    alleged amounted to mere "tattling and finger pointing," and
    so was not a basis for severance, see United States v.
    ___ ______________
    Arruda, 715 F.2d 671, 679 (1st Cir. 1983), and that Cofresi
    ______
    had made no showing of prejudice. Cofresi did not testify at
    trial, and his argument on appeal appears to allege only that
    the jury was unable to sift the evidence against him from
    that relating to Carrasquillo. Accordingly, we conclude that
    he has abandoned the other arguments made in his motion.

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    was implicated in that offense. The government introduced

    tape recordings of the phone calls, neither of which

    mentioned Cofresi or involved Cofresi in any way. See United
    ___ ______

    States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973) (The
    ______ ________

    defendant was not prejudiced by a joint trial where there was

    "no likelihood of confusion between the proof applicable to

    [his co-defendants] and that applicable to [the defendant.] .

    . . None of the evidence in the first count pertained to

    defendant.")

    The third count applied to both Carrasquillo and

    Cofresi, and alleged that they had aided and abetted each

    other in committing a drug crime. With respect to this

    count, the facts relating to Carrasquillo and Cofresi were

    inseparably connected. The very nature of the charge against

    them required a consideration of their joint actions with

    respect to the central allegation that a drug crime had taken

    place. Even if Cofresi's trial had been conducted

    separately, the government would have had to introduce

    evidence as to Carrasquillo's role in the transaction in

    order to establish that a drug sale had taken place.

    (Cofresi seems to believe, mistakenly, that in a separate

    trial the government would be able to introduce only evidence

    relating to his own role in the drug sale.) For that reason,

    trying Cofresi and Carrasquillo jointly did not prejudice

    Cofresi. Cf. id. at 829 (there was no prejudice in not
    ___ ___



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    severing trials where the evidence relating to the principal

    drug dealer's actions, whom the defendant was alleged to have

    aided and abetted, would have been presented even if the

    count relating to the defendant had been tried separately

    from the counts relating to his co-defendants, who were

    alleged to have aided and abetted the principal drug dealer

    on a different occasion); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d
    ______________ ______

    345, 349 (6th Cir. 1990) (there was no prejudice in not

    severing the trials of alleged co-conspirators where the

    facts relating to the defendants, the conspiracy and the

    substantive drug charge were "inextricably linked"), cert.
    _____

    denied, 111 S. Ct. 2038 (1991). The fact that most of the
    ______

    evidence presented concerned Carrasquillo does not mean that

    Cofresi was prejudiced, especially where, as here, the

    district court specifically instructed the jury to consider

    the evidence against each defendant separately.2 See United
    __________

    States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1991) (the
    ______ ________

    court rejected the defendant's claim that she had been

    convicted because of "spillover" from vivid testimony by the



    ____________________

    2. The court charged the jury as follows: "Now, let's also
    discuss the defendants. There are two defendants. Although
    the defendants are being tried together, you must consider
    the case against each separately. In doing so, you must
    decide what the evidence shows about each defendant without
    considering any evidence that may have been received solely
    against some other defendant or defendants. Each defendant
    is entitled to have the case against that defendant decided
    solely on the evidence and the law which applies to that
    defendant."

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    key witnesses against her co-defendant, in which she was not

    mentioned at all, because the evidence applied to her as a

    co-conspirator and because the court had adequately

    instructed the jury to consider only the evidence against

    each defendant separately); cf. United States v. Cox, 934
    ___ ______________ ___

    F.2d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991) (the court stated that the

    lengthy testimony about a co-defendant's criminal activities

    did not warrant reversal where the defendant did not make an

    "actual showing of prejudice").

    Finally, the last count, which alleged the use or

    carrying of a firearm in connection with a drug crime,

    applied only to Cofresi. The evidence clearly linked the gun

    to Cofresi. In any event, any jury confusion as to that

    issue would have worked to Carrasquillo's, and not Cofresi's,

    disadvantage.

    Accordingly, we conclude that the court's denial of

    Cofresi's motion for a separate trial was not an abuse of

    discretion.

    CONCLUSION
    __________

    The decision of the district court is affirmed.
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