Hager v. United States ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion












    May 21, 1993



    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ____________________


    No. 93-1017

    EDWARD B. HAGER,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Respondent.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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    and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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    Robert E. McDaniel with whom Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A. was
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    on brief for petitioner.

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    Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, for respondent.
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    May 21, 1993
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    BREYER, Chief Judge. In a hearing conducted on
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    May 29, 1990, the appellant, Edward Hager, entered a plea of

    guilty to a charge of unlawfully importing four wild animal

    pelts from Mexico into the United States. 16 U.S.C.

    3372(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting importation of wildlife taken or

    possessed in violation of foreign law), 3373(d)(1)(A)

    (setting criminal penalties for violation). Immediately

    after the hearing, the court sentenced Hager to serve one

    year of unsupervised probation and to pay a $75,000 fine.

    He did not appeal the court's judgment. On November 2,

    1992, he asked the district court to issue a writ of coram

    nobis, setting aside his conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
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    1651(a)("All Writs Act"); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
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    502, 512 (1954). The district court denied the petition for

    the writ. And, Hager appeals the court's decision.

    Hager makes one argument on this appeal. He

    points out that the district court, before accepting a

    guilty plea, must make certain that the defendant's "plea is

    voluntary." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d); see also North Carolina
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    v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (plea must be "voluntary
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    and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of

    action open to the defendant"). Hager says that, in his




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    case, the district court failed to make this determination.

    The court asked him

    "Now, have there been any threats made
    by anyone against you, any member of
    your family, or anyone near and dear to
    you which compels you to offer a plea of
    guilty here this morning?"

    The appellant replied,

    "Only the threat to my health, sir."

    How, asks the appellant, could the district court know

    enough about the matter after this brief exchange to satisfy

    itself that the "threat" to his "health" was not so grave as

    to make his plea essentially involuntary? Unless there is a

    satisfactory answer to this question, he adds, his "guilty

    plea" proceeding was so seriously flawed as to warrant

    issuance of the coram nobis writ.

    The legal answer to appellant's question is that

    the writ of coram nobis is an unusual legal animal that

    courts will use to set aside a criminal judgment of

    conviction only "under circumstances compelling such action

    to achieve justice." See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511. Those
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    circumstances include an explanation of why a coram nobis

    petitioner did not earlier seek relief from the judgment,

    see United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1061-62 (3d Cir.
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    1988), Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778, 779 (7th Cir.),
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    cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924 (1963); a showing that the
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    petitioner continues to suffer significant collateral

    consequences from the judgment, see Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-
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    13, Howard v. United States, 962 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir.
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    1992); and a demonstration that an error of "the most

    fundamental character," relevant to the plea decision,

    occurred. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512.
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    The appellant has neither explained why he did not

    pursue a timely appeal nor shown significant, continuing

    collateral consequences flowing from his conviction. And,

    he has conceded the following facts: (1) at the time of the

    plea hearing, the district court was aware of his medical

    problems, both from the record of earlier proceedings in the

    case prior to its transfer to New Hampshire and from

    appellant's own description of these problems, later in the

    course of the hearing; (2) when asked whether there was any

    reason why the court should not accept appellant's plea,

    appellant replied that there was not, see Key v. United
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    States, 806 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1986) (defendant's
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    representations at plea hearing strong obstacle to

    successful collateral attack on conviction); (3) appellant's

    counsel, in response to the court's inquiry, stated his

    opinion that the plea was in the best interests of his


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    client, see United States v. Guichard, 779 F.2d 1139, 1145
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    (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1127 (1986) (unless overt
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    coercion alleged, counsel's opinion good evidence of

    voluntary and intelligent plea), citing United States v.
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    Araiza, 693 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1982); and (4) the
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    government demonstrated at the coram nobis proceeding before

    the district court that, two months after entering his plea,

    appellant was well enough to travel to Africa to hunt wild

    animals. These facts, together, convince us that

    appellant's plea was not "involuntary;" that the court's

    failure to ask more health-related questions was not

    erroneous; and, certainly, that no error of a "fundamental

    character" occurred. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; Fed. R.
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    Crim. P. 11(h) (no redress for Rule 11 error which does not

    violate substantial rights); cf. United States v. Timmreck,
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    441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (to justify habeas relief,

    violation of Rule 11 must be "complete miscarriage of

    justice" or "omission inconsistent with the rudimentary

    demands of fair procedure," not just technical violation).

    The judgment of the district court denying the

    petition for a writ of coram nobis is

    Affirmed.
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