Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Sewer Authority ( 1993 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    _________________________

    No. 91-1602

    METCALF & EDDY, INC.,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHORITY,
    Defendant, Appellant.

    _________________________


    ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT
    OF THE UNITED STATES

    _________________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________

    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________

    and Selya, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    _________________________

    Perry M. Rosen, Paige E. Reffe, Thomas D. Roth, Cutler &
    ______________ _______________ _______________ _________
    Stanfield, Arturo Trias, Hector Melendez Cano, and Trias, Acevedo
    _________ ____________ ____________________ ______________
    & Otero on supplemental brief for appellant.
    _______
    Peter W. Sipkins, Dorsey & Whitney, Jay A. Garcia-Gregory,
    _________________ ________________ _____________________
    and Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez on supplemental brief for
    _______________________________
    appellee.

    _________________________

    May 3, 1993

    _________________________



















    SELYA, Circuit Judge. Notwithstanding that trial is
    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
    ______________

    still some distance away, this diversity case alights on our

    doorstep for the second time. The appellate roundelay began when

    Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. (M&E) sued the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and

    Sewer Authority (PRASA) for damages in Puerto Rico's federal

    district court. In the course of pretrial proceedings, the court

    denied PRASA the benefit of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The

    disappointed defendant essayed an interlocutory appeal.

    Following circuit precedent, see Libby v. Marshall, 833 F.2d 402
    ___ _____ ________

    (1st Cir. 1987), we dismissed the appeal for want of

    jurisdiction. M&E v. PRASA, 945 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991).
    ___ _____

    The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, resolving an existing

    split in the circuits, determined that pretrial orders granting

    or denying Eleventh Amendment immunity were immediately

    appealable. PRASA v. M&E, 113 S. Ct. 684, 689 (1993).
    _____ ___

    PRASA's appeal returns to us on remand from the Supreme

    Court. This time around, we must address the merits of the

    ruling below. After reviewing supplemental briefs and

    considering PRASA's overall relationship with the central

    government of Puerto Rico, we affirm the district court's denial

    of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

    I.
    I.
    __

    Setting the Stage
    Setting the Stage
    _________________

    Puerto Rico's legislature created PRASA over forty

    years ago in order to provide safe drinking water for inhabitants

    and to manage wastewater treatment. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 22,
    ___


    2














    141-168 (1987 & Supp. 1989). PRASA's stewardship has not been

    without blemish. The incident that sparked this suit occurred in

    1985, when the United States Environmental Protection Agency

    (EPA) brought an enforcement action pursuant to the Clean Water

    Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (1988), seeking to provoke a

    substantial modernization of PRASA's wastewater treatment

    facilities.

    In due course, PRASA and EPA signed a consent order

    limning the changes necessary to bring PRASA's treatment system

    into compliance. Toward that end, PRASA hired M&E, a

    Massachusetts-based engineering firm with professed expertise in

    wastewater management, to oversee the refurbishment. M&E's

    duties included contracting for design and construction services

    on PRASA's behalf, procuring necessary equipment, and supervising

    work on the project. M&E was to be remunerated on a time-plus-

    expense basis, invoiced as accrued. Bills were due and payable

    within thirty days of presentment.

    Over time, project expenditures mushroomed well beyond

    budget. As costs mounted, PRASA grew increasingly inhospitable

    to M&E's invoices. The denouement occurred when PRASA, amidst

    charges of skulduggery, suspended all payments to M&E and

    demanded a complete audit. M&E consented to the audit, but did

    not acquiesce in the cessation of payments. The audit dragged on

    and PRASA accumulated a huge stockpile of M&E invoices. Its

    financial plight ingravescent, M&E sued before the audit had run

    its course to force payment of the arrearage (roughly


    3














    $52,000,000).

    Confronted by defendant's motion to dismiss, the

    district court determined as a matter of law that PRASA did not

    enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. In so holding, the court

    stressed that PRASA possessed the "ability to raise funds for

    payment of its contractual obligations" and, thus, its

    obligations "do not affect the Commonwealth's funds." PRASA

    appeals this decision as a legal rather than a factual matter.

    Although there may sometimes be genuine issues of material fact

    sufficient to preclude brevis disposition in Eleventh Amendment
    ______

    litigation, there are none here. Agreeing with PRASA that the

    issue in this case is one of law, we afford plenary review to the

    district court's denial of immunity. See Dedham Water Co. v.
    ___ _________________

    Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1992);
    _____________________________

    New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d
    _________________________ ________________________

    157, 167 (1st Cir. 1989).

    II.
    II.
    ___

    Analysis
    Analysis
    ________

    A.
    A.
    __

    The Eleventh Amendment: An Overview
    The Eleventh Amendment: An Overview
    ____________________________________

    In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
    ________ _______

    the Supreme Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction

    to hear a South Carolina citizen's suit against the State of

    Georgia. This result, popularly perceived as a threat to state

    autonomy in a newly minted federal system, produced an

    overwhelmingly negative reaction. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
    ___ _______ ______


    4














    U.S. 651, 662 (1974). Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment

    followed apace.1

    On its face, the amendment appeared to introduce a

    fairly simple proposition into our constitutional jurisprudence.

    Nevertheless, driven by the pressure of pragmatic necessity,

    judicial sketching of the amendment's scope and requirements has

    displayed a creative bent. Under the gloss supplied by this

    abstract impressionistic flair, the federal courts now read the

    Eleventh Amendment, notwithstanding its plain language, to

    prohibit them from hearing most suits brought against a state by

    citizens of that or any other state.2 See De Leon Lopez v.
    ___ ______________

    Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir. 1991)
    ______________________________

    (collecting cases); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63.
    ___ ____ _______

    Withal, there are apertures in the Eleventh Amendment's

    protective swaddling. If a case falls within one of these gaps,

    the Eleventh Amendment will not bar maintenance of the suit in a

    federal court. See Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d
    ___ _______ ______________________

    694, 697, (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment


    ____________________

    1The Amendment reads:

    The Judicial power of the United States
    shall not be construed to extend to any suit
    in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
    against one of the United States by Citizens
    of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
    of any Foreign State.

    U.S. Const. amend. XI.

    2There is, of course, an exception for prospective
    injunctive relief. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv.,
    ___ ____ _______ ______________________
    715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983).

    5














    "bars federal court lawsuits by private parties insofar as they

    attempt to impose liabilities necessarily payable from public

    coffers, unless the state has consented to suit or unless the

    protective cloak of the amendment has been doffed by waiver or

    stripped away by congressional fiat"). Specifically, the

    amendment's raiment unravels if any one of four circumstances

    eventuates: a state may randomly consent to suit in a federal

    forum, see, e.g., Paul N. Howard Co. v. PRASA, 744 F.2d 880, 886
    ___ ____ __________________ _____

    (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191 (1985); a state may
    _____ ______

    waive its own immunity by statute or the like, see, e.g.,
    ___ ____

    Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673; Congress may sometimes abrogate state
    _______

    immunity (so long as it speaks clearly and acts in furtherance of

    particular powers), see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
    ___ ____ ___________ ______

    445, 451-54 (1976); or under certain circumstances other

    constitutional imperatives may take precedence over the Eleventh

    Amendment's federal-court bar, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
    ___ _____________________________

    v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (involving Fourteenth
    _________

    Amendment); Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456 (same).
    ______

    Here, M&E does not argue that PRASA consented to be

    sued, that Puerto Rico waived PRASA's immunity, that Congress

    abrogated PRASA's immunity, or that some other provision of the

    federal Constitution has usurped the field. Hence, this suit

    skirts the gaps. Rather, it is a "pure" Eleventh Amendment case

    in which this court must focus on whether PRASA enters the






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    Eleventh Amendment's sphere at all.3

    B.
    B.
    __

    The Test
    The Test
    ________

    The mere imprimatur of state authority is insufficient

    to inoculate an agency or institution against federal court

    jurisdiction. A "slice of state power," without more, will not

    sate the Eleventh Amendment. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
    __________________________ _____

    Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). By the same
    ________________________

    token and for much the same reasons political subdivisions of

    a state, such as municipalities and counties, do not lie within

    the Eleventh Amendment's reach. See, e.g., Owen v. City of
    ___ ____ ____ _______

    Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980); Moor v. County of
    ____________ ____ __________

    Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-721 (1973). Only the state itself and
    _______

    "arms" of the state receive immunity. See PRASA v. M&E, 113 S.
    ___ _____ ___

    Ct. at 689; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); see
    _______ ____ ___

    generally De Leon Lopez, 931 F.2d at 121 (discussing coverage of
    _________ _____________

    Eleventh Amendment). Because PRASA is not an organic part of the

    central government of Puerto Rico, we must investigate whether it

    is sufficiently a part of the central government to be considered

    an arm of the state. Framed in this way, the question poses an


    ____________________

    3We have consistently treated Puerto Rico as if it were a
    state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See, e.g., De Leon Lopez,
    ___ ____ _____________
    931 F.2d at 121; Fred v. Roque, 916 F.2d 37, 38 (1st Cir. 1990);
    ____ _____
    Paul N. Howard Co., 744 F.2d at 886; Ramirez, 715 F.2d at 697.
    ___________________ _______
    Although M&E invites us to revisit this position, we decline the
    invitation. In a multi-panel circuit, newly constituted panels,
    generally speaking, are bound by prior panel decisions on point.
    See United States v. Gomez-Villamizar, 981 F.2d 621, 623 n.9 (1st
    ___ _____________ ________________
    Cir. 1992); Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 993 (1st Cir. 1989).
    ______ _____
    So it is here.

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    essentially functional inquiry, not easily amenable to bright-

    line answers or mechanical solutions.

    The Eleventh Amendment's primary concern is to minimize

    federal courts' involvement in disbursal of the state fisc. It

    follows that "when the action is in essence one for the recovery

    of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party

    in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from

    suit . . . ." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.
    ______________ ______________________

    459, 464 (1945); see also Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 400-
    ___ ____ ____________________

    01 (identifying the desire to protect state treasuries as a

    driving force behind adoption of the Eleventh Amendment); Dugan
    _____

    v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (recognizing "that a suit is
    ____

    against the sovereign `if the judgment sought would expend itself

    on the public treasury or domain'") (citation omitted); Ainsworth
    _________

    Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co., 818 F.2d 1034, 1037
    ___________________________ ___________

    (1st Cir. 1987) (similar). Generally, if a state has a legal

    obligation to satisfy judgments against an institution out of

    public coffers, the institution is protected from federal

    adjudication by the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
    ___ _____ ______

    U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Reyes v. Supervisor of DEA, 834 F.2d 1093,
    _____ _________________

    1097-98 (1st Cir. 1987).

    Because it is not always limpid whether, or to what

    extent, the state treasury must stand behind the judgment debts

    of a particular institution, we have identified seven related

    areas as prospects for further inquiry. These areas, each of

    which can be mined for information that might clarify the


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    institution's structure and function, include: (1) whether the

    agency has the funding power to enable it to satisfy judgments

    without direct state participation or guarantees; (2) whether the

    agency's function is governmental or proprietary; (3) whether the

    agency is separately incorporated; (4) whether the state exerts

    control over the agency, and if so, to what extent; (5) whether

    the agency has the power to sue, be sued, and enter contracts in

    its own name and right; (6) whether the agency's property is

    subject to state taxation; and (7) whether the state has

    immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's acts or

    omissions. See Ainsworth Aristocrat, 818 F.2d at 1037
    ___ ______________________

    (collecting cases from other circuits recounting the same or

    similar factors). The list is not an all-inclusive compendium,

    for other areas of inquiry may prove fruitful in particular

    circumstances. It is, however, clear that all the pertinent

    factors have a common orientation: the more tightly the agency

    and the state are entangled, the more probable it becomes that

    the agency shares the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.

    C.
    C.
    __

    Applying the Test
    Applying the Test
    _________________

    In Paul N. Howard Co., supra, we adjudicated a similar
    __________________ _____

    dispute involving PRASA's renitency to make payments due under a

    construction contract. 744 F.2d at 881-84. The plaintiff

    prevailed in the district court. On appeal, PRASA advanced for

    the first time an added defense premised on Eleventh Amendment

    immunity. Although we suggested rather strongly that PRASA might


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    "not qualify for immunity under the Eleventh Amendment," id. at
    ___

    886, we did not conclusively resolve the issue because PRASA had

    purposefully availed itself of the federal forum and had thereby

    lost whatever entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity it might

    have possessed with respect to that particular suit. See id.
    ___ ___

    The case before us today requires that we return to, and resolve,

    the question deferred in Howard.4 Faithful to the explication
    ______

    of legal principles set out above, see supra Part II(B), we first
    ___ _____

    examine PRASA's access to the public fisc and thereafter

    scrutinize how the associated factors are arrayed in this

    particular situation.

    1. Access to the Commonwealth's Treasury. On the
    1. Access to the Commonwealth's Treasury.
    ________________________________________

    principal issue PRASA's access to the Commonwealth's treasury

    the die is quickly cast. Puerto Rico's legislature made it

    readily evident that PRASA

    shall have no power at any time or in any
    manner to pledge the credit or taxing power
    of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or any of
    its other political subdivisions. The bonds
    and other obligations issued by the Authority
    shall not be a debt of the Commonwealth of
    Puerto Rico nor of any of its municipalities
    nor of its other political subdivisions and
    neither the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico nor
    any such municipalities nor its other
    political subdivisions shall be liable
    thereon, nor shall such bonds or other
    obligations be paid out of any funds other

    ____________________

    4In this quest, we give no weight to the Howard court's
    ______
    comments concerning PRASA's immunity, for we recognize that, as
    dictum, the comments are not binding. That is not to say,
    however, that Eleventh Amendment issues must always be resolved
    de novo. Where the agency's activity and its relation to the
    __ ____
    state remain essentially the same, prior circuit precedent will
    be controlling.

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    than those of the Authority.

    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 22, 144. The statute erects a wall between

    the agency's appetite and the public fisc. The existence of this

    statutory barrier presages the result we must reach: PRASA is

    not an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.5

    PRASA argues that, notwithstanding the Commonwealth's

    disavowal of its liabilities, the Commonwealth's significant

    financial support of PRASA's activities constitutes the sort of

    access to public funds that triggers Eleventh Amendment

    protection. We do not agree. Although the central government

    subsidizes the agency to some extent, PRASA relies mostly on user

    fees and bonds to support its operations. The government does

    not give PRASA a blank check or an indeterminant carte blanche

    allowing it to draw on the public treasury as it thinks

    necessary. Thus, control of the money flow from tax dollars is

    unilateral; if the Commonwealth chooses not to open the faucet,

    the agency must go thirsty or else, by resort to its own devices,

    procure the funds needed to stay liquid.

    We think PRASA's situation is not unlike that of a

    typical political subdivision. Such an entity often receives

    part of its budget from the state and raises the rest

    independently. Despite this dual funding, such entities do not

    ____________________

    5The statutory barrier is especially important in this case,
    for Puerto Rico's legislature has demonstrated that, when it
    wishes to do so, it knows exactly how to pledge the
    Commonwealth's resources in security for PRASA's debts. See P.R.
    ___
    Laws Ann. tit. 22, 168 (explicitly agreeing to reimburse the
    Farmers Home Administration if PRASA should default on two
    particular loans).

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    automatically (or even usually) come within the zone of

    protection demarcated by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, in Mt.
    ___

    Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
    _______________________________________ _____

    (1977), the Supreme Court denied Eleventh Amendment sanctuary to

    a school board despite the "significant amount of money" it

    received from the state. Id. at 280; accord Fitchik v. New
    ___ ______ _______ ___

    Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 660 (3d Cir.)
    ____________________________________

    (denying immunity to a regional rail authority despite state

    funding while noting "that an entity derives some of its income

    from the state does not mean that it is entitled to partake of

    the state's immunity"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989); see
    _____ ______ ___

    also Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 723 (3d Cir. 1979)
    ____ _____ _____

    (recognizing that "the nature of the state's obligation to

    contribute may be more important than the size of the

    contribution"), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). The case at
    _____ ______

    bar is cut from much the same cloth.

    We hold, therefore, that a state agency cannot claim

    Eleventh Amendment immunity solely on the basis that judgments

    against it may absorb unrestricted funds donated by the state

    and, in that way, redound indirectly to the depletion of the

    state's treasury. It follows that PRASA's assertion of Eleventh

    Amendment immunity in this case is severely flawed.

    2. Other Factors. Although PRASA's inability to draw
    2. Other Factors.
    _____________

    on the public fisc cripples its immunity defense, we turn to the

    other factors mentioned in the case law in order that our

    investigation may be complete. In the circumstances at hand,


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    these factors, taken as an aggregate, corroborate the view that

    PRASA does not dwell within the Eleventh Amendment's shelter.

    To be sure, the two pans of the scale are not

    completely out of balance. PRASA to some extent wields the

    state's power; after all, the enabling legislation describes

    PRASA's mission to provide water and sewer services as fulfilling

    "an essential government function." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 22,

    142. Additionally, neither PRASA nor its revenue bonds are

    taxable, see id. 155; PRASA enjoys the power of eminent domain,
    ___ ___

    see id. 144(e); and the Governor of Puerto Rico appoints five
    ___ ___

    of PRASA's seven board members, see id. 143.
    ___ ___

    PRASA places particular emphasis on the fact that its

    water and sewage functions are governmental rather than

    proprietary and insists that this circumstance renders it an arm

    of the state.6 But the nature of PRASA's function is only one

    ____________________

    6In arguing this point, PRASA leans heavily on our decision
    in Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1,
    _______________________ ____________________
    12 (1st Cir. 1990). This reliance is mislaid. In Manhattan
    _________
    Prince, the Ports Authority was acting only as the licensor of
    ______
    harbor pilots for whom it provided no training and over whom it
    exercised no assignment power. The Authority derived no revenue
    from the licensing function. Moreover, the legislature had
    explicitly made Authority members' misfeasance of the kind
    alleged in Manhattan Prince attributable only to the
    __________________
    Commonwealth. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, 2303(b) (1987).
    ___
    PRASA's situation is much different; it charges for its services,
    controls its total operations, and answers for its own bevues.
    Thus, a more apt Ports Authority analogy is found in Royal
    _____
    Caribbean Corp. v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 973 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.
    _______________ _______________________
    1992). That case involved not licensing, but operation of the
    ports. See id. at 9. Because the Ports Authority charged user
    ___ ___
    fees that supported the costs of its port operations and was
    relatively free of central government control, we ruled that it
    did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to its
    management of the ports. Id. at 12.
    ___


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    part of the equation, and, standing alone, it is insufficient to

    bring PRASA behind the Eleventh Amendment's shield. Educational

    services, for example, are, like water treatment, a traditional

    governmental function. Education, however, has an even longer,

    stronger governmental history than water treatment, and as

    attendance requirements attest, a more entrenched place in state

    government. Yet, despite these more evocative characteristics,

    school boards are not immune from suits in federal court. See
    ___

    Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (holding that school board is not
    ___________

    entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity).

    On the other side of the scale, a heftier array of

    indicators suggests that PRASA is distinct from Puerto Rico's

    central government. PRASA has the power to raise funds through

    user fees (which, significantly, the Commonwealth, as a water-

    and-sewer user, must pay with respect to its own operations).

    See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 22, 158. PRASA also has the right to
    ___

    raise funds by issuing revenue bonds independently of the central

    government. See id. 152. The power and opportunity to
    ___ ___

    generate a revenue stream and thereby finance an agency's

    operations is an important attribute of the agency's separate

    identity. Cf. Hernandez-Tirado v. Artau, 874 F.2d 866, 872 (1st
    ___ ________________ _____


    ____________________

    We recognize the seeming anomaly in a single agency
    being held to possess Eleventh Amendment immunity for some
    functions but not for others. However, the two cases cited above
    turned on the nature of the function involved in each instance,
    presumably because, in light of the Authority's portfolio of
    diverse operations, the question of access to the Commonwealth's
    treasury was fuliginous. The case before us is free from this
    strain of uncertainty.

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    Cir. 1989) (finding agency to be an arm of the Commonwealth

    because the central government had the sole power to raise money

    for the agency). Moreover, bondholders must look only to PRASA

    for recompense in the event of default. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
    ___

    22, 152(I). Then, too, PRASA is separately incorporated as "an

    autonomous government instrumentality." Id. 142. It may sue,
    ___

    be sued, and enter contracts without the Commonwealth's

    particular permission. See id. 144(c), (d). Its funds are
    ___ ___

    kept entirely separate from the funds of the central government

    and are totally controlled by its own board. Last, but surely

    not least, the Commonwealth has explicitly insulated itself from

    any financial responsibility with respect to PRASA's general debt

    and ordinary bonded indebtedness.7 See id. 144.
    ___ ___

    One more item deserves mention. Whether an agency is

    an arm of the state vel non is a matter of federal, not local,
    ___ ___

    law. See Blake, 612 F.2d at 722. Nevertheless, it is notable
    ___ _____

    that the district court's view of PRASA as a separate political

    subdivision rather than as a part of the central government

    comports with that of Puerto Rico's highest tribunal. The Puerto

    Rico Supreme Court has consistently concluded that PRASA is not

    an alter ego of the central government. The court observed over


    ____________________

    7PRASA argues that because its generated revenues (bond
    monies and user fees) are "pledged" to current debts and
    projects, it will have no money to pay a judgment and any
    judgment creditor must, therefore, look to the Commonwealth.
    This is specious reasoning. If M&E prevails in this suit, it,
    like unsecured judgment creditors from time immemorial, would
    bear the risk that it might find few assets available to satisfy
    the judgment.

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    forty years ago that the legislature intended PRASA to "be as

    amenable to judicial process as any private enterprise would be

    under like circumstances . . . ." Arraiza v. Reyes, 70 P.R.R.
    _______ _____

    583, 587 (1949). More recently, the court reiterated that PRASA

    has a "personality separate and apart from that of the

    government," and does not have the "sovereign immunity

    traditionally enjoyed by the State." Canchani v. C.R.U.V., 105
    ________ ________

    P.R. Dec. 352, 489 n.2, 490 (1976); see also A.A.A. v. Union
    ___ ____ ______ _____

    Empleados A.A.A., 105 P.R. Dec. 605, 628 (1976) (stating that
    ________________

    PRASA is "unquestionably framed as a private enterprise or

    business and in fact operates as such"). While not dispositive,

    consistent decisions of a state's highest court construing an

    agency's or institution's relationship with the central

    government are important guideposts in a reasoned attempt to

    locate the agency's or institution's place within the scheme of

    things. See Ainsworth Aristocrat, 818 F.2d at 1037.
    ___ ____________________

    3. Assessing the Balance. The upshot is that PRASA
    3. Assessing the Balance.
    _____________________

    lacks eligibility for Eleventh Amendment immunity on several

    levels. First, and most fundamentally, PRASA's inability to tap

    the Commonwealth treasury or pledge the Commonwealth's credit

    leaves it unable to exercise the power of the purse. On this

    basis, PRASA is ill-deserving of Eleventh Amendment protection.

    Even putting aside PRASA's fiscal separation from the

    central government, we find that the sum total of the secondary

    factors preponderates against immunity. While PRASA indisputably

    operates with some quantum of state authority, as do many other


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    public utilities, it is readily apparent that Puerto Rico's

    legislature chose to structure an arm's-length relationship

    between PRASA and the central government. To implement this

    relationship, the legislature gave PRASA the power to raise

    funds, enter contracts, conceive strategy, and to make its own

    operational decisions. As a consequence of the legislative

    design, the central government does business with PRASA in the

    same manner as with other vendors: it pays for the services it

    receives and does not extend any credit or generic funding

    guarantees. When all the relevant factors are weighed, the

    indicia of separateness countervail the indicia of togetherness.





    III.
    III.
    ____

    Conclusion
    Conclusion
    __________

    We need go no further. The profound impact of PRASA's

    inability to reach the Commonwealth's treasury, and our

    calibrating measurement of the secondary factors, dictate that

    PRASA's assertion of immunity must fail. Consequently, we today

    confirm the suspicions adumbrated in Howard, 744 F.2d at 886: in
    ______

    its current incarnation, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer

    Authority is not safeguarded from federal court jurisdiction by

    the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the district court's denial

    of PRASA's motion to dismiss must be



    Affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ________


    17







Document Info

Docket Number: 91-1602

Filed Date: 5/3/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (22)

Ainsworth Aristocrat International Pty. Limited v. Tourism ... , 818 F.2d 1034 ( 1987 )

Paul N. Howard Company v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer ... , 744 F.2d 880 ( 1984 )

Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/v Manhattan Prince, Sujeen ... , 897 F.2d 1 ( 1990 )

David Libby v. Clifford Marshall, Michael Dukakis , 833 F.2d 402 ( 1987 )

Gloria E. Barreto Fred v. Awilda Aponte Roque , 916 F.2d 37 ( 1990 )

Dedham Water Co., Inc. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. , 972 F.2d 453 ( 1992 )

Tomas Reyes v. The Supervisor of the Drug Enforcement ... , 834 F.2d 1093 ( 1987 )

Waddie Jusino v. Carmen Sonia Zayas, Etc. , 875 F.2d 986 ( 1989 )

Pablo De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros , 931 F.2d 116 ( 1991 )

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer ... , 945 F.2d 10 ( 1991 )

Royal Caribbean Corp. And Caribbean Cruise Line, Ltd. v. ... , 973 F.2d 8 ( 1992 )

United States v. Gustavo Gomez-Villamizar , 981 F.2d 621 ( 1992 )

blake-margaret-anne-a-minor-by-blake-james-her-guardian-v-kline , 612 F.2d 718 ( 1979 )

32-fair-emplpraccas-bna-1239-32-empl-prac-dec-p-33783-jose-e , 715 F.2d 694 ( 1983 )

Alabama v. Pugh , 98 S. Ct. 3057 ( 1978 )

Moor v. County of Alameda , 93 S. Ct. 1785 ( 1973 )

Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , 99 S. Ct. 1171 ( 1979 )

Owen v. City of Independence , 100 S. Ct. 1398 ( 1980 )

Dugan v. Rank , 83 S. Ct. 999 ( 1963 )

Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle , 97 S. Ct. 568 ( 1977 )

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