Trinidad v. SK&F ( 1993 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 92-1462
    No. 92-1771

    RAFAELA TRINIDAD-DELGADO, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    SK&F LAB COMPANY, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Stahl, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Skinner,* Senior District Judge.
    _____________________

    ____________________

    Luis Angel Lopez Olmedo for appellants.
    _______________________
    Gregory T. Usera with whom Ramon L. Velasco and Goldman Antonetti
    ________________ _________________ _________________
    Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer were on brief for appellees.
    _____________________

    ____________________

    April 29, 1993
    ____________________

    _____________________
    * Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.





















    SKINNER, Senior District Judge.
    ______________________





    This appeal is from a summary judgment of

    dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The

    plaintiffs brought an action in the District Court of the

    District of Puerto Rico to recover damages from the

    defendants for injuries to the plaintiff Rafaela Trinidad

    Delgado resulting from exposure to cimetidine hydrochloride,

    a toxic substance used in the manufacture of Tagamet.

    Tagamet was manufactured by the plaintiff's employer. The

    other plaintiffs are Mrs. Trinidad's husband and son. The

    original defendants were "SK&F Lab Co., Smith Kline and

    French - U.S., Smith Kline Beecham Mellon and or other Smith

    Kline Corporation family and it insurers [sic]."

    Without challenge by the parties, the relationship

    of the various Smithkline corporations was found by the

    district judge to be as follows:

    Mrs. Trinidad's employer, originally called SK&F

    Lab Co., merged with SK&F Co. to form Smithkline Beecham

    Pharmaceutical Co., a Delaware corporation with its

    principal place of business in Puerto Rico. (This


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    corporation and its predecessors were referred to

    collectively by the court below as "Pharmco," and we will do

    the same.) Pharmco is a subsidiary of SKB, Puerto Rico,

    Inc., a holding company incorporated in Delaware, and with

    its principal place of business there. SKB, Puerto Rico,

    Inc., is itself a subsidiary of Smithkline Beecham

    Corporation (formerly Smithkline Beckman Corporation), which

    is a Pennsylvania corporation having its principal place of

    business in Pennsylvania. There is no such corporation as

    the named defendant, Smithkline Beecham Mellon. There are

    two other corporations referred to by the district court,

    Smithkline and French International Company and its wholly

    owned subsidiary, Smithkline & French Interamerican

    ("Interamerican"), a Delaware corporation with its principal

    place of business in Puerto Rico. Interamerican is engaged

    in the sale and distribution of products manufactured by

    Pharmco.

    Several months after the case was filed, and after

    the original defendants had filed their answer, the

    plaintiff moved to amend the complaint by including all of

    the above named Smithkline corporations as defendants. The

    record reveals neither allowance of this motion nor service

    on the added defendants. Nevertheless, after the filing of


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    this motion, all parties and the court treated these

    corporations as properly before the court, at least for the

    purpose of presenting their motions for summary judgment on

    jurisdictional grounds and to dismiss for failure to state

    claims against certain of the defendants. Counsel never

    filed an answer with respect to the added defendants, but

    did file a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on

    behalf of all named defendants. For purposes of this

    appeal, we too will treat all parties as properly before the

    court.

    About a month after the motion to dismiss or for

    summary judgment was filed by the defendants, the plaintiffs

    filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) for voluntary

    dismissal of Pharmco and Interamerican, the two corporations

    having their principal places of business in Puerto Rico.

    This motion was filed for the avowed purpose of creating

    complete diversity of citizenship, the lack of which had

    been cited by the defendants as a basis for dismissal for

    lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs did not

    specify upon which paragraph of Rule 41(a)1 they were

    ____________________

    1 The pertinent provisions of Rule 41(a) are as follows:

    Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions
    Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions

    (a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
    (a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.

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    relying. The motion was referred to a magistrate judge, who

    endorsed the motion, "Denied. Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)." The

    magistrate judge apparently did not consider whether the

    motion should be granted on conditions under Fed. R. Civ. P.

    41(a)(2).

    The district judge thereafter entered a judgment

    for the defendants upon the allowance of their motion to

    dismiss or for summary judgment. He ruled (1) that since

    the motion under Rule 41(a) had been properly denied under

    Rule 41(a)(1), the two local corporations were still in the

    case, so that subject matter jurisdiction failed for lack of

    diversity; and (2), alternatively, that the complaint failed

    ____________________

    (1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation.
    (1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation.
    Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e),
    of Rule 66, and of any statute of the
    United States, an action may be
    dismissed by the plaintiff without order
    of court (i) by filing a notice of
    dismissal at any time before service by
    the other party of an answer or of a
    motion for summary judgment, whichever
    first occurs, or (ii) by filing a
    stipulation of dismissal signed by all
    parties who have appeared in the action.
    . . .

    (2) By Order of Court. Except as
    (2) By Order of Court.
    provided in paragraph (1) of this
    subdivision of this rule, an action
    shall not be dismissed at the
    plaintiff's instance save upon order of
    the court and upon such terms and
    conditions as the court deems proper.

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    to state a claim against Pharmco and Interamerican, and

    there was no personal jurisdiction over the other Smithkline

    corporations. This appeal followed.

    It would appear from the magistrate judge's

    endorsement that the magistrate intended to determine the

    motion. This was error, because under 28 U.S.C.

    636(b)(1)(A) and (B), a motion to dismiss may not be

    referred for determination, but only for report and

    recommendation to the district judge. Accordingly we will

    treat the magistrate judge's endorsement as a recommendation

    to the district judge. The magistrate judge was correct in

    recommending denial of the motion for voluntary dismissal

    under Rule 41(a)(1), since a motion for summary judgment had

    been filed and the parties had filed no stipulation.

    The plaintiffs may well have been entitled to

    dismiss non-diverse parties for the purpose of establishing

    diversity jurisdiction under Rule 41(a)(2), absent any

    showing of prejudice to the defendants2. Newman-Green,
    _____________

    ____________________

    2 The defendants' argument that Pharmco and
    Interamerican were indispensable parties is totally
    insupportable on the record. Mrs. Trinidad Delgado had
    received workers' compensation from the State Insurance
    Fund, which, as the defendants correctly argued, is a
    complete defense to a direct claim against her employer, of
    which Pharmco is the corporate successor. 11 L.P.R.A. 21.
    Moreover, it is difficult to understand how Interamerican,
    which was a sales organization, had anything to do with the

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    Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 833 (1989); Sweeney
    ________________________ _______

    v. Westvaco Co., 926 F.2d 29, 41 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
    _______________ ____________

    112 S. Ct. 274 (1991); cf. Leroux v. Lomas & Nettleton Co.,
    _______________________________

    626 F. Supp. 962, 965 (D. Mass. 1986).

    The plaintiffs never sought reconsideration by the

    district judge of the magistrate's recommendation to deny

    plaintiffs' voluntary motion to dismiss, however. Under the

    Local Rules of Puerto Rico 510.1, an appeal from a

    determination by a magistrate judge must be filed within ten

    days, or the determination becomes a ruling of the court;

    but under Local Rule 501.2(A), an objection to a

    recommendation and report must also be filed within ten

    days, and "[f]ailure to file objections within the specified

    time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order."



    Not only did the plaintiffs fail to follow the

    local rule, they failed to honor the rationale behind it,

    which as the Supreme Court pointed out in Thomas v. Arn, 474
    _______________

    U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), is to

    enable [ ] the district judge to focus
    attention on those issues -- factual and
    legal -- that are at the heart of the
    parties' dispute. The [ ] rule, by

    ____________________

    manufacturing process in which Mrs. Trinidad Delgado was
    injured.

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    precluding appellate review of any issue
    not contained in objections, prevents a
    litigant from 'sandbagging' the district
    judge by failing to object and then
    appealing.

    As we have said, the magistrate judge's decision

    must be treated as no more than a recommendation to the

    district judge. Because of the plaintiffs' complete failure

    to protect their rights under Local Rule 510.2(A) (or under

    Rule 501.1 either, for that matter), the ruling of the

    district judge is not appealable. Keating v. Secretary of
    ________________________

    Health and Human Serv., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988).
    ______________________

    For purposes of this appeal, therefore, Pharmco and

    Interamerican remain parties in the case.

    Given this state of the record, the court's ruling

    that there was no subject matter jurisdiction must stand.

    The uncontradicted affidavits submitted by the defendants

    firmly establish that Puerto Rico was the principal place of

    business of both Pharmco and Interamerican. For purposes of

    diversity, they are citizens of Puerto Rico, 28 U.S.C.

    1332(c)(1), as are the plaintiffs. Absent complete

    diversity of citizenship, there is no basis for subject

    matter jurisdiction.

    There is no need to examine the court's alternate

    grounds for dismissal.


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    The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The

    appellees shall recover their costs.












































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