Naidich v. Mitre Cor & Horowitz ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    For The FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 93-1038

    HERBERT H. NAIDICH,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    THE MITRE CORPORATION & BARRY M. HOROWITZ,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Herbert H. Naidich on brief pro se.
    __________________
    David J. Kerman, Herbert L. Holtz and Ropes & Gray, on brief for
    ________________ ________________ _____________
    appellees.


    ____________________

    June 11, 1993
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    Per Curiam. The appellant, Herbert H. Naidich, has
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    appealed the denial of his "motion to reopen" a district

    court order dismissing his lawsuit for failure to prosecute

    and failure to attend a court session. In the absence of any

    designation to the contrary, we treat the court's dismissal

    as a dismissal with prejudice. Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land
    ________________ ________

    Serv., Inc., 920 F.2d 1072, 1075 (1st Cir. 1990). Although
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    such a dismissal is a harsh sanction, we conclude that it was

    within the court's permissible discretion in this case.

    The gist of the matter is briefly stated. On October 7,

    1992, two years after the start of this age discrimination

    suit, defendants filed a substantial motion for summary

    judgment. The district court on October 13, 1992, issued an

    order setting a scheduling conference for October 23 pursuant

    to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and D. Mass. Loc. R. 16.1. The

    order specified that its provisions relating to preparation

    for the conference were of the utmost importance. By cross

    reference, it noted that sanctions including dismissal were

    authorized for failure to comply. An opposition to

    defendants' motion was due under the governing rules by

    October 21.1







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    1. We reject Naidich's suggestion that the dismissal in this
    case was pursuant to D. Mass. Loc. R. 41.1(b), as the case
    was not on any "dismissal calendar," as referenced in that
    rule.















    Naidich neither appeared at the scheduling conference

    nor filed a timely opposition to the summary judgment motion.

    When Naidich did not appear, the district court dismissed the

    case. Naidich then filed a motion to reopen, but he did not

    adequately explain his failure to attend the scheduling

    conference whose importance had been plainly stressed. Nor

    did he adequately explain his failure to file a timely

    opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It appears

    that Naidich's failure to appear may have been related to

    disagreements with defense counsel about the preliminary

    steps but there is no doubt that Naidich knew of the

    scheduled conference and disregarded that obligation.

    There is ample authority for dismissal where court

    ordered deadlines or other obligations are ignored by

    litigants, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), Link v. Wabash R.R., 370
    ____ ____________

    U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962), and case precedent sustaining such

    dismissals as well. Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645,
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    649 (1st Cir. 1990) (dismissal where plaintiffs were guilty

    not only of simple delay but of disobedience of a court order

    as well); Zavala Santiago v. Gonzalez Rivera, 553 F.2d 710,
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    713 (1st Cir. 1977) (dismissal where plaintiffs disregarded

    court-ordered deadlines and counsel failed to appear at the

    pretrial conference).

    Equally important, Naidich did not seek leave, at the

    time he sought to reopen, to file the tardy opposition. A



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    court asked to forgive procedural defaults, and the

    consequent waste of its time and resources, ought at the very

    least be assured that there is some purpose to reinstating

    the case. Evennow we think no such purpose hasbeen made out.

    Indeed, because the sanction is a severe one and Naidich

    is proceeding pro se, we might find this a close case if

    anything filed by Naidich in the district court demonstrated

    a substantial defense to the summary judgment motion. But

    even now on appeal -- and appeal is too late -- Naidich makes

    only conclusory and unsupported assertions that, except for

    the defendants' description of the company, every other

    statement is "untrue" and defendants' documents are

    "forgeries" and "deceptions." Given defendants' quite

    thorough and well-documented affidavits -- which strongly

    indicate that Naidich's discharge was due to performance and

    not age -- Naidich's epithets are of no weight. See
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    generally Teamsters, Chauffeurs Local No. 59 v. Superline
    _________ _____________________________________ _________

    Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) (in order to set
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    aside a judgment, a movant must at least establish, by more

    than a purely conclusory allegation, that it possesses a

    potentially meritorious claim).

    There was no abuse of discretion either in dismissing

    this lawsuit or in denying the motion to reopen. The order

    of the district court is, therefore, affirmed. Naidich's
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    "motion to compel," filed in this court and which asks for



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    the imposition of sanctions, is denied.
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