Narragansett v. Guilbert ( 1993 )

March 24, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1622
NARRAGANSETT TRIBE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PAUL E. GUILBERT,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Brown,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Mark B. Morse for appellants.
Bruce N. Goodsell for appellee.
*Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. Judge Brown (now
deceased) heard oral argument in this matter, and participated in the
semble, but did not participate in the drafting or the issuance of the
panel's opinion. The remaining two panelists therefore issue this
opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 46(d).
1
BREYER, Chief Judge. The sole question on this
appeal is whether the Narragansett Indian Tribe has
sovereign immunity from claims against it for abuse of
process and slander of title. We have recently held that
the Tribe does possess sovereign immunity. Maynard v.
Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 92-2106, slip. op. at 4 (1st
Cir. January 27, 1993). And, that decision requires us to
reverse a default judgment entered against the Tribe.
I
Background
On December 6, 1990, the Narragansett Indian Tribe
brought a lawsuit in Rhode Island federal court against Paul
Guilbert, an adjacent landowner. The Tribe alleged that it
held title to Guilbert's property, and it sought to enjoin
Guilbert's planned sale of that property. The Tribe also
filed a lis pendens (or notice of pendency) with the
Charlestown, Rhode Island, Land Evidence Records Office.
That filing effectively clouded Guilbert's title to the
property and frustrated his efforts to sell it. Guilbert
filed an answer to the federal court complaint. That answer
included counterclaims for abuse of process and slander of
title.
The district court issued a temporary restraining
order, prohibiting the sale, but, after a hearing, it
vacated the TRO and denied the Tribe's motion for a
preliminary injunction. Thereafter, counsel for the Tribe
moved to withdraw from the case because the Tribe "has
insisted upon a course of action that counsel considers
imprudent." The district court granted the motion to
withdraw. It gave the Tribe one month to secure new
counsel. Five months later, the Tribe had not secured
counsel. Guilbert then asked the court to dismiss the
Tribe's claims, to vacate the lis pendens in the land
office, and to enter a default judgment against the Tribe on
Guilbert's counterclaims. The district court granted
Guilbert's motions and, after a hearing on damages (at which
the Tribe was represented by new counsel), it entered a
default judgment against the Tribe for about $50,000 (which
represented lost profit on a frustrated land sale, some
financing costs related to that failed sale, and legal fees
incurred in defending against the Tribe's suit). The Tribe
appeals the default judgment. It claims that its sovereign
immunity renders the default judgment void.
II
The Default Judgment
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Our recent decision in Maynard v. Narragansett
Indian Tribe, No. 92-2106 (1st Cir. January 27, 1993),
determines the outcome of this appeal. We there held that
the Narragansett Indian Tribe possesses sovereign immunity,
despite Congress's enactment of the Rhode Island Indian
Claims Settlement Act. Id. at 3 (explaining that the Rhode
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act subjected the Tribe's
lands, but not the Tribe itself, "to the civil and criminal
laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island," 25
U.S.C. 1708). Controlling case law also makes clear that
the Tribe, by filing its suit against Guilbert, did not
waive its immunity in respect to the counterclaims.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
111 S.Ct. 905, 909 (1991); United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 510-12 (1940) (allowing
counterclaims only to offset amounts owed under a principal
claim, but not to result in a money judgment against the
immune entity); cf. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel,
788 F.2d 765, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (no waiver of immunity
from cross-claims either). Consequently, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over Guilbert's counterclaims, see,
e.g., J.C. Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383, 385 n. 4
(4th Cir. 1990), and its default judgment is void. Fed. R.
-4-
4
Civ. P. 60(b)(4); 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure 2862 at 198-200 (1973).
We add that we have not considered the
relationship of sovereign immunity to Rule 11 sanctions,
which the district court mentioned but did not address.
Whether the bringing of a suit in federal court waives
immunity from such sanctions raises very different
considerations not now before us. See, e.g., Mattingly v.
United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1991) (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure waive the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity from Rule 11 sanctions); Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1988) (Equal Access
to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(b), waives Federal
Government's sovereign immunity from Rule 11 sanctions);
United States v. Gavilan Joint Community College Dist., 849
F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1988).
The judgment of the district court is
Reversed.
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