Wang v. Lynch , 795 F.3d 283 ( 2015 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-1845
    REI FENG WANG,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH,
    Attorney General of the United States,*
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Brown and Law Offices of Michael Brown, P.C., on brief
    for petitioner.
    Ilissa M. Gould, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil
    Division, and Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.
    July 31, 2015
    *  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
    Loretta E. Lynch has been substituted for former Attorney General
    Eric H. Holder, Jr. as the respondent.
    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.       Rei Feng Wang, a native and
    citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as untimely, by approximately
    fifteen years, his motion to reopen his earlier removal proceedings
    on the purported basis of changed country circumstances.                 We
    exercise jurisdiction and deny Wang's petition for review.              The
    BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang's motion.              We
    also decline to take a position on a potential circuit split on
    "mixed petitions."
    I.
    On   October   2,   1996,    Wang    was     interdicted    in
    international waters near Bermuda.       He was arrested by immigration
    officers and then detained.       Wang was served with a Notice to
    Appear in 1997 and was placed in removal proceedings.         He conceded
    he was removable from the United States for being an alien not in
    possession        of   valid     documentation,         see   8    U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).      Wang sought asylum on the basis that his
    life was in danger because, he claimed, he had testified against
    the organized crime group that tried to smuggle him into the United
    States.   He also claimed he faced persecution based on China's
    birth control policy because he and his wife had refused to undergo
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    forced sterilization.1         On February 2, 1998, an Immigration Judge
    denied, in part based on adverse credibility findings, Wang's
    applications for asylum and withholding of removal.                Wang's appeal
    with the BIA was dismissed on February 5, 1999.                 Wang, however,
    was not removed and remained in the United States.
    In his 2014 motion to reopen his asylum and withholding
    of removal proceedings, Wang argued that his admittedly late motion
    should    not    be   barred   by   the   ninety-day   limit,      see    8    U.S.C
    § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), because "he provides
    evidence demonstrating changed country conditions in China, his
    country   of     nationality."2      Wang   claimed    that   he    has       been   a
    practicing Christian since being baptized in 2012 and that he would
    face persecution if he returned to China.          He also maintained that
    local government cadres had shown his father a video in which Wang
    made critical statements about the Chinese government and its
    policies.       Wang alleged that the cadres had told his father that
    Wang must return to China and face punishment.                     As purported
    1  On the questionnaire Wang completed on October 11, 1996,
    he stated that he left China because his "family has no work, no
    livelihood," and he "was going to go to Canada as a refugee."
    2   Wang also challenged the Immigration Judge's adverse
    credibility finding in his original asylum claim. The BIA found
    these arguments should have been raised on appeal or potentially
    a timely motion to reopen. See Martinez-Lopez v. Holder, 
    704 F.3d 169
    , 172 (1st Cir. 2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).      Because we
    find that Wang failed to establish the changed country
    circumstances necessary to reopen his proceedings, we do not reach
    the validity of these rulings.
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    evidence         of   this,   Wang     provided     an    unauthenticated     letter
    allegedly from his father and a purported notice from the village
    committee in China addressed to Wang's father.                       Finally, Wang
    contended that the Chinese government's suppression of underground
    churches had intensified since 1998.
    The BIA denied Wang's motion to reopen on July 15, 2014,
    because it did not meet the exception to the time bar for relief
    based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality.                    See
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).                        The
    BIA found Wang's becoming a practicing Christian constituted a
    change      in     personal    circumstances,       not    a   change   in   country
    conditions.           The BIA gave little weight to the unauthenticated
    letter   purportedly          from    Wang's    father,    for   several     reasons,
    including that it was written by an interested party to support
    the reopening of Wang's final removal order and thus did not
    support a finding of materially changed circumstances.                       The BIA
    also found that the 2012 State Department report Wang submitted
    did   not    demonstrate       a     material   worsening      of   conditions   for
    Christians in China since his asylum hearing.                  Wang's petition for
    review followed.
    II.
    We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for
    abuse of discretion.           Aponte v. Holder, 
    610 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir.
    2010).   We "disfavor motions to reopen removal proceedings because
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    they run the risk of frustrating 'the compelling public interests
    in finality and the expeditious processing of proceedings.'"                         Hang
    Chen   v.   Holder,      
    675 F.3d 100
    ,    105     (1st    Cir.    2012)     (quoting
    Guerrero-Santana v. Gonzales, 
    499 F.3d 90
    , 92 (1st Cir. 2007)).
    A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of
    the     final         administrative        decision.                See      8    U.S.C.
    § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).                              Section 1229a
    provides an exception to this time limit for asylum applications
    if "the filing of a motion to reopen . . . is based on changed
    country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the
    country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is
    material and was not available and would not have been discovered
    or     presented       at      the     previous        proceeding."           8     U.S.C.
    §    1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);         see    also     8     C.F.R.    §     1003.2(c)(3)(ii)
    (applying       the     same     standard        to     withholding         of     removal
    proceedings).           Because      Wang      failed    to     demonstrate       changed
    conditions in China, he does not meet this exception, and his
    motion is time-barred.
    Wang presents a "mixed petition," that is both that his
    personal circumstances have changed and that country conditions
    have done so.         See Li Zhang v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 
    543 F. App'x 277
    , 285 (3d Cir. 2013) (defining a "mixed petition" as one
    "presenting changes in both personal and country conditions").                         He
    claims that he converted to Christianity and was baptized in 2012
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    and   that   conditions   in   China   have    worsened   since   his   1998
    hearings.3    A change in personal circumstances alone does not meet
    the standard for the exception to the time bar for changed country
    conditions.     See, e.g., Ming Chen v. Holder, 
    722 F.3d 63
    , 66-67
    (1st Cir. 2013); Yang Zhao-Cheng v. Holder, 
    721 F.3d 25
    , 27 n.4
    (1st Cir. 2013); accord Xiu Zhen Zheng v. Holder, 
    548 F. App'x 869
    , 870 (4th Cir. 2013); Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder, 
    702 F.3d 878
    ,
    879-80 (6th Cir. 2012); Khan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 
    691 F.3d 488
    ,
    497-98 (3d Cir. 2012); Almaraz v. Holder, 
    608 F.3d 638
    , 640 (9th
    Cir. 2010); Zhang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 
    572 F.3d 1316
    , 1319 (11th
    Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Qi Hua Li v. Holder, 
    354 F. App'x 46
    , 48
    (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Wei v. Mukasey, 
    545 F.3d 1248
    , 1255-
    56 (10th Cir. 2008); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 143
    , 155 (2d
    Cir. 2008); Zhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 
    523 F.3d 893
    , 895 (8th
    Cir. 2008); Cheng Chen v. Gonzales, 
    498 F.3d 758
    , 760 (7th Cir.
    2007).
    In Li Zhang, the Third Circuit diverged from the Seventh
    Circuit's decision in Shu Han Liu v. Holder, 
    718 F.3d 706
    (7th
    Cir. 2013), and explained that unlike the Seventh Circuit -- which
    will consider changes in personal circumstances when combined with
    changes in country conditions -- the Third Circuit's "case law
    3 In his brief, Wang writes, "Moreover, the 2012 country
    report . . . indicates the Chinese government is currently
    employing different methods to restrict people's freedom of
    religion and persecute the Christians."
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    makes clear that even mixed petitions . . . ordinarily . . . should
    be rejected."    Li 
    Zhang, 543 F. App'x at 285
    (citing 
    Khan, 691 F.3d at 497-98
    ).   In Li Zhang, although the Third Circuit did "not
    conclude that a mixed petition always must be rejected, [it]
    conclude[d] that the BIA would not have abused its discretion in
    rejecting the motion . . . as being based on a mixed petition
    because the claimed change in country conditions, standing alone,
    could not justify granting the motion."         Id.; see also Ying Chen
    v. Holder, 
    368 F. App'x 202
    , 204 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[C]hanging one's
    personal circumstances in a way that coincides with changes in
    one's country -- years after being ordered removed -- does not
    meet the changed country conditions exception . . . .").4          But see
    Chandra   v.   Holder,   
    751 F.3d 1034
    ,   1037-39   (9th   Cir.   2014)
    (collecting cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,
    and holding the BIA must consider untimely motions "even if the
    changed country conditions are made relevant by a change in the
    petitioner's personal circumstances," 
    id. at 1038).
               Because the
    BIA considered Wang's argument that conditions in China worsened
    in connection with his changed personal circumstances, we need not
    4  In other cases, panels from the Second and Third Circuits
    have appeared to suggest they will consider claims where the
    petitioner alleges personal and country conditions have both
    changed. See, e.g., Fang Zheng v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 
    569 F. App'x 136
    , 137 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014); Yuen 
    Jin, 538 F.3d at 155
    .
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    take a position on this and do not decide whether rejecting a
    petition because it is mixed would be an abuse of discretion.
    Wang's conversion to Christianity was clearly only a
    change in personal circumstances.            See Ming 
    Chen, 722 F.3d at 66
    ("'Under     the   current    case    law,   a    change     typically    will   be
    categorized as a change in personal circumstances, as opposed to
    a   change    in   country     conditions,        if   the    change     is   self-
    induced.' . . . This prevents aliens from repeatedly reopening
    their removal proceedings based on changes that are within their
    control." (quoting Larngar v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 71
    , 76 (1st Cir.
    2009))).     We treat self-induced changes as changes in personal
    conditions, "even if the change in personal circumstances will
    expose the alien to persecution in his home country."                  
    Id. Wang failed
    to demonstrate that conditions worsened for
    Christians in China.         He submitted a 2012 State Department report
    on religious freedom and human rights in China.                    This report,
    however, does not illustrate a change in China's conditions since
    the time of his hearings.            Indeed, in his brief, Wang describes
    the report as "provid[ing] a general background and solid support
    to [his] claim that the Chinese government is currently persecuting
    the Christians."     (Emphasis added.)           See Haizem Liu v. Holder, 
    727 F.3d 53
    , 57 (1st Cir. 2013) ("In determining if evidence submitted
    in support of a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in
    country conditions justifying reopening of proceedings, the BIA
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    'compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the
    motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing
    below.'" (alteration in original) (quoting In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N.
    Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007))).5
    The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that
    Wang's motion to reopen removal proceedings is time-barred.6
    III.
    For the reasons stated above, Wang's petition for review
    is denied.
    5  To the extent Wang argues the letter from his father and
    the village notice show changed country circumstances, this
    argument also fails.       Even assuming these documents held
    evidentiary weight, they demonstrate only "that any risk that
    [Wang] faces in China is not because of changes within [China],
    but due to his personal decision to [become a practicing Christian
    and make critical statements about the Chinese government]." See
    Ming 
    Chen, 722 F.3d at 66
    .
    6  We thus need not reach Wang's arguments that the BIA did
    not appropriately weigh the documents he submitted or determine
    whether he made a prima facie case for relief. See Haizem 
    Liu, 727 F.3d at 58
    ("Where a petitioner fails to establish changed
    circumstances, it is not necessary to reach the issue of whether
    she has made out a prima facie case for relief.")
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