Berdecia-Perez v. Zayas-Green ( 1997 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1490
JUAN A. BERDEC A-P REZ,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
JOS ZAYAS-GREEN, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Jose R. Perez-Hernandez and Pierluisi & Mayol-Bianchi on
brief for appellants.
Ramonita Dieppa-Gonz lez and Puerto Rico Legal Services,
Inc. on brief for appellee.
April 16, 1997
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellee Juan A.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Berdec a-P rez, an accountant, has worked for the Municipality of
Barranquitas from 1978 to the present time. In the November 1992
elections, the New Progressive Party seized the reins of power in
the municipal government. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was
transferred to a different post (though his salary remained
intact). In early 1994, however, the plaintiff's salary was
slashed sharply. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative
remedies, he invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1994) and sued two top
municipal officials. He alleged, inter alia, that, although
political affiliation was not a suitable criterion for the job
that he held, the defendants nonetheless cut his pay in
retaliation for his active support of the Popular Democratic
Party.
In due course, the defendants moved for brevis
disposition on the ground that they were at least qualifiedly
immune from the plaintiff's suit for damages. On February 26,
1996, the district court denied their motion in a cryptic,
single-sentence order. The defendants then prosecuted this
interlocutory appeal.
We need not tarry. To the extent that the appellants
claim that their actions are insulated from First Amendment
scrutiny as a matter of law because a reduction in the
plaintiff's salary was necessitated by the Uniform Compensation
Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 760 et seq. (1988 Supp.), the
regulations thereunder, and the personnel regulations of the
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Municipality of Barranquitas, they are wrong and they are wrong
under federal law that was clearly established when they acted.
See, e.g., Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 318
(1st Cir. 1989) (en banc); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865
F.2d 431, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1989); Roure v. Hernandez Colon, 824
F.2d 139, 141-43 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam). To the extent
that the appellants claim that their actions are insulated from
First Amendment scrutiny as a matter of fact because their only
intention was to obey the law, the record presents an issue of
fact as to their intent an issue of the type that can no longer
be resolved on interlocutory appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 115
S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (1995); Santiago-Mateo v. Cordero, F.3d
, (1st Cir. 1997) [No. 96-1688, slip op. at 3-5]; Stella
v. Kelley, 63 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 1995). Either way, the
instant appeal is an exercise in futility.1
Appeal dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
1The lack of specific findings by the lower court, while not
fatal to its ruling on summary judgment, see Domegan v. Fair, 859
F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (1st Cir. 1988), complicates the appellate
task. Especially in light of the jurisdictional questions that
attend the denial of summary judgment motions raising qualified
immunity defenses, we urge the district courts, either by
rescripts or bench decisions, to give us some indication of their
reasoning.
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